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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW 
TOXIC WASTE LITIGATION 
Tlzey ll'ere cnreless people, . . . they smashed up things and creatures and 
then retreated bach into their money or their rast carelessness, ... and let 
other people clean up the mess they had made 
·If sel'eJz maids with seFeJz Inops 
S11ept it j(Jr half a year, 
Oo you suppose.· the \Valrus said, 
'That they could get it clear?' 
·I doubt it,· said the Carpe7lter, 
And shed a bitter tear. 
F. SCOTT FITZGERALD 
THE GREAT GATSI3Y (1925) 
LEWIS CARHOLL 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GL,\SS (1871) 
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INTRODUCTION 
For decades American industry has generated and discarded haz­
ardous wastes ,  1 including flammables , explosives ,  nuclear and petro­
leum fuel by-products , germ-laden refuse from hospitals and labora­
tories ,  toxic metals such as mercury or lead , and dozens of synthetic 
chemical compounds including DDT, PCB s ,  and dioxin s .  Forty-three 
million metric tons of such waste were produced in r g8 r alone ,  2 by 
every step of the production ladder, from mining to m anufacturing .  
Most of this waste is not destroyed but stored3 - sealed by commer­
cial waste facilities in s s -gallon  drums and deposited in clay-lined 
dumps, inj ected deep underground between layers of rock,  or  aban­
doned in vacant lots ,  lagoons,  or  landfills . 4 Over time , at varying 
rates ,  the storage methods fail : containers corrode , plants or  animals 
pierce protective linings, rain and melting snow wash wastes from 
their storage sites .  Sometimes these abandoned chemicals intermingle , 
synergistically enhancing either their migratory or toxic potential . s 
Eventually, hazardous wastes infuse lakes and streams ,  underground 
waters, soil ,  and air, and from there come into contact with u npro­
tected victims . 
Exposure to hazardous wastes can cause cancer, genetic  mutation ,  
birth defects, miscarriages ,  and damage to the lungs ,  l iver, kidneys , 
or nervous system . 6 Even when leaking waste sites are detected before 
1 This Note uses the terms "hazardous waste , "  "hazardous substanc e , "  and " toxic waste" 
interchangeabl::. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabi l i ty 
Act (CERCLA) ,  4 2  U.S. C .  �� 9607-965 7 (I 982 ), uses only the term "hazardous substance " 
Four measurable characteristics are used to identify a waste material as hazardous -
ignitability, corrosivity, reacth·ity, and toxicity. See Cou='!CIL ON ENVIRON ME='ITAL QUALITY, 
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ( 1 982),  reprinted in  F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW � 4.04, 
at 639-40 (3d  eel. 1 985 ) .  
2 See CouNCIL ON ENVIRON MENTAL QuALITY, supra note r ,  9 4.04, at 640 .  The volume 
of hazardous wastes has increased dramatically in the last  decade . I n  1970, i ndustry produced 
only about 9 mil l ion metric tons. See EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE MANAGE M E NT PROGRAMS, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS: DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS W r\STES 4 ( 1 9 7 4), reprinted in 2 THE POL­
LUTION C RISIS 3 2 1 ,  3 2 6  ( E .  Rabin & M. Schwartz eels .  1 9 76 )  [hereinafter c ited as DISPOSAL 
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES] . 
3 Of the hazardous waste treatment ,  storage, and disposal faci lities that had notified E PA 
of their activities by the end of r 981, only about 13% had some disposal capability. See C OUNCIL 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supya note I, � 4 . 04 ,  at 640-4 1 .  
4 Of existing hazardous waste faci l ities , 74% use containers, 54% use tanks , 1 7 %  use surface 
impoundments , 6% incinerate wastes, and 5 o/c use landfi l ls .  See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, supra note r, * 4 . 04 ,  at 640 B ecause containers often leak,  storing wastes in 
containers may be no different i n  efiect from storing wastes in open landfills. Even the most 
secure storage s.ystem for chemical wastes probably cannot remain leak-proof forever. See 
Montague ,  Tlze Limitations of Landfill ing. in B EYOND DUMPING 3 ,  4-5 (B . Piasecki eel. 1 984) .  
5 For example ,  certain bacteria can convert inorganic mercury into more lethal methyl 
mercury. See DISPOS.\L OF HAV.RDOUS WASTES. supra note 2 ,  reprinted in 2 THE POLLuTION 
CRISIS at 330 .  
6 See Anderson, N egotiatio11 and l11jormal Agency Action:  The Case of Superfund, 1 985 
DuKE L.J.  2 6 1 ,  2 6 5 . 
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a significant number of humans have been exposed, toxic wastes may 
already have contaminated water supplies. 7 Of the 546 w aste sites 
considered most dangerous by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) , 4 1 0  directly threaten drinking water supplies .  8 The EPA es­
timates that go% of the I 8o ,ooo landfills , waste p its , and lagoons used 
to store waste liquids may threaten groundwater. 9 
Hazardous waste disposal does not pose the only - or even the 
greatest - threat to our environment, 1 0 but i t  does create a unique 
set of problems for the legal system.  First, it is often difficult to l ink 
the harm caused by a hazardous waste release to the hazardous 
wastes .  Years may pass before the wastes dumped at a storage site 
leak and before anyone is exposed; years more may pass before an 
inj ury manifests itself. Moreover, this entire course of events is  often 
invisible : wastes may seep unsee11 into an underground water supply, 
and victims may then swallow tasteless and odorless microscopic par­
ticles of a toxin . Even when detected, the harm is often difficult to 
measure , because the damage caused by exposure to toxic wastes is 
hard to distinguish from the damage caused by ordinary background 
conditions .  Indeed, some effects on health , such as increased risk of 
cancer or other disease ,  may be too subtle to quantify. 1 1  Determining 
the extent of  damage to  water supplies or  other natural resources may 
be no easier. 
Second, because responsibility for most hazardous waste is diffuse , 
deciding who ought to clean up the waste and to compensate the 
victims of a toxic release is a difficult task .  A given dump site might 
contain several dozen kinds of hazardous waste , discarded over many 
years , from a hundred different generators . The site might have been 
under the control and management of several different owners or 
; See F. ANDERSON ,  D .  iVIANDELKER, & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION :  LAW 
AND POLICY 554-55 ( 1 984); Anderson ,  supra note 6 ,  at 2 6 5-66; B urmaster & Harris, Ground­
water Contamination: A n  Emerging Threat, TECH. REV. , July 1 98 2 ,  at 5 1 .  
8 See Supplemental App1·opriat.ion for Su,IJeifund B eing Considered fo1· Fiscal 1984, EPA 
Says, E NV'T REP. ( B NA) 1 2 45 ( 1 983 ) .  The average cost of partially cleaning up a contaminated 
groundwater site is estimated to be $5 to $10 mill ion ;  total restoration of a badly contaminated 
aquife r  could take decades and might cost Ssoo mil lion to $1 bil l ion. See Montague ,  supra note 
4, at 1 0 .  
9 S e e  B rown, Preven t i ng Ground1.<.•ater Contam inat ion: The Role o f  State and Federal Pro­
grams , in B EYOND DUMPING ,  supra note 4, at 85 , 8 7  ( cit ing E PA ,  SURFACE I MPOUNDMENT 
ASSESSMENT: NATIONAL REPORT (Dec .  2 9 ,  1 98 2 )) .  
IO For example ,  air pollution continues t o  cause widespread health damage. O n e  study 
estimates that a so% reduction in air pol lution in major  urban areas would save over $4 bil l ion 
annually- 4. 5 %  of  all economic costs associated with morbidity and mortality. See Lave & 
Seskin, Air· Pollution and Human Health, 169 SCIENCE 7 2 3  ( 1 9 70) ,  reprinted in EcoNOMICS OF 
THE ENVIRONMENT 3 5 6 ,  383 (R. Dorfman & N. Dorfman eds. 1 97 2 ) .  
1 1  Sec Health Effects of Ha�ardous Waste Disposal Practices: Joint Hearings B efore the 
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on. Labor and Human 
Resounes and  the Senate Comm. on t!ze Judiciary, 96th Cong. , 2d Sess. 44-46, 52-54 ( r g8o) .  
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operators, who used levels of  c are ranging from recklessness to appli­
cation of the best technology available .  Moreover, many of the busi­
ness entities responsible might h ave changed ownership or gone out 
of business . Finally, if one does determine that certain p arties  ought 
to be responsible , they m ay have insufficient assets to meet their 
obligations .  The difficulties associated with hazardous waste , there­
fore , extend to insurance and bankruptcy law as well . 
Thus far the legal response to toxic waste has been v ar ied .  In 
1 976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) 1 2 to regulate prospectively the transportation and disposal of 
hazardous wastes .  In  rg8o, Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response,  C ompensation ,  and Liability Act (CE R­
CLA) 1 3  to address the problem of waste already generated and stored .  
This act imposed cleanup l iability on specified parties and instituted 
streamlined l itigation procedures to be implemented primarily by the 
EPA. B ut Congress has not addressed the problem of compensating 
victims of hazardous waste releases . S imilarly, common law courts 
have not yet resolved the special problems of proving inj uries that 
result from toxic wastes .  The difficulties of detecting, measuring,  and 
assigning responsibility for the harms of hazardous waste suggest that 
litigation may be an expensive and ineffective response to the problem.  
Congress might therefore consider whether an administrative cleanup 
and compensation scheme might prove more effective and operate 
more equitably. Nevertheless , c reating a slow, inefficient,  bureau­
cratic government agency could make the problem worse rather than 
better. 
This Note begins ,  in Part II , by describing the evolution of law 
governing hazardous waste . Part II also lays out an analytical frame­
work for evaluating the success of hazardous waste regulation in  
leading to fair and efficient outcomes .  The  next five Parts of  this 
Note analyze issues arising in C E RCLA litigation .  Part III covers a 
group of issues loosely labeled "procedural , "  including issues arising 
in suits brought by the government to compel private cleanup or to 
recover the costs of governmental cleanup . It also discusses proce­
dural issues arising in lawsuits brought by private parties under C ER­
CLA. Part IV critical ly analyzes the EPA's approach to settl ing law­
suits . Part V examines substantive liability issues under C E RCLA, 
looking at the standard and scope of liability, the nature of the cau­
sation requirement, and retroactivity. Part VI discusses affirmative 
defenses to l iability under C ERCLA. These include causation-based 
defenses , purely procedural defenses , and the "cost-effectiveness" de­
fense . Part VI also considers constitutional challenges to retroactive 
12  42 U.S.C. §� 6gor-6g87 ( 1982). 
u Id. §§ g6or-9657 (rg8z). 
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application of C ERCLA. Part VII discusses C ERCLA litigation aris­
ing from damage to natural resources. As this discussion of CERCLA 
was written ,  proposals for amending the statutory scheme were pend­
ing in Congress .  Many Parts discuss and evaluate the pending re­
forms. 
Part VIII investigates the relationship of hazardous waste cleanup 
and compensation claims to insurance and bankruptcy law. In  par­
ticular, this Part analyzes methods for ensuring that future claimants 
are represented and are given high priority in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Part IX discusses common law personal inj ury actions and addresses 
problems relating to statutes of limitations and to existing doctrines 
of liability. Part IX further analyzes the central barrier to tort recov­
ery - proof of causation - from both a medical and a legal per­
spective . Finally, Part X explores the possibility of implemen ting an 
administrative compensation system in order to avoid the difficulties 
of determining causation and damages and to ensure adequate funds 
to compensate victims. 
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY OF HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 
In the winter of r g8o, on the heels of the greatest conservative 
landslide in a generation , 1 Congress enacted perhaps the most radical 
environmental statute in American history. The Comprehensive En­
vironmental Response , Compensation,  and Liability Act of r g8o 
(CERCLA)2 created an innovative legal and financial apparatus3 to 
attack the dangers posed by discharges of hazardous substances into 
the environment. 4 The courts have enhanced the statute's radicalism 
1 Congress enacted CERCLA on December 11, 1980, just over one month after Ronald 
Reagan defeated incumbent President Jimmy Carter in the presidential election. Noting that 
Congress passed the statute during a "lame duck" administration, former EPA Administrator 
Douglas M. Castle termed CERCLA's enactment "an extraordinary action." 16 [Current De­
n!opments] Ei'iV'T REP. (BNA) 7, May 3, 1985. 
2 Pub. L No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 46rr, 4612, 466r, 4662, 
468r, 468:; 33 U.S.C. § 1364; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911, 69rr(a), 96or-rs, 9631-33, 9641, 9651, 9657; 
49 U S.C. § II90I(h) (1982)) . 
.; CERCL-\'s most notable administrative feature is the "Superfund," a pool of money 
amassed through legislative appropriations and a variety of taxes on the petroleum, chemical, 
and waste disposal industries. 5 ee i nfra note 35. CERCLA permits the Environmental Protec­
tion Agency (EPA) to finance cleanup of hazardous waste sites through the Superfund and to 
recover the costs of such cleanups in subsequent suits under § 107. To facilitate recovery, 
CERCLA specifies the parties that may be held liable for cleanup costs and removes some of 
the common law obstacles to establishment of liability for harm arising from improper disposal 
of hnarc\ous wastes. 5 ee infra pp. 14 i 2-7 3 & nn. 38-41. 
�See generally Note, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort 
.Reform, ro B.C. ENvT'L AFF. L REV. 797, 798 & nn.s-8 (1983) (discussing the health impli­
cations of the hazardous waste problem). Data on the actual or potential human health costs 
oi improper hazardous waste disposal are scarce. Estimates of the cost of abating the dangers 
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in subsequent interpretatio n ,  finding in its language and legislative 
history a congressional intent to adopt unusually broad and h ighly 
controversial standards of liability. s 
Despite considerable rhetoric suggesting that a crisis situation ex­
ists , the urgency of the h azardous waste problem rem ains u nclear. 6 
Moreover, Congress's choice of means to address the problem invites 
serious scrutiny. The conventional wisdom holds that C E RCLA's 
intent and effect were to make generators , transporters , and disposers 
of hazardous wastes bear the full social costs of their activities .  7 Yet ,  
whatever the intent of the statute , significant theoretical and practical 
obstacles stand in the way of achieving this goal . Parties  whose 
activities concededly impose substantial costs on society may never­
theless escape the regulatory net through a number of holes . 8 The 
effort to impose the costs of hazardous wastes on the parties  respon­
sible for creating the hazard is not itself without cost  to society: 
assignment of liability under C ERCLA requires enormous e nforce­
ment, negotiation,  and litigation expenses .  9 This Note addresses the 
legal issues surrounding the effort to redress the hazardous waste 
problem , examines their theoretical and practical origins , and suggests 
possible avenues for reform. 
Section A begins this Part with an outline of the historical devel­
opment of federal hazardous waste law.  Section B first presents an 
evaluative framework for hazardous waste law, introducing the norms 
of fairness and efficiency. After developing an economic model of the 
hazardous waste problem , Section B uses it to discuss some of the 
requirements for an effective governmental response . 
are more common , but they vary widely. The 1 980 Act provided for a Superfund of approxi­
mately S r. 6 bi l l ion to clean up  approximately 400 sites, anticipating that cleanup efforts be 
completed within a few years. Proposals for C ERCLA's reauthorization have sought funding 
in  the range of Ss.s to Sro bill ion to clean up  as many as ro,ooo sites over a far longer period. 
See, e.g., H. R.  REP.  No. 65 3 ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess .  54-5 5  ( 1 98 5 ) .  As  Congress has pondered 
reauthorization ,  federal agencies have presented new estimates of total direct cleanup costs 
ranging from $ 7 . 6  bi l lion to over :3 roo bi l l ion .  See W. fRANK & T. ATKESON, SUPERFUND: 
LITIGATION AND C LEANUP 5 ( BNA 1 98 5 ) .  
5 See, e.g., United States \·. Reil ly Tar & Chern.  Corp . ,  1 7  Env't R e p .  C as. (BNA) 2 1 1 0 ,  
2 r 1 9  (D. Minn. 1 980) ( stating that "Congress intended that the federal government b e  immedi­
ately given the tools necessary for a prompt and e ffective response to problems of nation al 
magnitude resu l ting from hazardous waste disposal") .  The courts have generally construed the 
text and legislative history of C E RCLA to impose strict ,  joint ,  and several l iabil ity for dangerous 
"releases" of hazardous wastes, both prospectively and retroactively. See generally infra Part V 
(presenting and analyzing l iabil ity features of C ERCLA).  
6 See supm p .  1 463 & n .  ro (discussing comparative magnitude of hazardous waste and other 
pol lution problems. )  
i See infm note 65 . 
"See, e.g., infra p. 1 483 (discussing opportunities to evade l iabil ity through i l l egal dumping) ;  
pp .  1 592-94 (discussing opportunities to evade liability through bankruptcy ) .  
9 See infra p .  1 4 79  & n. 73 .  
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A .  A Brief History of Hazardous Waste Law 
Although industries may dispose of the hazardous by-products of 
their manufacturing processes in a variety of ways , federal and state 
hazardous waste legislation has focused on disposal of such wastes i n  
storage facilities, in  open dumps , or  underground. 10 The principal 
risk presented by land disposal of hazardous wastes is groundwater 
contamination: significant health hazards arise when dumped or bur­
ied w astes seep into groundwater and spread to sources of  drinking 
water or areas of human habitation .  Similar hazards arise when 
leakage from defective landfills or  storage facilities contaminates air 
or surface water and comes directly into contact with individuals .  
The hazardous waste "problem" discussed here is thus largely, though 
not entirely, a problem of groundwater contamination .  
I. Initial Efforts t o  C pntro l Groundwater Pollution 
The history of legal efforts to control groundwater pollution is 
short .  Before the advent of federal pollution control legislation ,  the 
primary vehicle for addressing the problem of groundwater contami­
nation was the common law. The common law treated the problem 
principally as a potentially tortious invasion of private property rights . 
Plaintiffs sought compensation from polluters through the common 
law actions of trespass,  nuisance ,  and negligence .  Litigation of such 
claims continues today. For a variety of reasons ,  however, common 
law actions have proven inadequate to compensate hazardous waste 
victims and to promote responsible hazardous waste management. 1 1  
The need for collective action by pollution victims is a major  
obstacle to controlling pollution through the common law. In the 
typical case ,  the harms inflicted by the polluter affect large numbers 
of residents in a localized area. B ecause each victim's share of the 
aggregate harm is small relative to the costs of litigation,  no single 
·victim finds pursuit of either damages or injunctive relief a worthwhile 
investment.  Although society as a whole might benefit from abate­
ment of the pollution or compensation of its victims , only collective 
action by those harmed will bring this benefit to pass. Collective 
10 Disposal of hazardous wastes into air or  navigable (''surface") water generally falls under 
the aegis of other federal pollution control legislation. For instance, hazardous air pollutants 
are regulated under a provision of the Clean Air Act, .p U.S.C. § 7412 (1982). Similarly, the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (198�), regulates the discharge 
of toxic pollutants into water. See 33 U.S. C. § 1317(d). In addition, a variety of federal statutes 
authorize criminal sanctions for the discharge of hazardous wastes into improper media or at 
improper locations. See genemlly Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of E nvironmental 
iVrongs, 15 ENVT'L. L. REP. (ENVT'L. L .  blsT.) 1o,o6s, IO,o69-;o,o7I (Mar. 1985) (describing 
the criminal sanctions available under various federal pollution control statutes). 
1 1  See infra Part IX (discussing inadequacy of common law tort actions to redress injuries 
of hazardous waste victims). 
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action , however, is unlikely to occur. Under current law, courts are 
often reluctant to certify class actions by plaintiff classes whose mem­
bers vary significantly with respect to the types and magnitudes of 
harms they have suffered . 12  Such variation is common w here im­
proper disposal of hazardous substances has inflicted harm upon nu­
merous residents of the surrounding area .  Attorneys c onsequently 
have l ittle incentive to organize groups of pollution victims to pursue 
class actions . Even when class certification is likely, attorneys have 
little incentive to organize and bring class actions if the claim is for 
injunctive relief alone .  First, courts are reluctant to award fees  when 
there is no damage award. 1 3  Second,  because individual victims re­
alize that they will benefit from class actions even if they do not help 
to pay for them,  they tend not to j oin groups formed to finance  actions 
for injunctive relief. 1 4 Thus ,  reliance on common law actions results 
in overpollution: pollution victims fail to pursue collective redress for 
their harms and, consequently, polluters do not bear the costs that 
their pollution imposes on society. 15 
12 See Note, The JV!anville B ankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter I I Proceedings 
96 HARV. L. REV. rr2r, 1 1 34-II36 ( 1 983); infm p. r623 & nn. rq-r6 (discussing obstacles to 
successful class action litigation of hazardous waste claims). 
13 See Developments in the Law - Class A ctions , 89 HARV. L. REv. IJI 8, r 6o6-o 7 & 
nn.r27, 1 28 (1976). In Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the 
Supreme Court held that, absent congressional authorization, federal courts may not require 
unsuccessful defendants to pay the attorneys' fees of parties performing the services of a "private 
attorney general." Although the Court acknowledged the possibility that it might assess attor­
neys' fees against members of the victorious plaintiff class under a "common fund" principle, it 
noted that such assessments are appropriate only when the benefits of the litigation can be 
"traced with some accuracy, and there [is] reason for confidence that the costs could indeed be 
shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting." I d. at 2 64 n.40. These conditions often will 
not obtain in litigation for injunctive relief by hazardous waste victims, because hazardous 
waste sites frequently pose indeterminate risks to indefinite numbers of victims. 
14 For a concise explanation of such "free rider" problems see E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, 
A PRIMER FOR POLICY A:--IALYSIS 3 r 5 ( r  978). This free rider problem arises only when the relief 
sought through litigation has the character of a public good - that is, when the litigant cannot 
exclude other pollution victims from sharing in the benefits of the remedy. Thus, plaintiffs in 
individual damage actions are not afflicted with the free rider problem. Because victims will 
not expect others to litigate for damages on their behalf, they will sue for damages only when 
they expect to recover more than the cost of litigation. But plaintiffs in actions for injunctive 
relief will encounter free rider problems. Indeed, pollution victims will tend not to litigate for 
injunctive relief even when investment in litigation would yield a net benefit to the litigant, 
reasoning that a higher net benefit could be obtained by waiting for some other victim to assume 
the cost of litigating. 
15 Below, this Part discusses certain federal statutes creating regulatory schemes that have 
largely supplanted traditional common law actions. In principle, procedural reforms removing 
legal obstacles that currently hinder collective legal action by pollution victims might achieve 
many of the results sought by these statutes. For instance, more lenient class certification rules 
would provide individual attorneys with greater financial incentives to sue on behalf of large 
classes of victims. See, e . g . , Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass ExposuYe Cases: A 
'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System ,  97 HARV. L. REV. 849 , 908-916 ( 1 984) . 
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The shortcomings of the common law as a pollution control system 
attracted little attention through the first half of the twentieth century. 
But the postwar explosion of American industry brought increased 
use of the environment as a dumping ground for industrial by-prod­
ucts . As public disgust with brown skies and befouled waters 
mounted in the r gs os and r g6os, legal commentators incre asingly 
criticized the common law remedies for pollution.  1 6 A trickle of  fed­
eral air and water pollution control statutes in the rgsos swelled to a 
torrent in the r g6os. 1 7 These statutes used a variety of regulatory 
methods to alleviate the aesthetic and public health costs of pollution.  
Throughout this initial flood of environmental legislation ,  the prob­
lems posed by improper disposal of hazardous wastes remained some­
thing of a backwater. 1 8 Several factors may have accounted for this 
legislative inactivity. First, although the naked eye can often detect  
air  and surface water pollution,  detection of groundwater contami­
nation requires sophisticated monitoring and water quality analysis . 
Much of the technology required to detect minute amounts of chemical 
contaminants in groundwater h as developed only recently. 1 9 Second, 
the epidemiological data needed to establish causal relationships be­
tween exposure to such contaminants and impairment of human health 
has accumulated slowly; indeed, it continues to accumulate slowly 
16 Early commentators seem to h ave foc used primarily on the common law's failure to control 
water pollution . See ,  e . g., Note , R ights and Remedies in the Law of S tYeam Pollut ion , 35 VA. 
L. REv. 774 (1949); Note, StYeam Pollu tion-Recovery of Damages, 50 IowA L .  REv. 141 (I964); 
Note, A S u rvey of Common Law Remedies fo1· S tYeam Pollution in New York, IO BUFFALO L. 
REV. 484 (I961). 
17 The most notable of the federal pollution control statutes passed in the 1950s was the 
Clean Air Act of 195 5 ,  ch. 360, 69 Stat. 3 2 2  (I9SS) ( codified as amended at 42  US.C. §§ 7401-
76.-p (1982)). D u ring  the I 96os , this statute was amended by the Clean Air Act 1963, Pub.  L. 
No . 88-206 ,  77 Stat. 392; the National Emissions S tandards Act  of 1965 , Pub. L. No.  89-272 , 
79 Stat. 992; the C lean Air  Act Amendments of 1966, Pub.  L .  No. 98-675 , So Stat. 954; and 
the Air  Quality Act of 1 967, Pub. L .  No. 90-1 48, 8r Stat .  485 .  Federal water pollution statute s  
o f  t h e  r g6os inc luded t h e  Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) A c t  Amendments o f  
1960, P u b .  L .  No.  86-624, 7 4  Stat.  4 11 ; 1961, P u b .  L .  N o .  87-88 ,  7 5  Stat. 204; 1965 , P u b .  L. 
No. 89-2 34 .  79 Stat. 903; and 1966 ,  Pub. L. No . 89-753 ,  So Stat. I 2 46 .  These statutes  were 
superseded by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1 972 , Pub .  L. No. 92-
500 , 86 Stat. 8 r 6  ( codified as amended at 33 U S. C .  §§ 1251-1376  (1982 )). 
IS Concurrent with its enactment of various air and water pollution control statu tes ,  Congress 
also adopted statutes addressed to land disposal of solid wastes. See Resource Recovery Act of 
1 970, Pub.  L .  No. 91-512, 84 Stat .  1227 (codified as amended at 42 U . S . C .  §§ 6901-6987 
( 1982 ) ) ;  Solid Waste Disposal Act ,  Pub.  L. No. 89-272 , tit. II, 79 Stat. 99 2 (1965) ( codified as 
amended at 42 U S. C. §§ 6901-6987 ( 1 98 2 ) ) .  These statutes sought p rimarily to restrict u nsigh tly 
and unsanitary refuse dumping and to promote recyc l ing  of waste materials .  T hey neither 
recognized nor addressed problems caused by improper hazardous waste disposal . 
!9 See I OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PROTECTING THE NATION'S G ROUJ:-:DWATER 
FRmr CONTAWNATION I 2 7 (OTA-o-2 33, r 984) (asserting that the past decade has seen significant 
technological advances in detection of groundwater contaminants at progressively smaller con­
centrations ) .  
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today, even though its value is now clearly recognized. 2° Finally, 
because groundwater contamination is largely invisible , appreciation 
of its costs requires some measure of education . The public's failure 
to appreciate the gravity of the situation surely slowed development 
of a political constituency for groundwater pollution control legisla­
tion .  
A s  evidence o f  the risks attending improper disposal o f  h azardous 
wastes accumulated throughout the 1 96os and 1 9 70s , the pressure for 
legislative action grew. Congress first addressed the problem in en­
acting the S afe Drinking Water Act of 1 9 74 , 2 1  which authorized the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop drinking water 
standards to guard against consumption of contaminated groundwater. 
The Act also established a regulatory system to ensure compliance 
with the EPA standards and to promote safer siting and construction 
of water storage and delivery systems . Finally, the Act instructed the 
EPA to develop guidelines for state regulation of underground injec­
tion of hazardous wastes .  22 But these measures quickly proved in­
adequate to resolve the hazardous waste problem . In focusing on 
improvement of the water coming out of public drinking water supply 
systems, the Act did little to protect the public against h arm from 
contaminated groundwater caused by means other than ingestion . 
Moreover, the Act failed to address unsafe means of hazardous waste 
disposal other than underground injection .  These and other shortcom­
ings were taken up by Congress when it considered both the Resource 
Conservati'Jn and Recovery Act of 1976  (RCRA)23 and C ERCLA. 
2 .  Hazardous ·waste Control Under RCRA and CERCLA 
In 1 9 7 6 ,  Congress finally addressed the hazardous waste problem 
squarely by enacting RCRA. Although RCRA instituted "cradle-to-
20 See infra Subsection r of Section C of Part IX. {discussing uses of  epidemiological data 
to establish causation). To help in  the task of cumulating data on the health e ffects of hazardous 
wastes ,  Congress provided in C E RCLA for establishment within the Public Health Service of 
an Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. See C ERCLA § 104(i), 42 U . S . C .  § 
9604(i) {1982). The statutory functions of the Agency inc lude establishment and m ai ntenance of 
an "inventory of l iterature , research ,  and studies on the health effects of  toxic substances , "  
CERCLA § 104(i)(2), ,_p U . S .  C. � 9604{i)(2), and performance o f  "survey and screen ing programs 
tc determine relationships between exposure to toxic substances and i l lness . "  C E RCLA § 
r o-t(i ) (S ) ,  42 U . S . C. § 9604(i)(5l. The Reagan administration pro,·oked l itigation when i t  declined 
to put this provision of  CERCLA into effect. Implementation is now proceeding under terms 
of  a consent  decree. See Envt'l Def. Fund, Inc.  \'. Heckle r, 13 ENVT'L. L. REP. { ENVT'L .  L. 
1:-.IST.) 20 ,630 (D.D.C. 1983). 
21 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. r66o (codified at 42 u.S.C. §s 300f-,)Ooj {1982)). 
22 See H.R. REP. No. II85, 93d Cong . , 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U. S .  CoDE CONG. & 
.\D. NEWS 6454, 6454-55· 
2.l Pub. L No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 ( codified at 42 U . S . C .  §� 6901-6907, 69ri-69r6, 6921-
6931, 6941-6949, 6951-6954, 6961-6964, 6971-6979, 6981-6986) (1982)). 
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grave" tracking of hazardous wastes through the production cycle from 
creation to disposal , it failed to address problems created by improper 
disposal of hazardous wastes prior to enactment of the statute . In  the 
late r g 7 os ,  however, eruption of the Love Canal incident in the public 
media24 forced Congress to address these gaps in the regulatory 
scheme . Congress responded by enacting C ERCLA, thus completing 
the current statutory framework of federal hazardous waste law. 
(a) Key Features of the Federal R egulatory Regime.  - RCRA and 
C ERCLA together provide extensive regulation of the generation ,  
transportation,  storage , disposal , and cleanup of hazardous wastes .  
RCRA requires the  EPA to identify and maintain a list of  h azardous 
wastes .  2 5  Wastes so identified may be stored or disposed of only at 
sites whose operators have satisfied relevant EPA regulations2 6 and 
obtained special operating permits . 27 Generators of listed wastes must 
keep records "that accurately identify the quantities of . . .  hazardous 
waste , "28 and they must store , transport, or dispose of such wastes 
only in appropriate , carefully labeled containers . 2 9 RCRA further 
requires generators to inform transporters, storers , and disposers of 
the hazardous character of their wastes .  30 The Act imposes similar 
obligations on hazardous waste transporters , who must ship only 
properly labeled wastes3 1 and must record both the source and deliv­
ery points of the wastes they transport. 3 2 Finally, RCRA requires . 
both generators and transporters to report to federal or state author­
ities the types and quantities of wastes they generate , transport, and 
dispose . 33 In theory, this reporting system ("the manifest system") 
provides regulatory authorities with the ability to track hazardous 
wastes through all phases of the production cycle . For failure to 
comply with these requirements ,  RCRA authorizes both civil and 
criminal penalties .  34 
24 National media co\·erage of the problems at LO\·e Canal began on August 2, 1 9 7 8 ,  with 
reports on CBS News and in the iVew York Times. See N . Y. Times, Aug. 2 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  at A r ,  coL 
I .  
z s See RCRA § 300 1 , 42 U . S C .  � 69 2 1  ( r 982 ) .  
2 6  See id. § 3004, .p U .S C .  � 692 4  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
2 7 See id. § 3005, 42 U . S . C .  � 6 9 2 5  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
! S  !d. § 3002 ( 1 ) , 42  U . S . C .  � 692 2 ( 1 )  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
2 9 See id .  � 3002 ( 2 )-( 3 ) ,  . p  U .S C .  § 69 2 2 (2 )- (3 ) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
3 0  See i d .  § 3002 ( 4 ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  � 692 2 (4 )  ( I 9S 2 l .  
3 1 See id. § 3003(a)( 2 ) .  4 2  U S. C .  § 692 3(a) ( 2 )  ( 1 982 ) .  
32 See id. § 3003( a)(I) ,  42  U S. C .  � 692 3 (a)( 1 )  ( I 98 2 ) .  
3 .l  See i d .  §§ 3002 (6 ) ,  3003(a)(3 ) .  . p  U . S . C .  § §  692 2 (6 ) ,  69 23 (a) (3 )  ( I 982 ) .  
3-' Section 3008(a) o f  RCR.-\ . 42 C .S C .  § 6928 (a) ! I 98 2 ) ,  authorizes the EPA Administrator 
to gi\'e notice to and order compliance by any person who \'iolates the Act. If  the violator fails 
to take corrective action within 30 days of receiving such notice ,  � 3008 (a) (3 )  authorizes civi l  
penalties of u p  to S z s ,ooo for each day of noncompliance. Section JOOS(d) ,  42  U . S . C .  § 692 8(d ) 
( I  982 ) ,  authorizes criminal penalties, incl uding both fines and imprisonment,  for knowingly ( I )  
transporting  hazardous wastes to any facil ity which does not have a permit under § 3005; ( z )  
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To redress the problems engendered by leaking waste sites ,  C ER­
CLA established a fund (the "Superfund")3 5  to pay for cleaning up 
these site s .  C E RC LA requires the EPA,  in cooperation with state 
government authorities ,  to develop means of discovering and cleaning 
up dangerous waste sites .  36 It requires further that the EPA compile 
a National Priority List (NPL) of hazardous waste sites in need of 
remedial action . 3 ? The EPA may prompt cleanup of these sites by 
ordering the parties responsible for the sites to undertake remedial 
measures .  38 Alternatively, the EPA may undertake remedial measures 
itself, 3 9 finance the cleanup through the Superfund, and later sue the 
disposing of wastes identified by the E PA as h azardous under § 300 1 without having obtained 
an appropriate permit; or (3 ) m aking false statements in any applications or  other documentation  
required by  the statute. 
3 5 CERCLA actually establishes two funds .  Section 2 3 2  of CERCLA, 4 2  U . S . C . § 964 1 
( 1 98 2 ) ,  establishes a "Post-closure Liability Trust Fund , "  which finances cleanups at h az ardous 
waste sites that have been c losed pursuant to C E RCLA regulations. See C E RCLA §§ I 07 (k ) , 
I I IU) , 42 U . S. C .  § §  960 7 (k) , 96 I I (j ) (r 9 82 ) . Monies for the Post-Closure Liabil ity Trust Fund 
initially came from a tax on h azardous wastes received at qualified h azardous waste disposal 
facil ities. See id .  § 2 3 1 ,  2 6  U . S . C .  § 468 r ( I 98 z ) .  Section 2 2 I  of CERCLA, 4 2  U . S . C .  § 963 1 
( 1 9 8 2 ) ,  establishes the "Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund , "  commonly known as the 
Superfund. This fund  is used to finance all  other remedial actions authorized by C ERCLA. 
See id. § r r r (a) , 42 U . S . C .  § 96 r i  ( 1 98 2 ) .  Of initial Superfund monies ,  87 .5 % came from 
special taxes on  petroleum and certain chemicals ,  se e id. § z r r (a) , 26 U . S . C .  §§ 46 1 I - I 2 ,  4 6 6 r -
6 2  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  and 1 2 .5 % came from general revenue appropriations, see id. § 2 2 r (b)( 2 ) , 4 2  U . S . C .  
§ 963 r (b ) ( 2 )  ( 1 98 2  ) .  
36 See id .  § r os ( r )-( 2 ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  9605 ( 1 )-(z ) ( r g8 z ) .  In  determining whether a site is 
dangerous, C E RCLA instructs the E PA to consider whether there h as been a "re lease" of a 
"hazardous substance , "  or whether such a release appears imminent. C ERCLA defines a " re­
lease" generally as "any spill ing, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting ,  emptying, discharging, 
injecting, escaping ,  leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment. " l d. § I O r ( z 2 ) , 42 
U . S . C .  § 960 1 ( 2 2 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  The term "hazardous substance" is defined in § r o r ( 1 4) of C E RC LA ,  
42 U . S .  C .  § 96o i ( 1 4) ( I 98 2 ) ,  t o  include substances defined a s  h azardous b y  several earl ier federal 
pollution control statutes as well as substances with respect to which the E PA Administrator 
has taken action pursuant to § 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, IS U . S .  C. § z 6o6 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
CERCLA thus applies t o  a somewhat larger set o f  hazards than does RCR.A . S e e  RCRA § 
300 I ,  42 U . S .  C .  § 6 9 2  r ( 1 98 2  ) . In addition ,  CERCLA requires the E PA Administrator to 
designate any additional hazardous substances that "when released into the environment may 
p resent substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environment. " C ERCLA § 
r oz (a) ,  42 U . S . C . § 9602 (a) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
3 ;  S e e  CERCLA § 1 0 5 ( 8 ) ,  42  U . S . C .  § g6os (S)  ( I 98 z ) .  T h e  NPL i s  part of t h e  National 
Contingency Plan (NCP) required by CERCLA § r os ,  42 U . S . C .  § 9605 ( I 98 2 ) .  
3 8  C ERCLA authorizes the President t o  require the Attorney Gene ral t o  secure relief neces­
sary to abate ' ' imminent and substantial" dangers "to the public health or  welfare or  the 
em·ironment because of an actual or  threatened release of a hazardous substance from a faciiity. " 
CERCLA § I o 6 ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 9606 ( I 98 2 ) .  In addition ,  the statute authorizes the  President to 
issue "such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environ­
ment , "  id . ,  and authorizes civil fines not to exceed Ss , ooo per day for fai lure to comply with 
such orders. See id. 
3 9  After a site is  p laced on the l'\PL, cleanup proceeds in four steps. First, the E PA develops 
a plan for collecting information on the type and extent of contamination at the site . Second ,  
it  collects the  information .  Third ,  it studies the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of alte rnative 
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responsible parties for reimbursement. 4 0  The Act sets forth four 
classes of "responsible parties , "  including past and present operators 
of hazardous waste disposal facilities ,  and generators and transporters 
of hazardous substances . 4 1  
(b) Implementation of R CRA and CERCLA . - RCRA and C ER­
CLA fit squarely within the "agency-forcing" tradition  that has char­
acterized federal pollution control legislation since the late r g6os. 42 
Air, surface water, and solid waste statutes have quite specifically 
spelled out for the implementing agencies not only the activities to be 
regulated,  but also the mode of regulation and timetables for both 
agency performance and industry compliance .  43 Under these statutes ,  
agencies typically retain primary responsibility only for setting stan­
dards and implementing enforcement strategies .  44 Both RCRA and 
C ERCLA, as well as the RCRA Amendments of r g84, 45 spell out in 
definite terms Congress's mandate on the hazardous waste problem .  46 
remedial measures. Finally, it implements the remedial measure chosen .  See U . S .  GEN. Ac­
COUNTING OFF. , STATUS OF E PA's REMEDIAL C LEANUP E F FORTS 3 (RCE D-85 -86 )  (Mar. 2 0 ,  
I 985 ) .  
-1 0  Section I I I (a) of the  Ac t  allows the  President to  expend Superfund monies to  undertake 
remedial action pursuant to C ERCLA § I 04( a)( l ) ,  42  U S . C .  § 9604(a) ( 1 ) .  Section 1 04(b )  
authorizes the  President to take l egal action to  recover the  costs of  such measures. See id. § §  
1 04(b ) ,  1 1 1 (a) ,  4 2  U S.  C .  § §  9604(b ) ,  96 1 1 (a) I 1 982  ) .  
-I I Section 1 0 7 (a) o f  C ERCLA defines "responsible parties" to include present and past owners 
or operators of waste disposal facil ities, generators of hazardous substances, and those who 
transport hazardous substances for disposal .  See 4 2  U S. C .  § 9607(a)  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  infra Section A of 
Part IV. 
-12 Use of the term "agency-forcing" to describe statutes that give unusually strong guidance 
to implementing agencies apparently originated with Professor Ackerman, who employed i t  to 
describe the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1 9 70 .  See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER,  C LEAN 
COAL/DIRTY AIR 3, 8-10  ( 1 98 1 ) .  
43 Commentators have made much o f  the extent to which the major federal pollution control 
statutes have departed in form from New Deal social legislation.  See, e. g . , id.  at I- I 2 ; R. 
MELNICK,  REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE C LEAN AIR ACT 1-23  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
Traditional New Deal legis lation typically suggested only the general outlines o f  federal policy, 
leaving to the implementing agencies the tasks of establishing detailed policies and regulation� 
on their own timetables. By the r 96os, this approach had come under broad attack,  especially 
for promoting "capture" of the regulating authorities by the industries regulated and thereby 
subverting Congress' regulatory motive. Cf. B .  Ac KERMAN & \V. HASSLER, supra note 42 ,  at 
8 (discussing domination of state regulatory agencies by regulated industries ) .  Perhaps in re­
sponse to such criticism , Congress took a much more active role in formulating federal pol lution 
control statutes .  
4 4  Congress has occasionally attempted to force progress on i ts  regulatory agenda by estab­
l ishing pri\·ate rights of action to supplement agency enforcement .  See, e .g. , C lean Air Act 
Amendments of 1 9 70  § 1 2 ( a), 42 U . S . C. � 7 604 I r g S z )  (establish ing a private right of action to 
enforce certain provisions of the C lean :\ ir A.ct) :  Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend­
ments of  1 9 7 2  § 2 ,  3 3  US. C . § 1 3 6 5  ( 1 98 2 )  (establishing private rights of action to e nforce 
certain provisions of the Federal vVater Pollution Control Act) .  
45 H azardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1 984 .  Pub . L. -"To. g8-6 1 6 ,  98 Stat .  3 2 2 1  
(codified at 4 2  U S. C .  § §  690 1-6991  ( 1 985 Supp . ) ) .  
4 6  Both RCRA. and C ERCLA provided specific timetables for EPA implementation o f  their 
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Despite Congress's directives ,  however, EPA implementation of 
the federal hazardous waste statutes has had a tortured h istory. 
Cleanup of hazardous waste sites has proceeded slowly. 4 i The EPA 
has failed to meet its statutory deadlines , 48 and Congress has severely 
criticized EPA regulations and policy under both RCRA and C ER­
CLA. 49 Several causes account for these problems ,  including the 
intrusion of partisan politics into Agency operations , 5 0  the inadequacy 
of Agency resources,  and the magnitude of the Agency's task.  5 1 These 
recurring difficulties have raised doubts about the viability of agency-
regulatory directives. For example ,  RCRA required the E PA to promulgate , within 1 8  months 
of  RCRI\'s enactment, c riteria for identifying hazardous waste and safety standards appl icable 
to hazardous waste generators,  transporters ,  and owners and operators of  h azardous waste 
disposal facilities. See RCRA §� 300 I-3004 , 42 U . S .  C. §§ 692 r-6924 ( 1 98 2 ). Simi larly, C E R­
CLA mandated E PA preparation and publication of an NCP for oi l  and hazardous waste 
removal within r 8o days of C ERCLA's enactment. See CERC LA § r os ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 9605 
( 1 98 2 ) .  To ensure that its hazardous waste agenda would not founder on the shoals of  agency 
inertia, Congress also provided in RCRA for citizen suits to supplement agency enforcement 
efforts. See RCRA § 7002 , 42 U . S . C . § 6 9 7 2  ( 1 982 ) . 
47 Of the 5 3 8  sites the EPA had p laced on the NPL by the end of 1 984 ,  cleanup had been 
completed at only ro.  Cleanup actions were either approved or  underway at 1 04 sites ( r 9 % ) ,  
whi le  the  E PA was studying alternatives for  an additional 2 3 6  sites (44 % ) .  N o  action had been 
taken with respect to the remaining 1 94 sites ( 3 6 % ) .  See U . S .  GEN. ACCOUNTING O FF . ,  supra 
note 3 9 ,  at 2-3 .  At the same time ,  the E PA h ad proposed to add 248  additional sites to the 
NPL See id.  The EPA's p rogress in placing sites on the NPL is itself a source of  concern; 
according to some estimates, the number of sites requ iring remedial action under C E RCLA is 
an order of magnitude greater than the number on the l ist .  See supra note 4 · 
48 See, e . g. , Envt'l Defense Fund, Inc .  Y. Gorsuch .  1 7  Em·'t Rep. Cas. ( BNA) 1 099 ,  r 1 02 
(D .  D . C .  1 9 8 2 )  (requiring EPA promulgation of the NCP and publication of e mergency guidelines 
under CERCLA §§ 1 05 and 106 ) .  
4 9  See H .  R REP. No . I 98 ,  p t .  I .  98th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess. r 9-20 ,  34 ,  repYinted in 1 984 U . S .  
CODE CONG. & AD.  ?'-JEws 5 5 7 6 ,  5 5 78-7 9 ,  5 5 93 (cr iticizing the EPA's slow progress i n  issuing 
waste faci l i ty permits under RCRA ,  terming the Agency's enforcement efforts " inadequate , "  and 
noting that the E PA "has not been able to comply with past statutory mandates and timetables, 
not j ust for RCRI\,  but for \· irtually all of  its programs"); Supe1jund A mendments of 1985: 
Separate & D isse n ting Vieu:•s , H . R  REP. No. 2 5 3 ,  pt. r ,  99th Cong . , r st Sess. 2 5 7  ( r 98 5 )  
(dissenting views) ( terming cleanup efforts under CERCLA " tragically disappointing and inef­
fective" and p lacing responsibil ity, in part, upon the EPA's "propensity to let  private p arties 
escape the ir  fair l egal liability for the damages caused by Superfund sites"). 
50 The E PA's implementation of C ERCLA created a major pol itical scandal during President 
Reagan's first term . This scandal lead to the firing of Rita Lavelle , the E PA's Associate 
Administrator for Hazardous Waste.  and the resignation of EPA Administrator Anne B urford. 
See N . Y. Times, Mar. ro.  1 98 ,3 ,  at :\ 1 ,  coL 6 .  ivls .  Lavelle was subsequently tried and convicted 
of both criminal perjurv and impeding Congressional investigations of  hazardous w aste pro­
grams. See N . Y. Times, Dec. 2 .  I 98 3 ,  at A I ,  coL r .  
5 1 One committee report o n  the proposed CERCL:\ amendments recently passed by the 
House obsen·ed :  
The  resources gi\·en to  EPA. were s imply inadequate to  fulfill the  promises that were 
made to clean up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country. With political pressure 
on EPA to treat e\'er,· site discovered as a high priority, EPA was virtually guaranteed 
to fail from the moment C ERCLA passed in I 980.  
H . R .  REP.  No. 2 5 3 , pt .  1 ,  99th Cong , I st Sess .  ss ( r gS s J .  
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forcing as an approach to environmental legislation ,  leading some to 
call for increased administrative discretion . 5 2  
(c) S tate Programs i n  A id of Federal Hazardous Waste Law. -
Despite the difficulties that have plagued their implementation at the 
federal level ,  RCRA and CERCLA have spawned extensive state 
government efforts to regulate hazardous waste management and to 
clean up dangerous disposal sites .  Both RCRA and C ERCLA rely 
heavily upon the administrative and financial cooperation of state 
governments and provide strong incentives for states to develop com­
plementary regulatory schemes for hazardous waste management and 
cleanup.  RCRA specifically authorizes enforcement of its provisions 
by state or regional agencies . 5 3 It instructs the EPA to develop guide­
lines for state enforcement programs54 and authorizes expenditure of 
federal monies in  support of such programs.  55  CERCLA requires 
states to shoulder the burden of monitoring and maintaining sites 
following cleanup .  It further requires them to pay ro% of the costs 
of remedial action at sites that were privately owned when wastes 
were deposited there and s o% of the costs at sites that were publicly 
owned. 5 6 
These features of the federal statutory scheme have evoked con­
siderable response from the states. Many states have enacted hazard­
ous waste management statutes with features similar to those of 
RCRA.  S i  State authorities now have substantial responsibility for 
5 2 One House committee report on C E RCLA reauthorization noted: 
If the new law was overly detailed and restricted in its p rescription of how the agency 
should operate Superfund,  it  would almost surely doom the program to future fai l ­
u res. 
Unrealistic time schedules, standards impossible to enforce , and program requirements 
that exceed funding are al l  problems established by the investigation of the Oversight 
and Investigations Subcommittee as contributing to the appal l ing failures of E PA i n  the 
past .  
/d. at s s -s 6 .  Such sentiments represent a substantial shift from those prevai l ing in  Con gress 
during consideration of the RCR.i\ Amendments of 1 984.  Perhaps irritated by EPA misman­
agement of the federal h azardous waste programs ,  Congress imposed harsh discipline on the 
Agency i n  enacting the RCR.<\ amendments .  Some of the amendments take the extreme agency­
forcing  posture of mandating a particular, senre result un less the EPA takes specific action 
before a particular date . See, e . g . , H azardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1 984 ,  § 2 o r ( a) 
( codified at 42 U . S .  C .  A .  § 692 4(d ) (  I )  ( Supp .  r 985 )) ( p rohibiting all underground injection of 
hazardous wastes unless the EPA Administrator determines within 3 2 months that prohibition 
of one or  more methods o f  injection is not required to protect human health or the em·ironment) .  
5 3  See RCRA ::j§ r oos ( a) .  3oo6(b ) ,  4 2 U S. C .  � §  6904(a) ,  69 2 6 (b )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
s�  S e e  i d .  § 3006(a) , 4 2  U . S . C .  § 6 9 2 6  ( r g 8 2 J .  
s s  S e e  i d .  § 30 1 1 ( a ) ,  42  U . S . C .  § 6 gJ I (a )  ( 1 98 2  & Supp .  r g8 s ) .  
s o  See C E RCLA � I 04 (c )( 3 l ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 96o.j( c )( J )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
5 7  S e e .  e . g . , ALA. CODE § §  2 2 -30- I t o  -30- 2 4  (I\lichie 1 984 & Supp.  I g8s l ;  ARIZ.  REv. STAT. 
ANN. § §  36- 280 1 to 3 6- 2 8 2 i  ( West 1 9 i4 & 1 985  Supp . ) ; IDAHO CoDE § §  39-440 I to -44 3 2  (Michie 
I 98 s l ;  Im\·A CoDE §§ 45 5 B . 4 1  I to . 4 5 5  ( \Vest I 9 i l & Supp. I 98 5 ) ;  KA.N. STAT. ANN. §§ 6 5 -
3 4 3 0  t o  -34 i 2  ( 1 98 5 J .  
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enforcement of federal hazardous waste regulations .  5 8 Additionally, 
either as part of their waste management statutes or  separately, many 
states have passed legislation that resembles C ERCLA . These statutes 
vary considerably in form, content, and detail , but typically establish 
special funds to finance cleanup of hazardous waste sites and authorize 
state-initiated litigation to recover monies expended by the funds . 5 9  
Like their federal counterparts , however, many of  the  state programs 
have encountered difficulties in implementation and e nforcement. 60 
Unlike RCRA ,  however, C ERCLA contains no provision for del­
egation of e nforcement or  regulatory authority to the state s .  Indeed ,  
the Supreme Court has recently ruled that C ERCLA is at  least par­
tially preemptive of state legislation.  In Exxon Corp .  v .  Hunt , 6 1 the 
Court struck down a New Jersey statute requiring petroleum and 
chemical facilities to contribute to a "Spill Fund" intended in part to 
finance cleanup of releases of hazardous substances .  The Court held 
that the Spill Fund was preempted by CERCLA § I 1 4(c) , which 
prohibits states from requiring contributions to any fund intended "to 
pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or  
claims which may be compensated under [CERCLA] . "6 2 The  Court 
indicated,  however, that it found no obstacle to state legislation es­
tablishing similar funds to finance the state contributions to federal 
response costs required by C ERCLA section 1 04(c)(3 ) .  6 3 As a result 
of this decision , many of the state statutes that parallel C ERCLA will 
require revision .  6-l 
58 RCRA § 3006 p rovides that the EPA may authorize state authorities to operate their own 
enforcement programs, supplanting federal enforcement.  See 4 2  U . S . C. § 692 6 ( r 982 ) .  As of 
August, 1 985 , the EPA had granted final authorization to the enforcement programs of 25 states 
and the D istrict of Columbia. See List of S tates with Final Authorization for Hazardous Waste  
ivlanagement Programs , [State Sol id  Waste - Land Use Laws] ENV'T REP .  ( B NA) r oo r :oo6 r 
( r 985 ) .  
5 9  See, e . g . ,  CoLo. REv. STAT. § §  2 5 - 1 6- r o r  to  - 2 o 1  ( Bradford Pub .  Co .  1 98 2  & Supp .  
1 986) ;  IDAHO CoDE § §  39-44 1 7 ,  -44 ! 7B (Michie 1 985 ) ;  IowA CODE ANN. § §  455 B . 3 8 I- .J99,  
45 5 B . 42 3- - 432  (West 1 9 7 r & Supp .  1 985 ) ;  KAN .  STAT. ANN. § 65 -343 1 ( 1 985 ) .  
6o Much of the problem may l i e  in inadequate staffing and funding .  A survey of 2 3 states 
by the Maryland Department of Heal th & Mental Hygiene found that "current staff size i s  still 
only 6 2 %  of estimated needs to implement the current 1 980 federal p rogram. This does not 
take into account staffing needs brought about by statutory changes to C ERCLA . "  W. Eich­
baum, CERCLA I mplementation - Geneml S tate Perspec tive, in  ALI, HAZARDOUS WASTES,  
SUPERFUN D ,  AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 3,  4 ( 1 98 5 )  (emphasis in  original ) .  See also infra p .  1 483 
(noting that state authorities find vigorous enforcement efforts impractica l ) .  G iven the current 
budget difficulties of both state and federal governments ,  it is difficult to imagine that substantial 
funding increases will occur any time in  the near future.  
6 1  1 06 S.  Ct.  1 1 03 ( r g86) .  
62 C ERCL\ § r q(c ) ,  . .  p U S C  § 96 q(c)  ( ! g82 ) .  
6 3  See Exxon,  1 06 S .  Ct .  at r r r6 .  The state contributions required by C E RC LA are 
described supra p. 1 4 7 5 .  
64 The extent o f  the revision required wi l l  vary from state to state, depending on each state's 
legislation and state law with respect to severabi l i ty. In Exxon, the Court remanded to the 
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B .  A n  E valuative Framework for Federal Hazardous Waste 
Legislation 
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Criticism o f  Congress's response to the hazardous waste p roblem 
has come from many quarters and in various forms . By far the most 
influential criticism has come from environmental economists and pol­
icy analysts . These commentators have roundly criticized federal pol­
lution control schemes as administratively burdensome , economically 
inefficient, and grossly inequitable . This Section presents a simple 
outline of the evaluative framework from which such criticisms pro­
ceed. 
I .  The Concepts of Fairness and Efficiency 
Two concepts of critical importance to an analysis of federal haz­
ardous waste statutes and regulations are the norms of fairness and 
efficiency. The following analysis employs the term "fairness" to mean 
corrective justice .  Thus, one would say it is "unfair" for A to benefit 
at B's expense , even though A means no  harm . The law can restore 
fairness by forcing A to compensate B for his losses. Although other 
principles of fairness abound and may even explain certain features 
of federal hazardous waste law, courts and commentators appear 
unanimous in reading CERCLA's conception of fairness as rooted in 
the principle of corrective j ustice . This notion is frequently capsulized 
in the maxim "make the polluter pay, " which requires the parties 
responsible for hazardous waste pollution to compensate the innocent 
victims of such pollution for their inj uries. 65 
The concept of economic efficiency is used in this Note to identify 
opportunities to improve society's aggregate welfare either by reallo­
cating resources directly or by reordering incentives to achieve real­
location.  6 6  The norm of efficiency dictates that the primary goal of 
hazardous waste law should be to minimize the total costs that haz-
New Jersey Supreme Court the question "whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted 
provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions . "  r o6 S .  Ct .  at I I  r 6 .  
65 See ,  e . g . , United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp . , 5 4 6  F. Supp. r r oo,  r r r 2  ( D .  Minn.  
I 9 8 2 )  ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical 
poisons bear the costs and responsibil i ty for remedying the harmful conditions they created . ") ;  
City o f  Philadelphia v .  Stepan Chern. Co . , 5 44 F. Supp. r 1 3 5 , I 1 4 2-43 ( E .  D .  Pa. I 98 2 )  
(CERCLA was designed to  "plac[e] the  ultimate financial burden [of cleanup] upon those 
responsible for the danger"). Indeed, a goal of corrective justice is arguably implicit  in  CER­
CLA's occasional use of the term "responsible" to designate the parties whom C ERCLA m akes 
liable for hazardous waste releases. For examples of this terminology, see CERCLA §§  IO ? (C) ( r )­
( 2 ) ,  42 U .S C .  § §  9607 (C )( 1 )-( 2 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
66 I n  comparing existing resource allocations with hypothetical reallocations, this analysis 
uses the so-called " Kaldor-Hicks criterion , "  which states that reallocation is the desirable alter­
native if  those who benefit from it could in principle use their gains to fully compensate those 
who lose. For a concise explanation and discussion of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion,  see E. STOKEY 
& R. ZECKHAUSER, note 14 above, at 2 7 9-80. 
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ardous wastes impose on society, thus freeing societal resources for 
additional consumption or production . To accomplish this goal , the 
law should provide incentives for generators and transporters of  haz­
ardous waste , as well  as for waste site operators and members of the 
public ,  to behave in a manner that minimizes the long-term costs of  
managing generated wastes .  The law may effect this policy by re­
warding those who act correctly, by penalizing those who act incor­
rectly, or by some combination of rewards and penalties .  6 7 
The use of fairness and efficiency as evaluative criteria is appro­
priate for two reasons .  First, the concepts are fundamental to the 
economic theory of social choice among policy alternatives . 68 C onse­
quently, they pervade the l iterature of environmental policy in  general 
and hazardous waste policy in particular. More importantly, the leg­
islative histories of both RCRA and CERCLA suggest the relevance 
of these concepts .  In  enacting these statutes ,  Congress evinced clear 
interests both in minimizing the costs that hazardous wastes impose 
on society (an efficiency goal)69 and in reallocating those costs toward 
the parties responsible for them and away from innocent victims (a 
fairness goal) . 70 
6i Of course , the effectiveness of any system of rewards and penalties depends upon the 
assumption that economic actors beha\·e rationally with respect to probabilities of future harm 
or  l iability. Efficient behavior demands that members of society invest in risk-reduction measures 
up  to the point at which the cost of  reducing risk by an additional unit exceeds the p resent cost 
of the additional unit of risk it would el iminate. This result can occur only if  members of 
society have complete information and use it to calculate accurately thei r  expected h arms or  
l iabilities .  I f  society's members either exaggerate or underestimate the  magnitude or  probability 
of eventual harm from or l iability for improper waste management, the social costs of waste 
management rise .  
6S For a nontechnical introduction to use of the efficiency and fairness concepts in  choosing 
among alternative public policies,  see A. 0KUN , EQUALITY A:-iD EFFICIENCY: THE BIG T RADE­
OFF ( I9i5 l - See also C.  SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 67-76 ( 1 97 7 ) 
(discussing the interplay of equity and efficiency in public policy-making) .  For  a more technical , 
less extensive in troduction ,  see W. NICHOLSO N ,  MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES 
AND EXTENSIONS 7 2 7-34 ( 1985 ) . 
69 Statements in the legislative history oi C E RC LA suggest congressional inte rest in mini­
mizing the societal costs of hazardous wastes. S ee ,  e . g. , H . R. REP. No. 1 0 1 6 , pt. I ,  g6th  Cong. , 
2 d .  Sess. 20 ,  reprinted in r g8o U . S .  CODE. CoNe. & AD. NEWS 6 1 1 9 , 6 1 2 3 ( stating that "[t]he 
fai lure to properly dispose of hazardous waste is  costing the public mi l lions and the cost of 
cleanup is far more expensive than proper disposal in the first place") . Although i t  l acks explicit  
comparisons of the respective costs of improper waste disposal and regulation , RCRA's legislative 
history contains many suggestions of congressional concern with the excessive health and envi­
ronmental costs of improper waste disposal . See ,  e.g , H . R. REP. No. 149 1 ,  pt .  I ,  94th Cong. , 
2 d  Sess. I I ,  reprinted in 1976  U . S . CODE . CoNG & An. NEWS . 62 38 , 6249 (describing the 
potential harms to groundwater suppl ies ,  agriculture, and the environment that can result from 
improper disposal) .  
; o  The manifest injustice of inju ries suffered by residents of the Love C anal area p rovided 
the final impetus for congressional enactment of CERCLA in 1986.  See supra note 24; cf. H . R. 
REP . .:--Jo. 1 4 9 1 ,  pt. I ,  supra note 69 , at Ii-2 4 ,  reprinted in I 976 U . S .  C ODE CONG . & AD. 
N EWS 6 2 5 4-6 2 6 1  ( i l lustrating the dangers of improper disposal by listing examples of  damage 
i t  has caused) .  
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Although fairness and efficiency are distinct and potentially con­
tradictory concepts , in application they often point to the same result  
- especially when the standard of fairness is  corrective justice .  7 1 
Thus,  at least in the general case , both norms support legal efforts to 
allocate the social costs of hazardous wastes to responsible parties .  
From an efficiency standpoint,  such allocation forces responsible par­
ties to internalize the social costs of their activities and thereby sub­
jects hazardous waste production and dispersion to market constraints . 
At the same time,  it seems fair to saddle with liability those who 
benefit from activities that impose costs on the rest of society. 
On the other hand , fairness and efficiency are not wholly compat­
ible ends . Efforts to allocate the social costs of hazardous wastes to 
the parties who in fairness deserve to bear them may frustrate the 
efficiency goal of holding aggregate social costs to a minimum. The 
problem of retroactive liability under CERCLA provides a revealing 
illustration of this dilemma. 7 2 Although it seems fair to impose the 
costs of present and future abatement efforts on those whose past 
activities give rise to them,  this course of action is not necessarily 
efficient. Allocation of these costs requires expensive negotiation and 
litigation , which increase the aggregate costs that hazardous wastes 
impose on society. 73 Moreover, such allocation cannot reduce the costs 
of abatement and compensation resulting from any particular re­
lease .  74 To be sure , retroactive liability may function as a general 
deterrent, promoting cost-minimizing behavior in the present and fu­
ture and thereby reducing the aggregate social costs of hazardous 
wastes. iS Yet the marginal savings to society from this additional 
i l Cf. Kaplow, A n  Economic A nalysis of Legal Trans itions , 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 ,  5 7 6-S r 
( r g86)  (discussing the relationships among goals of efficiency, distributional equality, and h ori­
zontal equity). 
; z  For an extensive discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding retroactive liability 
under C ERC LA, see infra Section B of Part V I .  
i 3 O n e  authority recently gave a s  h i s  "best guess" at total C ERCLA litigation costs a n  
estimate o f  Ss bil l ion,  or 3 4 %  o f  direct cleanup costs . See Insurance Issues and Supeifund: 
Hearing Before the S enate Committee o n  E nviro nment and Public Works ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess. 
1 3 -1 ( 1 98 5 )  (report of Mr. John C .  B utler III , director, Putnam , Hayes & Bartlett, on behalf of 
the American I nsurance Association) .  This estimate assumes that the EPA will eventually place 
r Soo sites on the NPL, that direct cleanup costs will  continue to average approximately $8.  r 
mill ion per site,  and that l itigation wi l l  decline somewhat from present levels. See id. I f  
litigation continues a t  present levels, total litigation costs could reach :5 8  billion, o r  s s %  of total 
direct c leanup costs (estimated at $ 1 4 . 6  bi l l ion) .  See id .  For comparative purposes, it may be 
helpful  to note Mr.  B utler's observation that "Superfund litigation costs are at least as large and 
possibly more than twice as l arge as asbestos litigation costs of S2 . 9 bi llion . "  I d. at 1 3 5 .  
7 •  Once a release o f  hazardous material has occurred, society faces a c hoice between incurring 
abatement costs in the present  or incurring injury and compensation costs in the future when 
the health problems engendered by the release become manifest. Although the norm of efficiency 
requ ires that society choose the cheaper of the two alternatives, society cannot further reduce 
the costs of a specific discharge by assigning l iabil ity to any particular party. 
;; See  Kaplow, s upra note 7 1 ,  at 5 5 1-5 2 ( 1 984) .  
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general deterrent force may be small in a regulatory regime that 
already provides strong incentives to behave efficiently in the pres­
ent. 7 6 
2. The Market  Failure Model of Groundwater Pollu tion 
According to microeconomic theory, the surest path to an efficient 
allocation of resources is ,  in  general, an unregulated free market .  
Government must intervene in a particular policy area  only when 
fairness requires reallocation of resources - for example ,  to help the 
poor - or when , absent regulation ,  some market defect produces 
conspicuous inefficiencies .  77 The absence of serious debate over the 
need for government intervention to alleviate groundwater and other 
types of pollution reflects a remarkable consensus among economists 
and policy analysts that unregulated markets for industrial products 
have failed to yield efficient levels of pollution . 
The explanation of pollution as an instance of market failure is  
best illustrated through a simple model . Suppose production requires 
manufacturers to use both labor and raw materials and that ground­
water is a raw material that producers "use" by discharging their 
wastes into it .  If groundwater is free ,  two things will h appen.  First, 
producers will use groundwater instead of labor or other raw materials 
whenever possible .  Indeed,  they will have every incentive to make 
the most extensive possible use of groundwater78 without regard to 
the costs that its consumption imposes on others. Second,  producers 
will not need to recover the value of the groundwater they consume 
when they sell their products. Consequently, their prices will be lower 
and demand for their products higher than if they had been forced to 
pay for the groundwater they had used. This result is unobjectionable 
if groundwater really costs society nothing - as it might if there were 
an infinite supply - but such is not the case . On the contrary, 
individual consumers also require groundwater for a variety of pur­
poses .  Consequently, they suffer when they cannot obtain the ground­
water they need or when the groundwater they do obtain is contam­
inated .  
This model shows that an unregulated market for groundwater 
produces an allocation that is both inefficient and unfair. Inefficiency 
76 CERCLA and RCRA. contain quite c redible threats of liability for undesirable present and 
future behavior apart from any threat of liabi l i ty for past actions. These threats include not 
only strict joint  and several liabil ity for c leanup of hazardous substance releases but  also criminal 
sanctions for illegal disposal . See  generally Riesel ,  s upra note r o .  
7 7  See E .  STOKEY & R. Z ECKHAUSER, supra note q ,  at  c g r-2 9 3 ,  308- r g .  
78  More precisely, producers have a n  incentive t o  use a.s much groundwater a s  they profitably 
can. Even when groundwater i s  free ,  producers will not consume it  in infinite amounts,  because 
the assu mption of  declining marginal productivity suggests that there will a lways come a point 
at which p roducers will find they can make no p rofitable L;se of a.noth<:r unit  of  groundwater. 
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results because society's collective welfare would be greater under a 
system that allocated groundwater in  accordance with its utility to 
both producers and consumers. The unregulated regime allows pro­
ducers to exploit groundwater supplies from which others would ac­
tually derive greater benefit. Unfairness,  in turn , comes about in two 
ways in the unregulated market. First, producers get something for 
nothing - something for which others have an equally legitimate 
need . Second,  consumers suffer harm if producers leave them with 
less groundwater than they would be willing to purchase in a com­
petitive market .  Similarly, consumers suffer harm if they incur health 
care costs as a result of ingestion or exposure to "used" groundwater. 
One may see the imperfection of the situation by imagining how 
it would improve if  the allocation of groundwater were determined 
not by this imperfect market but by an omniscient resource manager, 
attempting to maximize the collective happiness of all concerned. i 9  
Seeking the optimal allocation of  groundwater, the manager would 
redistribute units of groundwater from producers to consumers until 
redistributing an additional unit would hurt the producers more than 
it would help the consumers.  By definition , the resulting allocation 
would be socially optimal . 80 Although in principle the same allocation 
would result if hazardous waste victims joined together to pay the 
responsible parties to generate less wastes or  dispose of their wastes 
more safely, such a result would never come about in practice .  F irst,  
transaction costs8 1 and "free rider" problems82 would inhibit hazardous 
waste victims from working together to achieve it .  More fundamen­
tally, long lapses of time between release and contamination ,  and 
between contamination and harm , would in many cases make such 
efforts at collectivization impractical . 
The market failure model suggests that the existence of more than 
the socially optimal level of pollution reflects the market's failure 
properly to allocate the costs of environmental resources to those who 
;9 The concept of  the "omniscient resource manager" employed here parallels the idea of the 
''basin-wide" firm in A .  KNEESE & B. BOWER, MA;<.;AGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS,  
TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 89-94,  1 84-8 7 ( 1 968) .  
so To see why this  allocation would be optimal , consider the marginal effects of allocating 
additional units of groundwater to either producers or consumers. Another unit of groundwater 
consumption by producers would impose on consumers costs exceeding the value of the additional 
consumption to producers. Thus, society as a whole would be worse off at any higher level of 
use by producers. By contrast, consumers would gain less from inc reased use than producers 
would lose by giving up the groundwater necessary to make increased use by consumers possible. 
Therefore , society would be worse off at any lower level of groundwater use by producers. An 
important consequence of  this analysis is that the socially optimal level  of the producers' use of 
groundwater is  probably not zero, because the costs to consumers of very small  levels of 
groundwater use by producers are almost certainly less than the benefits producers would obtain 
from such use. 
8 1 See supra p. ! 4 7 9  & n .  73 ·  
8 !  See  s upra p .  1 468 & n .  q. 
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use them . To prevent emission of more than the socially optimal 
quantity of pollution ,  the government must intervene  to repair o r  
control the market .  The  market failure model of the groundwater 
pollution problem suggests certain fairness and efficiency goals for 
such intervention :  to reduce the total costs that h azardous wastes 
impose on society, and to reallocate the remaining costs in  order to 
force their internalization by those who generate them and to prevent 
their infliction upon those who have not bargained for them. 
3 .  Fairness and Efficiency in the Market Failure Model 
The norms of fairness and efficiency provide valuable standards 
by which to assess the performance of federal hazardous waste stat­
utes . Before proceeding to discuss the role these concepts play in the 
market failure model , it  is important to understand the nature of the 
various costs that hazardous wastes impose on society, for the norms 
of fairness and efficiency are principally concerned with the allocation 
and minimization of these costs . Hazardous wastes impose four kinds 
of costs on  society. "Avoidance costs" include the costs of properly 
disposing of hazardous wastes in the first place ,  so as to minimize the 
likelihood that the wastes will create further costs in the future . 
"Abatement costs" include the costs of removal and cleanup following 
improper disposal . "Compensation costs"  are the costs of making 
whole parties who suffer immediate or  latent injuries from improperly 
disposed wastes .  F inally, "transaction costs" include the costs both to 
the government and to private actors of controlling and allocating the 
other three categories of hazardous waste costs .  83 
The norms of efficiency and fairness suggest a number of useful 
approaches for managing these various costs . Efficiency demands that 
the federal statutes minimize the aggregate of these four types of costs 
by providing incentives for actors to incur avoidance costs when 
avoidance is cheaper than the sum of abatement and compensation 
costs . Fairness requires that the statutes allocate abatement and com­
pensation costs to the parties responsible for the environmental haz­
ard . In turn ,  efficiency requires that the process of allocating abate­
ment and compensation costs create a minimum of transaction costs . 
To the extent that the statutes rely on threats of legal liability to 
produce correct behavior, they must also overcome the problems that 
make private litigation at common law inadequate as a means of 
pollution control . 84 
33 The typology of costs presented here fol lows that presented in Note , A llocating the Costs 
of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 H.-\RV. L. REV. 584,  585 ( I g3 r ) . 
84 See  supra p. q68 ( discussing legal and theoretical obstacies tc common law action by 
victims of pollutio n ) .  
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Efficiency requires further that the government allocate enough 
resources to detection of illegal disposal practices,  such as dumping 
along roadsides or  into open drainage ditches,  and to enforcement of 
statutory obligations to force actors to make the necessary tradeoffs 
between avoidance costs on the one hand and abatement and com­
pensation costs on the other. The problem of illegal dumping of 
hazardous wastes presents a particularly pernicious example of how 
inadequate enforcement efforts can lead to inefficient outcomes. Be­
cause generators and transporters can dump hazardous substances 
virtually anywhere , only vigorous tracking of hazardous wastes 
through the production cycle can detect points at which they are 
leaving the regulated system illegally. Although RCRA's manifest 
system theoretically provides the capability for such tracking,  regu­
latory authorities rarely attempt to verify the manifests they receive . 
On the contrary, when surveying enforcement efforts in four  maj or 
industrial states ,  the General Accounting Office found that state reg­
ulatory authorities consider such verification impractical . 85 Genera­
tors and transporters wishing to escape regulation may do so simply 
by failing to identify themselves to regulatory authorities86 or  by 
falsifying the reports they submit to such authorities .  8 7 Consequently, 
nobody knows the extent to which illegal dumping occurs or the costs 
that it imposes on society. 88 Yet, despite this lack of information ,  
efficiency demands that the state and federal governments commit 
resources to enforcement up to the point at which the last dollar 
invested in enforcement yields no more than a dollar's savings in 
abatement and compensation costs due to illegal dumping. Although 
it would be unrealistic to assume that the regulatory regime could be 
calibrated so finely as to yield this equilibrium, the potential for illegal 
dumping does suggest the need for strict attention to the adequacy of 
enforcement efforts . 
The market failure model of pollution provides insight into why a 
hazardous waste problem exists and indicates broad goals for govern­
mental efforts to resolve it .  The norms of fairness and efficiency 
provide more flexible standards for evaluating the success of particular 
regulatory tactics . Although in narrow contexts these norms may 
:;s See  U . S .  GEN.  ACCOUNTING OFF . . I L LEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: DIFFI-
CULT TO D ETECT OR D ETER 2 8 ( RCED-85-2 )  (I  985 ) . 
�6 See  id. at r 6 .  
s ;  See  id. at iii�iv, 26�3 1 .  
::;� See id.  at I J .  B u t  see Haza rdous  and Solid Waste A mendments of 1984 , H . R. REP. No. 
1 98 ,  pt. r ,  98th Cong . , :d Sess . 1 9 , reprinted in 1 984 U . S .  CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5 5 76 ,  
5 5  7 8  ("[D]espite this progress [ in  implementing the  hazardous waste provisions of RCR.A], it  i s  
estimated that an  amount of hazardous waste equal to  that wh ich  i s  currently regulated under 
RCR<\ {,.jo mill ion metric tons per year) is escaping control through various loopholes . ") .  In­
adequate staffing and funding of state enforcement authorities doubtless contribute to the prob­
lem. See supra note 6o.  
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dictate inconsistent responses ,  awareness of the tension between them 
can help to ensure that efforts to resolve the hazardous waste problem 
neither squander society's resources nor perpetrate gross inj ustices o n  
its members .  Subsequent Parts o f  this Note will employ the analytic 
framework presented in this Part to scrutinize the difficult substantive 
and procedural questions that permeate hazardous waste l aw.  
III . PROCEDURAL ISSUES UNDER CERCLA 
In the five years since the Comprehensive E nvironmental Re­
sponse , Compensation ,  and Liability Act (CERCLA) w as enacted,  the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has completed only ten clean­
ups . 1 This lackluster record of enforcement has been variously blamed 
on inadequacy of the Fund , 2  managerial problems , 3 and the high cost 
of cleanup.  Accumulating data on waste sites has created a growing 
consensus that the "EPA will never have adequate monies or man­
power to address the p roblem itself. "4 This data makes increasingly 
1 See  supra p .  I474 & n . 4 7  (citing U . S .  GEN. AccoUNTING OFF . , STATUS OF EPA's RE­
MEDIAL C LEANUP E FFORTS 2 -3 (Mar. 2 0 ,  I 98 5 ) ) ;  see also HOUSE COMM .  ON ENERGY AND 
COMMERCE, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF I 985 , H . R. REP. No. 2 5 3 ,  9 9th Cong. , I St Sess. 
2 5 5  ( 1 98 5 )  [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT] (dissenting view of Rep .  Scheuer) ( c laiming that 
only six cleanups have been completed) ;  W. DRAYTON ,  AMERICA'S TOXIC PROTECTION GAP: 
THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NATION'S TOXICS LAWS 58 ( I 984)  (same). 
2 In this Part , the term " Fund" will be used to indicate the fund created by § I I I .  This is 
distinct from the term "Superfu n d , "  used interchangeably with the more general and collective 
term "CERC LA . "  
1'v!uch o f  the inadequacy o f  Fund m oney resulted from a basic misunderstanding o f  the scope 
of the problem of abandoned hazardous waste sites. Congress originally believed that the 
hazardous waste problem was a l imited one involving relatively inexpensive and simple cleanup 
procedures. As a result, the agency was originally gi\·en $ r . 6  billion to administer the cleanup 
of 400 sites .  B y  I 985 , however, Congress's understanding of the problem had changed consid­
erably. The Office of Technology Assessment then estimated that there might be as many as 
r o , ooo Superfund sites,  cleanu p  of which would req uire decades of effort and might cost as 
much as :3 I oo bil l ion.  S e e  HousE REPORT , s upra note I ,  at 5 4-5 5 .  This problem has been 
exacerbated by shortfalls i n  planned Fund financing. E nvironmental Safety, an independent 
environmental group,  reported i n  J uly 1 984 , that the Fund, financed primarily by a tax on 
certain petroleum and chemical products and originally expected to reach Sr . 6  billion, would 
actually amount to only $ 1 . 3 billion because of lower than expected taxable sales of such 
products. The E PA admits that even with full funding the money would be sufficient to clean 
up only r oo of the 5 46 sites o n  the National Priority List ( NPL) , see CE RCLA § 1 05 ,  42  U . S . C .  
§ 9605 ( r 9 8 2  ) .  Environmental Safety has estimated that i t  will take well  into the next century 
to clean u p  j ust those sites c urrently on the N PL .  See 'vV. DR.WTON, supra note r ,  at 5 7-5 8 
( r gS.�); supra p .  1 465 & n . 4 .  
·' "U nder the initial leadership of Assistant Administrator La\·el le,  the program was victimized 
by gross mismanagement and policies which l imi ted expenditures for site cleanups, in part in 
an effort to dissuade Congress from extending the funding for the program . " HousE 
REPORT, s upra. note I ,  at 5 5 .  Congressional in\·estigations resulted in the firing or resignation 
of O\'er twenty top-level employees,  including the Administrator of the E PA. Lavelle received 
" jail sentence .  See id;  supya p. I 4 7 4  & n . s o .  
4 HOUSE REPORT, s upra note I ,  a t  5 5 .  
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apparent the need both to seek recovery of costs from responsible 
parties and to encourage private cleanup.  
The unclear drafting  and contradictory judicial interpretations of 
CERCLA's procedural provisions have combined to frustrate this goal 
of shifting the financial burden of cleanup to private parties .  Although 
the procedural framework of CERCLA is difficult to decipher, 5 it 
apparently sets out four basic routes to cleanup : ( r )  direct EPA cleanup 
under section 1 04 followed by potential recovery of costs from the 
responsible parties under section r o 7 ;  ( 2 )  EPA-mandated cleanup by 
potentially responsible parties under section r o6 ;  (3) private party 
cleanup followed by recovery against the Fund under section r 1 2 ;  and 
(4) private party cleanup followed by recovery against the responsible 
parties under section 1 0 7 .  Congress attempted to provide alternative 
procedures in an effort to ensure that the most prompt and efficient 
cleanup method would be chosen for each site . Instead , it produced 
a statute that is at times vague and internally inconsistent .  Many 
courts have compounded the problem by interpreting CERCLA's pro­
visions in ways that may unnecessarily delay cleanups and deplete the 
Fund. 
This Part first explores problems associated with government­
initiated cleanups and advocates increased use of administrative orders 
to compel direct cleanup by potentially responsible parties . It then 
analyzes the effectiveness of private cleanups and concludes that the 
only way to realize CERCLA's goal of prompt and effective cleanup 
is to reduce the number of preconditions to compensable private re­
sponse actions .  
A .  GoveYnment-Initiated Cleanups 
The government has two options in responding to releases or 
threatened releases of hazardous wastes .  First, CERCLA section 1 04 
allows the EPA to take direct "response actions , "  which may be either 
short-term ("removal ") actions designed to correct immediate damage , 
or long-term ("remedial") actions designed to be a permanent remedy 
for the site . :Money for these cleanups - cleanups regulated by the 
5 C E RCLA has been roundly criticized as an example of inadequate drafting: "CERCLA is 
m fact a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation ,  marred by vague terminology and 
deleted provisions. . The courts are once again p laced in the undesirable and onerous position 
of construing i nadequately drawn legislation . "  U nited States v. Northeastern Ph arm. & Chern .  
Co.  ( N E PACC O ) ,  5 7 9  F.  Supp .  8 23 ,  838  n . 1 5  (W D .  Mo .  1 984) ;  see Bulk Distrib .  Centers , Inc .  
v. Monsanto Co. , 589 F.  Supp .  1 43 7 ,  1 44 1  & n . r o  (S . D .  Fla .  1 984) For  a more complete 
examination of the hasty enactment of C ERCLA , see Dore, The S tando rd of C ivil  Liability for 
Hazardous Waste Disposal A c t ivity: Some Quirks of S upe1jund, 5 7  NOTRE DAM E  LAW. 2 60 
( 1 98 1 ) . 
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National Contingency Plan (NCP)6 - comes initially from the Fund.  7 
The EPA may bring subsequent cost recovery actions under section 
1 07  to replenish the Fund. 8 Second, the EPA can use section r o6 to 
seek injunctions compelling potentially responsible parties to clean up  
sites that pose "imminent and substantial danger" to  health and the 
environment. Section ro6 further allows the EPA to issue such ad­
ministrative orders as are necessary to protect public heal th and the 
environment. 9 
Section 1 04 actions may be initiated quickly, but they require a 
significant commitment of E PA personnel and deplete the Fund.  Sec­
tion ro6 orders involve far less cost to the Fund but may be hampered 
by dilatory tactics by potentially responsible parties , such as demands 
for judicial review. Section r o6 orders should be the p rimary tool for 
government enforcement of C ERCLA. Inadequate statutory drafting  
and unfavorable court rulings,  however, have forced the  E PA to rely 
on the far more costly section r o4/ r o 7  action .  
I .  S ec tion I 041I07 A c tions 
Sections 1 04 and 1 0 7  provide the EPA with the tools to make 
identifiable responsible parties pay the total cleanup cost incurred by 
the government at sites for which such parties are responsible . 10  Sec­
tion r o4 authorizes the EPA to clean up hazardous waste sites directly, 
and section 1 07  allows the agency to seek reimbursement from private 
parties .  Congress has stated that the EPA "may not act [under section 
1 04] where the party responsible for the release or threatened release 
. . .  will take proper action . " 1 1 When the responsible parties refuse 
to take proper action,  however, the EPA may initiate a section 1 04 
cleanup unhindered by immediate judicial review. Objections to EPA 
action under section 1 04 may not be raised in court until the E PA 
seeks to recover its costs in a suit brought under section r o 7 . None­
the less , various other procedural issues associated with EPA recovery 
6 See  C ERCLA � I o5 ,  4 2  U . S .  C.  § g6os ( I 98 2 ) .  The NCP, promulgated by the EPA, 
specifies "procedures, techniques ,  materials, equipment, and methods to be employed in  iden­
tifying, removing,  or remedying releases of hazardous substances . . . .  " I d .  
7 See C ERCLA § I I I ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 96 r i  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
s S e e  C E RCLA § I 0 7 (a) (4l (A)- (C ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 96o7 (a)(4)(A)-(C)  ( ! 98 2 ) .  
9 Sec  S 1 o6 (a) , 4 2  L' . S . C .  § 9606(a) ( 1 98 2 ) .  T h e  EPA also has a third option n o t  expressly 
mentioned in C E RCLA: it can negotiate with potentially responsible parties in  the hope of 
secur ing "voluntary" agreements to clean up  waste sites .  See Reed, CERCLA Litigation Update: 
The £;nerging La7.i} of Generator Liability, 1 4  E:-<VTL. L. REP. (ENVTL . L .  INST . )  1 0 , 2 2 4 ,  1 0 , 2 2 5  
( r 984):  i nji-a Part IV. 
I O S ee Reed. supra note 9, at 1 0 , 2 2 5 .  
I I  H . R REP. No. 1 0 1 6 ,  pt. 2 ,  96th Cong. , 2 d  Sess. 2 8 ,  reprinted i n  1 980 U . S .  CODE (ONG.  
& /\D.  NEws 6 1 1 9 ,  6 r 3 r  (emphasis added) ;  see C ERCLA § 1 04(a)( 1 ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 9604(a)( 1 )  
( I  93 2 ) . 
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under section 1 0 7  may increase the costs , reduce the recovery, and 
thereby limit the overall utility of section 1 04 actions . 1 2 
(a) S ec tion 1 04 and R eview of Agency A ction. - Courts have 
assisted EPA l'esponse actions by broadly construing the E PA's power 
to gather information about hazardous waste sites when the agency is 
attempting to determine whether to enter  and clean up a site under 
section 1 04 . 1 3  When the request for information is rebuffed,  the 
federal enforcement provision of the Solid Waste Disposal Act1 4 au­
thorizes the EPA to seek compliance through administrative orders ,  
criminal prosecution , or civil action . 1 5 Except in criminal prosecu­
tions ,  the Act requires no proof of intent not to comply. Courts have 
suggested that an administrative agency's requests for information will 
be enforced whe n :  ( 1 ) the investigation is within the agency's authority, 
( 2 )  the request is not too indefinite , and (3)  the information requested 
is reasonably relevant to the agency's purposes . 1 6 This liberal ap­
proach toward enforcing agency requests for information led one court 
to enter partial summary judgment against a C ERCLA defendant 
who failed for over fifteen months to produce information in  response 
to an EPA request . l i  
To aid further the prompt and effective collection o f  information,  
courts have allowed the EPA to engage in on-site discovery. Section 
1 04(b) and (e)  grants the EPA access to any site suspected of containing 
hazardous wastes . 1 s  Courts have rej ected challenges to such entry 
1 2  Inadequate recovery of costs under § 107 may further be explained by the absence of 
aggressive EPA action :  
I n  light oi the inadequacy of current Superfund resources , EPA should have had every 
incentive to recover monie5 from the parties responsible for hazardous waste pollution 
requiring dean-L;iJ Indeed, EE:l"'s 1 985 budget assumes very substantial recoveries . 
However. E PA h ;; '  m 2 de s:;-, gdarly little progress so far: it has recovered only $3 . 9  
mi llion , or !.:·ss ihc:n !we percent of the program's very limited outlays to date Uuly, 
1 984]. U mi! recently oniy one person had the entire responsibility for all the cost recovery 
actions. There are c u rrently 66 backlogged cases, with 30 to 40 additional cases expected 
this year. 
W. DRAYTON ,  su ,ora note r ,  at 58 (emphasis added) . 
1 3 S e e  C ERCLA � 1 04(e)( r ) ,  42 U . S . C .  § 9604(e) ( 1 )  ( 1 98 2 )  (providing that a potentially 
responsible party dealing with hazardous waste shall ,  upon request from the E PA ,  "furnish 
information re lating to such substances and permit [the E PA) at all reasonable times to have 
access to, and to copy all records relating to such substances") .  
14 4 2  u s. c .  § 6 9 2 3  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 5  F o r  all su ch controversies arising under C E RCLA, original j urisdiction i s  expressly granted 
to the federal district courts . See C ERC LA § 1 1 3 (b) ,  42 'C' . S . C .  § g6 r 3 (b) ( r g8 2 ) .  
1 6 See  U n ited States \'. Liviola, 6 o s  F. S u p p .  9 6 ,  9 9  (N . D. Ohio 1 98 5 ) ;  cf. U nited States v .  
Powell ,  379 U . S .  4 8 ,  S i -5 8 ( 1 964) ( adopting the same three criteria with respect to administrative 
actions by the In tromal Revenue Servic� ) ;  United States v .  Morton Salt Co. , 338 U . S .  6 3 2 ,  65 2-
53 ( 1 95 0 )  ( adopting the same three criteria with respect to administrative actions by the Federal 
Trade Commission ) .  
I ; See Lh.>ioia. 6os F .  Supp. a t  wo. 
18 Section ro.; authorizes the EPA to " undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, 
testi n g ,  and other information gathering as [it] may deem necessary or appropriate to identify 
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and have consistently allowed the E PA access in order to conduct a 
remedial investigation/feasibility study (Rl/FS) . 1 9 Nonetheless ,  courts 
often have mandated specific standards for EPA conduct once it h as 
gained access for discovery purposes . 20 One court prohibited the E PA 
from entering a site and adj acent sites to engage in  response activities 
beyond the precisely circumscribed scope of the court approved RI/ 
FS . 2 1 
Although courts have engaged in  narrowly limited review of E PA 
entry for RI/FS purposes , once the EPA decides to clean up a site , 
there can be no further judicial review until the E PA seeks compen­
sation under section 1 07.  Despite the section I 1 3 (b) grant of  exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over CERCLA claims,  most federal courts have 
held that they lack j urisdiction to conduct preenforcement substantive 
review of E PA section 1 04 cleanups .  22 Such time-consuming judicial 
the existence and extent of the release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardou s  
substances, pollutants or contami nants i n volved, a n d  the extent o f  t h e  danger t o  the public 
health or welfare or to the environment."  C E RCLA § r o4{b),  42 U . S . C .  § 9604(b)  ( 1 98 2 ) .  More 
specifically, § 1 04 authorizes the E PA to enter a hazardous waste site "at reasonable times , "  
C E RCLA § 1 04(e)( 1 )(A) , 4 2 U . S . C .  § 9604(e)( 1 )(A),  and "to inspect and obtain samples" o f  the 
potentially hazardous substance ,  C ERCLA § I 04(e)( 1 )( B ) ,  42 U . S . C .  § 9604(e) ( 1 ){ B ) .  
1 9  See U nited States v .  U nited N u c lear Corp . , 6 r o  F.  S u p p .  5 2 7  ( D . N . M .  1 98 5 ) ;  U n ited 
States v .  Standard Equip . , I nc . ,  1 9  Env't  Rep. C as .  ( BNA) 2 1 02 (W. D .  Was h .  1 983) .  Most 
courts faced with a chal lenge to an Rl/F S  have simply held for the E PA on the merits . One 
court, declaring that an Rl/F S  does  not fulfill the  requirement of final agency action prior  to 
direct j udicial review, has gone further and refused to engage in any review of an Rl/F S  prior 
to an E PA recovery action .  See United Nuclear, 6 r o  F. Supp. at 5 2 8-2 9 ( interpretin g  the 
finality requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U . S . C .  § 704 ( 1 9 8 2 )) .  
2o See ,  e . g . , United Nuclear, 2 2  E n v ' t  Rep .  Cas .  (BNA) 1 7 9 1 , app .  l i 94 ( D . N . M .  1 98 5 )  
(setting forth text of court order limiting permissible E PA conduct t o  specific acts s u c h  as 
hydrogeological study, aquifer testing,  and groundwater sampling); cf. Standard E quipment,  1 9  
E nv't Rep. Cas. ( B NA) at 2 1 02-03 (W.D.  Was h .  1 983)  (requiring the E PA to report to the 
owner within 6o days any damage to the property resulting from the agency's activities o n  the 
site and on adj acent l ands i f  such a report would be "reasonably practicable") .  No court has 
directly addressed whether, once the E PA has gained entry, the ownt:r retains a fifth amendment 
right of action for j ust compensation for any potential taking. 
2 1  See Outboard Marine Corp.  v .  Thomas, 7 7 3  F. z d  883 ( 7 th Cir. 1 98 5 ) .  I n  Outboard , the 
E PA sought to enter an u ncontaminated adj acent site and to engage in construction/response 
activities that were not included within the statutory right to survey and i nspect. The court 
held that "[t]he power to enter at reasonable times is not given to begin any response construction , 
or even for design or surveying purposes. The authority to enter to inspect and obtain 
samples ,  gather information , and inspect records is l imited to the hazardous substance it­
self. . " I d.  at S8g. The court went o n  to note that "what the E PA actually seeks is . a 
temporary easement to enter and cross over private ground" not itself alleged to be part of the 
hazard and that, therefore, to gain entry the EPA must have the land condemned and pay its 
appraised value prior to entry. See id.  at 890. 
22  See ,  e . g. , Lone Pine Steering Comm. v. E PA ,  7 7 7  F. z d  882 (3d Cir. r g8 5 ) ,  petition for 
cert. filed, 5 4  U . S . L. W. 3 5 84 ( U . S .  F e b .  2 0 ,  1 986) (No.  8 5 - 1 389) ;  J . V. Peters & Co.  v. Ruck­
elshaus, 7 6 7  F . 2 d  263 ( 6th Cir. 1 98 5 ) ;  Wagner Elec . Corp. \' .  Thomas, 6 1 2  F .  Supp. i36 ( D .  
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review and subsequent appeal would indeed frustrate the central goal 
of section 1 042 3 by eliminating the ability of the EPA to respond 
quickly to environmental hazards requiring  immediate cleanup ac­
tion .  24 Although courts have recognized that this lack of review raises 
due process concerns ,  they have concluded that potentially responsible 
parties are adequately protected by the opportunity under section r o7 
to raise all of their claims as defenses in the E PA's subsequent cost 
recovery action . 2 5 Beyond this procedural protection , the potentially 
responsible party is also accorded practical protection by the fact that 
the EPA has no incentive to undertake unjustified cleanup measures ,  
because i t  may ultimately recover from potentially responsible parties 
only those costs "not inconsistent" with the NCP. 2 6  
The E PA's ability to investigate and to conduct unhindered re­
sponse action has been strongly supported by the courts .  Section 1 04 
actions,  however, rapidly deplete the Fund . When a responsible party 
can be identified, therefore, recovery of costs under section 1 0 7  is the 
next important step if the integrity of the Fund is to be maintained.  
Various procedural battles,  however, may make such recovery com­
plicated and costly. 
(b) S e ction 1 0 7  Recovery of Costs . - Section r o7 (a)(4)(A) empow­
ers the EPA to recover response costs from responsible parties .  Section 
1 0 7  enumerates four classes of defendants against whom claims may 
be brought: 2 7 ( r )  the current owner of the vessel or facility that 
produced the hazardous waste ; ( 2 ) any person who owned or operated 
the property at the time the hazardous wastes were disposed on it; (3 )  
any person who contracted or otherwise arranged for disposal of the 
hazardous substance ; 2 8 and (4) any person who accepted the hazardous 
Kan . I 9 8 5 ) ;  United States v .  Reil ly Tar & Chern. Corp . , 6o6 F .  Supp.  4 I 2  (D. Minn. I 98 5 ) ;  
Aminoil ,  Inc .  v .  E PA ,  5 99 F .  Supp.  6 9  ( C . D .  C a l .  I 984) .  
One court h as rej ected the distinction between immediate ( "removal") and long-term ("re­
medic:l" J  actions for purposes of preenforcement review. S e e ,  e . g . , Lone Pine , i 7 7  F. 2 d  at 88?-
88 (rej ecting tht· p laintiff 's contention that  remedial actions should be appealable even if removal 
actions are not) . 
23 As a recent Senate Report declared :  "[P]re-enforcement review would be a significant 
obstacle to the implementation of response actions . Pre-enforcement review would lead to 
considerable delay in  pro\· iding cleanups, would increase response costs, and would discourage 
settlements and voluntary cleanups . "  S. REP.  No. I I ,  99th Cong. , I s t  Sess. 58 ( I 98S )  [hereinafter 
cited as SENATE REPORT]. 
24 See S .  REP. No. 848 , 96th Cong . .  2d Sess. I 0- 1 2 ( 1 980) .  
2 5  See Lone Pine ,  7 7 7  F. 2 d  at 88 7 ;  United States v .  U n ited Nuclear Corp . ,  6ro F. Supp.  
5 2 7 ,  5 2 9  (D . N . lVI. 1 98 5 ) .  
! 6  See  CE RCLA � I 0 7 (a) ( . j ) ( .-\ ) ,  4 2  U .S C .  § 9607 ( a) (4 )(A) ( r g8 z ) ;  see  also Industrial Park 
Dev. Co. v. E PA ,  6o4 F .  Supp. 1 1 3 6 ,  1 1 44 (E D . Pa. I 98 5 ) .  
2 7 S e c  CERCLA 9 I 0 7 ( a) ( I )-( .j ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 9607 (a) ( r )-(4) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
28 See New York v.  General Elec .  Co . ,  5 9 2  F .  Supp.  2 9 1 ,  297  (N. D . N . Y. I 984) ( holding 
that when a. company contracts with others to dispose or  transport hazardous wastes, it.  does 
1 490 HAR VARD LAW REVIEW [Vol .  99 : 1458 
waste for transportation or disposal . Despite this broad range of 
potential defendants , however, section r o 7  actions often encounter 
expensive and time-consuming procedural obstacles .  
(i) Penonal Jurisdiction.  - Section r r 3 (b) provides federal district 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction and venue over C ERCLA 
claims , but is silent with respect to the requirements for personal 
jurisdiction . 2 9 Because the statute does not provide for nationwide 
service of process , it is unclear whether potential defendants must 
have the normally requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum state 
before being subject to suit under CERCLA. At least one court has 
concluded that minimum contacts are required and that a defendant's 
abil ity to foresee that its h azardous waste might end up in the forum 
state is insufficient contact to confer jurisdiction .  30 B ecause such 
holdings inhibit an individual court's ability to exercise j urisdiction 
over all the potentially responsible parties with "deep pockets , "  they 
hinder the government's ability to recover the costs of cleanup under 
section 1 07.  Amendments recently proposed in Congress would ex­
plicitly provide for nationwide service of process in C ERCLA cases .  3 1 
Until such amendments become law, however, excess delays and in­
crease<;! costs in government recovery actions are inevitable as the 
government is forced to break up large actions and to sue defendants 
individually in those states that do have jurisdiction over them .  
( ii) Recoverable Costs .  - A recurring question in  cost recovery 
litigation has been what kinds of costs are recoverable under section 
1 07, particularly because that section does not define "recoverable 
costs .  "3 2 The EPA has had to address several diffe rent proposals to 
limit cost recovery. For example , one court has suggested that re­
moval and remedial costs should be treated differently for cost recov­
ery purposes . 3 3 The court reasoned that because remedial measures 
were long-term and involved the use of new or experimental tech­
niques,  the costs thus expended should be subj ect to heightened scru­
tiny 34 But because section r o 7  allows recovery for " necessary costs 
of response"35 and response is defined in CERCLA as "removal . . .  
not contract away its statutory responsibility) ;  see also infra Subsection 1 of Section A of Part 
' lT \ . .  
1 9  See C E RCLA � r 1 3 (b ) ,  4 2  U.S C .  § 9 6 r 3 (b}  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
3 0  S e e  Roberts v .  Pici l lo ,  C A  83-0 7 8 7 P  (D . R. I .  Feb.  1 2 ,  1 98 5 ) .  
3 1  S e e  HousE REPORT, s upra note r ,  at  1 3  (setting forth proposed § r r 3 ( f )) ;  SENATE REPORT,  
supra note 2 3 ,  at r r 6  (setting forth proposed § 1 1 3(h) ) .  
32 Courts have also had to contend with the basic question of whether costs incurred prior 
to the  enactment of  C E RC LA are recoverable. See infra Section E of Part  V .  
33 See  Artesian \Vater Co .  v. New Castle County, 6os F. Supp.  1 348 ,  1 35 9-6 1 ( D .  Del .  
1 9 8 5 ) .  B u t  see Thomas,  lvlunicipal and PYivate Party Claims UndeY Supe1jz:nd ,  13  ENVTL.  L .  
REP. ( E�-IVTL. L. INST . )  1 0, 2 7 2 ,  1 0 , 2 7 2  ( I 983)  (rejecting the  relevance of the  removal/remedial 
distinction for the purpose of defining recoverable costs ) .  
3-l See  A rtesian Water, 6os F .  Supp.  at 1 3 5 9-6 1 .  
3 3  C ERCLA S I O i ( al (4)( B ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § g6oi (a) (4)( B }  ( 1 982 ) . 
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and remedial action ,  "36 this distinction is untenable . 3 7 Despite this 
and similar attempts by defendants or courts to define cleanup costs 
narrowly, one commentator has suggested that the range of properly 
recoverable costs is quite wide . 38 Because the range of recoverable 
costs remains an unsettled question , however, extensive l itigation 
could ensue each time a particular cost is challenged.  This inherently 
piecemeal approach could be partially remedied by a congressional 
declaration that certain costs are categorically recoverable as "cleanup 
costs" and that only those falling outside this category would be 
subject to case-by-case analysis .  
( iii) S tatute of Limitations . - At least one court has expressly 
held that the three-year statute of limitations in section 1 r 2 (d)39 does 
not apply to section 1 07 actions and that such actions may be brought 
at any time . 40 In  United S tates v.  Mottola , a district court found 
that declining to apply the three-year limit is consistent with the 
remedial intent underlying section 1 04 because it ensures " that the 
Government is free to undertake thorough and cautious action in 
potentially protracted hazardous waste clean-up operations .  "4 1 The 
court decided that the statute of limitations in section r r 2 (d) should 
apply only to claims of recovery against the Fund42 and not to section 
1 07 actions against potentially responsible parties .  43 
The M ottolo court's reading is consistent with the express language 
of the statute . As more time passes ,  however, courts may balk  at an 
36 CERCLA � r o 1 ( 2 5 ) , 4 2  U . S . C .  9 96o r ( 2 5 )  ( r 98 2 ) .  
3 7  Some courts have also viewed the requirements o f  § §  1 04 and I O S  as l imiting the range 
of recoverable costs. For a discussion of these l imitations ,  see Part VI. A. 2 .  
38 Specific expenses that are potentially recoverable include the costs of: 
r )  identifying the source of contamination; 2) identifying the physical characteristics 
of the harmful  substance; 3 )  securing the site; 4 )  protecting the property or  water supply 
source through removal or  containment of the hazardous substance; 5 )  temporarily evac­
uating and housing persons at risk or [sic] exposure; 6) temporarily replacing a contam­
inated water source; 7) developing a permanent replacement source of water supply . 
8) operating and maintaining containment structures and treatment facilities. 
Thomas, s upra note 3 3 ,  at 1 0 , 2 7 3 ·  
3 9  4 2  U . S . C .  � g6 r 2 (d )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  T h e  statute provides that: 
No c laim may be presented, nor may an action be commenced for damages under this 
subchapter, unless that claim is presented or action commenced within three years from 
the elate of the discovery of the loss . : Provided, however, That the time l imitations 
contained herein shall not begin to run against a minor until he reaches eighteen years 
of age or  a legal representative is duly appointed for h im,  nor against an incompetent 
person until h is incompetency ends or  a legal representative is duly appointed for h im.  
ld. (emphasis in original ) .  
40 See United States \·. Mottolo,  6os  F. Supp .  898 (D . N . H .  1 98 5 ) .  
4 1  l d .  a t  903 
41  For a fuller discussion of claims for recovery against the Fund , see below pp. 1 496-1 5 00.  
4 3  See Mo ttollo , 6os F. Supp.  at 904-5 . Alo ttolo can be read, however, as removing the 
statute of l imitations only for governmental and not for private party claims brought under 
§ 1 0 7 .  The M ottolo case was brought by governmental plaintiffs; the court's reasoning relied 
in part on its assertion that any rule barring the rights of a government must be narrowly 
interpreted .  See 6os F .  Supp.  at 902 . 
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interpretation that gives the government a right to bring a recovery 
claim at any time , no matter how old the claim. Fearing prosecution 
on stale claims, federal courts might turn to analogous state statutes 
in order to imply some kind of statute of limitations in reimbursement 
claims . 4 4  This solution ,  of course ,  would pose its own problems be­
cause it would inject nonuniformity into the application of C ERCLA. 
The proposed House amendments would solve this problem by estab­
lishing a six-year statute of limitations for all recovery claims .  45  
(iv) R ight to a Jury Trial .  - Although virtually all courts address­
ing the issue have determined that the defendant has no right to a 
jury trial in  cost recovery actions , 46 the EPA must still occasionally 
expend resources and time contesting demands for trial by jury. These 
claims are largely frivolous because CERCLA cost recovery claims 
are equitable in nature . 47 In l ight of accumulated precedent confirm­
ing this view, courts should completely avoid unnecessary delays by 
44 When interpreting a federal statute without its own statute of limitations,  federal courts 
may turn to an analogous state law and apply that law's statute of  l imitations to the federal 
statute. See , e . g . , B rown v .  Producers Livestock Loan Co: , 469 F. Supp.  2 7 ,  3 3  ( 1 9 7 8 )  (turning 
to analogous state law to determine the relevant statute of limitations for the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1 940 ,  rs U . S .  C .  § 8ob- r  to 8ob- 2 r ,  a federal statute lacking its own statute of l imitations) . 
U nl ike the I nvestment Advisers Act, however, C ERCLA docs contain a statute of limitations ;  
it seems clearly l imited,  however, to  recoveries against the Fund.  See C E RCLA � I I 2 (d) ,  4 2 
U . S .  C .  § 96 1 2 (d) ( I  982 ) . In addressing recoveries against potentially responsible parties, courts 
should be free to look to state law for guidance j ust as though C E RCLA contained no statute 
of l imitations.  
45 See HousE REPORT, supra note r ,  at I .) .  Section r r 2 (d)( 1 )  would erect a six-year statute 
of limitations for all c laims against the Fund.  This limitation period would start to run on the 
date of completion of all response actions. Section r 1 3 ( h) ( 2 )  would do the same for cost recovery 
actions against potentially responsible parties .  See id. 
46 In a relatively early C E RCLA case i n  which the government sought reimbursement for 
cleanup costs expended, a district court declared that "(i)t is indeed a c lose question whether 
the government seeks equitable relief by being restored to the position it formerly occupied or 
as a legal remedy similar to a money j udgment on a debt for services rendered. "  U nited States 
v. Northeastern Pharm . & C hern Co. ( N EPACC O ) ,  13 ENVTL.  L REP. I E:-<VTL.  L lNST . )  
20 , 992 . 2 0 , 993 (\V. D .  Mo. I 98 3 )  (avoiding the difficulty by suggesting use o f  an advisory j ury 
under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 39(c ) ) .  Since that time, however, courts have not allowed jury trials 
in CERCLA cost reconry actions .  S ee,  e . g . , U n i ted States v. Mottolo,  6os F. Supp.  898 
(D . N . H .  1 98 5 ) ;  We hner v Syntcx Corp . ,  I 5 ENVTL. L .  REP ( ENVTL .  L INST . )  z o , 2 I O ( E . D .  
Mo. Dec.  2 6 ,  1 984) ;  U n ited States v .  Ohio e x  rei. Gcorgeoff, 2 2  E n v't Rep .  Cas. ( BNA) r 6o r  
( N . D  Ohio I 984) .  
47  A n y  request for a j ury by a defendant in a § r o 7 (a) action must no\v b e  viewed a s  a 
purely dilatory tactic . Claims for restitution have been recognized as equitable in natur::, see 
Porter v .  Warner Holding Co. , 3 28 U . S .  3 9 5 , 400-02 ( 1 946) , and the seventh amendment right 
to trial by j u ry does not extend to purely equitable claims, see Ross v .  Bernhard , 396 U . S .  5 3 1  
( 1 970) ;  Beacon Theaters, I n c .  v .  Westo\·er, 3 5 9  U . S .  s oo ( 1 959 ) .  Furthermore, c laims for natural 
resource damage u nder S 1 0 7 ( a) (4) (C)  are equitable to the extent that the government seeks only 
to reco\·er expended funds. S ee U nited States v. Wade, 20 Env't Rep .  Cas.  (B:NP..) r 8 5 3 ,  i 3 5 5  
( E D Pa. 1 984) .  
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summarily striking demands for jury trials sua sponte in section 1 0 7 (a) 
actions .  48 
(c) Conclusion.  - As interpreted by courts and implemented by 
the EPA, section 1 04 has been highly effective in achieving quick, 
effective cleanup at the most dangerous dumpsites .  This success 
comes at a high cost, however, in terms of both financial drain on the 
Fund and personnel hours spent implementing section 1 04 plans.  This 
cost also derives in large part from lengthy and expensive section 1 0 7  
actions against identifiable defendants . Although section 1 04/ 1 07 ac­
tions certainly have a role to play in the present C ERCLA system -
section 1 04 actions to remedy the most imminent hazards quickly and 
efficiently, section 1 0 7  actions to recover those costs expended and to 
set favorable legal precedents - they fail to achieve the most cleanup 
per Fund dollar spent. A system in which the EPA could directly 
order potentially responsible parties to clean up the sites themselves 
would be more effective , because Fund expenditures would be nec­
essary only for monitoring the cleanups . C ERCLA currently permits 
such directives through the provisions of section 1 06 .  Those provi­
sions are ideally suited for most nonemergency, government-initiated 
cleanups when a potentially responsible party has been identified.  
Section 1 o6 ,  however, is  used far less frequently than the more costly 
section 1 04/ r o 7  action .  This disuse has resulted from needlessly nar­
row judicial interpretations of C ERCLA . 
2. S ection 1 06 A c tions 
\Vhen the EPA has identified one or more potentially responsible 
parties , and the danger at the site is not so grave as to require 
immediate action , the most appropriate action by the EPA is to use 
the enforcement mechanisms of section 1 o6(a) . 49 Under section 1o6 (a) 
the EPA has two options .  Whenever it determines that there may be 
an "imminent and substantial endangermenf' to public health or the 
environment, it may ask the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief 
in federal court. Alternatively, it can issue an administrative order 
48 A j ury should not necessarily be denied, however, in nonequitable claims brought under 
other sections of C E RCLA. For instance , a jury might very well be appropriate in a punitive 
§ I O / (C ) ( 3 )  action for treble damages. 
49 See Reed,  supra note 9, at 1 0 , "  2 6 .  This is true despite the "imminent and substantial 
endangerment" language of  � 1 06 because, as discussed further at pp. 1 494-96 below, the 
allowance of p�eenforcement judicial re\·iew of § 1 06 administrative orders h as effectively 
eviscerated that section's immediacy. Of course, other considerations, such as the possibility of 
obtaining a favorable legal precedent, may tip the scales of an individual case toward enforce­
ment under § §  1 04 and 1 0 7  e\·en in the absence of an immediate danger. Moreover, when no 
potentially responsible parties can be found,  the EPA may c lean up the site itself u nder § 1 04 .  
See  i d .  
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directly if  i t  determines that such an order is  "necessary to protect 
public health and welfare and the environment. "5 0 The inj unctive 
order is immediately enforceable ,  but the procedures for obtaining it 
are slow and costly. Conversely, although administrative orders are 
easily and quickly issued,  they are not immediately enforceable .  B e­
cause the c ircumstances under which the EPA can issue an adminis­
trative order usually include the far narrower situations in which an 
inj unction would be authorized ,  the injunctive relief provision of sec­
tion r o6(a) is rarely used .  5 1  
Administrative orders , however, are not self-enforcing. The EPA 
has two options when it encounters noncompliance with an order. 
First , it can seek to enforce the order in federal district court under 
section r o6 (b) . If the EPA obtains the enforcement o rder, the poten­
tially responsible party may be retroactively charged as much as $s ooo 
a day for each day of noncompliance with the original administrative 
order. Nothing prevents the EPA from waiting an extended period 
of time to bring its enforcement action and thereby increasing the 
pressure on potentially responsible parties to comply without judicial 
review. 5 2  Alternatively, the EPA may clean up the site itself and then 
sue for treble damages under section r o7 (c)(3 ) ,  provided it can show 
that the defendant lacked "sufficient cause" for noncompliance .  The 
sufficient cause defense has been interpreted narrowly; thus, only 
rarely has a defendant invoked it with success . S :' It  may be inferred 
from the punitive nature of these two enforcement mechanisms that 
Congress intended even bare administrative orders to have an in 
terrorem effect on potentially responsible parties . 
Although this effect could render section r o6 orders an invaluable 
enforcement tool , the EPA has been reluctant to use then due to 
contradictory holdings with respect to their reviewablity. 5 4 One view 
is exemplified by Earthline Co .  v .  Kin-Buc>  Inc . , 5 5  in which the court 
found that the EPA's issuance of an order pursuant to section r o6 did 
50 C E RCLA � ro6(a) ,  4 2  U .S C .  � g6o6(al  ( r g8 2 ) .  
5 1 Compare the first sentence of � I 06(a)  which authorizes inju nctive relief only when there 
is "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public  health o r  welfare" with the second 
sentence of the same secti o n ,  which authorizes any other action,  including administrative orders, 
"as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare . "  See 4 "  U . S . C .  § g6o6(a)  ( r g8 2 ) .  
5 2 S e e  Aminoil , I n c .  v .  E PA ,  5 99 F .  Supp.  6 9 ,  73  ( C D .  Cal. 1 984) .  
53 S e e  id .  at 7 2 -7 3 .  
5 4  Another factor limiting the utility o f  § 1 06 i s  j udic ial indecision as to whether that section 
applies retroacti\·ely to allow recovery of damages against past, nonnegligent,  off-site generators . 
One court relied heavily on the usc of the present tense in s r o6 to support its view that that 
section authorizes only injunctive action to stop current dumping activity. See  U nited States v. 
Wade , 5 4 6  F. Supp.  785 , 7 9 2-94 ( E . D  Pa. r g8 2 ) .  B u t see United States \'. Price 57 i F. Supp.  
r 1 0 3 .  1 1  r r -1 3  (D . N.J.  1 983) ( noting that, gi\·en the c o ngressional purpose of el iminating dan­
gerous hazardous waste sites,  it is highly unl ikely that Congress i ntended � r o6 to apply only 
prospectively) . 
55 1 5  E :--�vn. L .  REP.  i ENVTL L. I N ST . )  2 0 , 3 1 5  ( D . :'--1 J 1 984l .  
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not constitute a final agency action and therefore was not subj ect to 
judicial review. 5 6 The court held that such review would be prema­
ture because the order serves merely as a prerequisite to a subsequent 
agency enforcement action and that no concrete dispute exists without 
an enforcement proceeding. 5 7 Under this view, judicial review would 
be unavailable even when the party challenging the agency - like 
the defendant in Kin-Buc - is subject to penalties for noncompliance ,  
because rights and liabilities become fixed only after an enforcement 
proceeding has commenced . The parties retain their rights , however, 
to assert any obj ection to the order if the EPA seeks enforcement. 5 8  
The alternative view o f  reviewability i s  exemplified b y  A minoil, 
Inc . v .  EPA . 59 In  A minoil ,  the potentially responsible party sought 
a preliminary inj unction against the imposition of penalties for its 
noncompliance prior to any EPA attempt to seek an enforcement 
order. The court agreed that, given the emergency public health and 
environmental protection purposes of section r o6 (a) , Congress had 
intended to preclude preenforcement review of abatement orders . 60 
The court proceeded, however, effectively to allow preenforcement 
review by granting the plaintiff potentially responsible party's request 
and preliminarily enjoining the EPA from seeking an enforcement 
order or imposing penalties for noncompliance .  The court found that 
because Aminoil ( I )  was likely to prevail on the merits of the CERCLA 
claim; ( 2 )  ran a serious risk of being erroneously deprived of due 
process because the penalties for noncompliance were sufficiently great 
to persuade it to obey without challenge ; and (3)  faced serious possi­
bility of irreparable inj ury, it was appropriate to grant Aminoil a 
preliminary injunction barring the EPA from seeking either a $s ooo­
a-day penalty under section r o6 (a) or treble damages under section 
r o 7 (c) (3 ) . 6 1  The A minoil  court admitted that its preliminary injunction 
contravened congressional intent, but the court allowed preenforce­
ment judicial revievv to avoid a feared unconstitutional deprivation of 
clue process . 
The A minoil court probably could have addressed its due process 
concerns in a less intrusive way. The Senate has passed an amend­
ment to section r o6 that would address the due process concerns raised 
in A minoil without burdening section ro6 actions with a lengthy 
process of pre-cleanup litigation . The amendment would allow poten-· 
tially responsible parties subj ect to section r o6(a) abatement orders to 
56 S e e  SE:--i.HE REPORT. supra note 2 3 .  at s S  ( indicating congressional i n tent to preclude pre-
eniorcemcnt review oi � ro6 administratin orders ! .  
5 i S e e  Kin-B u c ,  r s  ENVTL .  L.  R E P .  ( ENVT L .  L .  l:\ST . I ,  a t  2 0 , 3 1 6 .  
5 8  S e e  id .  
5 9  1 4  ENVT L .  L .  REP. I E :\\'TL .  L .  h;sT . )  a t  2 0 , 8 o r  ( C . D. Cal .  S e p t .  2 8 ,  1 984! .  
6 0  S e e  id .  at 2 o , So r .  
6 1 S ee i d .  a t  2 0 ,802-04 .  
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recover expended cleanup costs from the Fund. 62 Such potentially 
responsible parties would be able to recover their costs , plus interest, 
if they could prove either that they were not liable for the hazardous 
waste damage or that the response action had been ordered in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. 63 Although the proposed amendment 
would make explicit the right of a potentially responsible p arty w ho 
complies with an administrative order to challenge its validity later, 
courts could probably create such a right under C E RC LA as the 
statute is presently constituted .  64 
By allowing the potentially responsible party the option of com­
plying with the administrative order and later seekin g  reimbursement, 
Congress would take a large step toward addressing the due process 
concerns expressed by the A minoil court. Courts have traditionally 
observed a number of exceptions to the general rule requiring a hear­
ing prior to a government deprivation when a p rior hearing and its 
inherent delays would be inconsistent with an important governmental 
interest. 65 These exceptions have been allowed on the theory that, 
because the government would be required to pay compensation if the 
subsequent hearing indicates mistaken action ,  denial of the prior hear­
ing does not severely burden those subject to the summary action . 66 
Moreover, by expressly giving potentially responsible p arties only post­
cleanup hearings , Congress and the courts for the first time would 
realize the original goal of section ro6 to permit quick and effective 
response to dangerous hazardous waste sites .  6? 
B .  Private Party Cleanups 
C ERCLA establishes a private cause of action  for recovery of 
response costs68 in order to encourage cleanup by p rivate parties while 
62 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2 3 ,  at 5 8 . 
6J See id .  
64 Although nothing in  C ERCLA expressly compels the reimbursement of  those wrongfully 
forced to clean up a site under � 1 06 , nothing in  the statute forbids such reimbursement. For 
instance ,  parties erroneously ordered to bear the full cost of a cleanup  could sue other poten tially 
responsible parties for contribution .  
65 See B oddie v. Con necticut, 40 1  C . S . 3 7 1 ,  3 7 7  ( 1 97 1 ) ;  ] .  :--.rowAK, R. ROTUND.-'. & ].  
YouNG , CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw 5 7 8-; 9 ( 1 983 l ;  L .  TRIB E ,  AMERICA.:-� CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 
§ 1 0- 1 4 ,  at 5 45 ( 1 978 ) .  
66 S e e  L .  T R I B E .  supra note 65 ,  § r o - 1 4 ,  at  545 · 
6 i Strict EPA monitoring of these cleanups would be required to avoid any unnecessary 
delays or cutting of corners. E\·en the most rigorous monitoring, however,  would require far 
less expenditure of both Fund money and personnel  than a § 104 c leanup .  
6S Although i t  seems ob,·ious that C ERCL\ was intended to  create a p rivate right of action 
for cleanup costs, defe ndants in some early C ERCLA cases argued that on ly the government 
could sue for reimbursement .  See,  e . g  . .  Bulk Distrib . Centers, Inc. v. Monsar- �" Co. , 5 89 F.  
Supp.  1.1 3 7 , 1 444 (S . D .  F la .  1 9S4 l. 
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reducing the drain on federal resources. 6 9 A private party70 may bring 
either a section I I 2 claim against the Fund or a section I 0 7  action 
directly against the responsible parties. 7 1 Such a private party, how­
ever, is faced with cumbersome procedural standards for section I I 2 
claims and vague pre-cleanup conditions for section I 07  actions.  7 2 
The EPA's attempt to remedy these difficulties in its revised National 
Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)73 is 
inadequate for two reasons:  first , not all of the revisions are binding 
on courts ; 7 4  second, even if courts defer to the revised NCP, the 
numerous preconditions to recovery will likely deter private clean­
ups .  7 5  
I .  Common R e quirements for S ection 1 12 R ecovery Against 
the Fund and S ec tion 107 A c tions Agains t R esponsible Parties 
Both section I I 2 "claims" (against the Superfund) and section 
r o 7 (a)(4)(B) "actions" (against the potentially responsible parties) share 
certain basic procedural requirements . A valid recovery claim or 
69 When responsibility for a cleanup is assumed by nongovernmental entities,  savings are 
realized primarily through the reduction i n  administrative costs and the increased time value of 
Fund money. 
iO The term "private party, " as used here, comprehends local governments as well  as non­
governmental entities. 
i l  See C ERCLA § §  r r z (a ) ,  r o 7 (a)(4l( B ) ,  4 2  U S. C . § §  96 r 2 (a) ,  9607(a)(4)(B) ( r 98 2 ) .  "Claim" 
is used throughout C E RC LA to mean a demand for compensation against the Fund; "action" 
is consistently used to mean j udicial action .  See U n ited States v .  Mottolo, 6os F .  Supp 898 , 
903-04 ( D . N . H .  1 98 s l .  
There remains a n  unexplored third option for private action that i s  not included i n  C ERCLA: 
under the present language of the statute, a C E RCLA plaintiff may not seek private affirmative 
injunctive relief against the government as a remedy either under § ro6 or elsewhere. S ee Luckie 
\·.  Gorsuch ,  1 3  ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL L .  INST. )  2 0 , 400, 2 0 , 405 (D. Ariz. Feb. 2 5 ,  1 98 3 ) ;  
.1\JcCastle v. Rollins E nvtl.  Serv. , 5 1 4 F .  Supp.  9 3 6 ,  940 (M. D .  L a .  1 98 1 ) . T h e  proposed House 
amendments to C ERCLA would grant injured citizens the right to sue the E PA or any other 
governmental body for failure to perform a nondisc retionary act or duty under C ERCLA. See 
HousE REPORT , supra note r ,  a t  3 8 ,  6 r .  T h i s  proposal would not establish a private right 
under § ro6 ,  however, because the language of that section is discretionary. See  Luckie ,  1 3  
ENVTL. L .  REP . ( E NVTL. 1 .  INST. ) , at 2 0 , 405 . 
i l "With Congress's attention focused on government involvement in waste site clean u p ,  it 
comes as no surprise that those portions of C E RCLA's text and legislative history discussing a 
private party's rights against other private pm·t ies vis-a-vis the Fund are ill-defined. " Bulk 
Distrib .  Centers , I n c .  v .  Monsanto C o . , 5 8 9  F. Supp.  1 43 7 , 1 443 (S .D.  Fla. 1 984) (emphasis i n  
original ) .  
i J S e e  s o  Fed.  Reg .  4 7 , 9 1 2  ( 1 98 5 )  ( to be codified a t  40 C . F. R .  § 3 0 0 ) .  T h e  revised N C P  
became effective on February r 8 ,  1 98 6 .  See  i d .  
7 4 The E PA recognizes this problem but avers that courts w i l l  generally defer t o  the NCP. 
See  s o  Fed. Reg. 4 7 , 9 1 2 ,  4 7 , 934 ( 1 98 5 ) .  
; s  The E PA historically has failed t o  encourage significant private cleanup.  S e e  W. DK4Y­
To:--r ,  supra note 1 ,  at s S ;  supra p p .  1 4 93-96 (discussing § r o6 actions). 
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action presupposes that the private plaintiff has actually begun the 
cleanup of a site contaminated with hazardous substances.  7 6 This 
requirement promotes C ERCLA's goal of cleanup by e nsuring that 
the claimant or  plaintiff has undertaken more than mere studies and 
preparations - preparation by itself is not C ERCLA's aim .  7 7  B ecause 
this requirement may serve as a practical obstacle if a private party's 
resources are particularly limited,  however, many courts may issue a 
declaratory judgment regarding future liability provided that the 
plaintiff has incurred at least some response costs . 7 8  This j udgment 
allows a plaintiff who has begun cleanup to recover both past and 
future costs of preparing and implementing the cleanup plan .  
Before an action o r  claim for recovery can b e  initiated ,  C ERCLA 
further requires that a demand for restitution be submitted directly to 
any identifiable potentially responsible party. 7 9 Using EPA procedures 
for government cost recovery actions as a model , one court has indi­
cated that the demand letter should contain the following elements: 
( r )  a discussion of the spill site , including its location ;  ( 2 )  a description 
of the nature of the spill ; ( 3 )  a description of the cleanup efforts already 
undertaken ;  and (4) a clear statement of the past and future costs of 
response activity broken down into general categories. 80 The claim 
letter should also refer specifically to C ERCLA in order to ensure the 
adequacy of the notice . 8 1 Failure to include in the letter "a demand 
in writing for a sum certain" may lead to entry of summary judgment 
against the claimant or plaintiff. 82 After submission of the demand 
letter, the plaintiff must give the potentially responsible parties sixty 
days in which to satisfy the claim. If the claim remains unsatisfied 
after sixty days , the plaintiff may either present the claim to the Fund 
for payment or commence action in court against the potentially re­
sponsible parties .  83 
76 See  CERCLA §§ I o7 ( a) (4 )( B ) ,  r r r (a ) ;  42 U . S . C .  §§ 9607 (a) (4)( B ) ,  96 r r (a) ( 1 98 2 ) .  For the 
definition of "hazardous substance , "  see CERC LA § r o r ( q) ,  42  U . S . C .  § 96o r ( r 4 )  ( I 98 2 ) .  A 
valid recovery c laim also p resupposes that the private plaintiff is not attempting to recover for 
damage to state or federally managed natural resources, see C ERCLA §§ I0 7 (f l ,  I I I (b ) ;  4 2  
U . S .  C .  ��  960 7 ( f ) ,  9 6 1  r (b )  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  s e e  also infra Part VII .A . 2 ;  or  for response costs that were 
incurred before the enactment of C E RCLA, see C ERCLA § r r r ( d)( r ) ,  42  U . S . C .  § 96 r r (d )( r )  
( I 98 2 ) .  Note, however, that § 1 07 can b e  applied retroactively to waste dumped prior to I 980 
as  long as  the  response costs were incurred after I 98o. See U n ited States v .  Northeastern 
Pharm. & Chern. Co .  (NEPACCO) ,  3 7 9  F. Supp. 8 2 3 ,  84 I-43 (W. D Mo.  1 984) .  
; ;  See  Bulk D istrib .  Centers,  Inc .  \ ' .  Monsanto Co . , 589  F. Supp.  1 4 3 7 ,  1 43 1-3 2 ( S . D .  Fla .  
1 984) 
;s See, e . g . , Jones v. I nmont Corp . ,  3 84 F .  Supp. 1 4 2 3 ,  1430 (S . D .  Ohio 1 984) .  
i 9  S e e  C ERCLA § r r 2 ( a ) ,  .p U . S . C .  § 96 1 2 (a) ( r 98 2 ) .  
so S ee B ulk Distribu tion,  3 8 9  F. Supp .  at 1 44 9  & n . 2 3 .  
S l  S e e  Thomas ,  supra note 3 3 ,  a t  1 0 , 2 73 · 
S! See CERCLA § r o r (4 ) ,  42 U . S . C .  § g6o r (4 )  ( ! 982 ) .  
S.i See CERCLA § r 1 2 (a ) ,  42  U . S . C .  § 96 1 2 (a) ( r gS z ) .  
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2 .  R e covery A gains t the Fund Under S ection I I 2  
Any person who has incurred cleanup costs may recover against 
the Fund, provided that the costs were preauthorized by having them 
( I )  approved under the technical requirements of the NCP, and ( z )  
certified by  the responsible federal official . 84 After a c laim for reim­
bursement has been filed against the Fund , the government has forty­
five days in which to arrange a settlement between the c laimant and 
the potentially responsible parties . 85 Any successful settlement is final 
and binding ,  and the parties waive all recourse against the Fund. 8 6  
If the parties fail to settl e ,  either the President o r  the EPA87 may 
calculate and pay an award out of the Fund. 8 8  CERC LA provides 
no standards for calculating the award , 89 but a dissatisfied claimant 
may appeal the decision to the Board of Arbitrators appointed by the 
President. 90 If still dissatisfied, the claimant may in turn appeal the 
arbitrator's decision to the federal district court for the district in 
which the arbitral hearing took place .  9 1 If the section I I z claimant 
is ultimately successful in recovering against the Fund, the federal 
government acquires by subrogation the right of the claimant to re­
cover removal and damage costs from the responsible parties in order 
to reimburse the Fund. 92 
Obtaining reimbursement from the Fund is likely to be far more 
difficult than the statute's language indicates .  93 As noted earlier, the 
EPA has required that in order to acquire a valid recovery claim,  a 
private party must obtain EPA preauthorization before initiating a 
cleanup . 94 For short-term removal actions , approval will probably be 
84 See C ERCLA § I I I (a)( z ) ,  4 2  US. C .  § 96 I r ( a) ( 2 )  ( I 98 2 ) ;  see also Proposed Revision of the 
NCP, 5 0  Fed. Reg. 5 8 6 2 ,  5 8 7 0  ( 1 98 5 )  (describing the standards for preauthorization under the 
then-proposed C. F .  R .  § 300. 2 S (d ) ) .  
ss See  CERCLA � r r z (b ) ( 2 ) (A) ,  (b ) (3 ) ,  42 U S. C .  § g6 ! 2 (b ) ( z ) (A),  (b ) (3 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
86 See  C E RC LA § I I z (b) (2 )(A), 42  U S. C .  § 96 I z( b) (z ) (A) ( I g8 z ) .  
8 7  T h e  President delegated responsibility for managing the Fund processing c laims t o  the 
EPA on August 1 4 ,  r 98 I ,  pursuant to Exec .  Order No. 1 2 , J I 6 .  See 46 Fed. Reg. 4 2 , 2 3 7  ( 1 98 I ) .  
88 S e e  CERCLA § I I z (b)(3 ) ,  (b)(4)(A), 42  U S.  C .  § 96 I 2 (b)(3 ) ,  (b)(4)(A) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
8 9  S e e  C ERCLA § 1 1 2 (b ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 96 r z (b )  ( 1 98 2 ) ;  Comment, Hazardous Waste Clean 
Up in Wyoming: Legal Tools Available to the PYivate Citizen, I 9  LAND & WATER L. REV. 3 9 5 ,  
403 ( 1 984) .  
90 See C E RCLA * I I 2 (b l (4 l (A) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § g6 1 2 (b) (4) (A) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
9 1 S e e  C E RC LA § I 1 2 (b)(4)(G l ,  4 2  U S.  C .  § 96 I z (b)(4)(G )  ( I 982 ) .  This appeal i s  allowed 
because a B oard decision is a fmal administrative action .  See Thomas, supra note 3 3 ,  at 1 0 , 2 7 6 .  
A B oard decision will  b e  overturned , however, only for an "arbitrary or capricious abuse o f  the 
member's discretion . "  C E RCLA § I I 2 (bl(4)(G ) ,  42 U . S .  C .  § 9 6 r z (b)(4)(G) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
92 S e e  CERCLA § §  r I 2 ( c )( 1 )  and ( 3 ) ,  I q(b l ,  42  U . S .  C .  § §  9 6 1 2 (c )( r )  and ( 3 ) ,  9 6 1 4(b)  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
9 3  See  Thomas, supra note 3 3 ,  a t  I 0 , 2 7 5 .  The "difficulty in  obtaining a F u n d  award does 
not arise from the claims procedure established by the statute but rather from EPA's restrictive 
interpretation of the ty·pes of c laims a private party may present . "  !d. at 1 0 , 2 7 6 .  
94 S e e  id. at 1 0 , 2 76 .  Response costs are reimbursable from the Fund only i f  incurred " as a 
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forthcoming if the party is willing to follow the technical rules of the 
NCP. 95 Recovery for these removal actions is limited to costs incurred 
during six months of response action or $r million , whichever is less . 96 
For remedial actions,  however, the NCP requirements formulated by 
the EPA virtually preclude private parties from obtaining preauthor­
ization entitling them to reimbursement. 97 First, the NCP restricts 
remedial action to those sites on the National Priority List (NPL) . 98 
Second,  the EPA has taken the position that Fund assistance for 
remedial action is available only when the requirements of section 
ro4(c)(3) are met - that is , when the state in which the site is located 
has agreed to pay at least ro percent of the costs and to ensure proper 
operation and maintenance of the site . 9 9  A private party or  a 
municipality 100 will probably be unable to convince a state to accept 
such responsibil ities on  its behalf. As a result of these preauthorization 
requirements, private remedial claims against the Fund are virtually 
precluded.  
In crafting the claims procedure for the Fund,  Congress intended 
to create a streamlined system that would process claims quickly. 10 1 
Congressional intent, however, has been frustrated by the EPA's re­
strictive regulation of claims against the Fund .  As one author con­
cludes: 
While EPA approval of privately sponsored remedial actions is cer­
tainly j ustifiable in order to assure proper and cost-effective responses 
to pollution incidents , both the language and legislative history of 
CERCLA's claims provision suggest that Congress did not intend to 
preclude private party c laims on the Fund . . . . The authority for 
EPA's [excessive] regulation in this regard is thus questionable . 102 
Although restrictions on Fund spending are important in order to 
maintain its integrity, unnecessary barriers to recovery only discourage 
private cleanups - especially of those sites for which potentially 
responsible parties cannot be definitely identified. 
resul t  of carrying out  the  n ational contingency pl:m . "  CERCLA § I I I (a ) ( 2  ) ,  42 U . S .  C .  § 
96 r r (a)(2 )  ( 1 98 2  ) . To obtain Fund recovery, the NCP requires that the private individual's plan 
be approved by the EPA Director prior to c leanup. See so Fed. Reg. 4 7 , 9 1 2 ,  4 7 , 95 8  ( 1 98 5 )  
(NCP § 3oo . 2 S (d ) ) .  
9 5  S ee so Fed.  Reg .  4 7 , 9 1 2 ,  4 7 , 969-78 ( I 98 S )  (NCP,  Subpart F-Hazardous Subst2.nces 
Response ) .  
96 S e e  id .  at  4 7 , 9 7  I (NCP S 300 .  6s (b)(J ) ) .  
9; S e e  Thomas, supra note 33 ,  at 1 0 , 2 7 6 .  
9 8  S e e  so Fed. Reg. 4 7 , 9 1 2 ,  4 7 , 9 73 ( r g8 s )  ( N C P  § 30o. 68(a) ) .  Un less the site i s  aiready o n  
the l ist ,  o r  the private party assumes the burden of having it  p u t  o n  the l ist .  there can b e  n o  
recovery. 
99 See C ERCL:\ § I 04 (C ) (3 ) ,  42 u . S . C .  § 9604(C) (J )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 00 See sup>'a note 70 .  
1 0 1 S ee S .  REP .  No.  848 ,  g6th  Cong , 2 d  Sess. So  ( 1 980) .  
1 0 2  Thomas, supra note 33, at 1 0 , 2 7 7  n . so .  
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3 .  S ec tion 107  R ecovery Against R esponsible Parties 
Under section I I 2 the claimant may forego recovery against the 
Fund and bring a recovery action directly against the potentially 
responsible parties .  The machinery for such an action is established 
in section I 0 7 (a)(4)(B) . 1 03 Section r o 7  sets up a two-pronged test that 
the plaintiff must meet in order to recover :  first, the damages must 
be "necessary costs of response"; second,  they must be incurred "con­
sistent with the national contingency plan . " 1 04 When interpreting the 
requirement that costs of response be "necessary, " courts must define 
what expenses qualify as legitimate response costs . The term "re­
sponse costs" is not defined in the Act, and "response" is  defined only 
as "remove , removal , remedy, and remedial action . " 105 The doctrinal 
issues that arise in attempting to define response costs are conceptually 
analogous to those issues that arise in trying to define recoverable 
costs under section I I 2 . 1 06 
By far the more difficult question for courts addressing private 
recovery under section I 0 7 has been the second prong of section 
r o7 (a)(4)(B) requiring that response costs incurred be "consistent" with 
the NCP. A major policy dispute has arisen in the federal courts with 
respect to whether this standard has independent meaning or whether 
it implicitly incorporates the strict preauthorization requirements of 
section I I 2 recovery against the Fund. Two basic views on the 
question have arisen in the cases litigated to date . One court has 
expressed concern that if the governmental approval required by sec­
tion r r 2  is not read into section r o 7 ,  plaintiffs will be set loose to "dig 
up everything. " 107 This court failed to discuss , however, the enormous 
economic disincentive involved in expending cleanup costs that would 
be unrecoverable under the detailed requirements of the NCP: no 
plaintiff would dig up anything unless it were relatively sure that the 
expenses incurred in such an enterprise would lead to a viable cost 
recovery action . These courts also argue that refusal to incorporate 
the section I r 2 preauthorization requirements into section 1 07 en­
courages unilateral action when a concerted action including the po­
tentially responsible parties might be less costly. 108 
103 Courts have found that the language of � I I 2 creates no private right of action indepen­
dent from * I O { .  S e e ,  e . g . , Walls ,. _ Waste Resource Corp . ,  7 6 1  F . 2 d J I I ,  3 1 8- r g  ( 6th C ir. 
r gSs l ;  Jones v. Inmont Corp. , 5 84 F. Supp .  1 4 2 5 ,  r.p 8  ( S . D . Ohio 1 984) .  
1 0 •  C E RCLA § I 0 7 (a)(4)( 8 ) ,  . p  U S C .  � g6o7 (a)(4)( B l  ( 1 98 2 ) . By comparison,  the EPA may 
recover under � 1 0 7  merely by showing that its expenditures were "not inconsistent" with the 
NCP.  S e e  CERCLA § r o 7(a) (4 ) ( .-\ l .  42 U . S . C .  § g6o; (a l (4 l (A)  ( I 98 2 ) .  
105 CE RCLA § r o i ( 2 S ) ,  4 2  U . S . C  � g6o 1 ( 2 5 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
I06 For a discussion o f  recoverable costs, see pp .  qgo-g i abO\·e. 
1 07 B ulk Distrib. Centers, Inc .  , . . :\Ionsanto Co . , 5 8 9  F. Supp .  1 43 7 ,  1 44"\ fS . D .  Fla .  1 984) 
( attri buting the phrase to a member of Congress and recognizing the concern as "val id" ) .  
1 0 '� S e e ,  e . g . , B ulk Distribut ion ,  589 F. Supp.  at 1 44 9 .  
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Most courts , however, have held that the introductory phrase of 
section I 0 7 - "Notwithstanding any other provision or  rule of law" 109 
- indicates that the requirement of section I 07 (a)(4)(B)  is to be defined 
independently of section I I z .  1 1 0 Among the courts adhering to this 
general trend away from j udicial preconditions , however, a severe 
split still exists on the subsidiary question of whether any governmen­
tal action is required to make a private cleanup "consistent" with the 
NCP. Of these courts, at least one has required that before a private 
party may commence a recovery action , the site must be on the 
NPL. 1 1 1  This court reasoned that by failing to require listing of the 
site on the NPL, it would eviscerate the requirement that the action 
be "consistent" with the NCP, undermining the congressional intent  
to  provide a systematic unified response to  hazardous waste prob­
lems . 1 1 2 The court explained away the fact that inclusion in the NPL 
is clearly not required in state recovery of cleanup costs 1 1 3 by arguing 
that governments do not need the additional restraints on  unbridled 
cleanups that individuals require . 1 14 
Most courts that rej ect incorporation of the requirements of section 
I I 2 into section I 07 , however, have adopted the less restrictive view 
that neither adherence to the preauthorization requirements of section 
I I 2 nor listing on the NPL is a prerequisite to recovery of cleanup 
costs under section I 07 .  Some of them have stated that a lesser form 
of government action or  authorization is required . 1 1 5 Others , seeking 
to further the statutory aim of cleanup,  have imposed still fewer 
prerequisites on private recovery plaintiffs , 1 1 6 believing that sufficient 
safeguards are imposed by the statute 's stricter requirement that the 
private plaintiff prove that its actions were "consistent" with the NCP, 
whereas the government has only to prove that its actions were "not 
inconsistent" with the NCP. 1 1 7 
109 CERCLA 9 r o7 (a ) ,  4 2  U S. C .  � 9607 (a )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
t 1 o  S e e, e . g . , U n i ted States v .  Northeastern Pharm . & Chern. C o .  (NEPACCO) ,  5 7 9  F .  Supp .  
8 2 3 ,  850 (W. D .  Mo.  1 984) ;  U nited S tates ,._ Wade,  5 7 7  F. Supp.  1 3 2 6 ,  1 33 6  ( E . D .  Pa. 1 983 ) .  
1 1 1  See  C adil lac Fairview/Cal ifornia ,  Inc .  v. Dow Chern .  Co. , 1 4  ENVTL .  L .  REP .  ( ENVTL. 
L .  INST . )  2 0 , 3 7 6 ,  2 0 , 3 7 9  ( C . D .  Cal. March 5 .  1 984)  
1 1 2 See id .  
1 1 3 S e e  New York \'. Shore Realty Corp . ,  759 F. 2 d  1 03 2 ,  1 04 7-48 ( 2 d .  Cir .  1 98 5 ) . 
1 1 4 See C adil lac Fairview/Cali fornia,  Inc .  v. Dow Chern.  Co. , 1 4  ENVTL. L . REP. (ENVTL. 
L. INST . )  20 , 7 1 6 ,  2 0 , 7 1 7  ( C . D .  Cal.  1 984 ) .  By its own terms this argument i s  over-inclusive,  
however, because many "private'' p laintiffs u nder 9 107 are themselves local governmental 
entities. See s upYa, note 70. 
1 1 5 See, e . g . , Bulk  Distr ib .  Centers ,  Inc . ,. _ :\1onsanto Co.  589 F. Supp .  1 43 7 ,  1 444-45 & 
n . 1 8  (S . D .  Fla.  1 984)  ( requir ing p rior goHrnment approval of cleanup) .  
1 1 6  S e e ,  e . g . , Pinole Point  Properties. Inc . ,. _ Bethlehem Steel Corp . ,  5 96 F .  Supp .  283 ,  2 8 7 -
9 0  ( N . D. C a l .  1 984) .  
1 1 i See United S tates ,. _ Northeastern Pharm . & Chern.  Co .  (NEPAC C O ) ,  5 7 9  F .  Supp .  8 2 3 ,  
8 5 o  (W. D Mo. 1 984) .  
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This least restrictive approach is most consistent with the EPA's 
recently revised NCP. 1 1 8 The NCP attempts to clarify what is meant 
by "consistent with the NCP" and "makes it absolutely clear that no 
Federal approval of any kind is a prerequisite to cost recovery under 
section r o 7 .  " 1 1 9 The revisions are undoubtedly designed to encourage 
more private sector cleanups - cleanups that have been discouraged 
by courts' restrictive reading of the "consistent" requirement of section 
ro7 (a)(4)(B) .  The regulations miss their goal , however, because they 
impose other burdensome prerequisites for private cost recovery. 1 2 0 
By including such requirements as providing "an opportunity for ap­
propriate public comment concerning the selection of a remedial ac­
tion ,  " 1 2 1  the NCP prevents the streamlined response that should be 
the primary advantage of private party cleanups .  The EPA should 
simply establish that third parties may recover only an amount equal 
to what would have been reasonably thought to be the cost-effective 
response . 1 2 2  Further prerequisites to recovery would be unnecessary 
because third parties would have the proper incentives to take efficient 
cleanup measures .  Any further regulation leads only to the possibility 
of delay and the continued existence of dangerous and uncleaned waste 
sites . 
C .  Conclusion 
The amount of federal money available for cleanup of the thou­
sands of hazardous waste sites in the United States is ultimately 
inadequate . CERCLA's problems,  however, would not be solved by 
simply increasing the amount of money available to the Fund . 1 23 The 
EPA is probably not properly equipped to handle effectively a massive 
influx of money into the C ERCLA Fund. 1 2 4  Furthermore , the money 
would be better spent on the prospective and preventive goals of the 
1 1 3 See so Fed. Reg. 4 7 , 9 I 2  ( I 98S ) .  
1 1 9  s o  Feci .  Reg. 4 7 , 9 I 2 ,  4 7 , 934 ( 1 98s l ( to be  codified a t  C . F. R .  9 300. 7 1 ) .  As  noted earlier, 
however, preauthorization is a requirement for recovery against the Fund. Perhaps this dis� 
tinction grows out of a realization that the spending restrictions of §§  104 and I 1 2  were 
implemented to preserve finite F u nd monies. No such considerations need come into play under 
§ 1 0 7  where costs are recovered not from the Fund but from the responsible parties. 
1 20 See so Fed. Reg. 4 7 , 9 1 2 ,  4 7 , 9 7 7  ( r gSs l ( N C P  § 3oo . ; r (a)( 2 )( iHii ) ) .  
1 n  !d.  (NC P  § 300 .  7 I (a)( 2 ) ( i i )( D ) I .  
1 2 2  Moreover, recovery for a n  ineffective response should b e  absolutely barred .  
1 2 " The House has proposed increasing C E RCLA funding for I 985-1 990 to  S2 bi l l ion per 
year. see HousE REPORT , supm note I ,  at 54·  an increase of 6 2 s o/c over the previous average 
annual authorization of S 3 2 bil l ion ,  see \V. DRAYTON, supra note 1 ,  at 5 7 .  The Senate h as 
proposed an increase to S r . s  billion per year, a 469% increase. See SENATE REPORT, supm 
note 2 3 ,  at 6 8 .  
1 2 � S ee N . Y. Times , F e b .  I I ,  1 98 6 ,  at :\) o ,  col . 1 .  
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act  (RCRA) . 1 2 5  The proper 
solution is to spend more effectively the Fund monies currently avail­
able by encouraging more aggressive recovery under section 1 0 7 , 1 2 6  
and more private cleanups to b e  followed by recovery o f  costs under 
sections r o6 and 1 07 . 1 2 7 The procedural ambiguities c reated by C on­
gress and perpetuated by the courts and the EPA continue to frustrate 
these reforms . As a result, the EPA engages in a l imited number of 
capital-intens ive cleanups while thousands of potentially dangerous 
sites go unaddressed . The hastily adopted procedures that Congress 
intended would facilitate needed cleanups have unfortunately, in  sev­
eral instances ,  led to a series of complexities that tend to frustrate 
that goal . Procedure has been allowed to hamper rather than facilitate 
the substantive performance of C ERCLA. 
IV. SETTLEMENTS UNDER CERCLA 
A policy of pursuing settlements under the Comprehensive Envi­
ronmental Response , Compensation ,  and Liability Act (CERCLA) is 
encouraged both by statutory provisions and by a number of practical 
considerations .  C ERCLA section r o4(a) provides that the EPA may 
take appropriate response action - such as direc t  cleanup under 
section 1 04 1 or the issuance of administrative orders under section 
ro62 - to clean up a hazardous waste site if it first determines that 
no responsible party will do so . 3 If a responsible party fails to take 
removal or  remedial action , i t  may be required to pay punitive dam­
ages .  4 Moreover, numerous practical advantages exist both for the 
government and for potentially responsible parties  in the settlement 
of CERCLA claims . The government gains because settlements lodge 
1 2 5  This  redirection of E PA money would be particularly appropriate because a G A O  study 
suggests that compliance with RCR..\ is running at less than 2 3 % .  S e e  W. DRAYTON, supra 
note r ,  at 49-5 0 .  For a discussion of RCR.� , see Subsection 2 of Section A of Part II .  
1 26 As of J uly 1 984,  recovery was running at less than 2 % ,  see \V. DRAYTON, supra note I ,  
at 5 8 ,  although the E PA based its most recent budget request on predic tions of s o %  cost 
recovery, see Envi ronmental S afety's Senate Testimony on Federal Year I 986 RCRA B udget 
Proposal (February, 1 98 5 )  (on file at Harvard Law School Library). 
1 2 7 Part of the answer would be to encourage more settlements. This option i s  discussed 
more thoroughly, below in Part IV. 
I 4 2  U . S . C .  § 9604 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
2 I d.  § 96o6(a) . 
3 See C ERCLA § 1 04(a),  42 U . S .  C .  § 9604(a) ( 1 98 2 ) . Settlement is further encou�aged by 
other provisions ,  including the informal notice to potentially responsible p arties of having a site 
listed on the National Priority List ,  see Rikleen ,  :Vegotiat ing Superfu nd S ettlement A greeme.'tts,  
ro B . C .  E:-IVTL. AFF.  L .  REv. 6 9 7 ,  702-03 ( 1 98 3 ) ,  and formal notice letters generally s<:nt by 
the EPA to potentially responsible p arties , see i d .  These notice provisions ensure that defendan ts 
are aware of the legal consequences of their dumping. 
4 See C ERCLA § I O /(C)( J ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 9607(c) (J)  ( 1 98 2 ) .  The punitive damages provisions 
rna>• discourage defendants from attempting to delay rather than to settl e .  
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cleanup responsibility directly with those who will ultimately bear the 
cleanup costs , obviating the need for governmental cleanup followed 
by protracted court battles .  Settlements may thus result in  more 
expeditious resolution of pressing environmental problems with con­
comitant reductions both in the EPA's aggregate costs of litigation 
and in the need to finance cleanups through the Fund . Likewise , a 
potentially responsible party who settles gains in a number of ways: 
it can have greater control in  defining its responsibility and the mode 
of cleanup;  it can avoid the enormous cost that trying a hazardous 
waste case entails;  and it can reap the potential public relations ad­
vantage involved in appearing to be the "good corporate c itizen . "5 
Despite these incentives for both the government and for potentially 
responsible parties , negotiated settlements under C ERCLA have failed 
to realize their initial promise as a suitable alternative to litigation .  
A .  The E PA 's Set tlement Policy Prior to 1985 
The EPA's approach to negotiating settlements under C E RC LA 
has gone through three distinct phases .  In the first five years after 
the statute was passed,  the EPA analyzed settlement proposals without 
publishing its criteria. This approach not only frustrated legitimate 
settlement offers by obscuring the applicable settlement standards , 6 
but also lent itself to abuse by the EPA. During its first phase , from 
1 980 to I 983 ,  the mismanaged ,  pro-industry EPA executed a series of 
"sweetheart deals" with the waste-generating industry. In I 983 , new 
leadership took the EPA into a second phase attempting to salvage 
the agency's tarnished image by aggressively pursuing litigation and 
avoiding the now-controversial route of settlement. In I 985 , publish­
ing an interim settlement policy and returning to settlement as a 
legitimate enforcement tool ,  the EPA entered yet a third phase less 
extreme than those of the previous five years .  
Prior to mid- I 983 , the EPA's policy of analyzing settlement offers 
in the absence of published standards drew severe criticism, including 
accusations that the EPA was participating in "sweetheart  deals" with 
the regulated industry. 7 This evaluation policy thus contributed to 
; See  Rikleen , s upm note 3 ,  at 704-05 . 
6 See Dinkins ,  S h all We Fight or Will lYe Finish:  E nviro nmental Dispu te Resolu tion in a 
Litigious Socie ty ,  1 4  ENVTL. L. REP .  ( E l\VTL. L .  INsT . )  1 0 , 398 ,  1 0 , 400 ( r g84) ( noting that i n  
some instances "settlement pol icies were vague , inconsistent, or not widely publ ic ized , thus 
gi\·ing the regulated community no guidance on hO\\' and when the government would settle 
cases"). 
i See Miller, E PA S upe1j11 1id  E nfo rcemmt .· The Question Isn't Whe n  to Nego tiate  and Whe n  
to Li t igate, But  How to Do E it h e r  a 1 z d  Hou} Often , 1 3  ENVTL.  L.  REP .  ( E NVTL.  L .  INST . l  
10 ,06 2 ,  r o , o63 ( r g8J ) .  B u t  see B ernstein ,  The Enviro-Chem Set tlement :  Superfund Problem 
Solving, 1 .3  ENVTL.  L. REP. ( ENVTL.  L. INST . l  r o , 40 2 ,  r o , 403 11 . 7 ( 1 983)  ( arguing that at least 
one purported "sweetheart deal" was in fact legitimate ) .  
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the EPA's inability to maintain a credible enforcement presence .  8 
Many settlements negotiated during this time were highly unfavorable 
to the government. For instance ,  in United S tates v. S eymour Re­
cycling Corp .  , 9 the EPA allowed the twenty-four largest generators to 
escape suit and to obtain releases shielding them from any additional 
liability by p romising only partial cleanup . 1 0 Exposure of these prac­
tices led to the resignation or firing of over twenty top-level EPA 
officials .  1 1  
After r g83 , new EPA leadership aggressively pursued C ERCLA 
litigation and direct federal cleanup,  thus downplaying the role of  
settlement and voluntary cleanup . 1 2 Although purporting to m ake 
settlement decisions on the basis of individual circumstances ,  the EPA 
analyzed settlement offers using rigid , unpublished criteria. For in­
stance,  the EPA consistently refused to begin negotiations unless the 
opening offer by the potentially responsible parties would cover at 
least eighty percent of the cleanup costs . Moreover, the EPA would 
rarely settle for less than r oo percent of total costs . The Administra­
tive Conference of the United States 1 3 sharply criticized the EPA's 
inflexible approach . 14 The EPA,  it  argued,  " 'put[ ] too l ittle stress on 
negotiations and ha[d] adopted a series of procedural and substantive 
requirements that unnecessarily constrict[ed]' the number of negotiated 
settlements possible . " 1 5  In r g8 4 ,  the Administrative C onference rec­
ommended a number of steps designed to promote settlements,  in­
cluding increased use of mediators , adoption of more flexible standards 
by the EPA ,  and public participation in negotiations . 1 6  The Confer­
ence most prominently recommended abolition of the rigid eighty 
8 See Miller, s upra note 7 ,  at ro ,o63. 
9 5 54 F. Supp .  1 334 ( S . D .  Ind .  1 98 2 ) .  
IO See Largest Voluntary Cleanup S et t lement  A nnounced for Seymour  S it e  Under S upeifund, 
13 [Current D evelopments] Env't  Rep . ( B NA) 8 7 7 ,  878 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 1  See H . R. REP. No. 2 5 3 ,  pt.  r ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess. 55 ( 1 985 ) .  
1 2  See  Alvin Aim,  E PA Deputy Administrator, EPA Memorandum and L i s t  of C andidate 
Priorities for Agency Activities in  Fiscal 1 985 (Sept .  2 6 ,  1 983 ) ,  reprinted in  14 [Current Devel­
opments] Env't Rep .  ( B NA) 942 ,  942 -43 ( 1 98 3 )  (ranking removal and remedial action s  first and 
second among the agency's pr iorities and ranking negotiation with potential ly responsible parties 
thirty-third) .  
1 3 The Administrative Conference is an independent federal agency that recommends ways 
to increase the effectiveness of various legal processes. The Conference lacks enforcement  
authority. 
1 4 Other sources also criticized the EP.-\ for its rigid settlement policies .  See Dinkins,  s upm 
note 6, at ro ,4oo . 
1 5 U . S .  A dmin istrat ive Conference  Ur·ges Greater Use of .Vego tiations Under CERCLA , r s  
[Current Developments] Env't Rep .  ( BNA) 3 9 2 ,  393 ( 1 98s l [hereinafter cited as A dministrative 
Conference] (quoting recommendations adopted by the u S. ,"'.clministrative Confe rence) .  
1 6  In at least one early C E RCLA case ,  the D epartment of Justice pubiishecl a proposed 
consent decree in the Federal Register and solicited public comment. See U nited States v .  
Seymour Recycl ing Corp . , 554 F.  Supp.  1 334 .  1 33 6  ( S . D I ncl . 1 98 2 ) .  
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percent rule . 1 7  Although the EPA's strategy of focusing on litigation 
of Fund-financed cleanups avoided controversial settlements, it  also 
increased the drain on the Fund and discouraged the voluntary efforts 
essential to a successful cleanup of the nation's hazardous waste 
sites . 1 8 
The EPA entered its third phase in February r g85 , when it at­
tempted to remedy these problems by publishing an interim C E RC LA 
settlement policy setting forth standards to guide settlement negotia­
tions . 1 9  These guidelines serve the important function of reducing 
uncertainty among potentially responsible parties with respect to the 
kind of offer necessary to reach settlement with the EPA .  More 
important ,  publication of the interim policy expressly indicated the 
EPA's cautious reacceptance of the value of settlements20 and a more 
balanced pursuit of both litigation and settlement. The interim policy, 
however, contains several flaws which may hinder its effectiveness at 
encouraging settlements . 
B .  The Interim Policy S tatement: The EPA1s Current Approach to 
S ettlements Under CERCLA 
By simultaneously increasing the EPA's flexibility and reducing the 
regulated industry's uncertainty, the interim statement increases the 
likelihood of productive negotiations in CERCLA cases . Although 
complete cleanup of each hazardous waste site remains the general 
obj ective of the interim settlement policy, 2 1  the EPA is now more 
willing to consider settlement offers covering less than the total costs 
of cleanup . Most important ,  the interim statement abandons the 
eighty percent requirement in favor of a more flexible evaluation 
scheme that relies on ten published criteria.  22 Settlements are further 
1 i  See  A dministrative Conference ,  s upra note r s ,  at  3 9 3 ·  
1 S  See  Bernste in ,  s upra note 7 ,  at  r o , 402-05 ; Dinkins,  supra note 6 ,  a t  r 0 , 3 99 .  
1 9  S e e  s o  Fed. Reg. 5 03 4  ( r g8 j ) .  T h e  interim statement sets forth the approach that the 
EPA will use in evaluating private party settlement proposals unti l  public comments are received 
and incorporated into a final settlement policy. Although published over a year ago , the interim 
policy will  probably not be final until after reauthorization of  C ERCLA because amendments 
to C E RCLA could l imit the provisions of the EPA settlement pol icy. Telephone interview with 
Debbie Wood , EPA, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement ( Jan . r 6 ,  r g86) .  
20 See so Fed. Reg . 5 034 ( 1 98 5 ) .  
2 1  See id. at 5 0 3 5 .  
2 2 T h e  ten criteria are: ( r )  the volume o f  wastes contributed t o  the site b y  each potentially 
responsible party; ( 2 )  the nature of the wastes contributed ( the more toxic the waste, the less 
likely it is that the EPA will consider granting releases from future liability); (3) the strength of 
the evidence tracing wastes at the site to the settling parties ( the weaker the evidence, the more 
l ikely it is that the EPA will accept terms favorable to the potentially responsible parties ) ;  (4) 
the ability of the settling parties to pay (the ability of a potentially responsible party to pay the 
settlement offer coupled with its probable inabil ity to pay potential litigation costs and damage 
awards will encourage the EPA to accept the settlement offer ) ;  ( 5 )  the l i tigative risks associated 
with proceeding to trial ( the strength of the government's evidence and the number of defenses 
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aided by the articulation of even relatively inflexible rules that were 
previously unpublished.  For example , the interim policy expressly 
states that negotiations may last up to a maximum of sixty days and 
will not be authorized until completion of the remedial investigation/ 
feasibility study (RI/FS) .  23 This requirement reflec ts the EPA's belief 
that meaningful negotiations cannot occur until the agency h as deter­
mined the nature and extent of the damage. 2 4  Thus,  although the 
published criteria reflect a move toward both increased flexibility and 
predictability, the EPA h as made it clear that, unlike the years p rior 
to r 98 3 ,  it now has strong precedent on its side and will  settle for less 
than total cleanup as rarely as possible . 
The interim policy statement also sets forth the E PA's position 
regarding two important problems potentially faced by settling parties .  
The first problem concerns the settling party's likely future exposure 
to suits by nonsettling p rivate parties seeking contribution .  The doc­
trine of contribution allows a j ointly and severally liable party who 
has paid all or a portion of a judgment to seek reimbursement from 
other jointly and severally liable parties . B ecause C E RC LA defen­
dants are jointly and severally liable , 2 5  those who settle with the EPA 
theoretically remain exposed to the contribution suits of  nonsettlers 
from whom the EPA subsequently recovers. 2 6 Although the industry 
has urged the EPA to grant settling parties express p rotection from 
such contribution suits , the EPA believes that settl ing parties are 
protected by law from liability for contribution2 7 and ,  pending a court 
a\·ailable to the potentially responsible parties) ;  (6 )  "public interest" considerations (such as the 
availability of Fund and state monies ) ;  ( ? )  precedential value (strong evidence  favorable to the 
EPA wil l  encourage i t  to proceed to trial ;  l ikewise, if  the potentially responsible parties offer 
terms favorable to the E PA, the agency may accept the settlement in  order to encourage future 
potentially responsible parties to settle on similar terms); (8 )  the value o f  obtaining a present 
sum certain ( in  the presence of high interest rates ,  protracted l itigation for relatively small 
increases in  the damages received from potentially responsible parties may not be  cost-effective ) ;  
(g)  inequities and aggravating factors ( such  a s  whether a proposed settlement unfairly burdens 
one party) ;  ( r o )  the nature of the case that remains after settlement (whether there are any 
financially viable parties against whom to proceed for the balance of  the cleanup costs and 
whether the settlement itself h arms future recovery from non-settling parties). See id.  at 5 03 7-
38 .  Many of  these criteria are typically used to assess offers of  settlement in  other kinds of  
litigation . S e e  id .  at  5043 . 
!3 See id .  at 504 1 .  Extensions of the sixty-day time period will  be considered when there is  
' 'no threat of  seriously delaying c leanup action . "  ! d .  
2 4 Pre litigation negotiations must a wait not on ly the completion of  the RI/FS but also the  
])reparation of the Negotiations Decisions Document that follows the RI/FS and makes a 
preliminary identification of the most appropriate remedy for the site. I d .  
2 5  See infra Section D of  Part VI .  
2 6 See s o  Fed. Reg.  at  5038 .  
2 7 The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act  provides that  when settlements are 
entered into in  "good faith , "  settlers are discharged from "all l iability for c ontribution to any 
other joint tortfeasors . "  UNIFORi\I Co�HRIBCTIO)I Al\IONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(b ) , r 2 U. L. A .  
98 l r gs s l .  The  Uniform .-\ct i s  not directly applicable to  federal statutes, but  m any federal cour ts 
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ruling on the issue , the interim policy makes clear that the EPA will 
be highly reluctant to grant settling parties a specific contribution 
protection clause . 2 8 In order to provide settling parties the finality 
they desire , the EPA may agree in rare instances "to reduce its j udg­
ment against the non-settling parties[ ] to the extent necessary to 
extinguish the settling party's liability to the nonsettling [sic] third 
party. "2 9 
The EPA's refusal to provide settling parties with protection from 
subsequent contribution suits is problematic . 30 This refusal is partic­
ularly untenable in light of the EPA's position that good faith settlers 
are probably entitled to contribution protection as a matter of law. 3 l  
I n  order to further encourage settlements with minimal costs t o  the 
Fund, the EPA should grant contribution protection to settling parties 
unless there is a significant likelihood that in subsequent l itigation 
involving nonsettling parties ,  liability will be apportioned in  a way 
that is contradictory to the terms of the settlement. 
The second important issue illuminated by the interim statement 
concerns the potential exposure of settling parties to future c laims by 
the government itself. This exposure arises because of the EPA's 
unwillingness to grant to settling parties an absolute release from 
liability. 3 2 Although many settling parties would obviously prefer  that 
the EPA grant them an absolute release ,  scientific uncertainty about 
both the effect of hazardous substances and the effectiveness of 
cleanup have made the EPA extremely reluctant to grant such re­
leases .  33  Remedial measures that presently seem adequate to clean up 
a site effectively may in the future prove insufficient. As a result, the 
EPA has adopted a sliding scale :  releases will be relatively broad or 
narrow depending on the degree of confidence the EPA has in the 
proposed remedy. Regardless of what scale is used ,  a release from 
liability ordinarily will not become effective until the cleanup is com­
pleted;  moreover, the settlement policy requires that the EPA be given 
the right to reopen the case if previously unknown conditions arise at 
the site or if the EPA receives other information unavailable at the 
time of the settlement. 34 
have c ited it as persuasive authority in contribution suits against settl ing parties .  See In re 
Waverly Accident of Feb.  2 2-24,  502  F. Supp .  r ( M . D .  Tenn .  1 9 7 9) .  
28  See so Fed.  Reg .  so34 ,  5 039 ( 1 98 5 ) .  I t  makes little sense for the  EPA to deny parties 
explicit  contribution protection if the EPA takes the position that settling parties are already 
protected by law - particularly when granting such an explicit  provision could be used to 
extract concessions from the settling parties .  
29 !d .  at 5 0.3 9 .  
30 See  so F e d .  Reg. at so.38-39 .  T h e  E PA refuses t o  grant these releases despite i t s  l imited 
acknowledgement that contribution protection is c ritical to settling parties .  See id .  
3 1  S e e  s upra pp.  r so8-o9 & n . 2 7 .  
3 2  See s o  Fed. Reg. at 5 039 .  
3 3  See id .  
34 See  id.  at 5 040. 
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This position with respect to releases from liability is particularly 
problematic .  The EPA's reservation of numerous rights to reopen 
litigation deprives most C E RCLA settlement agreements of the finality 
that settling parties probably feel is the most important goal . Clearly, 
the EPA has legitimate reasons for refusing to grant an absolute 
release .  Potentially responsible parties , however, will be unwilling to 
pay large sums of money in settlement without greater assurance of 
finality regarding future liability. Several alternatives exist to placing 
all of the risk of uncertainty on settling parties .  The best approach 
would be to place a cash value on the risk that remedial measures 
will prove inadequate in the future and to accept a "premium" from 
the settling parties to cover that risk. If such a premium were c al­
culated in light of the best current information , the EPA would be 
able to grant absolute releases without forcing the Fund to bear the 
entire risk of uncertainty about the effectiveness of cleanup.  Addi­
tionally, the EPA could make certain that it had narrowed the risk of 
failed remedial measures to the maximum extent  possible through 
careful testing and planning. The EPA might also consider transfer­
ring at least some of the risk to the cleanup contractor by obtaining 
firm fixed-price agreements ,  rather than time and materials agree­
ments . These steps would allow the EPA to grant a greater number 
of absolute releases and to increase the number of negotiated settle­
ments without unduly benefitting settling parties . It would thus avoid 
any impression of showing favoritism to settling parties . 
C .  Conclusion 
The publication of the interim settlement policy represents a pos­
itive step by the EPA toward a more balanced enforcement strategy 
that deemphasizes the agency's recent over-reliance on l itigation and 
administrative actions .  35  Those who criticize the E PA for attempting 
JS For a discussion of EPA litigation and administrative orders, see s upra Section A of  Part 
III. 
Courts have also sought to encourage this trend back toward settlement in  C ERCLA cases 
by employing the novel approach of  bifurcating the trial and trying the remedy issue first -
particularly i n  cases in which settlement already seems l ikely. Defendants are thought to be  
more likely to settle when  when they know the  extent of the contamination and  when their  
potential l iabi lity after l itigation is certai n .  See U nited States v. Seymour Recycl ing Corp . ,  2 r 
Env't Rep .  Cas. (BNA) 1 999,  2 oo r  ( S . D Ind .  1 984) .  This procedure , however, is of l imited 
utility. F irst, bifurcation forces the parties to  move directly to  the most  costly, time-consuming,  
and complicated part of the l i tigation .  The goal of litigating the remedy issue is  primarily to 
produce information that wil l  lead to the best  remedial plan.  Joinder of  all potentially i iable 
third parties possessing information thus becomes far more important i n  C E RC LA cases than 
in  most other litigation i n  which the defendants are joint and severally l iable .  S ee, e . g . , U nited 
States v. Price ,  14  ENVTL .  L .  REP. (ENVTL. L .  INST . )  2 0 , 5 0 1 ,  2 0 , 5 0 2  ( D . N . ] .  1 984) (providing 
for a period of time during which third-party defendants could be  added). By far the most 
limiting factor in  the use of bifurcated CERCLA trials is  that they are effective only w hen  
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any negotiation with potentially responsible parties prior to bringing 
judicial action are misguided. 3 6  Such negotiations are not necessarily 
the result of pro-industry sentiment within the EPA ,  nor do they 
necessarily delay effective cleanup .  Because the EPA lacks the re­
sources to locate and join every potentially responsible party, it  must 
engage in the combination of l itigation and negotiation that maximizes 
deterrence of would-be violators . 3 7 Indeed ,  the EPA should resort to 
the judicial enforcement process only in that fraction of disputes nec­
essary to make its threats of litigation credible .  38 Aggressive enforce­
ment of C E RCLA has been myopically defined in terms of the number 
of cases actually brought to trial . 3 9  
B ecause legal precedents obtained i n  the last several years have 
confirmed the standards of strict ,  j oint and several liability, 40 the EPA 
is in a much stronger bargaining position now than it was p rior to 
mid- r g83 . The EPA should use this position of strength to move 
toward a greater reliance on negotiated settlements as an enforcement 
tool for C ERCLA. The agency's present settlement policy still strikes 
the balance too much in favor of encouraging litigation when settle­
ment would be more appropriate and more cost-effective . The EPA 
should not let the specter of past abuses , such as the pre- r g83  "sweet­
heart" deals , deter it from fully integrating settlements into its overall 
CERCLA enforcement scheme . O nly with a properly balanced ap­
proach can the EPA best fulfill the purpose that underlies C ERCLA: 
complete cleanup of all hazardous waste sites as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible .  
V. LIABILITY IssuEs I N  C ERCLA CLE ANUP AcTIONS 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has overcome a num­
ber of legal obstacles in its attempt to clean up hazardous waste sites 
l iabil ity is fairly certain and when action by the defendants is  relatively coordinated .  Sec, e . g. , 
Price ,  14 ENVTL.  L .  REP. ( ENVTL. L .  INST . )  at 2 0 , 5 02 (defendants had formed a Defendant's 
Study G roup) ;  S eymour, z r  Env't Rep . Cas. ( BNA) at 2 oo r  (defendants h ad cooperated and 
chosen , by majority vote, six lawyers to act as l iaison counsel in the case). Because of such 
concerns ,  the Justice Department opposes bifurcation and trial of remedy first  unless there exists 
a real possibility of settlement and the RI/FS is completed. See EPA Response to OTA R eport, 
Questions on S tringfellow Leakage Termed I nadequate,  [ r s  Current Developments]  Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 765 l r g84) . 
36 S ee Miller, supra note 7 ,  at r o ,o6z  ( criticizing commentators who question the EPA's 
propensity to negotiate settlements) . 
. l i See Dinkins ,  supra note 6 ,  at 1 0 , 3 9 9 ·  
3 8  Clearly, l itigation may h ave value independent from contributing t o  the EPA's enforcement 
presence.  For instance ,  it serves as a vehicle for setting out the legal boundaries of novel 
C E RCLA questions .  But "[o]nce the legal ground rules are established, once the relative rights 
and responsibil ities of the parties are precisely defined, l itigation is not a satisfactory means to 
resolve disputes . "  /d.  
39 See id .  at r o , 4o r .  
40 See infra Sections B & D of Part V. 
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under the Comprehensive Environmental Response ,  Compensation , 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) . The statute provides l ittle more than 
a sketch of its intended liabil ity scheme . Section I 0 7  states simply 
that enumerated parties "shall be liable" for cleanup costs ,  leaving the 
standard of l iability undefined.  1 C ERCLA's introductory section pro­
vides that the standard of liability shall be that imposed u nder the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) , 2 but the language of 
the FWPCA is similarly vague . 3 C ERCLA's legislative h istory is also 
unhelpful . In order to secure enough votes for p assage , Congress 
deleted endorsements of strict liability and joint and several liability 
that were originally contained in the legislation . 4 Statements in  the 
legislative h istory indicate that Congress intended courts to decide 
liability issues in accordance with general principles of tort common 
law and to seek guidance from cases decided under the FWPCA . s 
1 Section I o 7 (a) provides that: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses set 
forth in  subsection (b) of this section -
( I )  the owner and operator of a vessel ( otherwise subject  to the j u risdiction of the United 
States) or a facility, 
( 2 )  any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated 
any facility at which such h azardous substances were disposed of, 
(3)  any person who by contract, agreement,  or otherwise arranged for disposal or treat­
ment,  or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment ,  of h azardous 
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or  e ntity, at any 
faci lity owned or operated by another party or entity and contain ing such hazardous 
substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or  accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal 
or treatment  faci lities or sites selected by such perso n ,  f�om which there is a release, or 
a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs , of a hazardous 
substance,  shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or 
a State not i nconsistent wi th the national contingency plan: 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con�istent with 
the national contingency plan;  and 
(C) damages for injury to ,  destruction of, or loss of natural resources,  including the 
reasonable costs of assessing such inj ury, destruction , or loss resu l ting from such a r':!lease. 
4 2  U . S C .  § 9607 (a) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
2 33  U S. C .  § §  r z s r- 1 3 7 6  ( ! <.)86 ) .  The  C E RCLA provision reads : " '[L]iabil ity' under this 
subchapter shall be construed to be  the standard of  liability which obtains under section 1 3  2 r 
of Title 33 . "  C E RCLA § I O I ( 3 2 ) ,  4 2  U S. C .  § 96o r {J 2 )  ( r 98 2 ) .  
3 Like CERCLA, the FWPCA p ro\'ides simply that parties "shall be l iable" for costs enumer­
ated in the statute. F\VPCA § J I I (f )( r ) , 33 U . S C .  § I 3 2 I ( f }( I )  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
4 These references were deleted from the statute in response to opposition from a number of 
senators. S e e, e . g . , 1 2 6  CONG.  REC .  3 0 . 9 3 2  ( 1 980) (statement of Sen.  Randolph) .  
5 Senator Randolph,  a CERCLA sponsor, explained the compromise bi l l  as  fol lows: 
U nless otherwise provided in  this act, the standard of liability is intended to be the 
same as that provided in section 3 r I of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 
U . S . C .  § 1 3 2 1 ) .  I understand this to be a standard of strict liability. 
I t  is intended that issues of l iability not resolved by this act, if  any, shal l  be go\'erned 
by traditional and e\'olving principles of common law. An exampie is joint  and several 
liabil i ty. Any reference to these terms has been deleted, and the l iability of joint tort 
feasors will be determined under common or previo tlS statutory law. 
1 2 6  CoNG.  REC.  30 ,932  ( r g8o).  One court suggested that CERCLA's reference to the FWPCA 
was inconclusi\'e with respect to the issue of joint and several liability: 
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Although developing CERC LA case law has filled some of the gaps 
in the sparse statutory provisions , defendants continue to challenge 
government implementation efforts . Congress is currently debating a 
number of amendments to CERC LA that would codify prevailing 
judicial interpretation of its liability provisions .  6 The courts never­
theless retain significant discretion to shape the statute in accordance 
with evolving principles of common law. 
This Part discusses problems courts have encountered in applying 
CERCLA's liability provisions .  Controversial issues include determin­
ing who may be liable ; whether liability is stricL or based on a neg­
ligence standard; what the government must show in order to prove 
that a defendant contributed to a release of hazardous waste ; whether 
liability may be j oint and several or  must be apportioned among 
defendants; whether defendants have a right to seek contribution from 
other potentially liable parties ;  and whether CERCLA applies retro­
actively. The discussion reveals that courts have interpreted CER­
CLA b roadly in  favor of the government. Indeed, the driving force 
behind CERCLA cleanup actions is the government's power to 
threaten an individual defendant with overwhelming liability for what 
other waste disposers have done .  Although this liability scheme is 
potentially harsh , it is justified for several reasons .  First, it shifts 
cleanup costs from the victims of hazardous waste to the parties 
responsible for creating the hazard . Second, it creates incentives for 
safer  handling and disposal of wastes by ensuring that cleanup costs 
are internalized by the waste-generating industry. Third, it relieves 
the strain on the government's limited budget by encouraging defen­
dants to locate and implead other responsible parties with whom they 
may share the burden of cleanup . 
To the extent  that the government carries out its threat - forcing 
selected defendants to bear a disproportionate share of cleanup costs 
- CERCLA's l iability scheme could impose unfair burdens and frus­
trate a number of its own obj ectives . 7  Courts should guard against 
F\VPCA says noth ing specifically about  joint  and several l iability.  nevertheless,  a number 
o f  courts h ave impos�d joint and seHral liability by relying on common law rules of 
liability. Therefore , it is reasonable to conclude that by incorporating the l i ability 
provisions of § 3 I I of F\VPCA i nto C E RCLA , Congress intended the courts to impose 
common law liabi lity rules on generators and other entities l iable under CERCLA. 
United States \'. A & F Materials Co. , 5 7 8  F.  Supp.  1 2 4 9 ,  1 2 5 4-5 5 ( S . D  Il l .  1 984) .  
6 See,  e . g . , H . R. 2 005 , 9 9th Cong. , 1 st Sess . , I 3 1  C O?--i G .  REc .  S u , 1 84-85 ( daily eel. Sept .  
2 6 ,  r g8 s l ;  S .  5 1 ,  99th Cong . .  r st Sess . , 1 3 I  CoNG. REc .  S q 2 - 4 7  (daily ed.  Jan . 3 ,  1 98 5 ) .  
; T h e  Senate report o n  the original C ERCLA bil l  reveals se\·eral objectives o f  the broad 
liabil ity scheme: to ensure that those responsible for creating the h azardous waste problem bear 
the burden of remedying the problem ; to ensure that the social cost of unsafe disposal practices 
is internalized by the industries that gen erate waste; to create incentives for safer behavior for 
those parties \\'h o  possess the greatest knowledge about the risks associated with their wastes 
and who are in the best position to control disposal decisions; to spread cleanup costs among 
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this danger by imposing j oint liability in suits for contribution ,  thereby 
requiring third-party defendants to share with original defendants the 
liability of parties who are absent or insolvent.  8 This change in  the 
common law rule would encourage all C ERCLA defe ndants - not 
just those originally sued by the EPA - to assume the burden of 
locating and impleading other responsible parties .  D efendants would 
still face some inequity, because they would still have to pay for 
cleaning up the wastes of parties found to be judgment-proof. Under 
the new rule ,  however, defendants originally sued by the EPA would 
be able to spread the shares of these absent parties equitably among 
all those parties they could identify and bring into the action . Re­
sponsibility for these shares would no longer depend on the fortuity 
of whom the EPA decides to sue . 
A .  Who J11Jay B e  Liable 
CERCLA identifies four classes of potential defendants : current 
owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities ;  past own­
ers and operators;  generators of hazardous waste ; and those who 
accept waste for purposes of transporting it to disposal facilitie s .  9 
Courts have not addressed in any detail the issue of who may be 
classified as a transporter; defendants so classified h ave thus far failed 
to contest the designation .  B ut defendants have challenged the gov­
ernment's interpretations of "owner/operator" and "generator. " These 
challenges have compelled courts to establish some limits on  the kinds 
of activity that will expose parties to CERCLA liability and to con­
sider the extent to which corporate officers , in any category, may be 
held liable for the acts of their corporations . 
The statutory definitions of each category of liable actor are very 
broad . 1 °  Courts have generally resolved ambiguity with respect to 
whether a particular party falls within one of the statutory definitions 
by inquiring into the degree of the defendant's control over some 
essential link in the disposal decision .  One may be an "owner, " with­
out possessing legal title to a site , if one had authority to determine 
how the land was to be used . A producer of hazardous wastes may 
be a "generator, " without having arranged for actual disposal , if it  
could have foreseen that the wastes would be disposed of at a partic­
ular facility. A corporate officer may be individually liable for the 
acts of the corporation if he personally supervised the corporation's 
decisionmaking process with respect to the disposal of wastes . This 
as  many parties as  possible;  and  to  promote efficient resource allocation among industries. See 
S. REP .  N o .  848,  g6th Cong. , 2d Sess. 1 2 - 1 5 ,  3 1-34 ( 1 980) .  
8 See  infra p .  1 5 3 9 .  
9 S e e  C E RCLA § 107 (a)( 1 )-(4 ) ,  42  U . S . C . � g6o7 (a)( r )-(4) ( 1 98 2 ) , q u oted s upra note 1 .  
10 See id. 
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approach accords with the statute 's  aim of implicating parties respon­
sible for contributing to the environmental hazard. 
I .  Owners and Operators 
Decisions defining "owner" under section r o7(a)( r )  suggest a strong 
trend toward expansive interpretations of CERCLA liability. It is 
apparent that one who owns land has control over how it will be 
used. A number of courts have held that a landowner may be liable 
for a release of hazardous wastes on his land even though the disposal 
facility is operated by a lessee . 1 1  Possession of legal titl e ,  however, 
may not be necessary to designation as an "owner. " One court has 
held that a lessee of property was an "owner" within the meaning of 
the statute , because its sublessee operated a disposal facility on the 
property. 1 2 Courts have , however, placed some limits on liability for 
mere ownership . One court refused to impose liability on a party who 
had once owned a disposal site but had neither deposited nor allowed 
others to deposit hazardous wastes during the time the defendant 
owned the site . 1 3 The court based its decision on the wording of the 
statute , which imposes liability for past ownership of a waste site only 
if the defendant owned the site " 'at the time of disposal . "' 1 4 The 
Second Circuit has asserted that although past owners may be liable 
only if waste disposal took place during their ownership , current 
owners become liable as soon as they take title to land on which a 
release has occurred . 1 5 This interpretation closes up a potential loop­
hole in the statute whereby site owners could sell their land to new 
owners after the cessation of dumping and then become judgment­
proof, leaving the government unable to recover from either the old 
or the new owner. l 6  
I I  See U nited States v .  Argent Corp . ,  1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL .  L .  INST . )  2 0 , 6 1 6 ,  2 0 , 6 1 6  
( D . N . M .  May 4 ,  1 984);  United States v .  South Carolina Recycl ing & Disposal , Inc . , 1 4  ENVTL.  
L .  REP.  ( ENVTL.  L .  biST . ) 2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 7 5 ( D . S . C .  Feb.  23 ,  1 984) ;  see also U nited S tates v .  
Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co .  ( NE PACCO) ,  5 7 9  F. Supp.  8 2 3 ,  845 n . z 6  ( W. D .  Mo.  1 984) 
( stating that a landowner/lessor could have been a defendant if  the parties had chosen to join 
him).  
1 2 See United States v .  South Carolina Recycl ing & Disposal , Inc . ,  1 4  ENVTL. L. REP. 
( ENVTL.  L .  INST . )  2 0 , 895 , 2 0 , 897  ( D . S . C .  Aug.  2 8 ,  1 984) .  
15  See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chern. Co . , 14 ENVTL. L .  REP.  ( ENVTL. 
L .  INST ) 2 0 , 3 7 6 ,  2 0 , 3 7 8  ( C . D .  Cal . lVlar. s ,  1 984).  
1 4  See id.  ( quoting C ERCLA § 1 07 ( a)( 2 ) ,  4 2  U . S . C . § 9607 (a)( 2 )  ( 1 98 2 )) .  But see U nited 
States v Carolawn Co . , q E:-.iVTL. L. REP. ( ENVTL. L .  INST . )  20 , 698 ,  2 0 , 699 ( D . S . C .  June 
1 5 ,  1 984)  ( ruling that owner liabil ity under C ERCLA might possibly extend to a company that 
had held legal title to a disposal site for only one hour - when it was acting as a conduit in  a 
sale of the property on which the disposal site was located - and remanding for determination 
of the extent of defendant's control over the land) .  
I S See New York \·. Shore Realty Corp . , 7 5 9  F . 2 d  1 03 2 ,  1 044-45 ( z cl  Cir. 1 98 5 ) .  
l 6  S ee id .  at 1 045 . 
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2 .  G enerators 
C ERCLA defines generators as persons who "arranged for" dis­
posal or  treatment of w astes that they "owned or possessed. " 1 7  Be­
cause this language does not  require the defendant to  have "produced" 
the wastes , the provision extends to the operators of storage facilities 
and to those who inherit  wastes from previous owners of their prop­
erty. 1 8  Despite this broad definition,  a number of defendants have 
challenged their classification as generators on the ground that they 
were too remote from the d isposal decision to be held l iable . 
One may "arrange for disposal" by choosing a disposal facility, by 
choosing a transporter or, court decisions suggest, by making any 
more remote decision that can predictably lead to disposal at a par­
ticular facility. At least one court has stated that a generator may be 
liable for cleanup costs even though the disposal site was chosen not 
by the generator but by the transporter. 1 9  In another case , the defen­
dant company had sold its wastes to the operator of a disposal facility 
not for the purpose of disposal but for use in the facility's oil recla­
mation process .  20 The court found that this transaction constituted 
an arrangement for disposal . The key factor in this decision was that 
the defendant had contracted directly with the facility and knew that 
the wastes would eventually be disposed of there . 2 1  The court noted , 
however, that "liability for releases under § g6o7 (a)(3 )  is not endless ;  
it ends with that party who both owned the hazardous waste and 
made the crucial decision how it would be disposed of or  treated,  and 
by whom . "2 2  The court distinguished the case from a similar one i n  
which a seller o f  hazardous wastes had escaped liability a s  a generator 
because the buyer of the wastes had independently arranged for their 
disposal . 2 3  The determining factor in each of these holdings was the 
defendant's control over some decision essential to the disposal pro­
cess. 
3. Corporate Officers 
A number of courts have ruled that corporate officers may be held 
personally liable for the acts of their corporations .  One court held 
1 7  See  C E RCLA § I O / (a)( J ) ,  . p  U S. C . S 9607 (a) (J )  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  quoted supra note 1 .  
1 8 S e e  Reed, CER CL.4 L i t igati
.
o ll Update: The Emerging Law of Generator Liability,  I 4  
ENVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL.  L. INST . ) I 0 . 2 2 4 ,  1 0 , 2 2 6-2 7 ( 1 984 ) .  
19 S e e  United States \·. Wade, 1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL.  L .  INST . )  2 0 ,096 ,  20 ,098 n . J  
( E .  D .  Pa. Dec .  2 2 ,  I 983 ) .  Another court held that a generator could b e  held l iable even though 
its wastes had been remoHd from the site to which the generator had sent them and had been 
taken to another facility where the release occurred.  S e e  Missouri v .  Independent Petrochem.  
Corp . . I S  E NVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL .  L .  lNST ) 20 , 1 6 1 , 20 , 1 6 I  (E .D .  Mo .  Jan S ,  I 985 ) .  
2 0  S e e  U nited States \·. A & F· Materials Co . ,  5 8 2  F.  S u p p .  8 4 2  (S . D .  I l l .  1 984 ) .  
2 1 S e e  id.  at 845 . 
2 2  !d.  
23 See  U nited States v. Westinghouse Elec .  Corp . , 1 4  E:-<VTL .  L .  REP. ( ENVTL.  L.  INST . )  
2 0,483 , 20 ,484 (S . D .  Ind .  June 2 9 ,  1 983 ) .  
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that an officer of a transportation company would be liable "if he 
personally participate[ d) in the wrongful , injury-producing act. "24 The 
court curiously went on to hold, however, that merely placing drums 
at the site and negotiating the transportation contract were not suffi­
cient participation to meet this standard . 2 5  Another court gave con­
tent to the standard when it held that the vice-president of a waste 
generating company could be held liable based on his ownership 
interest in the corporation and his continuing position as a manager 
in its operations regarding the disposal site . 2 6 Thus , the l iability of 
corporate officers, like the liability of the companies they manage , 
appears to rest on the degree of control that they exercise over the 
disposal decision itself. 
Expansive interpretations of who may be liable under C ERCLA 
promote the statute 's objectives in a variety of ways . By assigning 
liability to parties who can influence disposal practices ,  courts increase 
the likelihood that CERCLA sanctions will lead to safer behavior in 
the handling and disposal of wastes . To the extent that courts impose 
liability on parties responsible for creating environmental hazards , 
they carry out Congress's intent to allocate the burden of cleanup in 
the fairest way possible and to make the waste disposal industry 
internalize its social costs . Because broad liability enables the gov­
ernment to reach a wide range of defendants , it promotes cost­
spreading throughout the industry. Finally, by hastening replenish­
ment of the Superfund, such liability facilitates the government's effort 
to clean up waste sites as quickly as possible . 
B .  The Standard of Liability 
A basic question that courts have faced is whether CERCLA 
requires a showing of negligence.  The statute's liability section con­
tains no language requiring the EPA to show that a defendant acted 
negligently in disposing of its wastes .  2 7  The absence of such an 
explicit requirement has permitted speculation that the statute imposes 
24  United States v. \Vade , 14  ENVTL.  L .  REP.  ( E:--�vTL. L .  INST . )  20 ,og6 ,  20 ,  ro z  ( E . D .  Pa.  
Dec .  2 2 .  1 983 )  ( citations omitted) .  
25  S e e  i d .  
2 6  S e e  United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & C h e rn .  Co .  (NEPACCO) ,  5 7 9  F .  S u p p .  8 2 3 ,  
849  (W. D Mo.  1 984 ) .  The court stated: 
Defendant Lee had the capacity to control the disposal of hazardous waste at the NE­
PACCO plant: the power to direct the negotiations concern ing the disposal of wastes at 
the Denney farm site; and the capacity to prevent and abate the damage caused by the 
disposal of hazardous wastes at the Denney farm site .  Final ly·, Lee was a major  stock­
holder in NEPACCO and acti\·ely participated in the management of NEPACCO in his 
capacity as \·ice-president. The Court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to 
impose liability on Lee as an "owner and operator" pursuant to section I O { (a) ( I ) . 
!d.  Other courts haH followed this holding. See ,  e . g . , New York v. S hore Realty Corp . , 7 5 9  
F. z d  ! OJ Z ,  1 05 2  ( 2 d  Cir. r g8 j ) ;  United States v .  Carolawn Co . , 1 4  E NVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL. 
L .  INST . ) 2 0 , 6gq ,  2 0 , j00 ( D . S . C .  June r s ,  1 984) .  
27 S e e  C E RCLA § r o ; (a ) ,  4 2  U S. C .  § 96o;(a) ( 1 98 2 ) ,  quoted s upra note 1 .  
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liability without fault ,  which would allow the EPA t o  recover cleanup 
costs from any defendant shown to have the statutorily required con­
nection with the waste s ite . 
Defendants have argued that Congress intended to impose a n eg­
ligence standard . 28 They point out that Congress specifically deleted 
references to strict liability before it enacted the statute . 2 9 Courts 
addressing the issue have concluded, however, that C ERCLA does 
impose strict l iability. 30 The statute explicitly states that responsible 
parties shall be liable "subj ect only" to the three defenses listed in  
section 1 07  (b) . 3 1 That section provides that due c are may be raised 
as a defense when the defendant's liability is predicated upon the act 
or omission of a third party. 3 2 If the statute imposed a negligence 
standard,  courts have concluded,  the defense of due care with respect 
to possible intervention by third parties would be redundant, because 
due care is always a defense to negligence . 3 3  Indeed ,  to adopt  a 
negligence standard would be to ignore Congress's deliberate exclusion 
of this due care defense when the third party is an employee ,  agent ,  
or contractual partner of the defendant. Courts draw further support 
for a strict liability standard from statements in the legislative history 
and from cases holding that the FWPCA imposes strict liability. 3 4 
28 See,  e . g . ,  NEPACCO,  5 7 9 F. Supp.  at  843 ; United States v .  Price,  5 7 7  F. Supp.  I 1 03 ,  
I 1 1 3 ( D . N . ] .  1 983) .  
2 9 See,  e .g . , NEPA CCO, 5 7 9  F.  Supp.  at 843 ; Price ,  5 7 7  F. Supp.  at 1 1 1 3 - 1 4 .  
30 S e e ,  e .g . , U nited States v .  Argent Corp . , 1 4  E NVTL. L .  REP. ( E NVTL. L .  INS T . )  2 0 , 4 9 7 ,  
20 ,497  ( D . N . M .  May 4 ,  1 984) ; U nited States v .  South Carolina Recycl ing & Disposal, Inc . , I 4  
ENVTL. L .  REP. ( ENVTL .  L .  INST . )  2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 74 (D. S . C .  Feb.  2 3 ,  1 984); U nited States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co. , 1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP. (ENVTL. L.  IKST . )  2 0 , 2 0 7 ,  2 0 , 2 08 (W. D .  Mo. 
Feb. 3,  I 984) ;  NEPACCO,  5 7 9  F .  Supp. at 844; Price ,  5 7 7 F.  Supp.  at 1 1 1 4 . 
3 1  Section I O / ( b )  states: 
There shall be no l iability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise 
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat of 
release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely 
by -
( 1 )  an act of God; 
( 2 )  an act of war; 
(3)  an act or omission of a third party other than an employee o r  agent of the 
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual 
relationship , existin g  directly or i ndirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole 
contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a 
common carrier by rail ) ,  if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence 
that (a)  he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking 
into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance,  i n  l ight of all relevant 
facts and circumstances,  and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions 
of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts 
or omissions; or 
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs. 
4 2  U . S . C .  § 96o7(b)  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
3 2  See genemlly p p .  1 5 4 5 -48.  
33 See ,  e . g . , PYice ,  57  7 F.  Supp.  at  I I 14 :  see also Comment, Genemtor Liability Under 
Supeifund for Clean-Up of A bandoned Hazardous Was te Dumpsites , 1 30 U .  PA. L. REv. 1 2 2 9 ,  
1 2 60 ( 1 98 2 )  (describing the operation o f  the third-party due care defense ) .  
3 4  See,  e . g . , U nited States v. Argent Corp . , 1 4  ENVTL.  L .  RE P .  (ENVT L .  L .  lNST . )  2 0 , 4 9 7 ,  
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B ecause CERCLA defines its standard of liability as that obtaining 
under the FWPCA , courts have given these cases great weight. Fi­
nally, courts have reasoned that because strict liability is more likely 
to achieve the goals of rapid cleanup, cost-shifting to responsible 
parties ,  and cost-spreading throughout the industry and the population 
of consumers, it is probably the standard that Congress intended to 
impose . 3 5  
Strict liability i s  indeed preferable to negligence . Under a negli­
gence standard,  the government would be able to clean up fewer 
disposal sites .  First, the government could not prove negligence at 
some sites .  Second, the greater expense of litigating negligence would 
result in more rapid depletion of the Superfund . Moreover, imposing 
liability without fault ensures that cleanup costs will be borne by the 
companies that generate and dispose of the wastes rather than by the 
local residents or the taxpayers generally. 
This result is both fair and efficient. If a site is not cleaned up, 
the social cost of the release is borne by residents of the surrounding 
area, who must either move from their homes or suffer the health 
hazards resulting from contaminated soil and groundwater. As be­
tween the innocent victims of hazardous waste and the companies 
who created the hazard, it is the latter who should pay for the costs 
of cleanup . The companies not only caused the "injury, " they also 
reaped the financial benefits of cheaper waste disposal . 
By forcing corporations involved in toxic waste disposal to inter­
nalize cleanup costs , strict l iability serves as the most efficient means 
of encouraging the development of safer waste disposal techniques .  
If companies know in advance that they will be liable for any releases 
with which they are associated,  they will continue to seek newer and 
2 0 , 4 9 7  ( D . N . M .  May 4, 1 984) ;  U nited States v .  South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc . ,  I4 
ENVTL. L. REP. ( ENVTL. L. INST . ) 2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 74 (D. S . C .  Feb. 2 3 ,  1 984);  United States v. 
Conservation Chern. Co . , 14 ENYTL .  L.  REP. (ENYTL.  L. INST . )  2 0 , 207 , 2 0 , 2 08 (W. D.  Mo. 
Feb.  3,  1 984) ;  U n ited States v .  Northeastern Pharm. & Chern. Co. (NEPACCO), 5 7 9  F. Supp. 
8 2 3 ,  843 (W. D .  Mo.  1 984) ;  U nited States v. Price, 5 7 7  F. Supp. 1 103 , 1 1 1 3  (D .N.J .  1 983) .  
Senator Randolph ,  a C E RCLA sponsor, commented on the compromise bi l l  as follows: "As 
under section 3 I 1 ,  due care or  the absence of negligence with respect to a release or  threatened 
release of a hazardous substance does not constitute a defense under this act. " 1 2 6  CONG. REC. 
3 0 , 93 2 ( 1 980) .  Representative Florio made a similar statement when explaining the final com­
promise bill to the House.  See 1 2 6  CoNe. REc . 3 1 , 965 ( 1 980). 
The FWPCA provides that defendants "shall be l iable" subject to the same three defenses 
contained in CERC LA .  See FWPCA � 3 I I (f )( r ) , 33 U .S C .  § I 3 2 I ( f )( I )  ( 1 986) .  Courts have 
consistently interpreted that proYision to require strict l iability. See, e . g . , United States v. 
LeBeouf B ros. Towing Co . , 6 2 1  F. 2 d  7 8 7 .  789 (5 th Cir. 1 980), cert.  denied, 452 U . S .  906 ( 1 98 1 ); 
Steuart Transp. Co. \'.  All ied Towing Corp . ,  596 F. 2 cl 609, 6 1 3  (4th Cir. 1 9 79) ;  United States 
v.  Tex-Tow, I nc . , 5 3 9  F. z d  I J I O ,  1 3 1 3  ( 7 th Cir. ! 9 7 8 ) ;  Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 5 64 F. 2d 964, 
g81 ( 1 st Cir. 1 9 7 7 )  
3 5  Conse;·,,at ion C h e m ical ,  1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP. ( El'-:VTL.  L .  !:<ST . )  at 2 0 , 208;  Price, 5 7 7  F. 
Supp .  at r 1 q .  
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safer methods of waste disposal . These companies are generally in 
the best position to evaluate both the hazards created by their waste 
products and the means to alleviate those hazards .  3 6 U nder strict 
liability, prevention costs will be internalized and will be reflected in 
the prices of products that create toxic waste . 3 7 Because consumers 
will then reduce their purchases of products that generate toxic waste , 
strict liability makes it more likely that the market will attain an 
efficient balance between chemical consumption and safe disposal . 
C .  The Standard of Causation 
The version of C ERCLA originally passed by the House stipulated 
that parties could be held liable only if they had "caused or contributed 
to" a release . 3 8 The final version of the bill eliminated this clause and 
thus eliminated from the statute any express requirement that the 
government prove causation as an element of its case in chief. 3 9 
Instead , the statute simply lists potentially liable parties40 and sets 
forth three narrowly circumscribed causation-based defenses .  A party 
may escape liability by showing that the release was caused solely by 
an act of God, an act of war, or the act of a third party not in a 
contractual relationship with the defendant. 4 1 Courts have interpreted 
CERCLA to require only a very weak showing of causation .  This 
broadening of the traditional standards of tort common law is justified ,  
however, by  the special difficulties of  proof i n  hazardous waste cases .  
36 For a discussion o f  the economic efficiency bencb.ts o f  nlacing l iability o n  t h e  "cheapest 
cost avoider , "  see Calabrcsi & H i rschoff, Toward a Tesi fo'· Sirici L iahiUv in Torts, 8r YALE 
L.J .  r os s .  ro6o ( 1 9 7 2 ) . 
3; The Seventh Circuit  noted in an FWPCA case: 
[T]he party engaged i n  the potentially poiluting enterprise is in the best position to 
estimate the risk of accidental pollution and plan accordingly, as by raising its prices or 
purchasing insuran c e .  E conomically, i t  makes sense to place the cost of  pol lution on the 
enterprise (here water transport of gasoline)  w h i c h  statistically will c ause polluti o n  and 
in fact does cause pollution. 
United States v.  Tex-Tow, I nc . ,  589 F. 2 d  1 3 1 0 ,  1 3 1 4-1 5 ( 7 th Cir. 1 9 7 3 )  (footnotes omitted ) .  
38 H . R. 7020 ,  96th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess.  § 307 r(a)( r ) , 1 2 6  Co:-J G .  REc .  2 6 , 7 7 9 ( I g8o). The 
committee report stated: 
The Committee intends that the usual common law principles of  causati o n ,  including 
those of proximate causatio n ,  should govern the determination of whether a defendant 
'caused or contributed' to a release or  threatened release . Thus,  for instance, the 
mere act of generation or transportation of hazardous waste , or the mere existence of a 
generator's or transporter's waste in a site with respect to which cleanup c osts are i n curred 
would not, in and of itself, resuit in  liability under section 307 1 .  
H . R. REP. No. r o r 6 ,  pt.  r ,  g6th C o n g . , 2 Cl Sess .  3 3 ,  reprinted i n  1 9So U . S .  CODE CONG. & 
AD.  NEWS 6 r  r g ,  6 1 3 6 .  
3 9  S e e  1 2 6  CON G .  REc .  3 1 , 96 9  ( r 980) .  
40 See C ERCLA � I Oi(a) .  4 2  C . S . C .  � g6o7 (a) ( !  982 ) ,  quoted supra note r .  
4 1 See id .  § I O ? ( b ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  § 960i(b)  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  quoted supra note 3 1 .  
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Most litigation of the causation issue has involved generators. 42 A 
number of courts addressing the issue have held that a producer of 
toxic waste may be held liable if ( r )  its wastes were delivered to the 
site ;  ( 2 )  wastes of that type were found at the site at the time the 
release occurred; and (3 )  there was a release or threatened release of 
any hazardous substance that (4) caused the government to incur 
recoverable response costs . 4 3  This test imposes liability without re­
quiring proof that the defendant's own wastes or even wastes of the 
same type were part of a release . The wastes need only have been 
present at the site at the time the release occurred. Once the govern­
ment has established the four elements of liability listed above , the 
defendant can invoke one of the affirmative defenses of section 
1 07 (b) .  44 Although a defendant could theoretically rebut the pre­
sumption of causation by showing that all the chemicals in a release 
were produced by another generator sharing the disposal site - thus 
demonstrating that the release was caused solely by the act of a 
contractually unrelated third party - government experts have con­
ceded that it is virtually impossible to prove such an assertion. 45 
42 Owners have litigated the causation issue, but not through the third-party defenses. 
Rather, defe ndants h ave argued u nsuccessfully that Congress intended that liability require more 
than simple ownership of  the land on which the site was located. See New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp . ,  7 5 9  F. z d  1 03 2 ,  1 043-44 ( 2 d  Cir. 1 985)  (stating that causation is not required to 
establish the liabi lity of  an owner/operator) ;  United States v. Cauffman , rs ENVTL. L .  REP .  
( ENVTL. L .  lNST. ) 2 o , r 6 r ,  20 , 1 62 ( C . D .  Cal .  Oct .  23 ,  1 984) (same). Generators and the 
transporters who carry their wastes could invoke the third-party defense by showing that those 
particular wastes were not contained in the release . Proving such an assertion , however, is 
almost impossible .  See iufra notes 46 & 4 7 .  
43 See , e . g . , United States v .  South Carolina Recycl ing & Disposal , Inc . ,  1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP. 
( ENVTL.  L. lNST . ) 2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 7 4 ( D . S . C .  Feb. 2 3 ,  1 984) ; U nited States v. \Vade,  14 ENVTL. 
L.  REP. ( ENVTL. L. lNST. ) 2 o,og6, 2 o,og8 ( E . D .  Pa. Dec. 2 2 ,  1 983). A court might effectively 
collapse the first two parts of the test into one by manipulating evidentiary requirements and 
burdens of proof. See  Reed, supra note r 8 ,  at 1 0 , 2 2 9 .  Noting the difficulty and expense of 
chemical analysis ,  one court has stated in dictum that circumstantial evidence is enough to 
pron both ( r )  delivery of  a defendant's wastes to the site and ( 2 )  continued presence of similar 
waste at the time of the release: 
Less resource exhaustive means of  showing that a generator's waste or similar wastes are 
at a site , such as by identification of a generator's drum at the site during cleanup or by 
way of documentary or circumstantial proof that the wastes were hauled to the site absent  
proof that  they were subsequently taken away, should also be  sufficient to  satisfy [the 
second] element of proof. 
South  Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L .  INST . )  at 20, 2 7 5  n . 6 (emphasis 
added) .  under this Yiew, satisfying part r creates a p resumption that part 2 is also satisfied.  
Once the plain tiff has shewn evidence of delivery, the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
that its wastes 11·cre not present  at the site when the release occurred. The pending amendments 
provide no guidance concerning the evidence necessarv to prove causation .  The issue may 
therefore continue to generate litigation .  
4 4  South Carolina Recyding , 1 4  ENVTL.  L. REP.  (ENVTL .  L .  lNST . )  at  20, 2 7 7  n . 1 r .  For a 
l ist of the affi rmati1·e defenses, sec note 3 1  abo1·e. 
4·; S e e  infra note 4 7 .  
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Courts adopting this weak causation standard stress that the com­
mingling of wastes that often occurs at a disposal site makes it difficult 
and prohibitively expensive to identify every substance in a release . 46 
Once the substances have been identified,  it is even more difficult, if 
not impossible , to determine which generators produced each one and 
in what proportions.  4 7 Requiring the government to "fingerprint" each 
chemical , one court concluded, would place too great a burden on 
cost recovery actions , "eviscerating" the statute and defeating congres­
sional intent .  4 8  
Generators argue that before they are held liable for cleanup costs , 
the government should be required to prove that a particular gener­
ator's wastes were actually found in a release . 49 Alternatively, they 
argue that the government should at least have to show that the 
release contained wastes of the same type that the defendant  delivered 
to the site . 5 0 The government, however, would face the same difficult 
problems of proof as those faced by defendants . The standard of 
causation that generators propose would shield not only nonresponsi­
ble parties ,  but some responsible parties as well . By requiring the 
government to prove that a generator's wastes were delivered to a site 
and that wastes of the same type were present at the site when the 
release occurred,  the courts have applied reasonable safeguards for 
the protection of nonresponsible defendants . 
Weak causation standards are not unique to C E RCLA litigation . 
Courts may find precedent for such standards in other legal contexts . 5 1  
46 S e e ,  e . g . , South Carolina R ecycling, 1 4  ENVTL. L. REP. ( E NVTL. L .  l NST . ) at 2 0 , 2 7 5 n . 6 
( " [ I Jt would have cost in the range of :) 2 .  5 m il l ion to attempt through analytical means to identify 
all waste types in the conglomerate of  materials stored at the B l u ff Road site , approximately 
five times the cost of surface removal itse lf . " ) .  
" ; See, e . g . , United States v. Wade ,  1 4  ENVTL. L.  REP. ( E NVTL. L .  INST . )  2 o , og 6 ,  2 0 , 098 
( E . D  Pa. Dec . 2 2 ,  1 983 )  ( " The  government's experts have admitted that scientific technique  
has  not  advanced to  a point that the  identity of the  generator o f  a specific quantity of  waste 
can be stated with certainty. " ) .  
·13 S e e  id .  at  2 0 , 098 .  
49 See ,  e . g . U nited States v Wade. 14  ENVTL. L .  REP.  (ENVTL .  L. I N ST . ) z o , og 6 ,  2 0 , 0 9 7  
( E D Pa. Dec . 2 2 ,  1 98 3 ) .  
5 0  S e e  id .  
S l  In  negligence cases ,  for  example ,  courts may employ the doctrine of res  ipsa loquitur to  
infer causation from circumstantial evidence.  See  \V.  KEETON ,  D .  DOBBS,  R .  KEETON & D .  
0\\' E l'." ,  PROSSER A N D  K E ETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 9  ( 5 th ed .  r g84)  (hereinafter cited as  
PROSSER & hEET0:--1 ] .  Th i s  technique permits courts to  impose liability on parties not  proven 
to han caused harm. One j ustiflcation for  us ing res  ipsa loquitur is that one among a number 
of parties clearly has been negligent ,  and threatening them al l  with l iabi lity wi l l  force those not 
respor.sible to come forward with e\·idence .  The objective in  C E RC LA cases, however ,  i s  not 
to break a "conspiracy of si lenc e , "  as it  often is in traditional res ipsa loquitur cases. The  
defendants are  not  necessarily in any better position than the  government to  show whose wastes 
were contained in the release . B oth sides agree that it is almost impossible to distinguish the 
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Market share liability, for example , requires no conclusive proof that 
the victim's injury was caused by a particular defendant's product. 5 2  
I t  does not,  however, impose joint and several l iability; instead, i t  
assigns t o  each defendant a percentage o f  the total liability that cor­
responds to the defendant's percentage market share of the harmful 
product. 5 3 Courts have generally felt comfortable applying market 
share liability only in cases in which all the defendants produced an 
identical product, and the plaintiff has joined enough defendants to 
represent a substantial share of the market. 5 4 These restrictions in­
dicate that the courts attempt to reach a fair approximation of how 
much harm each defendant actually caused .  By contrast, C ERCLA 
has been interpreted to permit joint and several liability, and it con­
tains no requirement that the EPA j oin a substantial share of parties 
responsible for a release.  5 5 Furthermore , the wastes released at a site 
are not identical ; they differ in toxicity and in migratory potential . 
Under C ERCLA , a defendant may be required to pay the cost of 
cleaning up not only its own wastes , but also wastes produced by 
other, perhaps more culpable ,  defendants . 5 6  
Although these differences suggest that market share liability is 
inappropriate , the alternative theory of enterprise liability offers a 
useful model for the toxic waste problem.  5 7 A waste site can be seen 
as an enterprise in which each defendant has produced a similar 
product,  the harm from which is ,  practically speaking,  indivisible . 
Joint and several liability would be applied because the defendants 
were jointly aware of the potential risk of their activities and could 
have taken joint action to reduce that risk. The major drawback to 
wastes of different generators in a release. S ee s upra note 4 7 .  Threatening them each with 
liability thus will  do little to affect the nature o r  extent of the available evidence.  
Other doctrinal schemes impose liabil ity without proof of causation when the defendant is 
found to be the "cheapest cost a voider. " Such a rule encourages parties in the best position to 
take inju ry-avoidance measures to provide the economically efficient level of precaution.  I n  
these o t h e r  schemes, however, t h e  l a w  attempts t o  mitigate t h e  defendant's b u r d e n  b y  limiting 
liability. Under workers' compensation,  for example ,  the employer must accept liability for 
workplace accidents regardless of who was at fault and regardless of whether the employer 
caused the inj ury. See PROSSER AND KEETO N ,  s upra, § So, at 5 7 3-7-1 .  At the same tim e ,  
however, t h e  employ·er receives the benefit of statutory l imitations on the amount of damages 
an employee may recoHr. See id.  
52 See Sindell v.  Abbott Labs, 2 6  Cal .  3d 5 8 8 ,  6o7 P. 2 d  9 2 4 ,  1 63 Cal Rptr. 1 3 2  ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,  
cert. de nied ,  449 C' . S .  () T 2  ( 1 980) .  F o r  a general discussion o f  market share liability, see PROSSER 
AND KEETOK , s upm note j l ,  � 1 0 3 ,  at 7 1 4 . 
5 3 See PROSSER & KEETO N ,  supra note 5 1 ,  � 1 0 3 ,  at 7 1 4 ·  
5 4 See id.  For this reason ,  it has been thought inappropriate to extend market share liability 
to cases im·oh'ing asbestos produc ts ,  because those products contain varyi ng amounts of asbes­
tos. See id. 
s s  See i11jm Section D oi this Part. 
S o  See i 11jra note 9 r .  
5 i See i11ji·a p p .  r 6 2 7 -.3 0 .  
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the enterprise liability approach is that CERCLA contains no  require­
ment that the EPA sue enough parties to represent a substantial share 
of the market .  If courts can construct the liability rvles in such a 
way as to ensure that a substantial number of defendants responsible 
for a release are included in a suit, the risk of unfairness to those 
defendants that are j oined can be greatly reduced.  
The courts seem to be satisfied that if a generator used a disposal 
site , there is a substantial l ikelihood that its wastes were part of the 
release.  5 8 This weak causation test greatly facilitates the government's 
efforts to achieve rapid cleanup.  On the other hand ,  it creates a risk 
that courts may assign liability to generators who have little more 
than a remote relationship to the site and no responsibility whatsoever 
for the release .  Given the special difficulties of proof in hazardous 
waste cases,  courts must run the risk of sacrificing some fairness to 
waste generators in order to effect Congress's intent that the industry 
pay for cleanup .  A weak causation standard is the best available 
compromise between the interest in accurately assigning l iability and 
the interest in achieving rapid cleanup . Because courts have found it 
necessary to sacrifice certainty of causation , however, they should be 
especially vigilant in  preventing inequitable apportionment of liability 
among defendants . 
D .  The S cope of Liability 
CERCLA fails to address the question of how courts should ap­
portion liability among defendants . Congress deleted language re­
quiring joint and several liability from the statute in o rder to secure 
enough votes for passage . 5 9 Statements in the legislative history in­
dicate that Congress intended the courts to make apportionment de­
cisions on a case-by-case basis in accordance with traditional principles 
of common law. 60 The amendments currently pending in Congress 
explicitly confirm that the courts have discretion to apply joint and 
several liability in appropriate cases .  6!  Courts considering the issue 
have concluded that the statutory language is ambiguous , permitting 
but not requiring the imposition of joint and several liability. 6 2 
5 8 "Generators are adequately p rotected by requiring a plaintiff to prove that a defendant's 
waste was disposed of at a site and that the substances that make the defendant"s waste 
hazardous are also present at the site . "  U n ited States v .  Wade ,  1 4 ENVTL. L .  REP. ( E NVTL. 
L .  INST. ) 2 o ,og6 ,  20 ,og8 ( E . D  Pa. Dec .  2 2 ,  1 983) .  
5 9 See supm note  4 .  For a discussion of th is  change in the  language of the statute, see 
Moore and Kowalski ,  When Is One Genemtor Liable for A nother's Was t e ? ,  33 C LEV. ST. L .  
REV.  93 ,  g j-g6 ( ! 984-Sj ) .  
60 See supra note 5 .  
6 1 See S .  REP .  No. 2 5 3 ,  ggth Cong. , r st Sess . 74 ( r gS j )  (expl icitlv endorsing the  rule of joint 
and several l iability adopted in United States v. C hem-Dyne Corp . ,  5 7  2 F Supp.  802 ( S . D .  
Ohio r g83 ) l .  
62 See ,  e . g . , United States \".  Stringfellow, 1 4  £ 1\VTL. L. RE P.  ( ENVT L L .  lNST . )  2 0 , 385 , 
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Having found a number of defendants liable under CERCLA, a 
court may choose either of two alternative methods of apportioning 
liability. The court may hold each defendant l iable only for its own 
share of the damage , or  the court may impose j oint and several 
liability, making each defendant individually liable for the entire cost 
of cleanup.  If liability is apportioned,  and some parties are absent or 
insolvent, their shares go uncompensated. On the other hand, if 
liability is j oint and several , the government may recover the entire 
judgment from any one defendant. U nder j oint and several liability, 
the EPA need sue only a few financially viable parties in order to 
ensure recovery of substantial cleanup costs . If all the responsible 
parties are available , and if the original defendants are able to implead 
them by means of suits for contribution ,  the lawsuit will result in an 
equitable apportionment of liability. To the extent that the original 
defendants are unable to implead the remaining responsible parties , 
however, j oint and several l iability forces the original defendants to 
pay for the unapportioned shares .  
The threat of joint and several liability is an essential means of 
compelling defendants to shoulder the burden and expense of locating 
and impleading parties potentially liable for a release . Because this 
threat creates a possibility of misallocation of liability, however, courts 
should permit original defendants to threaten third-party defendants 
with j oint liability for the shares of absent parties in suits for contri­
bution .  63 
I .  Applicable Law 
CERCLA's legislative history urges the application of common law 
principles to questions not specifically answered in the statute . Courts 
have resolved most of the liability issues by straightforward statutory 
interpretation .  64 Congress has made clear, however, that the courts 
should decide issues regarding apportionment of liability among de­
fendants in accordance with traditional and evolving principles of 
common law. 6 5 
: o , 3 86 ! C D .  Cal.  Apr. 5 ,  1 984J ;  u nited States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal , I nc . ,  
1 4  E NVTL .  L REP. ( E N\'TL .  L .  INST . ) 2 0 , 2 7 2 , 2 0 , 2 7 5 ( D . S . C  Feb.  2 3 ,  1 984);  U nited States v .  
Consen·ation Chern.  Co . ,  q E:-;vTL .  L. REP. ( E :-<VTL .  L .  INST. ) 2 0 , 2 0 7 ,  2 0 , 2 0 9  (W. D .  Mo.  
Feb . 3 ,  1 984) ;  United States v. !'\ortheastern Pharrn . & Chern.  Co. (NEPACCO),  5 7 9  F .  Supp. 
8 2 3 .  844 I W. D .  Mo. 1 98 4 ) ;  U nited States , . .  A & F Materials Co. , 5 7 8 F.  Supp.  1 2 4 9 ,  1 2 5 4-5 5 
( S . D .  I l l .  1 984 ) :  United States , . . \Vad e .  q E NVTL .  L RE P . ( ENVTL. L. lNST . )  2 0 , 0 96 , 2 0 , 099 
I E . D .  Pa.  Dec.  2 2 .  1 98 .3 1 ;  Cnitccl States \ ' .  Chem-Dync Corp . , 5 7 2  F.  Supp. 8o2 , 8oS ( S . D .  
Ohio r g8,3 J .  
63 See  i1 1jra pp.  1 5 35 -3 9 .  
6 4  S ee s u p m  pp.  1 .) q-2 0 ;  infra pp .  1 5 3 9-4 2 . 
65 Sec supm note .=; . 
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Initially, courts were uncertain whether they should look to federal 
or state common law. 66 Courts addressing the issue have determined 
that they have power to apply federal common law and have asserted 
a variety of sources for this power. 6 7  First, federal courts can create 
law for the purpose of filling gaps left by federal statutes .  68 Second , 
federal courts may create federal common law when it is '"necessary 
to protect uniquely federal interests . "'69 The very existence  of C E R­
CLA and other pollution control statutes ,  enacted largely because state 
solutions to the hazardous waste problem were inadequate , indicates 
that hazardous waste involves "uniquely federal inte rests . " 7 0 Third, 
some courts hold that because the U nited States derives its authority 
to sue for reimbursement from a federal law, its rights in obtaining 
that reimbursement should also be determined by federal law. 7 1  Fi­
nally, some courts hold that CERCLA's legislative history unambig­
uously confers on  courts the power to create federal common law. 72 
Having determined that they have power to create federal common 
law, courts must next determine whether the law should be uniform 
or whether each may simply adopt as federal common law the law of 
the state in which it  sits . The Supreme Court has stated that federal 
programs that " 'by their nature are and must be uniform in character 
throughout the Nation"' require the development of distinctly federal 
common law. 7 3 Courts imposing joint and several liability for cleanup 
of toxic wastes have set forth two reasons why liability rules should 
66 For a discussion oi federal common l awmaking power under CERCLA, see Note , Liab ility 
of Paren t  COJ-pora tions for Ha:ardous Waste  Cleanup and Damages , 99 HARV. L.  REv. 986 , 
999-roor ( 1 98 6 ) .  
6 7 S e e ,  e . g . , United States v .  A & F Materials Co . , 5 7 8  F. Supp .  1 2 4 9 ,  1 2 5 5  ( S .D .  I l l .  1 984) ;  
United States v.  Wade,  14  E NVTL. L. REP. ( ENVTL.  L .  INST. ) 2 0 ,096 , 2 0 ,  I oo (E .  D .  Pa .  Dec .  
2 2 ,  1 983 ) ;  U nited States v .  Chem-Dyne Corp . ,  5 7 2  F. Supp .  802 , 8oS ( S . D .  Ohio 1 983 ) .  
68 See Clzem-Dyne ,  5 7 2  F.  Supp .  at 8oS ( c iting U nited States v .  Litt le Lake Misere Land 
Co. , 4 1 2  U S . s So,  5 93 ( 1 9 7 3 l l . 
69 See id. at 8oS ( quoting Texas Indus .  v. Radcliff M aterials ,  I nc . ,  45 1 U . S .  630,  640 ( 1 98 1 )) . 
70 See id. ; see also I l l inois v. City of M ilwaukee , 406 U . S . 9 1 ,  r o r-02 ( 1 9 7 2 )  (suggesting  
that the  existence of a federal statute is itself evidence of strong federal in terest ) .  When  federal 
statutes are designed to be "comprehensive , "  they may preempt federal common law in the area .  
See City of Milwaukee v. I l l ino is ,  45 1 U . S . 304 ,  3 1 8-1 9 ( 1 98 1 ) . C ERCLA. however, is  not  
such a comprehensive statute . I t  establishes a liability rule ,  but leaves the courts free to  fil l  i n  
the detai ls .  See U nited States \·. Stringfel low, 1 4  E:-.rvTL.  L .  REP.  ( ENVTL .  L.  I:\'ST . ) 2 0 , 385 , 
2 0 , .3 8 7  ( C . D .  Cal .  Apr. 5 .  r 984J :  U nited States v. A & F Materials Co . , 5 7 8 F. Supp.  1 2 4 9 ,  
1 2 5 5  ( S .D .  I l l .  1 984 ) ;  Note , Join t  and Se1•eral Liability for Hazardous Was te Releases Under 
S upe1ju nd,  68 VA. L.  REv .  r r s ; .  r q g-So ( 1 98 2 ) .  
7 1 S e e  United States \' .  C hcm-Dyne Corp . , 5 7 2  F. Supp.  802 , Sog ( S . D .  Ohio 1 983 )  (c it ing 
United States v .  Kimbell Foods ,  Inc . , 440 U . S . 7 I S ,  7 2 6  ( I 9 7 9 ) ) .  
7 2 See Colorado v. ASARCO. r s  ENVTL. L. REP .  ( ENVTL. L. lNST . )  2 0 , .) 2 ,3 ,  20 , 5 2 6  (D .  
Colo. May 1 3 .  r gS s l :  U nited States \·. A & F Materials Co . , 5 7 8 F .  Supp .  1 2 4 9 ,  1 2 5 5  ( S .D .  I l l .  
1 984) . 
73 U nited States v. Kimbell  Foods .  Inc . ,  440 U . S .  7 I S ,  7 2 8  ( 1 9 79 )  (quot ing U nited States \·. 
Yazel l ,  3 8 2  C . S .  34 1 ,  3 5 4  ( r g6 6 ) ) .  
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be uniform in such cases .  First, adopting different state laws would 
encourage excessive dumping in states with lenient liability stan­
dards.  74 Second, variation from state to state would subject replen­
ishment of the Superfund to the "needless uncertainty and subsequent 
delay occasioned by diversified local disposition .  "75  The idiosyncracies 
of state common law rules would complicate litigation and unneces­
sarily burden EPA resources. 
Once a court has determined that it should apply a uniform federal 
rule ,  it must then consult a proper source for the content of the rule .  
C E RCLA refers to the FWPCA, 76 which has been interpreted in a 
number of cases to impose joint and several liability. 7 7  Courts have 
held , however, that because Congress refused to mandate j oint and 
several liability, a blanket rule of joint and several liability in all cases 
would be inappropriate . 7 8 They have examined traditional sources of 
common law, including not only cases decided under analogous federal 
statutes ,  but also state common law, treatises ,  and the second Res­
tatement of Torts . 7 9 Thus far, courts addressing the issue have fol­
lowed one of two alternative approaches .  Some have followed the 
Restatement rule , which allows joint and several liability whenever 
the harm is "indivisible . "8° Others have followed the approach set 
forth in the Gore Amendment, a proposed CERCLA amendment that 
passed in the House but failed in the Senate . 8 1 This approach allows 
a court to impose either j oint and several liability or apportionment 
according to a number of different factors. 
2 .  The Restatement Approach 
Most courts that have ruled on the issue of joint and several 
liability have adopted the Restatement formulation , 82 which provides 
74  See ,  e . g . , Chem-Dyne,  5 7 2  F. Supp.  at 809 .  
75 I d.  
76 Sec  supm p .  1 5 1 2 .  
7 7  See ,  e . g . , United S tates v .  M!V Big Sam , 6 8 r  F. :o d  43 2 ,  439 ( 5 th Cir. 1 98 2 ) ;  In re Berkley 
C urtis B ay Co. , 5 5 7  F. Supp.  335·  .33 9  ( S . D  N . Y  1 98 3 ) ;  United S tates , .. Hol lywood Marine . 
Inc . ,  5 1 9  F. Supp.  6 8 8 ,  6 9 2  ( S . D .  Tex. 1 9 8 1 ) . 
iS See,  e . g . , Chem-Dy11 e ,  5 7 2 F. Supp .  at 8 1 0.  
i <J See ,  e . g . , id .  at 8o9- 1 0 .  
so See infra pp .  1 5 2 8-2 9 .  
s r  See 1 2 6  CONG . REc.  2 6 , 7 8 1 ,  2 6 , 7 8.�-85 ( 1 980) .  
sz Sec,  e . g . , United States v. Argent  Corp . . 1 4  E:-<VTL. L .  REP.  ( E?-:VTL.  L .  l N ST . )  2 0 , ..J. 9 7 .  
2 0 , 4 9 7  ( D . N . M .  May 4 .  1 984) ;  United States , . .  South Carolina Recycling & Disposal , Inc . ,  q 
ENVTL . L. REP. ( Ei':VT L. L. lNST . )  2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 . 2 7 5  ( D . S . C .  Feb.  2 3 .  1 984) ;  United States \·. 
C onscn·ation Chern .  C o . , q ENVTL.  L.  REP. ( £ 1\VTL L. INST . )  2 0 . 2 0 7 ,  2 0, 2 09 (W. D .  Mo.  
Feb .  3 .  rr J84) ;  U nited States , . .  \Vade ,  1 4  ENVTL.  L .  REP.  ( ENVTL .  L .  lNST . )  z o , og 6 ,  2 0 , 1 00 
( E . D .  Pa. Dec .  2 2 ,  1 983) ;  U nited States 1·. Chem-Dyne Corp . , 5 7 2  F. Supp.  So:- . 8 r o- r r tS D.  
Oh io  1 983) .  B u t  see  United States v .  Stringfel low. q ENVTL.  L .  REP. ( ENVT L .  L. lNST . ) 
2 0 , J 8 j , 2 0 , 3 8 7-SS ( C . D .  Cal .  Apr. j .  1 98-J. l (holding that although joint and several l iabi l it,· 
m ay apply in a � 1 0 7  reimbursement action. i t  is not applicable in a � ro6 action to abate a 
hazard created by toxic 11·astc l .  
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that liability will be j oint and several when the harm suffered is  
indivisible . 83 An inj ury is deemed indivisible when there is no "rea­
sonable basis" for dividing the harm among the responsible parties .  84 
If the government makes any showing of harm , the burden shifts to 
the defendant to prove that the harm was divisible . 85 At least one 
court finding harm produced by a release of toxic waste has held that 
the harm was indivisible .  8 6  
In discussing the issue of divisibility, some courts have rej ected 
defendants' arguments that harm could be divided according to the 
relative volume of waste deposited by each defendant at the site . The 
courts have reasoned that wastes differ in toxicity and migratory 
potential and that they have typically commingled with one another 
at the site . 8 7 Hazardous substances may differ in  their potential to 
cause harm. Substance A might account for ninety percent of a 
release;  but if it were of low toxicity, cleanup might be inexpensive .  
Substance B might account for only ten  percent of the  release ; but  its 
high toxicity might require rigorous safety precautions ,  making 
cleanup very expensive . If  the  two substances escape independently, 
one polluting an acre and the other polluting nine acres , a court should 
S.l See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A ( I 96S ) .  
3 4  An example  of divisible h arm would be :  
Through the  negligence of A,  B ,  and C ,  water escapes from irrigation ditches on their 
land, and floods a part of D's farm.  There is evidence that so per cent of  the water 
came from A's ditch ,  30 per  cent from B 's ditch ,  and 20 per cent from C's. On  the basis 
of this evidence ,  A may be held liable for so per cent of the damages to [ D's) farm, B 
liable for 30 per cent ,  and C l iable for 2 0  per cent .  
/d.  comment d ,  i l lustration 4 ( 1 96 5 ) .  An  example of  indivisible h arm would be :  
A Company and B Company each negligently discharge oil  into a stream. The oi l  
floats on the surface and is ignited by a spark from an u nknown source . The f1re spreads 
to C's barn, and burns i t  down.  C may recover a j udgment for the full amount of his  
damages against A Company, or  B Company, or both of them .  
/d.  comment i ,  i l lustration q .  
3 S  See S o u th Carolina Recycling, 1 4  ENVTL . L .  REP. ( E NVTL. L .  I:-JST . )  at  20 . 2 7 5 ;  Chem­
Dyne, 5 7 2  f. Supp.  at 8 r r ;  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B ( 1 965 ) .  
86 See  South  Carolina Recycling, 1 4  ENVTL . L .  REP. ( ENVTL.  L .  INST . )  at 20, 2 75 .  The 
court there noted that: 
/d. 
Because of the deleterious condition of the site at the time of clean u p ,  it is impossible to 
divide the harm in  any meaningful way. There were thousands of  corroded, leaking 
drums at the site not segregated by source or  waste type. U n known,  incompatible 
materials comingled to cause f1res, fumes,  and explosions. Because of the constant threat 
of further f1res, explosions ,  and other reac tions ,  all of the materials at the site were , if 
not actually oozing out, in danger of being released. Thus,  while all of  the substances 
at the site contributed synergistically to the threatening condition at the site , it is impos­
sible to ascertain the degree of relative contribution of each substance .  C learly, the harm 
was indi\·is ible , and defendants have failed to meet their burden of  proving otherwise . 
3/ See ,  e . g . , id .  at 2 0 , 2 7 s ( noting that the harm might also be caused by the synergistic 
effects of commingling) ;  Un ited States v.  Chem-Dyne Corp . , 5 7 2  F. Supp .  802 ,  8 I I  ( S . D .  Ohio 
1 983 ) .  The S o uth Carolina Recycling court noted,  however, that volume migh'  :ppropriately 
be considered in an action by the defendant for contribution from other potentially l iable parties .  
See Sou tlz Carolina Recycling , q ENVT L .  L REP. ( ENVTL. L INST . )  at :2 0 , 2 7 5 -76 
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hold the harm to be divisible , because each substance has produced 
a distinct harm . If the two mix together, however, and innocuous 
substance A spreads over a wide area ,  carrying with i t  the highly 
toxic substance B ,  expensive cleanup procedures will be required for 
the entire release . In that case ,  the harm is indivisible , much like the 
harm resulting from a fire started by two negligent actors .  88  
Despite the difficulties created by commingling of wastes ,  volume 
might under some circumstances provide a "reasonable basis" for di­
viding harm - particularly when the defendant can show that the 
various substances in the release require identical cleanup procedures .  
A defendant might also be able to prove divisibility if it could show 
that its waste had been segregated from other wastes at the site and 
that the cost of cleaning up its portion could be quantified .  In prac­
tice ,  however, evidence of this kind is rarely present. Thus , even 
though courts are willing to receive evidence that the harm is divisible , 
defendants have little chance of proving a sufficiently precise appor­
tionment of responsibility for cleanup costs . Courts that adopt the 
Restatement rule , therefore , will practically always impose j oint and 
several liability. Congress refused to mandate joint and several lia­
bility for all C ERCLA actions ,  because it intended to permit case-by­
case adj udication of whether apportioned or joint and several l iability 
is appropriate . 8 9 In hazardous waste cases , however, a rule based on 
divisibility proves to be a less than meaningful standard for determin­
ing whether joint and several liability or some form of apportioned 
liability is more appropriate . 
When the EPA brings suit against only a subset of the responsible 
parties ,  the distribution of costs resulting from joint and several iia­
bility may often prove both unfair and inefficient, because it fails to 
ensure that all responsible parties bear the full cost of their activities . 90 
The EPA ,  because it can rely on j oint and several liability, has little 
incentive to sue everyone connected with a waste site but can afford 
to focus its resources on only the wealthy or highly visible defen­
dants . 9 1 If certain kinds of waste are found at a disposal site after a 
ss S e e  su,IJra note 8-t .  
S<J S e e  s upra note s .  
YO One of C ongress's express goals in enact ing C ERCLA. was to p l ace liability on those 
responsible for creating the  em·ironmental hazard . Sec supm note 7 .  
9 1 The government does not ah\ a\·s sue all possible defendants. I n  one case the defendant 
pointed out that the EPA harl. failed to join some 2 00 to s oo persons with ownership interests 
i n  the land on which the release h ad occu rred.  Colorado \'.  ASARC O ,  rs ENVTL. L RE?.  
( ENVTL. L .  lNST . )  2 0 , ) 2 ) ,  2 0 . 5 2 -1- 1 D  Colo .  l'da\· 1 3 .  1 985 ) .  In another case the EPA suec; the 
site  owner and fou r  generators. fai l i n g  to j o i n  more than 2 00 generators whom the ddendan ls 
c laimed were potentially l iable . T h ree of the four original  generator defendants had produced .  
respectively. 1 . 9 % .  1 . 3 �;;. .  and 0 . 9 '1c of  the 1xastc at the  site . By contrast,  certain third-parry 
defend:  ''  had produced far greater percentages. some as high as 1 3 . 6 % .  See FMC C orpcra-
:1 tal :\Icmoranclum Concer11ing B i furcation at s - 6 ,  United States v. C onservaticn 
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release ,  the EPA may choose to sue a generator who disposed of a 
small quantity of the same type of waste years before C ERCLA was 
enacted,  and this defendant could be forced to pay the entire cleanup 
bill - even absent any proof that its wastes were part of the release 
- while other responsible parties escaped liability altogether. One 
might dismiss the specter  of this extreme case on the ground that in 
most lawsuits , substantially all responsible parties wil l  probably be 
solvent and available for suit. If that were true ,  however, the gov­
ernment would have had no need to provide for j oint and several 
liability. Indeed,  C E RCLA's legislative history clearly shows that 
Congress wanted to provide a source of compensation when defen­
dants were absent or  insolvent.  Moreover, even if all parties were 
certain to be available and solvent,  the possibility of selective targeting  
would remain:  the EPA has no  incentive to  sue all potential defendants 
if it can rely on j oint and several liability to recover from a few 
wealthy defendants . Indeed, because multiparty l itigation is complex 
and expensive , C ERCLA creates a disincentive to sue all the respon­
sible parties .  
Joint and several liability may prove unfair when it forces certain 
parties to pay for cleaning up releases to which they did not contribute 
and from which they derived no past financial benefit.  It may also 
prove inefficient when it fails to provide accurately placed incentives 
for safer treatment and disposal of wastes . The threat of joint and 
several liability should create very strong safety incentives for highly 
visible companies who can anticipate that they will be sued . On the 
other hand ,  the fact that one may be required to p ay for the liability 
of others over whom one has no control vitiates the incentive to invest 
in safety precautions .  The incomplete enforcement mechanism fos­
tered by joint and several liability largely insulates small companies 
from liability and forces wealthy companies to overinternalize the costs 
of waste disposal . Companies that escape liability do not bear the 
costs of their unsafe disposal practices;  hence their products are un­
derpriced,  encouraging them to produce too much .  Companies held 
Chern.  Co . ,  1 4  ENVTL. L .  REP.  ( ENVT L .  L. L'-!ST . )  2 0 , 2 0 7  (W. D .  Mo.  Feb. 3 ,  1 984) .  Da\·id 
Stockman .  a Congressman at the time of C E RC LA's enac tment and an opponent of  the broad 
liability standard, stated in a House debate: 
I would l ike to suggest to the Members of this House that some day dovvn the road about 
a year from now they are going to receive a letter from a company in their district that 
has just received a Ss o r  Sw mill ion l iabil ity suit from EPA that was triggered by noth ing  
more than a decision of a GS- q that some landfil l ,  some disposal s i te  somewhere, needed 
to be cleaned up and. as a result of an im·estigation that h is office did , he found out 
that that company in your district contributed a fe1v hundred pounds o f  waste to that 
site 30 years ago. 
[And once the EP."" has]  found that deep pocket. they will immediately go to court 
and sue that deep pocket, and then all the onus of the law, all  of  the burden will  be on 
him to proH that he was not  responsible . 
1 2 6  Co�G.  REC.  2 6 , 786  ( I gSo) .  
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jointly and severally l iable pay more than their share of cleanup costs ; 
hence their products are overpriced, and they produce too l ittle . The 
result is to shift production away from the only producers that might 
alter their behavior in response to the threat of CERCLA liability. 
Market share shifts toward the very companies that do not respond 
to CERCLA's safety incentives. They fail to respond, because they 
know that due to their low visibility they are unlikely to be sued.  
They know that if they are sued,  the high-visibility defendants will 
also be available to share the liability. C ERCLA thus encourages the 
proliferation of these small companies,  who take the market share lost 
by the large companies that have been forced to overinternalize 
cleanup costs . Joint and several liability therefore leads to both ov­
erdeterrence and underdeterrence of unsafe waste disposal rather than 
to a uniform incentive for safer behavior. 
These negative consequences of incomplete enforcement under 
joint and several liability can be avoided only when defendants orig­
inally sued by the EPA implead all remaining parties connected with 
the site in suits for contribution . 92 Then each responsible party must 
pay its respective share of the total cleanup bill . Fairness and incen­
tive problems will take care of themselves . Faced with j oint and 
several liability, the original defendants have an incentive to locate 
and join all parties connected with the site . Unfortunately, in most 
toxic waste cleanup cases ,  at least two obstacles stand in the way of 
effective contribution by all responsible parties .  
First, although many of the smaller responsible parties may have 
prospered because they were spared direct suit by the EPA, some of 
them may nonetheless have become judgment-proof. A defendant 
cannot spread liability by impleading third parties who have become 
insolvent or have ceased to exist. One traditional argument purporting 
to answer this concern asserts that wealthy targets threatened with 
joint and several liability will arrange in advance to apportion l iability 
by contract among their potential co-defendants and to ensure that 
money will be available to cover liability. A large generator, for 
example , could refuse to do business with a disposal facility unless 
the facility required all of its customers to carry liability insurance .  
If  a customer eventually became insolvent ,  the insurance policy would 
still be available to cover that customer's share of liability. This 
argument fails to address two complexities of CERCLA liability. 
First, C E RCLA applies retroactively. 93 Defendants cannot now rem­
edy the fact that other responsible parties failed to obtain insurance 
in the past and failed to apportion liabil ity among all the users of a 
particular waste site . Second , insurance companies are now refusing 
02 See infra pp.  1 5 35 -3 9 .  
9 '  S e c  infra p p .  1 5 39-4 2 .  
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to write policies for potential C ERCLA defendants . 94 No generator 
can force others to buy insurance if insurance is unavailable .  Gen­
erators theoretically could band together and pool their resources in  a 
self-insurance scheme; but the class of waste-producing firms is so  
large and so  diffuse that such a proj ect  would be unmanageable . The 
fact that no industry-wide insurance scheme has appeared during six 
years of CERCLA litigation suggests that it is only a theoretical 
possibility. 
The second obstacle to complete contribution is that even when 
all responsible parties are solvent and available for suit ,  the original 
defendants must bear the expense of bringing all these parties into 
the litigation . U nlike original defendants, impleaded parties are liable 
only for their apportioned share of the damages .  Joint liability does 
not apply in suits for contribution .  95 Thus , even if the harm is held 
to be indivisible and the original defendants are liable to the govern­
ment for the entire damage award,  an impleaded party is liable to 
those defendants only for its individual portion of the release ,  calcu­
lated by whatever method of damage allocation the court chooses .  9 6  
Liability for the shares of absent parties must be borne by the original 
defendants alone ;  impleaded parties are not forced to shoulder any of 
this burden .  Because they do not fear being forced to bear potentially 
overwhelming liability for cleaning up their own and some portion of  
absent parties' wastes ,  impleaded parties can afford to  sit back while 
the original defendants pay the costs of locating and joining the re­
maining parties , conducting the litigation ,  and performing the feasi­
bility study for cleaning up the site . Even when the original defen­
dants succeed in impleading other responsible parties ,  they are 
unlikely ever to recover these transaction costs , which may run into 
the millions of dollars . And even if the case never goes to trial , the 
cost of settlement negotiations may be quite high ; impleaded defen­
dants who are not subject to joint and several liability and are unlikely 
to be involved frequently in C ERCLA suits tend to drag their feet 
and obstruct settlement efforts . Moreover, regardless of whether the 
case goes to trial or is settled,  the original defendants still bear the 
costs of conducting the cleanup feasibil ity study and j oining the other 
parties . 
Highly visible defendants that are frequently involved in C ERCLA 
litigation will be forced time and again to pay for these transaction 
costs and for the shares of absent parties . Over time ,  therefore , they 
·wil1 be forced to bear an increasingly disproportionate share of cleanup 
costs relative to low-visibility defendants. It is no doubt more appro­
priate to place these costs on defendants than to leave them on the 
"4 See iHti·a pp .  1 5 7 5-76 .  
' '5 S e e  RESL\TEME::-iT ( S E C O N D )  OF ToRTS � SS6A( 2 )  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
9 6  S e e  p p .  I S :J 7-3 9 · 
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EPA;  nevertheless ,  there is n o  reason to place these costs on  only 
those parties that the EPA initially chooses to sue . Courts should 
therefore alter the current rules to avoid inequitable distribution of 
liability among responsible parties .  
3 ·  The Gore A mendment Approach 
A number of courts have held that C ERCLA's legislative history 
permits them to depart from the Restatement rule by apportioning 
liability in certain cases ,  even when the harm has been found to be 
indivisible .  97 In  support of this conclusion , they refer to the Gore 
Amendment, 98 which would have modified the Restatement rule by 
allowing courts to apportion liability not only according to divisibility 
but according to a variety of factors: ( r )  the ability of the parties to 
distinguish their relative contribution to a release ; ( 2 )  the amount of 
waste involved ;  (3) the degree of toxicity of wastes involved; (4) the 
degree of involvement of the parties in disposal decisions ;  (S) the 
degree of care exercised by the parties; and (6)  the degree to which 
the parties cooperated with the government in the prevention of 
harm.  9 9  This approach presents the same practical difficulties in di­
viding harm that one finds in the Restatement approach.  Here , hmv­
ever, the court simply does its best to approximate the relative shares 
(as it would have to do in a suit for contribution , even under the 
Restatement rule) and limits each defendant's liability to its respective 
share . Courts following this approach have concluded that, by refus­
ing to mandate a uniform rule of joint and several liabil ity, Congress 
indicated its willingness to allow apportionment according to fac tors 
like those listed in the Gore Amendment. 1 0o 
Apportioning liability according to the factors listed in the Gore 
Amendment would reduce the potential for unfair targeting of wealthy 
defendants. The Restatement itself suggests that an exception to its 
rule might be justified when a defendant has contributed only a small 
' !i  See  United States v.  A & F Materials Co . , 5 7 8 F.  Supp.  1 2 49 .  I 2 5 5-5 7 ( S . D  Il l .  r gS-:. • :  
T_jnited States v. Stringfellow, I 4  E NVTL.  L.  REP. ( E NVTL L INST . )  20,385 , 2 0 , 3 8 7-88 : C. D .  
Cal Apr. 5 .  1 984) . 
'Jo See  A & F :vlaterials , 5 7 8  F. Supp .  at 1 2 5 6 ;  S tringfellow , q E NVTL.  L. REP. ( E :< VTL. 
L. I'·lST ) at z o , 38 7 .  
99 Sec 1 2 6  CONG.  REC. 2 6 , 7 8 I  ( r g8o). 
; oo S e c ,  e . g . , A & F Materials , 5 78 F. Supp.  at  I 2 5 6 .  The amendments recently passed in 
Lhe House would permit the government to expend Superfund money to cover "orph:.:tn sh<ir�s . "  
these ior i\·hich the responsible party i s  absen t o r  insolvent .  See H . R .  2005 , 99th Cong. , I ol 
:;c::;s � ! JO .  1 3 1  C O N G .  REC .  S I 2 , 1 94 (daily eel Sept .  2 6 ,  r g8 5 ) .  The go\·ernment cleady ,_, ; ' !  
c o n tinue t o  seek joint and several l iabil ity whenever possible ,  hown·cr, because i t  wiii ncJ t  b e  
reimbu rsed for these orphan shares, and the Superfund i s  n o t  large enough t o  cover th'! c o s c .  
Cf Eckhardt .  The Unfin ished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L .  Rr:v. -' 5 :' ·  
2 .', 3 -5 ,� .  2 6 3  ( I  9 8  I )  ( asserting that C E RC LA's financing is inadequate to accomplish its go<:.Js ) .  
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amount to  the total harm. 1 0 1 The Gore Amendment approach is , at 
least in theory, both more equitable and more likely to create appro­
priate safety incentives than is a general rule of j oint and several 
liability. It does not impose liability on some defendants for cleanin g  
up the wastes o f  others .  Thus , i t  does not compel overinternalization 
of cleanup costs . Moreover, because the factors listed in the Gore 
Amendment tie liability to a defendant's relative causal responsibility, 
apportionment according to these factors rewards attempts to find 
safer methods of waste disposal . 
Unfortunately, the Gore Amendment approach is fatally flawed 
because of practical l imitations on the EPA's enforcement capability. 
Apportionment of liability, whatever factors of apportionment are 
used,  suffers from two disadvantages:  first, when some of those re­
sponsible for a given site are unavailable or unable to pay, the gov­
ernment cannot recover the full cost of cleanup ; second,  when liability 
is no longer joint and several , defendants lose all incentive to locate 
and implead other potentially liable parties ,  shifting  the costs of doing 
so to the government.  Because of l imited EPA funding, this shifting 
of costs to the government would require the EPA to abandon cleanup 
efforts at many sites .  Joint and several liability is therefore desirable 
as a means to ensure that private parties pay for the bulk of C ERCLA 
litigation costs . 
Congress could perhaps resolve the first difficulty - absent and 
insolvent parties - by amending C ERCLA to change the standard 
from j oint and several to apportioned liability, while expanding the 
Superfund to cover any unapportioned shares of cleanup costs . This 
blend of tort liability and industry taxation would ensure fairness to 
responsible parties , because no generator would have to pay for clean­
ing up another's wastes ;  the expanded Superfund would cover that 
expense . The plan would also improve somewhat the accuracy of 
resource allocation and safety incentives within the industry, because 
highly visible producers would no longer be forced to overinternalize 
the costs of cleanup or to overinvest in safety precautions .  
Although this congressional action would solve the problem created 
by absent  or insolvent parties , it would fail to address the second 
drawback of apportioned liability - that defendants would have no 
incentive to locate and j oin other potentially liable parties and that 
the costs of doing so would shift back to the government.  B ecause 
1 0 1 In a comment to � 4 3 3 B  the Restatement suggests: 
[I]f a hundred factories each contribute a smal l ,  but still uncerta in ,  amount of pol lu tion 
to a stream,  to hold each of them l iable for the entire damage because he cannot sho1v 
the amount of his contribution may perhaps be unjust. Such cases ha1·e not arisen ,  
possiblv because in  such cases some evidence l imiting the liability always has been in  
fact a1·ailabl c .  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS � 433 B ,  comment e ( 1 965 ) .  C ERCL\ c ases closch �esc mblc 
this scenario, and there usual ly is no evidence a1·ailable that would limit l iab il itv. 
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of the inadequacy o f  its own resources, the government would b e  
likely t o  allow a substantial percentage o f  responsible parties t o  escape 
liability, leaving their shares to be covered by the Superfund.  And, 
because fewer responsible parties would be targeted and forced to 
bear the costs of cleaning up their own wastes ,  this development 
would dilute CERCLA's potency as a means to encourage proper 
resource allocation and development of safer disposal procedures .  As­
suming that transaction costs are better placed on defendants than on 
the government, j oint and several liability i s  essential to  making C E R­
CLA effective . 
4 ·  Suits B e tween Defendants and Third Parties 
At the very least, courts should attempt to ensure equitable allo­
cation of damages among defendants . Courts can further mitigate the 
harshness of j oint and several liability, however, by fashioning rules 
that give leverage to defendants in impleading and obtaining contri­
bution from other responsible parties .  A relatively simple and poten­
tially effective step would be to impose joint liability in suits for 
contribution .  This approach would not resolve all the difficulties of 
CERCLA liability, because defendants would still bear the liability of 
absent  parties .  It would ,  however, enable named defendants to pass 
some transaction costs on to other responsible parties and would 
increase the likelihood that all parties would be j oined, thus reducing 
the potential for unfair or inefficient distribution of liability. 
Provisions establishing a right to contribution were deleted from 
C ERCLA. 102 As enacted, the statute is ambiguous . It simply states:  
"Nothing in this subchapter . . .  shall bar a cause of action that an 
owner or operator or any other person subj ect to liability under this 
section ,  o r  a guarantor, has or would have , by reason of subrogation 
or otherwise against any person .  " 1 03 The words "or otherwise" could 
refer  to a defendant's right to sue other parties for contribution ,  and 
courts have generally held that defendants have such a right .  
A number of courts examining CERCLA's language have held 
that, although it fails to establish an explicit right to contribution ,  it 
nevertheless preserves whatever contribution rights a defendant might 
have under the common law. 1 04 These courts cite statements in the 
102 Th e  Senate bil l  contained a detailed contribution provision :  "In any action brought under 
this section a person held j ointly and sc\·crally l iable with one or more other persons is  
entitled to seek contribution from such persons to the extent o f  the proportionate l iabil ity of  
such persons '' S .  qSo,  g6th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  � 4( f )( 2 ) , 1 2 6 Co:--�G .  REC .  30, 900 ( I gS o ) .  
10·' C E RCLA � I O / ( C ) ( 2 ) , 4 2  U S. C .  � g 6 o 7 ( c )( 2 )  ( r gS 2 ) .  
10 1 S ee Colorado v .  ASARCO ,  I j  E NVTL. L REP. ( ENVTL L lNST . )  2 0 , 5 2 3 ,  2 0 , 5 2 6  1 D .  
Colo .  l'day 1 3 ,  1 9S j ) :  Wehner \'. Syntex ,\gribusiness,  r s  E NVTL. L REP. ( ENVTL L hsT . )  
c 0 , 3 4 6 ,  2 0  . .  146  I E . D .  :\To. Apr. r ,  r gS j ) :  U nited States v .  Ward , 1 4  ENVTL . L REP. ( E:--!VTL.  
L I N S T .  I 2 0 . 804 .  2 o , Sos -o6 ( E. D .  N . C .  l\Iay q, r gS 4 ) ;  see a lso New York \ ' .  S hore Realty 
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legislative history suggesting that Congress believed contribution was 
an appropriate adjunct to j oint and several liability. 1 05 They treat 
contribution as one of the liability issues that Congress intended for 
them to determine on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the 
FWPCA 1 06 and evolving principles of common law. 1 07 The sources 
to which a court might look in creating federal common law - cases 
interpreting the FWPCA, 1 08 the Restatement, 109 the U niform Contri­
bution Among Tortfeasors Act (the Uniform Act), 1 1 0 treatises 1 1 1  and 
Corp . ,  759 F. z d  1 03 2 ,  1 04 2  n .  13  ( zd C ir. 1 98 5 )  ( c iting commentators for the proposition that 
"joint and several l iability i s  consistent with the contribution language of  [CE RCLA]") . The 
Supreme Court has held that a right of contribution can be found under a federal statute in 
either of  two ways: ( r )  "through the affirmative creation of  a r ight of action by Congress, either 
expressly or  by clear implication" ;  or (2 )  "through the power of the federal courts to fashion a 
federal common law of contributio n . "  Texas Indus .  v. Radcliff Material s ,  I nc . ,  45 r U . S . 630,  
638 ( 1 98 1 ) . 
105 See,  e . g . , ASARCO, r s  E NVTL. L .  REP. (ENVTL L .  INST . )  at 2 0 , 5 2 4-2 5 .  This court 
found a right to contribution ,  relying  on the remarks of  Representative Gore,  who stated that 
a scheme of  joint  and several l iability, combined with a right of  contribution , would give n amed 
defendants the " incentive to locate all  other responsible parties , "  r 2 6  CONG . REc. 2 6 , 784 ( r 980) .  
Any parties omitted from the suit "would be located by the named defendants and inc luded by 
cross-claim . "  I d. Thus,  i f  one defendant were held liable for all damages, that defendant 
"would then h ave the right to go against the other 'nonapportioned' defendan ts for contributio n . "  
!d. 
\tVhen explaining the compromise bil l  to the House, Representative Florio inserted into the 
Record an opinion prepared by the Department of Justice. That opinion stated that § 9607 (e) ( 2 )  
as passed by the Senate "confirms that a defendant helJ l iable for response costs has the right 
to seek contribution from any other person responsible for a release or threat of release o f  a 
hazardous substance . "  r 2 6  CONG . REC .  3 1 , 966 ( 1 98o l .  
106 The language of  the FWPCA regarding contribution i s  no clearer than that of C ERCLA. 
I t  reads: "The l iabiliUes established by this  section sha!i in n o  ·.vay affect any rights which ( r )  
the owner or operator of a vessel or of a n  onshore faciEty 0> an offshore facility may h ave 
against any third party whose acts may in  any way ha\·e caused or contributed to such discharge 
" FWPCA � 3 1  r ( h ) , 33  U S . C .  � 1 3 2  r ( h )  ( 1 986 ) .  
10 ' See,  e . g. , A SARCO, r s  ENVTL. L.  REP.  ( E NVTL L.  I NST . )  at 2 0 , 5 2 6 ; Ward, 1 4 ENVT L .  
L .  REP. ( ENVTL. L .  I N S T . )  at  2 o , 8os . B u t  s e e  United States v .  Westinghouse Elec .  Corp . ,  1 4  
ENVTL.  L .  REP.  ( ENVTL. L .  I N ST . )  2 0 , 483 , 2 0 . 485  ( S . D .  Ind. June 2 9 ,  1 983 )  (concluding that 
CERCLA preserves state contribution rights but c reatt.s no such right under federal common 
law) .  
1 08 S e e ,  e . g . , In  r e  Berkley Curtis B a:-· Co . , 5 5 7  F.  Supp .  335 . 3 3 9  ( S . D . N . Y. 1 983 ) ;  United 
S tates v. Bear Marine Servs . , 5 09 F. Supp 7 1 0 .  7 1 6 ( E . D .  La. 1 980) ,  vacated and ru;wndcd 
e n  other gyo u nds , 696 F. 2 d  r r r 7  ( 5 th Cir.  1 983 ) .  
100 S ee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 836A ( 1 9 79 )  (providing for a right of c o n t ri­
bcltion among defendants l iable in  tort to the same person for the same harm ) .  
t t u 1 2  U . L . A . 63 ( 1 9 7 5 )  ( 1 95 5  version) ;  see  U nited States v .  Ward. 1 4  ENVTL .  L. REP.  
(EX\'TL. L.  I:"'ST ) 2 0 , 804 , w. 8os-o6 ( E . D . N  C .  May q ,  1 984 ) (c it ing the Uniform A.ct as  
support for a r ight  to  contribution) .  Eighteen states h a ·>'� adopted t h e  co ntribution principles 
rcmbodied i n  the Uniform Act. See Note , Th e R ig h t  to Co11tri b u t i o n  for R �sponse Cost::  U.•1der 
C.ERCLA , 6o NOTRE DA�IE L .  REV. 3 4 5 · , 6 r  & n . 1 2 2 ( 1 985 ) .  
1 1 1  S ee PROSSER & KEETON,  .wpm note s 1 , � 5 0 ,  a t  33 7-.38 ( asserting that denial of t h e  
right to  contribution would exhibit a n  "obvious lack of sense and  justice' ') .  A number o f  courts 
h m·e c ited such commentary as support for their decisions t·egarding contribution. See Colorado 
\· . . -\S:\RCO,  r s  ENVT L .  L. REP. ( ENVTL.  L .  lNST ) 2 0 , 5 2 3 ,  2 0 , 5 2 6  (D. Colo. May 1 3 , I (lEi S )  
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scholarly commentary, and laws existing in the various states 1 1 2 -
support a right to contribution . 
Traditionally, courts forbade contribution suits only in order to 
force intentional tortfeasors to bear the full costs of the unlawful acts 
they had committed . 1 1 3 CERCLA liability, however, is predicated on 
nonculpable conduct. The purpose of the statute is not to punish 
defendants but to ensure that waste sites are cleaned up . Thus, the 
historical argument for denying contribution has little force in the 
CERCLA debate . Because a right of contribution secures the benefits 
of a larger defendant pool , it serves C ERCLA's goals of fairness and 
efficiency. 1 1 4 Moreover, it protects the Superfund from depletion by 
encouraging voluntary cleanup efforts . When potential defendants 
receive notice from the EPA that they may be liable for a release of 
hazardous wastes ,  they have an incentive to enter settlement negoti­
ations and to try to establish as low a share of liability as they can . 
If the original defendants had no right of contribution , however, other 
responsible parties would have little incentive to enter such negotia­
tions .  Their better strategy would be simply to wait and hope that 
the EPA would never sue them directly. 
Courts permitting suits for contribution must determine the proper 
method for allocating damages among defendants who are found lia­
ble . The statute gives no guidance regarding the proper method of 
allocation .  Nor is there a uniform rule among the states. 1 1 5 Some 
states apportion damages by dividing them equally among defen­
dants , 1 1 6 vvhile others divide damages according to the comparative 
(c it ing PROSSER & h.EETON); Wehner v.  Syntex Agribusiness, IS ENVTL. L REP.  (ENVTL. L.  
INST . )  2 0  . .  )46,  2 0 ,346 ( E . D .  Mo.  Apr. I ,  1 985 ) ( c iting Note , supra note I I O ,  at  3 6 I ;  Comment,  
supra note 33·  at I 2 6 6  n .  I 84 l ; U nited States v. Ward ,  14 ENVTL.  L.  REP. (ENVTL L INST . ) 
2 0 . 804 , 2 o , 8os ( E . D . N . C .  May 1 4 .  I 984 )  (same) .  
1 1 2 Sec  .-lSARCO, I S  ENVTL. L.  REP. ( ENVTL.  L .  INST. ) at 2 0 , 5 2 6 ; Ward, 14  ENVTL. L .  
REP. ( E NVTL. L.  INST . ) at 2 o . Sos ( c iting acceptance in t h e  states) .  A right t o  contribution i s  
recognized in  4 4  states a n d  t h e  District of  Columbia. S e e  Note , s upra note I I O ,  a t  3 5 6  n . 9 2 .  
1 1 .3 S e e  PROSSER & KEETON, supra note ) I ,  � s o ,  a t  336-3 7 .  A t  least one court has held 
that there is  no right to contribution under C ERCLA in  cases of intentional misconduct .  See 
Ward, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. ( E NVTL. L .  INST . )  at 2 o , 8os (denying contribution to defendant 
com·icted of il legally spraying polychlorinated biphenyls on roadsides, while granting contribu­
tion as to l iability for spraying on other roadsides ,  for which in tent  had not been proved ) .  
1 1 4 It has  been argued,  however, that a right to contribution would reduce the  incentive 
effect ,  because the large waste generators would no longer fear crushing l iabil ity. Denying a 
right of contribution would thus create ''an e\·en stronger deterrent" than would granting a right 
of  contribution , because "a single [defendant] could be held fully liable for the total amount of 
the j udgment .  In this \·iew, each [potential defendant] would ponder long and hard before 
engaging in  \\·hat mc.y be called a game of 'Russian roulette . "' Texas Indus .  v .  Radcliff 
Materials , Inc . , 45 I U . S .  630,  636 ( I  98 I ) . This argument is powerful only if waste disposers 
be l ien there is a significant l ikel ihood that they will be sued . Defendants \vho are not wealthy 
or  highlv \·isiblc are unl ikely to see themselves as playing a game of "Russian roulette . "  
1 1 5  S ee  PRCSSEF. & h.EETOl\,  supra note S I ,  � s o ,  at 338-39 .  
1 1 o  See ,  e . g , Early Settlers Ins .  Co .  v .  Schweid , 2 2 I  A . 2d  920,  9 2 3  ( D . C .  I 96 6 ) .  The EPA 
h as argued for t11.e adoption in CERC L:\ actions of the U n iform Act,  which rejects comparative 
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fault of each defendant.  1 1 7 Alternatively, courts might  choose a mid­
dle course , allocating damages neither equally nor according to com­
parative fault, but according to volume and toxicity, a sort of "com­
parative causation" approach . 1 1 8 Even courts adhering firmly to the 
Restatement rule would be u nlikely to take the equal divisions ap­
proach . 1 1 9 
Allocating damages according to the factors listed in  the Gore 
Amendment would mitigate somewhat the undesirable e ffects of j o int  
and several l iability, because it would tie the burden of c leanup more 
closely to responsibility for '  creating the haz ard. 1 2 0  As long as l iabil ity 
is joint and several , however, the potential for unfairness and inac­
curate internalization remains :  if the entire damage award must be 
split among a pool of defendants representing only a small  portion of 
the waste at a disposal site , then each defendant will be paying for a 
share o f  some absent party's cleanup bill . B ecause of the E PA's 
limited resources , it will  l ikely opt to sue primarily the wealthy de­
fendants . These defe ndants will face numerous difficulties in  locatin g  
and recovering from less visible contributors to the site . A rule that 
allocates dam ages according to a finely tuned formula of relative 
responsibility can be effective in achieving C E RC LA's goals only if 
all  potenti ally liable parties are j oined so that they all  pay their 
apportioned shares . The rule of j oint and several l i ability, even ac­
companied by equitable apportionment of damages among defendants , 
fau l t  in favor of equal division of damages among tortfeasors. See UNIF .  CoNTRIBUTION A MO\IG 
TORTFEASORS ACT � 2 ,  ! 2  U . L . A .  8 7  ( 1 9 / 5 ) ( 1 95 5  version) .  
1 1 7 S e e ,  e . g . , B ielski \'. Schulze .  1 6  Wis.  :> d  1 ,  r q  N . W. :> d  1 05 ,  1 0 7  ( 1 9 6 2 ) .  The comparative 
fault approach represents the general trend of contribution doctri ne .  See RESTATEi\IENT ( SEc­
OND) OF TORTS � 886A comment h ( 1 9 7 9 )  ( suggesting that the c o mparative fault approach ,  
although m ore difficult  to adm inister, i s  fairer than the equal division approach).  
1 1 ' Cou rts should adopt a u n i form federal rule for allocation of d amages rather than adopt 
the differing rules of  the states in \l'h ich they sit .  The need for u niformity docs not  end with 
establishing joint  and se\'Cral l iabi! itv and contributio n .  A defendant who knows it can be 
,; u bj ecteci to joint and ::;c\·eral l iabi l ity and suits for contribution wi l l  sti l l  be infiuenccd by 
differing rules o n  allocation of damages. For example ,  generators would be encouraged to 
dispose of their wastes i n  states where damages arc divided equally among defe ndants.  The 
C: ERCLA amendments recently passed i n  the  House would explicitly perm i t  courts to divide 
damages according to ' 'such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate . "  H. R. 
2 005 . c;c;th Cong . , r st Sess .  � 1 3 5 .  1 .3 1  Co"G . REC . S r 2 , 1 95 (daily eel.  Sept .  2 6 ,  1 9 8 5 ) .  
1 i 9 One court has indicated that i t  \\'Otl l cl consider volume a relevant,  though n o t  the only 
factor in allocating damages .  S e e  L nited States v .  South C arol ina Recycl i n g  & Disposal , I nc . ,  
q E�\.TL.  L .  REP. ( £�;\'TL. L .  I.'-fsT ) 2 0 , 2 7 2 .  2 0 . � 7 5- 7 6  < D . S . C .  Feb .  2 3 ,  1 984) .  
1 211 S ec s u p m  pp.  1 5 2 9-3 1 .  It  is usefu l  at  this point to describe the distinction between 
allocation of damages and allocation of l iabil ity. Using the factors in the  G ore Amendment to 
<J.pportion l iabil ity "·ould mean that the go\·ernment could not recover any u n apportio necl shares. 
Imposing joint and :;eHnd l iabi l i ty, however.  and using the Gore Amendment to di\· ide damages, 
v:ould •enable the go\·ernment to obtain full reco\·ery. The Gore Amendment factors would 
c;impl:-· scn·e a s  a guide for  equitable division of the damages among the defendants.  
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remains an imperfect mechanism both for internalizing costs and for 
ensuring fairness to the original defendants in a C ERCLA suit.  
A relatively simple adj ustment to CERCLA liability rules - im­
posing j oint liability in suits for contribution - would go far toward 
producing equity among defendants . Under present law, the EPA can 
shift transaction costs to the original defendants , because those defen­
dants fear being held l iable for cleaning up the entire site . Suppose , 
for example , that there are ten parties ,  each of whom is responsible 
for ten percent of the waste at a site . If the EPA sues only one of 
them , then that party must pay the entire j udgment. That defendant 
is therefore willing to spend a great deal of money to bring in other 
parties . In a subsequent suit for contribution under present law, the 
original defendant could recover only ten percent of the full amount 
from each of the other nine parties . The original defendant would 
bear the liability of any absent or insolvent parties . In return for 
shouldering the burden of locating and impleading other parties ,  the 
original defendant should be empowered to threaten those parties with 
the possibility that they too will be forced to share the liability of 
absent or insolvent parties . Under current common law rule s ,  im­
pleaded defendants have no incentive to spend their own resources 
expanding the pool of defendants . The fact that impleaded defe ndants 
feel no threat of j oint liability also leads them to be obstructive in 
settlement negotiation s .  
I f  courts imposed j oint liability i n  suits for contribution ,  the orig­
inal defendant in the above example could sue any one of the re­
maining nine parties and collect fifty percent of the damage award . 
That party could implead another, whereupon the damages would be 
split three ways , and so o n .  This threat would lead the impleaded 
parties to locate and implead other pote ntial defendants. The addition 
of each successive impleaded party would lead to a reduction of the 
liability borne by each defendant. Even when the marginal reduction 
in liability became too small to motivate the original defendants to 
pursue still more potentially liable parties ,  the marginal reduction 
might prove sufficient to motivate the less wealthy impleaded defen­
dants to pursue all remaining parties . This process would continue 
until the defendants had impleaded the smallest contributors worth 
pursuing. In this way the original defendants could spread transaction 
costs throughout the entire pool of responsible parties . They would 
not be forced to drive the process with their own funds . 
E .  R e tYOactivity 
C ERCLA contains no unequivocal statement that its liability pro­
visions apply retroactively. Its legislative history suggests , however, 
that the statute was enacted as a means of compelling the waste 
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disposal industry to correct its past mistakes .  C E RC LA's sponsors 
introduced the legislation primarily to fill a gap left by the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of I 9 7 2  (RCRA) . 1 2 1  Although RCRA 
had created an elaborate "cradle-to-grave" regulatory structure to over­
see waste disposal , it  provided no solution to the dan gers posed by 
inactive , abandoned waste sites . 1 2 2  In light of this legislative h istory, 
courts confronted with the retroactivity issue generally have concluded 
that C ERCLA permits them to impose liability on parties who dis­
posed of hazardous wastes before the statute was enacted.  1 2 3  A num­
ber of courts have limited the scope of retroactivity by holding that 
although liability extends to pre-C ERCLA conduct,  the government 
may recover only the response costs it has incurred since the effective 
date of the statute : December r I ,  I g8o. 1 24  One court ,  however, re­
cently held that the government may recover even for pre-enactment 
response costs . l 2 5  
The  courts are correct to  interpret C ERCLA as  imposing retro­
active l iability. The statute was enacted to remedy an environmental 
hazard that had already occurred , and the only way to make it 
effective is to hold responsible parties liable for acts they committed 
before the statute was passed . 1 2 6 Congress nevertheless should rec-
1 2 1  42  u . s . c .  § §  690 1-6987 ( 1 98 6 ) .  
1 2 2  T h e  House Report accompanying the original bi l l  stated: 
( c )  Deficiencies in  RCRA h ave left important regulatory gaps. 
( r )  [RCRA) is prospective and appl ies  to past sites only to the extent that they are 
posing an imminent hazard . Even there , the Act is no help i f  a finan cially responsible 
owner of the site cannot be located. . It is  the intent of the Committee in  [CERCLA] 
to initiate and establ ish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and 
control the vast p roblems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste 
disposal sites. 
I-L R. REP .  No. w r 6 ,  pt. 1 ,  96th Cong. , 2d Scss. 2 2 ,  rep1·inted in 1 980 U . S .  CoDE CoNG.  & 
AD. NEWS 6 r  1 9 ,  6 1 2 5 .  
1 2 3 See U nited States v .  Wade,  1 4  ENVTL.  L .  REP. (ENVTL .  L .  I NST . ) 20 ,43 7 ,  2 0 ,438  ( E . D .  
Pa. Mar. 2 2 ,  1 984) ;  United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal , I nc . ,  1 4  ENVT L .  L .  
REP .  (ENVTL. L .  INST . )  2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 7 7  ( D . S . C .  Feb .  2 3 ,  1 984) ;  U nited States v .  Conservation 
Chern. Co . , 14 ENVT L .  L. REP. ( ENVTL . L.  INST ) 20 , 2 0 7 ,  z o , w 8 ,  2 0 , 2 09 n . 4 (W. D .  Mo. Feb .  
3 ,  1 984) ;  U nited States v .  Northeastern Pharrn . & Chern.  Co .  (NEPAC C O ) ,  579  F. Supp .  8 2 3 ,  
839 (W. D .  M o .  1 984) ;  U nited States \'. A & F M aterials Co. , 5 7 8  F .  Supp .  1 2 49 ,  1 2 5 7  ( S . D .  
Il l .  1 98 4); U n ited States v. Price , 5 7 7  F .  Supp.  I I OJ , 1 1 1 2 - 1 3  ( D . N . J .  1 983 ) ;  Ohio ex rel .  B rown 
\·. Georgeoff, 562  F. Supp .  1 300, 1 3 1 3 - 1 4  (N . D .  Ohio ,  1 983 ) ;  U n ited States v .  Rei l ly Tar & 
Chern. Corp .  546 F. Supp .  1 1 00, 1 1 1 3 ( D .  Minn .  1 98 2 ) .  B u t  see U n ited States v. Wad e ,  5 46 
F. Supp.  785 , 7 94 ( E D .  Pa .  1 98 2 )  ( holding that a § 1 06 action to abate can be brought only 
to h ait  current conduct) .  The  reasoning in  Wade was explicitly c rit ic ized in  Conservation 
Chemical ,  14 ENVTL.  L. REP. ( E NVTL. L. bST ) at 20 , 2oS ;  NEPACCO,  5 7 9  F. Sup p .  at 84o;  
Price ,  5 7 7  F. Supp.  at 1 1 1 1 . 
1 2 4 See,  e . g . , !-Vade,  1 4  ENVTL . L. REP. ( E :-::vTL . L. INST . )  at 2 0, 4 3 8 ;  NEPA CCO,  5 7 9  F. 
Supp.  at 843 . 
1 2 ; United States , . . Shel l  Oil  Co . , 1 5  ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVT L . L .  INST . )  20 ,33 7 ,  2 0 , 343 
(D.  Colo. Mar. 2 6 ,  1 98 5 ) .  
1 2 6 For a discussion o f  why C E RCLA retroacti\·ity is  not unconstitutional , see Section B o f  
Part VI . 
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ognize the limits of what retroactivity can accomplish and its cost in 
terms of fairness to certain defendants . Retroactive liability cannot 
promote the goal of creating incentives for safe handling and disposal 
of wastes ,  because it is not possible to change behavior that has 
already occurred . 1 2 i Proponents of retroactive liability thus cannot 
justify it on the basis of the need to create safety incentives .  Retro­
active application of C ERCLA must be aimed largely at the goals of 
compensating the Superfund and spreading cleanup costs among the 
responsible parties . Retroactive liability, however, is the fairest and 
most effective among the available methods of accomplishing these 
goals . 
Congress's clearest alternative to making liability retroactive would 
have been to finance cleanup through general taxes .  CERCLA defen­
dants opposing retroactive liability argue that they relied on the re­
quirements of prior law and that they should not now be penalized 
for failing to go beyond those requirements. 1 2 8  I f  prior law was too 
lax , they argue , the taxpayers - not the regulated industry - should 
bear the burden of the shortfall . 1 2 9 In response to this argument ,  
proponents of retroactivity contend that the existence of prior regu­
lations should have placed companies on notice that they were con­
ducting dangerous activities and that they should be seeking safer 
disposal methods . The parties with the information and ability to act 
- in other words , waste generators and disposers - should bear the 
burden of the inj ury. Moreover, it was the industry, not the taxpayer, 
that caused the harm . As between the industry and the general public , 
the industry, its shareholders ,  and its consumers should bear the cost .  
CERCLA's supporters in Congress argued that placing retroactive 
liability on waste-generating companies was appropriate not only be­
cause the companies had caused the harm, but also because they had 
received the financial benefits of cheaper waste disposal under the 
pre-C ERCLA regime . l .30 Having received the benefits , C ERCLA 
sponsors maintained ,  the companies should be compelled to make 
"restitution'' for the costs incurred owing to their earlier windfall . This 
1 2 ; One might argue,  howe\·er. that it functions as a warning to the c hemical industry that 
future, more stringen t  l aws may also be imposed retroacti\·ely, encouraging the industry to 
develop safer disposal methods in ad vance.  
1 2s  Had a company known it would be held l iable for cleanup of any release o f  its wastes ,  
i t  might  ha\·e taken greater precautions or e\·en stopped doing business altogether i n  order  to  
a\·oicl the risk . 
1 29 Some would argue that if the l a w  was too lax,  it was probably clue to the effcrts of the 
industry's lobby and the i n d ustry should therefore be liable for the shortfall 
uo Representati\·e Gore remarked:  ·· I n  the decades since the postwar petrochemical boo m ,  
o n l y  t h e  c hemical companies themseh"es h ad t h e  expertise to understand the damage their 
dumping practices were doing to the em·ironment.  They chose to recklessly disregard that 
damage and benefitted fmm the e conomics of  cheap disposal practices . "  H . R  REP. No. r o < 6 ,  
p t .  I ,  g6th Cong. , 2 cl  Sess.  6 3 ,  1'ep1·i n t e d  i11 r gSo t' . S .  CODE Co:-<G . & A D .  N EWS 6 r r g ,  6 qo .  
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restitution argument ,  however, suffers from the fact that groups cur­
rently paying for cleanup actually may have received little or  no 
benefit from disposal practices that took place many years ago . 1 3 1  
The benefits may have gone to former employees i n  the form of higher 
wages ,  to former shareholders as dividends , or to former consumers 
in the form of lower p rices . B ut some continuity nevertheless m ay 
exis t between past and present beneficiaries. If the company's past 
profits enabled it to prosper, the current owners , employees , and 
business partners of the company are probably better off as a result.  
Thus,  although the correlation between benefit and burden is not 
perfect ,  the fit may be closer when liability is imposed on the waste­
generating industry than when it is imposed on the taxpayers gener­
ally. 
If Congress intends to achieve its goal of cleaning up inactive , 
abandoned waste sites , it will find it necessary to impose retroactive 
liability on the waste-generating industry. If a site was already aban­
doned when the statute was passed , the only way to reach the parties 
responsible is  to hold them liable for their pre-CERCLA disposal 
activities . The industry's arguments against retroactivity appear more 
convincing,  however, when one considers them in combination with 
the weakness of C ERCLA's causation requirement ,  its no-fault liabil­
ity standard , and the possibility that one defendant may be required 
to pay for cleaning up the wastes of many others .  The potential 
inefficiencies and unfairness of retroactivity thus underscore the need 
to assist defendants in spreading costs by imposing j oint liability in 
suits for contribution . To maximize efficiency and fairness , cleanup 
costs should be spread across as large a group of firms as possible .  
Nevertheless , because the waste-generating industries  arguably h ave 
profited more than any other element of society from past waste 
disposal , the industry should bear the cost of restoring the healthful 
environment that its wastes have despoiled. Despite the inexact cor­
relation between past  benefit and present burden ,  it seems least unfair 
to place liability for cleanup costs on those companies .  
F .  Conclusion 
As interpreted by the courts , CERCLA imposes a standard of 
liability more sweeping than any the tort system has yet developed.  
Congress appears to have determined that the chemical industry is to 
bear the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste disposal sites .  In an 
effort to carry out that intent ,  the courts have closed most avenues of 
escape from liability. The courts have held, and C ongress may soon 
confirm, that liability is strict ,  retroactive , and can be made joint and 
I J I  In one case . for examp l e ,  the defendant was c harged with liability for waste disposal 
that it h ad been p erformi n g  as long ago as 1 96 0 .  United States v .  C o nservation C h e rn .  C o . , 
q E �T\"TL. L .  REP. ( E :-.rvTL .  L .  hsT . )  2 0 . 2 0 7 .  2 0 . 2 08 (W D .  Mo. Feb.  3 ,  1 98-+ l .  
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several at a court's discretion . The statute imposes this liability with­
out requiring definite proof of causation . Moreover, the existence of 
j oint and several liability encourages the government to focus its 
efforts on a few target defendants rather than to join all those re­
sponsible for a release .  
Despite its deficiencies , C ERCLA can provide a reasonable re­
sponse to the problem of inactive , abandoned wastes sites .  B ut its 
effectiveness will  depend on proper enforcement. If the government 
focuses only on wealthy defendants , a segment of the industry will 
remain unmoved by the safety incentives CERCLA was designed to 
create . Such a system will place liability on parties not necessarily 
responsible for creating  the hazards and thus lead to misallocation of 
resources and inequitable distribution of benefits and burdens .  
C ERCLA liability must extend to as many responsible parties as 
possible .  To promote the successful j oinder of all potential defendants , 
and to spread the transaction costs of litigation and settlement among 
those defendants , the courts should modify common law rules to 
permit the imposition of joint liability in suits for contribution . There 
is no reason why the EPA's decision to sue a given number of parties 
should result in fixing upon them a disproportionate share of the 
burden of cleaning up hazardous waste sites .  If the government is 
permitted to use j oint and several liability to shift its transaction costs 
onto the parties it decides to sue , it is only fair that these parties be 
given the same leverage in their attempt to join others responsible for 
creating the hazardous waste problem.  
VI . AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
Defendants liable under CERCLA section r o ; (a) may seek to raise 
a variety of affirmative defenses. Section A of this Part will address 
the defenses available under CERC LA, both the express causation 
defenses under section r o ; (b) and implied statutory defenses . Defend­
ants also challenge the statute itself as unconstitutional and thereby 
seek to avoid liability. Section B of this Part will discuss constitutional 
challenges to CERCLA's retroactive liability, and Section C will dis­
cuss challenges to government cleanup pursuant to C E RCLA. 
A .  S tatutory Defe nses 
r .  Causation Defenses Under S ection 107 
(a) Three Intervening Causes . - Section I O 'i ( b ) !  l ists defenses ;�o 
liability for cleanup costs under CERCLA .  A. defendant "o thenNi::;e 
liable" can escape liability by establishing " by a preponderance of tht' 
t +2 C S. C .  � g 6 o ; ( b l  ( 1 98 2 1 .  
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evidence" that the actual or  threatened release was "caused solely" by :  
( r )  an act of  God;  ( 2 )  an act  of  war; (3) the act or  omission of  a third 
party; or  (4) any combination of the above .  2 Because the government 
need not meet the traditional tort requirements of negligence and 
causation in order to prove liability, 3 these defenses are especially 
important. Indeed,  these defenses serve as a substitute for a require­
ment of causation .  The Second Circuit in New York v. S hore R ealty 
Corp .  4 called each of these three defenses "an exception based on 
causation" that would be superfluous i f  the prima facie case required 
proof of causation .  s 
Viewed as a whole , then ,  section 1 0 7  does not eliminate the re­
quirement of causation . In effect,  section r o 7 (b) completes what is 
merely a shift of the burden of proof of causation from the plaintiff 
to the defendant. G iven the difficulties of establishing individual 
causation in the toxic waste context , this shift prevents defendants 
who cause harm from avoiding liability. The traditional rules of proof 
would create loopholes that undermine the broad purposes of tort law 
in shifting social costs to those who cause them . C E RC LA closes this 
loophole , but it does so at the cost of imposing liability upon some 
individual defendants who caused no harm, but are unable to prove 
it by a preponderance of the evidence . 6 Under any rule of proof, 
there is both the risk of imposing liabil ity upon defendants who should 
not be liable and the risk of allowing defendants who actually cause 
harm to avoid liability. C ERCLA strikes an appropriate balance 
between these risks and provides incentives to take safety precautions .  
Shifting the burden of proof encourages firms to seek disposal practices 
that allow better identification of parties whose wastes are released .  
Preexisting law perversely encouraged firms to aggravate the problems 
of proof by disposing of their wastes in common sites in a manner 
that made identification of waste generators difficult .  
Although courts have not yet created much case law interpreting 
section r o 7 (b )  defenses ,  the early cases confirm that the defenses are 
2 !d.  
3 See supra Sections B & C of  Part V ( discussing str ict  liabil ity and requirements for proof 
of causation).  
• i59 F. 2 d  1032 ( 2 d  Cir .  1 985 ) .  
5 !d. a t  1 044.  
6 The law of torts has doctrines analogous to this policy. When a plaintiff p ro,·es that one  
of  se\·eral defendants caused the inj u ry, but  cannot p ron which one ,  courts wi l l  sometimes 
shift the burden of proof to the  defendants. See ,  e g. , Sindel l  , .. Abbott Laboratories. 2 6  CaL 
Jd s S S ,  ! 63 CaL Rptr. 1 3 2 .  6 0 i  p 2 cl 9 2 -f .  CCYI . denied .  -+-+9 li . S .  9 1 2  ( I 98o) ;  Summers \'.  Tice , 
.33 CaL 2 cl So.  1 9 9  P. 2 d  1 ( I 9-f8 ) ;  Ybarra , . . Spangard , 2 5  CaL z cl 486 ,  1 5 .1  P 2 cl 687  ( 1 944) ;  
,.\nderson Y .  Samberg. 67  N.J .  2 9 1 ,  338  A . 2 d  r ,  cer t .  de 1 1 ied .  423 U . S .  9 2 9  ( 1 9 7 5 1 ; see also  W. 
KEETON, D.  DOBBS, R. KEETON 8.: D .  OWE N ,  PROSSER AND KEETON o:-; THE LAW O F  TORTS 
* -t 1 .  at 2 70-7 r ( j th  ed. r gS-t) [hereinafter c ited as PROSSER & KEETON] (discussing tort cases 
shifting th:� burden of p roof on causation ). Similarly. CERCLA seeks to pce,·ent  defendants 
from using anonymity to avoid internaliz ing the cost of harms they cause . 
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very narrow. The release or damage must be caused solely by the 
intervening agent .  This hurdle is particularly significant because proof 
of causation is so difficult in hazardous waste litigation . Even aside 
from these general difficulties ,  the "solely" requirement will pose prob­
lems for defendants who fail to prevent or  clean up hazardous con­
ditions . In  New York v .  S hore R ealty Corp . , 7 for example ,  the defen­
dant site owner raised the " third party" defense , claiming that it had 
had nothing to do with the transportation of the waste and that prior 
tenants were the sole cause of the problem . The court held that the 
tenants were not the "sole cause , "  because the defendant knew of their 
activities before buying the property and "could readily have foreseen"  
that they would continue to  dump there. s 
(b) The "Third-Party" Defense .  - Among these three causation 
defenses , the third-party defense is most likely to be invoked by 
defendants ,  but it features further requirements that limit its reach .  
Most important, the defense requires that the third party be someone 
"other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose 
act or  omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, 
existing directly or indirectly with the defendant. "9 This limit on the 
third-party defense ensures that generators , for example ,  cannot avoid 
liability by contracting with another party to transport or dispose of 
hazardous waste . This limit derives from the common law doctrine 
of vicarious liability. Although generally a defendant is not l iable for 
the torts of independent contractors , tort law contains exceptions that 
courts could apply to toxic waste disposal . 1 0  
The economic rationale for imposing such liability i s  that i t  creates 
incentives for the firm to employ responsible contractors and to mon­
itor their activities . This rule imposes liability in such a way that it 
minimizes the social cost of accidents . The burden is placed on the 
employer because the damage is a cost of its business . This rule is 
particularly appropriate when the employer is the only party available 
for suit that had any control over safety measures .  To impose liability 
on the independent contractors alone would be ineffective if these 
parties were unavailable for suit when the harm materialized. It is 
fair as well as efficient for the employer to bear this risk,  in light of 
the benefits the employer derives from the activity and the freedom 
of the employer to provide for indemnity in the contract. 1 1  
The statute provides that a contractual relationship may bar in­
vocation of the third-party defense if the relationship exists "directly 
; 7 5 9  F . 1 d  1 0 3 2  ( 2 cl Cir. r 9S 5 l .  
S fd .  a t  I O.f9 · 
9 C E RCLA � r o ; ( b J ( J l .  .f 2 U S . C .  � g6oi ( b )( J )  ( r 98 1 ) .  
10 See infra p .  r 6 2 5  n .  1 w ;  see also PROSSER & KEETO�, supra note 6 ,  * i 1 ,  at 5 09-1 5 
(discussing exceptions to the general rule of non l iabil ity). 
1 1  See PROSSER & KEETO:-;,  supra note 6 ,  � 7 1 ,  at  509 .  
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or indirectly. " 1 2  The statute does not define "indirect , " but i ts legis­
lative history suggests that it should be read to deny the defense to a 
defendant with a "business relationship" with the third party, even if 
a contractual relationship is technically absent. 1 3  For example , a court 
may deem a waste generator who arranges for disposal by a contrac­
tor, who in turn enters into a subcontract, to be in a "business rela­
tionship" with the subcontractor through an " indirect" contractual 
relationship .  1 4 Commentators suggest that a generator may raise the 
defense only if the third party was another generator using the site , 
a transporter of another's waste , or a stranger. 1 5  In  short,  the defense 
seems applicable only if the third party is completely unrelated to the 
defendant . 1 6 
Although C ERCLA liabil ity is retroactive , 1 7 one commentator has 
suggested that the "contractual relationship" limitation upon the third-
1 2 C E RCLA � I o 7 ( b )( 3 ) ,  4 2 U . S . C .  � g 6o 7 ( b ) ( 3 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
IJ S e e  1 2 6  CONG . REc .  2 6 , 7 8 3  ( I g8o)  ( statement o f  Rep.  Gore) .  
1 4  See C HEMICAL MFRS. Ass'N, SuPERFuN D:  KEY LIABILITY IssuEs at V-6 7 n . r o7 ( 1 98 2 ) ;  
Comment, Gene1·ator Liability Under S upe1jund for Clean-up of A bandoned Hazardous Waste 
D umpsites ,  130 U. PA . L .  REv . 1 2 2 9 ,  1 2 6 I  ( I <)8 2 l .  
1 5  S e e  Hinds ,  Liability Under Fedeml Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries , 6 HARV. E NVTL. 
L.  REV . I ,  28 ( I g8 2 ) . A stranger may be a vandal o r  other unrelated party who c aused damage 
to the site. See Comment ,  supra note 1 4 ,  at I 2 64 n. r 7 9 .  The chemical industry argues that a 
generator does not have a direct or indirect contractual relationship with a subsequent site 
owner. The industr,· reasons that this relationship is "so remote that no contractual relationship 
whatsoever should be in ferre d , "  because the generator "has no control whatsoever over the 
selection or actions of a subsequent purchaser of a disposal site . "  C HEMICAL MFRS . Ass'N, 
supra note q, at V-66 n. 1 0 7  ( r g8 2 l .  Although an absence of control does undercut the effic iency 
and fairness rationales for imposing \·icarious l iabil ity, the chemical industry's argument fai ls i n  
this situation.  Generators may in  fact exercise control by providing i n  their contracts that 
subsequent purchasers of the site assume the same obligations as the con tracting site owner. 
1 6 As the author of the p rovision explains . the defense may· be raised when damages are 
caused by an "un foreseeable"  act or  omission by a third party with "no connection whatsoever" 
with the defendant. See 1 2 6  CoNG.  REc . 2 6 , 783 ( 1 980) (statement of Rep .  Gore ) .  Hence a 
landowner wil l  be l iable for the acts or omissions of a tenant who operates the site . See United 
States v. South Carolina Recycl ing and Disposa l .  Inc . ,  q E:-�vTL. L.  REP. ( ENVTL. L.  INST . ) 
2 0 , 2 7 2 ,  2 0 , 2 7 5 (D . S . C .  Feb.  2 3 ,  1 98 4 ) .  
:\ landowner should also be l iable for  cleanup of its site even i f  hazardous conditions were 
c reated by p re\·ious owners. The economic rationale for imposing liability on successor owners 
is that it creates an incentive for buyers to c lean up  or avoid such sites .  This l iabil ity depresses 
the real estate market for these sites and thus reduces the ability of owners to escape the 
internalization of social costs by sell ing their sites and becoming una\'ailable for suit. See New 
York \'. Shore Realty Corp. , 7 5 9  F. 2 cl  1 03 2 . I O.J8 n . 2 .3 ( z d  Cir. r gS s l  ( noting in dictum that the 
current O\Yners had a contrac tual relationship with the previous owners that would block the 
use of the "third party" defense .  because the purchase agreement included "a provision by which 
Shore assumed at least some of the en\·ironmental liability of the p revious owners'' ) .  :-1 o such 
special pro\·ision should be necessar\· , ho\\'C\·er. because the economic rationale is sti l l  persuasive 
without it. 
1 ; See supra Section E of  Part V ( discussing retroactiH liabil ity under C ERCL.A.) ;  cf infra 
Section B oi this Part ( discussing the constitutionality o i  retroactin liabil ity ) .  
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party defense should not b e  applied retroactively. 1 8 This construction 
of the third-party defense is implausible ,  however, given Congress's 
clear intent to apply liability retroactively. 1 9 Representative Albert 
Gore , Jr. , the author of the "contractual relationship" l imitation ,  de­
scribes the purpose of his amendments as the removal of "various 
escape hatches" that "would enable the parties who are most respon­
sible for our hazardous waste problem to avoid liability. "20 B ecause 
Gore referred to the problem existing before enactment, these "parties" 
would include generators who had contracted out disposal in the past. 
The underlying policy of the Gore Amendment, therefore , favors full 
retroactive application .  2 1  Indeed , to the extent that section r o 7 (b) 
may merely preserve common law vicarious liabil ity in some jurisdic­
tions ,  it would be perverse to read that section to permit evasion of 
that l iability. 
Once the defendant establishes causation by an unrelated third 
party, it still must prove that it acted with "due care . "  The third­
party defense requires that the defendant establish that he exercised 
"due care with respect to the hazardous substance" and "took precau­
tions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party" 
and against the foreseeable consequences of such acts or omissions .  2 2  
The definition o f  "due care" i n  the legislative history includes "all 
1 " See  Comment,  supra note q, at I 2 so-6 5 .  According to this view, generators who had 
contracted for disposal by the "third p arty" before C ERCLA's enactment could successfully raise 
the defense ,  but those who had done so afterwards could not. The author points out that 
whereas the other p rovisions in  � 1 0 7 (b \  use the past tense , the "contractual relationship" c lause 
uses the present tense "occurs" rather than "occurred '' 4 2 U . S .  C .  � g6o7 (b)  ( I  982 ) ( providing 
that there shall  be no l iability for damages ' 'caused solely by . .  an act or omission of  a third 
part\ ·  other than one whose act or  omission occurs in  connection with a contractual 
relationship' ' ) .  The author argues that this language should be taken to apply this l imitation 
prospectively only. See Comment ,  supm , at I 2 S 6 .  
� �  I t  strains reasonable construction to apply one portion o f  a single subsection of  a single 
sentence only prospectiHiy while applying the remainder of the subsection retroactively. It is  
true that � 1 0 7 ( b) mixes its tenses ,  creating a defense when the harm is "caused" by a third 
party's act or omission,  but not if the act or omission "occurs" in connection with a contractual 
relationship . . p U . S . C .  � g6o7 (b )  ( I g8 z ) .  B u t  this draftsmanship is so subtle that it seems to 
be a mistake rather than a calculated signal to the courts.  
F urthermo;·e , reliance on tense alone should raise some doubt about the retroactive appli­
cation of the ·'em ployee or agent" l imitations as well .  That phrase appears without a verb, but 
parallels the ' 'contractual relationship" l imitation .  The Gore Amendment added both l imitations 
to modi±\· the same phrase, "third party. " See 1 2 6  Co:--.�c .  REC. z 6 , 7 8 I  ( I g8o) .  The author 
assumes without explanation that the ''employee or  agent'' l imitation applies retroactively, while 
claiming that the ' 'contractual relationship" l imitation does not.  See  Comment,  s upm note I 4 ,  
a t  1 2 5 4 .  The common history and parallel structure o f  these two l imitations mi l i tate against 
p rying them apart in  this fashion.  
2 0 1 2 6 Coi\G.  REc .  z 6 , 785  ( I gSo ) .  
2 l S e e  Comment ,  supra note 1 4 ,  a t  1 2 5 5-5 6 ( conceding that Gore 's statement supports 
retroacti\·ity) .  
2 2 CERCL:,, § r o ; (b ) ( J ) ,  4 2  U . S . C .  S g6o7 (b ) (3 )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 
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precautions with respect to the particular waste that a similarly situ-
ated reasonable and prudent person would have taken in light of all 1 
relevant facts and circumstances .  "2 3 The issue of due care was liti- l 
gated in New York v. Shore Realty Corp . , in which the court rejected li. the third-party defense not only because Shore was not the "sole 1
cause , "  but also because Shore had failed to take precautions against 
the foreseeable acts of the third parties involved. 24 
(c) Conclusion .  - The defense provisions of section r o7 (b) , to­
gether with the liability provisions of section ro7 (a) ,  resolve uncer­
tainties and remedy defects in preexisting law that could permit many 
defendants to avoid liability. 2 5 The shift in the burden of proof of 
causation corrects a previous bias in favor of defendants .  C ERCLA 
applies the doctrine of vicarious liability to toxic waste disposal , in 
order to create useful incentives for greater precautions and to ensure 
that parties cannot transfer  responsibility to others who may later be 
unavailable for suit . 
2 .  Proc edural Defe nses and Cost-effectiveness 
(a) Defenses Under Sec tion 1 04 .  - Defendants have looked be­
yond the l imited reach of section r o7(b) for defenses to section ro7 (a) 
liability. In  particular, the chemical industry and some commentators 
have suggested that the procedural requirements of section 1 04 may 
provide defendants with defenses to government recovery actions . 2 6 
Section r o4(c) states that the federal government "shall" consult with 
affected states before deciding upon permanent remedial action , 2 7 
implement such action only after entering a cooperative agreement 
with the state , 2 8 and select cost-effective responses .  2 9 Section r 04( c )  
also imposes dollar and time l imitations on Fund-financed initial re­
sponse actions . 30 Section r o4(d)( r )  requires Fund-financed state re-
23  H . R. REP. N o .  J O r 6 .  96th Cong . , 2d Sess . ,  pt .  I ,  at 34 ( r g8o) ,  repYinted in r gSo U . S .  
CODE CONG.  & A D .  NEws 6 r  1 9 . 6 1 3 7 .  
2 4  See 7 5 9  F . 2 d  1 03 2 .  r o-tS-49 ( 2 d  C ir. 1 98 5 ) .  
2 5  S e e  infra Part IX ( discussing t h e  shortcomings o f  common law doctrine) 
2 6 See ,  e . g . , CH EMICAL lVIFRS . Ass 'N.  supra note q ,  at  V- 10  to  -30 ;  Gib l in  & Kelly, Judicial 
Developmen t of S tandards of Liabi lity in Govemme11t  E nforcement A c tions Unde·r the CompYe­
lzCils i7H E mJironmenial Response ,  Compensat ioll and Liab ility Ac t ,  33 C L EV . ST. L. REv . r ,  
q-q ( 1 98-t ) ;  Mott .  Defenses Under S upe1jund.  1 3  �AT. RESOURCES L .  N E WSLETTE R  1 (May 
1 98 r l . 
2 '  See -1-2 U . S . C .  � g6o-t( C )( 2 l  ( r g8 2 )  ( incorporated into the National Cont ingency Plan iNCP) 
at 40 C . F. R. § 300 . 6 2 (f l 1 1 98 -t l ) .  
2 8 S e e  i d .  § 9604(c ) (3 )  ! incorporated into t h e  �CP a t  4 0  C . F. R. * 300. 6 2 ( c )( r )  ( 1 984 ) ) .  
2 9  See id .  s 960-t (c ) ( -t l  ( incorporated into the re,·ised N C P  at s o  Fed . Reg .  4 7 . 9 7 5  ( 1 985 ) ( to 
be codified at 40 C .  F. R. � 300. 68 ( i ) (  r ), formerly at -to C .  F. R. § 300. 68(j ) ( 1 984) ) .  
3 0  See id .  § 9604( C ) ( r )  ( incorporated into the NCP at 5 0  Fed.  Reg. 4 7 , 9 7 1  ( 1 98 5 )  ( to be 
codified at 40 C . F. R. § .)00 . 6S (b)(J ) ) ) .  The "initial response" that "must be undertaken quickly 
to protect or pre\·ent actual or potential i nj u ry, " is distingu ished from remedial action ,  which 
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sponse to be pursuant to a federal-state cooperative agreement that 
follows a federal determination that the state is capable of conducting 
the response . 3 1 Defendants have asserted that government failure to 
comply with these procedural requirements serves as a defense in 
government suits to recover costs after cleanup . 3 2  
Courts have rejected these claims , stating that the defenses listed 
in section r o7 (b) are exhaustive because section r o 7 (a) imposes liability 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subj ect only 
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) . "33 For example , in United 
S tates v .  R eilly Tar & Chemical Corp . , 34 the defendant argued that 
the government could not recover because it had failed to enter  into 
a cooperative agreement with the state as required by section 
r o4(c)(3 ) . 35 The court, citing the "subject only" clause , held that 
liability under section r o7 (a) is independent of that requirement. 36 
"involves the  more permanent, costly measures wh i ch  may be necessary after the  need  for 
emergency action has terminated . "  S. REP. No. 848 ,  g6th Cong. , 2 d  Sess. 53-5 4  ( r g8o) .  Private 
party response action pursuant to � r o 6 ,  however, is exempt from these requirements. See s o  
Fed.  Reg. 4 7 , 9 7 I-7 2 ( I g8 s l  (to b e  codified at 4 0  C . F. R. � 300. 6 5 ( h l\3 l l  . 
.l t See 42 U . S . C .  § g6o4(d ) ( I )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  Some have also argued that § I 04(a)( I )  p revents the 
government from undertaking c leanup i f  p rivate p arties offer to undertake cleanup themselves.  
See, e .g . , Malter & Muys, E merging and S ignificant CERCLA Issues ,  in :\LI-ABA C OURSE OF 
STUDY: HAZARDOUS WASTES,  SUPERFUND , AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES I 3 7 ,  I 4 7-6 1 ( 1 98 5 ) .  Section 
r o4(a)( r )  authorizes government response "unless the President dete rmines that such removal 
and remedial action will be done properly by the owner or operator of the vessel or facility 
from which the release or  threat of release emanates, or by any other responsible party. " 42 
U S  C. § g6o4( a)( r )  ( I 98 2 ) . 
Pending legislation ,  however, would amend that prO\·ision to make clear that the government 
may perform the c leanup itse l f. The Senate Committee on Em·i ronment and Public Works 
reported a bi l l  that would replace the c urrent language with: "The President may authorize the 
owner or operator o f  the vessel or facility from which the release or threat of release emanates, 
or  any other responsible party, to perform the removal or remedial action if  the President 
determines that such action wil l  be clone properly by the owner, operator, or responsible party. " 
S .  5 r ,  99th Cong. , r s t  Sess. 5 8  ( I  985 ) .  The Committee report explains that the federal govern­
ment need not make such a determination before acting, even if  responsible parties are wil l ing 
to c lean up the site .  See S .  REP. No.  I I ,  99th Cong. , Ist Sess .  r 6 ( r 985 ) .  
3 2  Courts have uniformly held that private parties may not challenge remedial actions unti l  
the government seeks to reco\·er its costs from those parties .  See  supra pp. I 488-8g ( discussing 
� I 04 j udicial review) .  Allowing such challenges before cleanup ,  these courts reasoned,  would 
delay remedial action and hamper governmental responses to hazardous conditions .  
·'3 4 :  U . S . C .  § g6o 7 ( a) ( I 98 : ) .  
3 4  5 4 6  F .  Supp.  r r oo ( D .  Minn .  I 98 2 ) .  
35 See id. at I I I 7 ( citing 4 2  U . S . C .  § g6o4(c ) ( 3 )  ( 1 98 2 ) ) .  
36 S e e  i d .  a t  I r r 8  ( s tating  that § I O { (a) l iability i s  "absolute" and that "Congress did not 
intend that courts engage in  the complex inquiry and statutory tracing of the various sections" 
o f  CERCL\);  see also U nited States v .  Northeastern Pharm. & C hern. Co.  (NEPACCO) ,  5 7 9  
F .  Supp.  8 2 3 ,  850 (W. D .  Mo.  I 984) ( holding that the government need not comply with 9 r o4 
in order to maintain a recovery action ) ;  Ohio ex vel .  B rown \· .  G eorgeoff. 56 2  F. Supp.  1 300,  
I 3 I 5  ( N . D .  Ohio r g83 )  (same) .  One court, in  dictu m ,  has suggested that a defendant may not 
be liable for the cost of agen cy response actions that are inconsistent with § 1 04 (a ) .  See ] . V. 
Peters & Co. \". Ruckelshaus, 584 F. Supp .  r oos , I O I I  ( N . D .  Ohio I 984 J .  ajj'd O i l  o ther grounds ,  
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Courts appear to be mistaken in  reading the "subj ect  only" clause 
literally. As one court has noted ,  the section I 0 7 (b)  defenses  cannot 
be exhaustive , because defenses such as res judicata, payment ,  accord 
and satisfaction , statute of limitations ,  waiver, and laches must be 
available . 3 7  Indeed,  C E RCLA i tself recognizes bars to l iability be­
yond those mentioned in section I O?(b) . For example ,  section I O ? U) 
bars government recovery for response costs resulting from a federally 
permitted release , and section I I 2 (d) imposes a three-year statute of 
limitations on certain claims. 3 8 To read section I 0 7 (a) as precluding 
all defenses other than those l isted in  section I 07 (b)  would directly 
contradict the plain language of these provisions . Rather, the legis­
lative history of C ERCLA suggests that the "subject  only" clause was 
primarily intended to exclude defenses based on the absence of neg­
ligence .  3 9  
But even i f  courts recognize defenses not enumerated i n  section 
I07 (b) , they should not find them in section I 04 .  Section I 04 ,  unlike 
the other provisions of C E RCLA described above , contains no explicit 
reference to liability. Although defenses based on noncompliance with 
section I 04 would create a major  incentive for the government to 
comply with statutory procedures ,  40 there is no indication that Con­
gress intended to create such defenses. 4 1 
(b) Defenses B ased on the National Contingency Plan. - Unlike 
section I 04 ,  section I 0 7 (a)(4)(A) does provide a defense to l iability in 
certain circumstances .  That provision limits the government to re-
7 6 7  f. 2 d  263 (6th Cir .  1 98 5 ) .  That case dismissed an action to enjoin government remedial 
action because the complaint failed to set forth any material facts to support its allegations .  See 
id. at IO J O .  The opinion stated that inconsistency with � 1 04(a) and the NCP could be raised 
later as a defense to liability, but did not address the "notwithstanding any other provision"  
language of � r o7 (a ) .  See  id. at  r o r r . 
. l; See  Mardan Corp.  \'. C . G . C .  Music , Ltd. , 6oo F. Supp .  t049 ,  1 05 6  n . 9  ( D .  Ariz .  1 984 ) ;  
see  also id .  at 1 05 6-s 8 (granting summary j udgment against a pri\·ate plaintiff seeking to  reco\·er 
costs, on the grounds that the plaintiff was barred by a release executed by the parties and by 
the equitable defense of "u nclean hands"). 
38 See 42  U . S . C .  �§  g6o7( j l ,  96 1 2 (d }  ( 1 98 2 ) .  Furthermore, � I 0 7(d )  bars l iabil ity for acts or 
omissions "in accordance with the n ation al contingency plan or at the direction o f  an onscene 
coordinator appointed under such plan , "  id .  § g6o; (d ) ,  and � r o ; ( i )  bars government recovery 
for response costs resulting from the application of pesticide products registered u nder the Federal 
Insecticide, F ungicide. and Rodenticide Act,  see  id .  § g6o 7 ( i ) .  
39 See ,  e . g  . .  r 2 6  C o N G .  REC.  3 1 , 965  ( r g8o) ( remarks of Rep .  Florio)  ( describing § 1 0 7 (b )  
defenses a s  exclusive and  concluding that "the absence of negligence i s  not a defense to  l iabil ity" ) .  
40 See Gibl in  & Kelly, supra note  2 6 ,  at 1 6-1 7 ( arguing in favor of § 1 04 defenses) .  
4 1 The chemical industry points to language in § r r r (a}( r ) , 4 2  D . S . C .  § 96 1 r ( a) ( r )  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  
which suggests that the go\·ernment must comply with § I 04 to b e  reimbursed from the Fund . 
See CHEi\IICAL MFRS.  :\ss 'l'\,  supra note q, at V- r s .  A l though this requ irement may l imit  
go\"Crnmcnt reimbursement from the Fund, there is no similar requirement for go\·ernment 
reco,·ery from a pri\·ate defendant .  See  United States , . .  Reilly Tar & C hern. Corp . , 546 F.  
Supp .  1 r oo , r I r S  (D.  Min n .  1 98 2 )  (holding that § r o 7 (a) l iabil ity is " independent of the authorized 
uses of the Fund u nder section I r r " ) .  
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covery of those costs that are "not inconsistent with the national 
contingency plan"42  (NCP) , a set of rules required by C ERCLA and 
promulgated by the EPA to govern the cleanup of hazardous waste 
sites .  Courts have generally read this language as creating another 
affirmative defense . 43 Cases rej ecting defenses based directly on sec­
tion r o4(c) ignore the fact that the relevant requirements of subsection 
(c) are incorporated in the NCP. 44  Government departures from those 
procedures incorporated in the NCP should provide some affirmative 
defense to liability. 
Defendants , however, should not be permitted to escape all l iabil ity 
merely because the government neglected to follow the NCP. Section 
ro7 (a)(4)(A) does not provide a complete defense , because it  bars only 
recovery of "costs "  inconsistent with the NCP, not recovery for "ac­
tion" inconsistent with the NCP. 45 Procedural irregularities should 
not be a defense unless they lead to greater l iability than would have 
resulted from proper procedure , and even then they should only shield 
against l iability for the excess costs . 46 Most of the provisions adopted 
by the NCP from section r o4 deal with federal-state relations and are 
not designed for the protection of defendants . Violations of these 
provisions are unlikely to increase cleanup costs . In contrast, the 
requirement of cost-effectiveness in the NCP incorporated from section 
r o4(c)(4) is designed to protect defendants and thus should provide a 
defense . 
(c) "How Clean is Clean?" and the Meaning of "Cost-effectiveness . "  
- The chemical industry stresses that it may challenge the "cost­
effectiveness" of cleanup actions .  4 7  C ERCLA , however, does not 
specify precisely what "cost-effectiveness" means and thus allows the 
EPA to resolve this question in the NCP. 48 Most important ,  C ERCLA 
·12 , p  C . S . C  � g 6 o 7 ( al( . f )( .-\ i  ( I 93 2 ) . 
4-l Sef ,  e . g . , ] . \·. Peters & Co .  \'. E PA,  7 6 7 F. 2 d  2 6 3 ,  2 66 (6th  Cir. I 985 l ;  New York \'. 
General Elec .  Co . .  5 9 2  F. Supp.  2 9 I , 304 ( N . D . N . Y. 1 984) ;  U nited States v. Northeastern 
Pharm . & Chern. Co. <NEPACCOl,  5 7 9  F.  Supp. 8 2 3 ,  8so (W. D .  Mo. 1 98-tl - The NEPACCO 
court  contrasted the double  negative "not inconsistent" in  � 1 0 7 (a) (4) (A) with the language in  � 
r o ; ( a)( -t )( B J ,  which imposes l iabi l ity for '"costs of response incurred by any other person consist­
ent w i t h  the national contingency p lan . ' "  I d .  (quoting 42 U . S .  C. � 960 7 (a)(4)( B ) ( I  982  ) )  ( emphasis 
deleted) The court concluded in dictum that private plaintiffs seeking to recoHr under this 
p rovision carry the burden of proving inconsistency with the NCP. See id. at 850-5 1 ;  see also 
Pinole Point Properties ,  Inc .  V. Bethlehem Steel Corp. ' 5 96 F. Supp.  2 8 3 ,  2 90 (N .  D CaL I 984) 
(same) 
H Sec  supra notes 2 7-30 .  
4·' S r e  4 2  C . S  C .  � g6o7 (a)(4)( A) ( r g8 2 ) .  I n  the  phrase , "a l l  costs of removal or remedial 
action incurred b\· the United States Go\·ernment or a State not inconsistent with the n ational 
contingency plan. ,. id. , the words "not inconsistent" - like the parallel phrase ' ' incurred by'' -
are most scnsibl\· read to modit\· the word "costs . "  
4 6  S e e  T.; nitcd States ,_._ U nited Nuclear Corp . , 6 I o  F .  Supp .  5 2 7 ,  5 2 9  ( D  )J I\1. r g8 5 J  ! dictum) ;  
Lone Pine Steering Comm. \·. E P.-\ , 6oo F .  Supp .  1 4 8 7 ,  1 499  ( D . N .J .  1 985 1 (dictum) 
4 7  Sec  C H E!\IIC.-\L MrRS.  r\ss'0.',  supra note q, at V-2 1 to - 2 3 .  
48 The !\iCP includes response action requirements beyond those set forth in  C ERCLA, such 
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i s  ambiguous with regard to  whether defendants may challenge the 
degYee of cleanup as well as the cost-effectiveness of the means used 
to achieve that degree of cleanup.  Section r o4(c) (4) provides only that 
cleanup must be practicable in accordance with the NCP and must 
be "that cost-effective response which provides a balance between the 
need for protection of public health and welfare and the environment 
at the faci lity under consideration ,  and the availability of amounts 
from the Fund . . .  to respond to other sites . "49 Section r o5 (7 )  states 
that the NCP shall include "means of assuring that remedial action 
measures are cost-effective . "50 At a minimum , "cost-effectiveness" 
must mean that any particular degree of cleanup is achieved at the 
lowest possible cost;  the statute leaves open the question whether 
"cost-effectiveness" also means that cost-benefit analysis must deter­
mine the degree of cleanup .  
The N C P  as recently revised by the EPA,  in  any event, may 
provide only a limited defense for defendants , because it restricts the 
selection of cost-effective alternatives .  The remedy selected must be  
one "that attains or  exceeds applicable or relevant and  appropriate 
Federal public health and environmental requirements . "5 1 The EPA 
will treat these requirements as "a baseline or floor for C ERCLA" 
cleanup "as a matter of policy, " although they are "not legally appli­
cable to C ERCLA response actions , "  because Congress preempted 
these requirements in enacting C ERCLA. 52 "Applicable" require-
as detailed procedures for the government to fol low in  developing and comparing remedial 
alternatives .  See so Fed.  Reg. 4 7 , 9 7 4-75 ( I g8 s l  ( to be codified at 40 C . F. R. � 300 68 ( f )-{h) ) .  
4 9  • .p U . S. C .  � g6o4{c)(4) ( 1 982 ) . Pending legislatio n  that would amend � I 04(c) (4)  elaborates 
on the government 's selection of remedial actions .  The new section 1 04(C ) (4 )(C )  would require 
"a degree of cleanup" and "control of further release" which, "at a minimum , "  "assures protection 
of human heal th  and the environment" and also would insist that the spcciftc remedy shall  be 
" �eln·ant and appropriate " to the c ircumstances of the site . See  S.  5 r ,  99th Con g . , r st Sess. 63  
( r g8s ) .  The Senate committee report explains thai: 
For example ,  the mix of  wastes and the size, topography, and geology and other important 
factors for one site will  l i kely vary from any other. No rigidly un iform remedy would 
likely be the best at all of these sites .  This subsection provides flexibil ity to the Presiden t  
in the choice of design standards selected for remedial action . 
S. REP. No. I I ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess. 2 0  ( 1 985 ) .  
The n e w  � r o4 (c ) (4)( E )  would retain the current language call ing for a balancing test .  S ee 
S .  5 1 ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess. 64 ( 1 985 ) .  The Senate committee report explains that the balancing 
test  "should assure that  available funds are used to attack the most  important problem sites . "  
S .  REP. N o .  r r ,  99th Cong. , r st Sess. 2 0  ( 1 98 5 ) .  
; o  42 C . S . C .  � g6o5 ( 7 )  ( I 98 2 ) .  
·' 1 s o  Feel. Reg .  4 7 , 9 7 5  ( 1 985 )  ( to b e  codified a t  4 0  C . F. R .  �J00 . 68 ( i)( r ) J .  T h e  E PA believes 
that the agency "should weigh risks and costs only with respect to remedies that adequately 
protect public health and welfare and the environment, " id .  at 4 7 , 9 2 2 ,  and should use federal 
requirements as the standard for determining this "adequate protection . "  The EPA explains 
that the cost-effecti\·eness analysis should not be performed until after compl iance with such 
stand<lrds is  assured. See id .  at  4 7 , 9 1 8 , 4 7 , 9 2 1 
52 l d. at 4 7 , g i  7. C ERCLA was an "implied repeal of other em·i ronment.al and public health 
requiremen ts . "  ! d .  at 4 7 . 9 1 8 . 
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ments are defined as those federal requirements that would apply to 
the site but for preemption by CERCLA. 5 3 "Relevant and appropri­
ate" are other requirements "designed to apply to problems sufficiently 
similar to those encountered" at the site ; these may be " 'applicable' 
but for j urisdictional restrictions . "54 The EPA emphasizes that it  "does 
not suggest that a cost-benefit analysis should be performed" in deter­
mining whether a requirement is "appropriate . " 5 5  
The EPA's policy of adopting federal requirements as floors for 
the cleanup level would limit a cost-effectiveness defense to those 
cleanups that exceed such floors . The EPA's policy in determining 
the extent of cleanup is generally within its discretion and consistent 
with C ERCLA section r o5 (3 ) ,  which directs the EPA to decide "meth­
ods and criteria for determini.ng the appropriate extent" of response . 5 6 
Although C ERCLA's sponsors recognized that rational policy requires 
some weighing of costs and benefits , and envisioned that such weigh­
ing would be site-specific , 5 7 they also dismissed the notion of formal­
ized cost-benefit analysis .  5 8 They expressed doubts about the ability 
53 S ee id .  at 4 7 , 95 1  ( to be codified at 40 C . F. R .  � 300 . 6 ) ,  explained in id .  at 4 7 , 9 1 8  
( p reamble !  
54 /d .  at 4 7 . 954 ( to be codified at 40 C . F. R  § 300 . 6 ) .  S tate and local environmental l aws ,  
whi le  not "applicable or rele\·ant and appropriate , "  wi l l  be  "considered " I d. at 4 7 , 9 1 7  ( p ream­
ble); sec id .  at 4 7 , 9 7 5  ( to be  codified at 40 C . F. R .  § 300. 68 ( i) (4 1 l .  
55 l d. a t  4 7 . 9 1 8 .  Although the revised NCP lists five situations in which the  agencv "may" 
c hoose not to comply with "applicable or relevant and appropriate" requirements, i t  repeatedly 
rej ects any cost-benefit analysis in  defining these exceptions. See id.  at 4 7 , 9 7 5  ( to be codified 
at 40 C . F. R  � 300 .68 ( i )( S ) I ,  expla ined i11 id .  at 4 7 , 9 2 1 ,  4 7 , 947-48 ( p reamble and memorandum) .  
EHn when the  agency im·okcs one  of these exceptions ,  the  NCP insists that the  agency select 
the alternati\·e that ''most closely approaches the level of protection provided" b\·  federal IT­
q uirements , not necessarily the alternative suggested by cost-benefi t  analysis. S e e  id .  at 4 7 - 9 7 5  
( to b e  codified at 4 0  C .  F .  R .  * 300. 68 ( i )( 5  ) ( i i )- (v) ) .  
s o  . p  U S. C � 96os (3 l  ( 1 98 2 )  (emphasis added). 
' 7  Senato;· Stafford. for example,  stated that "considerations o f  the relationship between the 
costs and benefi ts of a particular response action arc an essential part of both the national 
contingency p l an '' and "the selection of remedial and response actions . "  1 2 6  CoNe .  REc . .)0 , 98 5 
( 1 980) .  Senator Randolp h  explained that in deciding when and how to respond, "it is appropriate 
to the exte n t  practicable and with deference to the threat to public heal th ,  welfare or the 
environment.  to consider the benefits and to consider the costs of such action '' /d. at S I 6 , 4 2 8  
(daily eeL Dec . I 2 .  I 980) . 
. i S  Senator Randolph cautioned that considerations of costs and benefits are "certainly not 
intended . . to become cumbersome analytic p rocesses. Formalized bcnefiUcost analyses would 
only preclude t imely response and would be dccei\· ing,  since the current state of science is  
unable to vro,·idc with sufficient certainty much of the necessary information on benefits . 
! d .  at S I 6 , .1 2 S  i dail:· eel .  Dec .  I 2 .  1 98ol .  Senator Stafford concurred, stating that ''the balan cing 
proces:; i s  to  include not only benefits which are susceptible of easy or exact calculatio n ,  but 
those other considerations \\'hich are c ustomarily included when the Congress uses the term 
'welfare . ·  �;uch intangible or long-term benefits must be considered in weighing whether a 
particular response or cost is inappropriate . "  /d .  The response action "is not  to be constrained 
by a rigid or inflexible construction of this language concerning cost effectiveness or  considering 
co::-.ts or b·..:ne11ts . " I d. 
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of economists to quantify the benefits of a clean environment and fears 
that analysis would be so cumbersome that it would delay remedial 
action. As a result of these considerations , C ERCLA does not provide 
firm constraints on the extent  of cleanup.  When governmental au­
thorities have determined that a particular level of  pollution is unac­
ceptable ,  it will usually be appropriate for courts to abide by that 
decision .  
B u t  CERCLA's legislative history indicates that the EPA's policy 
should be qualified .  Because C ERCLA's sponsors did contemplate 
some site-specific weighing of costs and benefits , 59 courts should allow 
defendants to raise a defense when the costs of a cleanup are obviously 
disproportionate to the benefits . Of course, litigating the "how clean 
is clean " issue in every case would be difficult and costly. Thus,  
courts should not permit defendants to raise such a defense unless 
cleanup is so excessive as to be arbitrary and capricious - that is , 
an abuse of agency discretion .  
Defendants should have greater freedom to raise a defense based 
on the agency's choice of the means to achieve the target level of 
cleanup . Although C E RCLA leaves the EPA with broad discretion 
in deciding "how clean is clean , "  courts should grant the agency l ittle 
discretion in choosing the most cost-effective means of achieving that 
l evel . Once the EPA sets the criteria for the extent of c leanup , C E R­
CLA demands that the the agency use the technology that achieves 
the target level of cleanup at the lowest cost. 60 B ecause the choice of 
means requires only a comparison of the costs of remedial action -
rather than a comparison of costs and benefits - this issue provides 
simpler questions for judicial review and does not pose the problems 
of measuring benefits that were noted by CERCLA's sponsors . 6l A 
defendant demonstrating that the same degree of cleanup could have 
been achieved at lower cost should not be liable for the excess costs . 
The NCP, however, appears to limit the abil ity of a defendant to 
c hallenge the cost-effectiveness of the means chosen to effect a speci­
fied level of cleanup.  The NCP allows any "applicable or relevant 
and appropriate" standards to determine not only the extent of 
cleanup , but also the means to achieve that c leanup regardless of cost­
effec ti veness .  The EPA explicitly approves of adopting "engineering 
and technology-based standards" from other statutes , even though 
these " !nay be set without regard to pollutant concentrations that 
protect  public health or welfare or the environment.  "6 2 Hence ,  the 
� '-i Sec  sup;·tJ note 5 7 .  
<Ai Sec  supra p .  1 5 5 � ­
�1 1 See sujn·a note _; S .  
b '  S et' s o  Fed . Reg . .f / , 9 1 9  ( 1 98 5 ) .  For example ,  the E PA contemplates using "technology­
b c:sed stHndard:;"  from the Clean Water Act. id .  at 4 7 , 9  r 9 n. r ,  arguing that "Congress determined 
i_r; enc;_ctin;;: ihose stal'Jtes that technology-based l imitations were the best  means to that  end , "  
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NCP o n  its face violates even a minimal interpretation of CERC LA's 
requirement of "cost-effectiveness . "  Although the EPA correctly notes 
that section 1 05 ( 7 )  mandates that the NCP decide the "means of 
assuring that remedial action measures are cost-effective , "63 this lan­
guage does not allow the EPA to define away the requirement of a 
"cost-effective" remedy. The defendant should be permitted to chal­
lenge the cost-effectiveness of remedial action even if the action was 
mandated by "applicable or relevant and appropriate" technology­
based standards . To the extent that the government relies upon the 
NCP· to justify excessively costly cleanup,  the NCP runs contrary to 
statutory authority. 
In reviewing the cost-effectiveness of government cleanup ,  how­
ever, courts should grant some deference to agency decisions .  64 One 
court has held that government response action should be upheld 
unless "arbitrary and capricious ,  "65 and pending legislation would also 
direct courts to award cleanup costs unless the response action was 
"arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. "6 6  
Courts should apply this standard to  remedial action challenged by 
defendants as not cost-effective . As long as the remedial action is 
reasonably cost-effective , or was reasonably believed to be cost-effec­
tive ,  the defendant should be liable for cleanup costs . 
B .  Consti tutional Challenges to R e troactive Liability 
Congress clearly intended C ERCLA to apply retroactively, in  order 
to clean up wastes generated prior to enactment .  6 7 The chemical 
industry, however, encouraged by recent Supreme Court decisions 
protecting property and contract interests in other contexts , has raised 
id.  at 4 7 , 9 r 9 Those regulations ,  however, were general rules,  designed to apply to sites across 
the board and to guide private behavior. They are inappropriate when Congress h as specihed 
that go\·ernmental  remedial action is to be site-specitlc and cost-effective . 
63 ! d .  at 4 7 , 9 2 1 ( c iting .p U . S . C .  � g6o5 ( 7 )  ( 1 98 2 ) ) .  
6 4  Senator Randolph stressed that: 
The plan is  intended as guidance - the best thinking at the time of publication - but 
not as a rigid rule or set of procedures which must be adhered to, when Federal response 
authorities bel ieve the particular circumstances . . .  require other procedures or  policy in 
order to protect public health or welfare or the environment. To consider the plan as a 
rigid l imiting document . would be to make it useless in dealing with emergencies. 
1 2 6  CoNG. REC . S r 6 , . p 7  ( daily eel .  Dec .  1 2 ,  1 980) .  
65 See  United States \". Ward , No. 8 .3-6 ,3-CIV-5 ( E D  N . C .  Sept .  9 ,  1 98 5 )  ( a\·ai lable March 
2 6 .  1 986 .  on L EXIS ,  Genfed l ibrary, Dist file ) .  
66 S .  5 r , 99th Cong. , r st Sess. r o6 ( 1 98 5 ) .  What constitutes "arbitrary and capricious" action 
will depend upon the agency action re\·iewed . Gi\·en the difficulty of deciding the optimal le-ul!i 
of c leanup,  courts should grant agencies great deference in these decisions and should find vei·y 
fe\\" of them ··arbitrary and capricious . "  Gi\·en that the choice of the optimal m e a 1 1 s  of cleanup 
is more amenable to economic analysis and to j udicial re\·iew, courts should be l ess reluctant 
to tine! these choices ·'arbitrary and capricious . "  See supra p .  1 5 5 4 .  
67  S e e  supra Section E o f  Part V (discussing retroacti\·e l iability under CERC L\) .  
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constitutional challenges to  the retroactive application of the l iability 
provisions of C E RCLA. 68 Neither courts nor commentators have 
been sympathetic to such claims .  69 However questionable retroactive 
l iability may be as a policy choice in some instances ,  the chemical 
industry's arguments fall far short of establishing any constitutional 
violation . 
I .  The Due  Pmcess Clause  
(a) The S tandaYd of R eview. - Chemical industry defendants have 
challenged retroactive liability as a violation of the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment.  70 United S tates v. Northeas teYn Pharmaceu­
tical and Chemical Co. 7 1  (NEPACCO) was the first case to rule on 
such a challenge . In rejecting the defendant's argument,  the court 
looked to Useyy v .  TurneY E lkhorn Mining Co . , 7 2 i n  which the Su­
preme Court set forth the appropriate standard of review. That case 
upheld the Black Lung B enefits Act ,  7 3  which imposed retroactive 
strict l iability on employers of coal miners in order to compensate past 
employees and their survivors for black lung disease . The TuYneY 
Elkhorn Court stated that legislation "is not unlawful solely because 
it upsets otherwise settled expectations , "  even if i t  imposes "a new 
duty or l iabil ity based on past acts . " 74  Laws "adj usting the burdens 
and benefits of economic l ife come to the Court with a presumption 
of constitutional ity" and will be upheld unless "the legislature has 
acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. "7 5  Despite this language ,  
the chemical industry quotes other language in TunleY E lkhon� to  
argue that the  Supreme Court established a higher level of  scrutiny 
for retroactive legislation than for prospective legislation :  "It  does not 
follow . . .  that what Congress can legislate prospectively i t  can leg-
6S See  CHEi\l!CAL MFRS.  Ass 'N ,  supra note 14 ,  a t  VI- 1 4  ( 1 98 2 )  ( c i t ing  Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp . ,  45 8 U . S .  • P 9  ( 1 98 2 )  (finding that a taking of  property had occurred 
requiring just compensation ) ;  Kaiser Aetna \·. United States ,  444 U S . 1 64 ( 1 9 7 9 )  (same) ;  Al lied 
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 C . S .  234 ( 1 9 7 8 )  (striking down a state statute under the 
contract clause) ;  Un ited S tates Trust Co . \'. New Jersey, 43 1 U . S . 1 ( 1 9 7 7 )  (same) .  
6 9  See ,  e . g . , United States v .  Northeastern Pharm . and Chern. Co .  ( NE PACCOl ,  5 79 F.  
Supp .  8 2 3 ,  84o-, p (W. D .  Mo .  1 984) ( rej ecting a due process chal lenge to the retroactive 
application of C E RC LA) ;  U nited States v. South Carolina Recycl ing and Disposal . Inc . , 1 4  
ENVTL.  L .  REP. ( ENVTL. L .  INS T . )  20 , 2 7 2 .  20 , 2 7 6-7 7 ( D . S . C .  Feb .  2 3 ,  1 984 ) ( rejecting both 
due process and contract c lause c h allenges to the retroacti\·c application of C E RCLA);  B laymore , 
Retroact il•e .-ipplica t ion  of S upnfu nd: Can Old Dogs B e  Taught New Tricks? ,  1 2  B . C .  ENVT 'L 
.-\FFAIRS L .  REv.  r ,  2 0-5 0 ( 1 98 5 )  ( arguing that retroactive application of C E RC LA is consti-
tutional ) :  Comment .  supra note q ,  at 1 2 46-so (same) .  
; o  U . S .  Co:--JST .  amend V 
7 1 5 7 9 F. Supp .  8 2 3  ( \V. D .  Mo. 1 984) 
7 1 .pS  C . S . r ( 1 9 76 ) ,  c i ted i n  .\'EP.·l CCO,  5 79 F. Supp .  at 84o 
7 '  30 C S . C .  S� 901-962 ( 1 9 8 2 ) .  
: .;  . p S  C . S . a t  1 6 .  
: ;  I d .  a t  1 5 .  
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islate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of legislation ,  as well 
as the prospective aspects , must meet the test of due process, and the 
justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former. " 7 6  
The industry misreads Turner E lkhorn. The levels of  scrutiny for 
retroactive and prospective legislation do not differ, only the types of 
justifications that qualify as rationally related to the legislative means 
chose n .  7 7  Retroactivity requires only a legitimate state interest, not a 
compelling or important one ,  and does not require the least restrictive 
alternative . The mine operators in Turner Elkhorn argued that ret­
roactive liability was "arbitrary and i rrational "  because it gave "an 
unfair competitive advantage to new entrants into the industry, " so 
that competitive forces would prevent the incumbent firms "from 
effectively passing on to the consumer the costs of compensation" 
imposed by the statute . 78 The Court rejected this  argument and stated 
that it is for Congress to choose how to distribute the burden :  
W e  are unwilling to assess the wisdom of Congress' chosen scheme by 
examining the degree to which . . .  retrospective l iabil ity imposed on 
the early operators can now be passed on to the consumer. It is 
enough to say that the Act approaches the problem of cost spreading 
rationally; whether a broader cost-spreading scheme would have been 
wiser or more practical under the circumstances is not a question of 
constitutional dimension . 79 
Given this deferential standard of review, the NEPACCO court 
held that CERCLA's "imposition of l iability for past acts is rational 
and satisfies the due process clause , " because Congress "rationally" 
viewed this liability "as a means to spread the costs of the clean-up 
on those who created and profited from the waste disposal . "80 The 
NEPACCO court did not discuss the particular equity arguments 
raised by the chemical industry to attack the rationality of this liabil­
ity, but an analysis of these arguments in fact supports the constitu­
tionality of C ERCLA. Indeed,  the following discussion shows that 
C ERCLA is precisely the type of retroactive legislation that should 
be upheld. 
'6 I d .  at  r 6- r  7 . quoted in CHE:'>HCAL MFRS .  Ass':-.;, supra note q .  at  VI-40. Some lower 
courts have also read Tumer E lkh o m  in this way. Sec Daughters of Miriam Center for the 
Aged v.  Mathews, 5 90 F. 2d r: � s o ,  1 2 5 9 & n . 2 5  (3d Cir.  1 9 7 8 l ;  Adams Nursing Home of 
Will iamstown,  Inc .  \ " .  Mathews,  5 48 F. 2 d 107  7 .  w8o ( r st Cir .  r 9 7  7 ) .  
; ;  T h e  Tu nzer Elk/zom Court s imply pointed o u t  that different considerations apply to 
retroacti\·e and prospecti\·e iegislation , so that a rationale that makes sense for the latter may 
not \\·ork for the former. For example .  the Court stated in dictum that it  would be re luctant 
to accept de terrence or blameworthiness as rationales for retroacti\·e legisiation .  S e e  428 TJ . S .  
a t  ! f- r 8 .  
; s  .. p 8  TJ . S . a t  1 8 .  
' 9  ld. at 1 8- 1 9 .  
so 5 7 9  F. Supp.  a t  840-4 1 .  Indeed . it \\·ould be less "rational" t o  impose this burden o n  
nnv firms that haH n o t  profited from past disposal practices. 
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(b) A n  A nalysis of the E qu ities of CER CLA 's R e troactive Liability. 
The most common objection to retroactive legislation is that it 
violates the reliance interests of affected parties .  In their unsuccessful 
due process challenge to C E RCLA, the defendants in United S tates 
v .  South Carolina R e cycling and Disposal, Inc . , 8 1 for example ,  argued 
that had they known they would later be held liable , they would have 
taken steps to avoid incurring l iability. 82 One defendant insisted that 
it could have implemented alternatives that would have prevented 
interference by others with proper disposal . The chemical industry 
argues that retroactive l iabil ity is especially unfair when it  not only 
upsets expectations but also holds a defendant l iable for damage it 
would have prevented had it  anticipated the liability. 83 
These arguments are perverse because they support reliance on 
deficient laws . Some changes in law may be more reasonable to expect 
than others;  laws that are obviously deficient in protecting recognized 
public interests , such as the environment and public heal th , are par­
ticularly subject to reform. C ERCLA is a prime example of a pre­
dictable reform . 84 The S outh Carolina Reecycling defendants claim 
8 i  ! 4 E NVTL . L .  REP. ( ENVTL.  L.  INST . )  2 0 , 2 / 2  m . s . c .  Feb .  2 3 ,  1 984) .  The S o u t h  Carolina 
Recycling court did not consider C E RCLA " ' retroactive' i n  the constitutional sense"  because 
"CERCLA is a broad remedial statute premised upon present and fu ture ef e c ts of defendants' 
past actions . "  !d. at 2 0 , 2 7 6 . The court held that l iabil ity for "presen t  con ditions stemming 
from past acts does not necessarily have retroactive effects that are subject to due process 
l imitation s , "  but stated in  the alternative "even if  CERCLA were considered retroactive it would 
clearly satisfy the requirements of due process . "  I d. 
" See Reply Memorandum of  "Generator" Defe ndants and Amicus C uriae in Support of 
Motion for Summary  Judgmen t  on  Constitutional Grounds at 2 1 ,  South Carol ina  Recycling, 1 4  
ENVTL. L .  REP . ( ENVTL. L.  INST . )  2 0 , 2 7 2  ( D  S . C .  Feb .  2 3 ,  1 984) ( Civil  Action No.  80- 1 2 /4-
6) [ hereinafter cited as Memo] ,  reprinted in  PRACTICING LAW L'iSTITUTE , HAZARDOUS WASTE 
L IT IGATION 1 984,  at 3 3 3 ,  3 5 3  ( 1 984 ) .  
S.l See ,  e . g . , id .  ( statin g  that  retroactivity deprives defendants of "the bas ic  opportunity to  
conform their conduct  so as to avoid liability" ) ;  CHE MICAL lVIFRS .  Ass 'N , s upra note  q ,  at VI-
63 to -65 ; id. at VI-64 ( inc luding the fai lure to take ' 'such measures as abandoning the generatin g  
activities , incinerating their waste, or . making alternati\·e arrangements for waste disposal" 
among its examples o f  reliance inte rests ) .  To support this position ,  the chemical industry, see 
id. at VI-49 ,  cites language in  Tunzer Elkho m ,  428 U . S . at 1 7 ,  which states that "the j ustification 
for the retrospective imposition of l iabil ity must take into account" the possibi l ity that even if 
mine operators "did know of the danger" of b lack lung disease , "their conduct  may h ave been 
taken in reliance u pon the current state o f  the law, which imposed no  l iabi lity on them . "  The 
Tu rn e r  E lklzom Court noted, however, that the mine operators had "not specifical ly pressed the 
contention that they would h ave taken steps to reduce or eliminate the i nc idence of pneumo­
coniosis [black lung disease] h ad the law imposed liabil ity upon them . "  I d. 
o-l One may object that although c hanges in  the law arc foreseeable , retroactive c hanges in 
the law are not. To assert .  h owever. that people are entitled to assume that no retroactive 
legislation will be enacted merely begs the question of \\·hether they shou ld be entitled to make 
such an assumption .  See L.  TRIBE ,  Al\rERIC\:-i CONSTITl:TIONAL LAw, § 9-5 , at 467 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  
J.-;.aplow, A n  Economic  A na lys is of Legal Tmnsitions ,  99 HARV. L .  REV. 5 0 9 ,  5 2 2-25 ( 1 98 6 ) .  I n  
this sense. all reliance arguments are c ircular. Courts cannot determine doctrine regardin g  
retroacti\·ity by reference to reasonable expectations ,  because what expectations are reasonable 
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that they knew o f  the risk of improper disposal and chose not to 
reduce that risk because current law did not hold them responsible . 
These facts should not militate in favor of the defendants . It would 
be ironic if defendants with knowledge of a risk who deliberately 
refused to take precautions could thereby obtain increase d  protection 
from retroactive l iability: this situation is precisely the one in which 
the threat of l iability creates the greatest social benefit . The possibiiity 
of future retroactive liability will be most effective in discouraging 
socially undesirable reliance when firms know of the risks they create 
and the safety measures they can take . The risk of retroactive liability 
creates an incentive for firms to take greater care than is profitable 
under existing law. A firm will be most inclined to exceed safety 
standards when they seem most likely to be changed in the future -
that is ,  when they seem least adequate . 85 
The existence of prior federal and state regulation further under­
cuts the industry's reliance arguments . Given prior heavy regulation 
in the hazardous waste area, the industry knew that the government 
sought to guard against these hazards, and it was reasonable to an­
ticipate that the legal regime would change . The imposition of ad­
ditional obligations is most equitable when the parties have been put 
on notice by prior legislation . 86 To the extent that C ERC LA goes 
beyond existing law, it merely removes defects that vvere inconsistent 
with the broad purposes of environmental regulation and tort Jaw. 
Defendants may not claim a constitutional right to exploit such defi­
ciencies in the law. S i 
In fact ,  CERCLA draws upon existing principles of tort lavv' and 
prior statutory environmental law, so that its extrapolation from fa­
miliar principles should not have been completely unexpec led S8 Strict 
wil l  depend upon w hat doctri ne the cou rts adopt. To the extent that  the "settled expectations'' 
argument "is cast exclusi\·ely in terms of the expectations that persons in fac t e ntertain in 
reliance upon l egal commitments expressly made by the so\'ercign , i t  is within the so'.·erci�n's 
power to hedge those commitments i n  order to cut the expectations down to any deo;ired size · ·  
L .  TRIB E ,  supra , � <)-6, at 4 6 9 .  
85 Professor Kaplow argues that contrary to  the  commonly he ld  1.· iew. the  ince:1ti n� effects 
of !ega! changes upon p ri\·ate im·cstments arc economically efficient .  Sec E�aplo '.'.' . .  'il!jJi'a r. ote 
84. at s z S-30. An ideal retroacti\·ity policy would require full\· retroacti\·e appl icatio<l '··,vhen 
the justification for a reform suggests that the prior acti\·ity was u ndesirab l e . "  l d .  at 5 5 1  In 
such a regime,  pri\·ate actors wil l  adjust their i nvestments according to the p l'obabil i ties  of sue;-; 
retroactiH legislation .  taking into account the risk that their actions arc actuai ly u ndesirrtblt: .  
86 See .\l l ied Stru ctu ral Steel Co . \' . Span nau s . 438 C . S .  2 34 .  2 4 2 -43 n . l .) .  2 50 ( l G/' 3 ) .  
s; See  Bla)·more . s u p ra  note 6 9 .  a t  2 7-29  (arguing that C E RC LA m ust be sus la.i ned o�cause 
it is intended merely to close loopholes in existing Ia\\' and to cocl il\· e:,i;; t in[!: sta ndards ) 
Retroacti\·e remedial statu tes,  \\·hich are designed to rcmo\·e "unintended f\a'.'.'S ;n e:,i,; t in>: 
legislation and help gi\·e ful l  effect to the l egislati\·e intent behind the in itial legis)a'cio r; . "  m �,,. 
be sustained on that ground.  ]. NO\\'AK. R .  Ron;;:mA & ]. ':/01.::-.JG,  CossTITtP'W>'A.L LA>.V 
4 7 3  ( 2 d  ed .  1 98 3 ) .  
ss See infra p p .  r 6 r o- 1 7 .  ! 6 2 4-30 (ad\·ocating strict, joint .  and se':erc;! i iZ�bil it;: for tG;;ic 
r s 6o HAR VARD LA W REVIE W [Vol .  9 9 : 1 4 5 8  
and vicarious liability is common for ultrahazardous activities;  J Oint 
and several l iability is also familiar from the common law. Even 
shifting the burden of proof on causation derives from tort law prec­
edent. The chemical industry acknowledges that the "potential for 
pre-existing liability often cannot be determined with great precision" 
given "the uncertain application of state nuisance law, " but claims 
that the "mere possibility of pre-existing liability under state nuisance 
law should not by itself preclude a generator from challenging the 
assertion of retroactive liability. "89 But it is hardly unfair to impose 
retroactive l iability on a party who was already subj ect to the risk of 
liability. No defendan t  who had reason to anticipate liability should 
be permitted to escape it when remedial legislation is enacted to make 
the liabili ty clear. 
Nevertheless , the chemical industry argues that the equities of 
retroactive l iability militate against liability for defendan ts who have 
tenuous connections to the hazardous waste site . The S ou th C aYolina 
Recycling defendants argued that CERCLA's retroactive "no-causa­
tion" l iability "violates basic due process limitations .  "90 The defen­
dants read TunuY E lkhoYn to hold that causation is an essential 
condition for the retroactive imposition of liability. 9 1  Yet nowhere 
does Tun�eY E lkhorn insist on the technical requirement of proximate 
cause as traditionally used in the common law. That c ase approved 
of shifting  to firms the costs of their business by imposing l iability for 
harms "arising out of " their operations .  92  The Court's dicta expressed 
doubts only regarding harms "unrelated to" and "due to causes other 
than" the firm's "conduct . "93 These dicta, if read to create a causation 
requirement at all , should be read to require nothing more than "but 
waste disposal ) ;  1 2 6 CONG . REc .  2 6 . 7 8 2-85 ( 1 980)  (statement of  Rep .  Gore )  ( argui n g  that existing 
tort l aw principles of strict, jo int ,  and several l iabilit�· should be applied in  the C E RC LA 
context) ;  S. REP. No. 848 , g6th C o ng . ,  2 d  Sess. 1 4- 1 5 ,  .3 3-36 ( 1 gSo)  ( c i t ing legal precedents  for 
str ict ,  jo int ,  and several l iability in the hazardous waste disposal context) .  
s� CHEMICAL MFRS. Ass ' N ,  supra note q ,  at VI-6 6 .  
90 Memo, supra note 8 2 , at 4 ,  reprinted in PR.-\.CTICING LAW INSTiTUTE at 336  ( argument 
heading) .  
9 !  See id.  at 1 .) - 1 8 ,  reprin ted i n  PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE at 3 4 5 - 5 0 .  C HEi\i!CAL :viFRS . 
Ass'N, supra note 1 4 ,  at VI-4 1 to -45 , -5 9 to -6o , de\·elops the same argument  and points i n  
partic ul ar to  two  passages i n  Tu rner Elkhorn. The Turner Elklzom C ou r t described the  liabil ity 
as a means of allocatin g  to the defendant ·'an actual , measurable cost of his business" to 
compensate for harms "aris ing out of employment in  its mines . "  . p S  G . S .  at 1 9- 2 0 .  Dic ta i n 
that case also stated that retroactive l iabil ity for damages ·'unrelated to the operator'' conduct'' 
would "present difficulties not encountered in our prior discussion of retroacti\· ity, " because harm 
"due to causes other than the operator's conduct can hardly be termed a 'cost '  of the operator's 
business . "  ld. at 2 4-2 5 .  
9 2  . p S  G . S .  at 1 9- 2 0 .  The court stated that the scheme simply allocatc:d " to the ope rator an 
actual cost of his business, the a\·oidance of which might be thought to ha\'C enla rged the 
operator's profits . "  ld. at 2 4-2 5 .  
9·' id .  at 2 4-2 5 .  
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for"  causation .  The less stringent causation requirements under C ER­
CLA are sufficient to meet any minimal requirements one may read 
into Turner E lkhorn . Thus , the conduct of a generator, which is 
responsible for creating hazardous waste and arranging for disposal , 
is a cause of subsequent harmful releases .  The section r o 7 (b) causa­
tion defenses protect a defendant that demonstrates that a hazardous 
release resulted solely from intervening causes unrelated to the defen­
dant. 9 4  With this provision , C ERCLA merely shifts the burden of 
proof to the defendant to adjust for the difficulties of proof at haz­
ardous waste sites .  9 5  Although these causation defenses are limited , 
they nevertheless permit a defendant to show that it was unrelated to 
the harm and thus to avoid any liability that would conceivably be 
unconstitutional under Turner E lkhorn .  96 Even if some defendants 
that caused no harm are unable to make this showing, CERCLA 
liability is constitutional , j ust as tort doctrines that similarly shift the 
burden of proof on causation are constitutional .  97 
The chemical industry undercuts i ts own "causal nexus" argument 
by claiming that Congress must use the "less drastic means" of taxation 
to fund cleanup .  98 The S o u th Carolina Recycling defendants con­
tended that "the ready availability of the $ r . 6  billion statutory Trust 
Fund demonstrates" that section 1 0 7  l iability "cannot be justified as a 
narrowly tailored method of spreading cleanup costs . "99 The industry 
implies that using C ERCLA's taxing mechanism is preferable to sec­
tion 1 0 7  as a means for funding cleanup because it makes all firms 
contribute . Ironically, this argument favors shifting costs to firms with 
94 See 42 U . S . C .  � 960 7 ( b )  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ;  see mpra pp. 1 543-45 . 
95 Hence C E RC LA c ausation doctrine is "remedial" in that it "neither en larges nor impair; 
substantive rights, but  rather relates to the means and procedure for enforcing those rights . "  
B agsarian v.  Parker Metal Co . , 2 8 2  F.  Supp .  ; 66 ,  7 6 9  ( N . D .  Ohio 1 968)  (discussing a long-arm 
statute for obtain ing personal j urisdiction ) ,  quoted in Ohio ex rel. B rown \'. Georgeoff, 5 6 2  F. 
Supp.  1 300 , 1 306 n . ;  ( 1 983 )  ( rej ecting  the argument that C E RCLA in  general is "remedial'' ) .  
Remedial legislation i s  n o t  constitutionally suspect .  S e e  s upra note 8 7 . C ERCLA modihes 
traditional rules of p roof of causation because these would make causation too difficul t  for the 
government to prove and would thereby allow firms to evade the substantive l iabil ity for harms 
they actually caused. See s upra p .  1 544 .  
96 F urthermore, other pro\·isions of C E RCLA moderate the  impact of retroactiH liabilit::. 
Section I O j (c ) ( l ) , 4 2  U . S . C .  � g6o; ( c ) ( l )  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  sets ceilings on  l iabi lity. Section r o ; ( e l( 2 ) ,  id .  " 
g6o; (e ) ( 2 ) ,  permits a defendant io maintain a separate cause of action for indemnification fro m  
other parties w i th  whom the  defendant may have agreements to  transfer l iabil ity. The indem­
nification provision was particularly important in the South Camlina Recycling court's rejection 
of a contract c lause chal lenge.  S e e  infra p .  1 5 63 .  
9;  See  supra note 6 .  
9 5  S e e  CHEtiiiCAL MFRS . Ass '\\ .  supra note 1 4 ,  a t  VI-5 1 .  This argument i s  simplv inconsis­
tent 11· ith the "rational means" test used in Turne r  E lkhorn and adopted in SEPACCO.  S e e  
supra pp .  1 5 5 6-5 7 
99 1\•Iemo . supra note 8 2 ,  at 1 8 .  reprinted in PRACTIS I N G  LAW ll\ST!TlJTE at 350 ;  see CHE'. f ­
I C A L  IVIFRS . Ass 'N,  supnz note q ,  at Vl - 70  n .  1 05 ( c laiming that "Congress created its own less  
drastic alternati\'C by establishing duplicative means of accomplishing its cleanup 
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even weaker causal connections to the hazardous waste sites .  The 
industry's own suggestion of alternative means is inconsistent  with its 
claim that Turner E lkhorn creates a constitutional requirement of a 
"causal nexus. " 100 
(c) Conclusion.  - All of the factors weighed in this due process 
analysis go to the question of whether retroactive liability under C ER­
CLA is equitable and therefore rational .  The above discussion sup­
ports the conclusion reached in NEPACCO that such l iabi lity meets 
these criteria . 1 0 1  Congress , seeking to distribute the costs of cleanup 
most equitably, chose to put part of the burden upon those firms 
available for suit that are most closely connected with the sites , and 
part of it upon the entire industry through a tax . Congress sought to 
make the firms that created hazardous wastes sites and benefited from 
past waste disposal practices ,  rather than the general taxpayer, bear 
the social costs imposed by their operations.  Although one may dis­
pute empirical assumptions underlying its policy, this legislative choice 
simply cannot be attacked as irrational under the due process clause . 
2 .  The C ontract Clause 
The chemical industry also argues that the enactment of C ERCLA 
section 1 0 7  impaired the transfer of liability in waste disposal contracts 
and thereby violated the contract clause , which guarantees that no 
state shall pass any "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . " 1 02 
The S outh Carolina R e cycling court rejected this claim . The waste 
generators in that case had contracted with South C arolina Recycling 
and Disposal , Inc. for the disposal of their wastes .  They transferred 
ownership of the waste in order to avoid the kind of l iability imposed 
by section 1 0 7 . 103 The court rejected their claim that their contracts 
had been unconstitutionally impaired and noted that the contract 
clause itself applies only to the states ,  not to Congress .  This rationale 
is questionable , because the protections of the contract clause are 
lliO As one commentator notes: 
In  fact ,  imposing l iabil ity for dumpsite c lean-up on  past waste generators, who ha,·e at 
least a common-sense connection - if not a previously recognized legal conn ection - to 
the problem , may be more rational than holding all chemical companies or the general 
public responsible for c lean-up through an across-the-board tax scheme: such parties may 
have no connection whatsoever to the condition .  
Comment, supra note q, at r 2 50 ;  see B laymore, supra note 69 ,  at  3 2 -33 (quot ing legislative 
history in defense of this rationale ) .  
1 0 1  S e e  supra p .  1 5 5 7 .  
1 02 U . S .  CO='IST. art. I .  � 10 ;  see Memo a t  2 3-30 ,  repYi llted i n  PRACTISI='IG LAW 1:-�STITUTE ,  
supra note 8 2 .  a t  3 55-62  ( chal lenging C E RC L\ under the contract clause ) ;  C H EMICAL M F R S  . 
. '\ss 'N,  supra note q, at VI-; r to -74  (same) .  
1 03 S e e  l\'Iemo, s up·ra note 8 2 , a t  2 6-2 7 ,  reprinted i n  PR.-\CTISJ);"G LAW 1:-:�STITUTE a t  3 5 8-
5 9  
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usually thought to be effectively incorporated in the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment, and hence to apply to federal as well as state 
laws . 1°4 The court held in the alternative , however, that C ERCLA 
did not substantially impair the defendants' waste disposal con­
tracts. 105 The court reasoned that the contracts remained valid be­
cause the generator defendant could still seek indemnity under the 
contract. 1 06 
By rejecting the claim that CERCLA imposes a "substantial " im­
pairment, the court avoided an evaluation of the competing interests 
at stake . The "substantial impairment" requirement is the initial in­
quiry in contract clause analysis as set forth in A llied S tructuml Stee l  
Co .  v .  Spannaus . 107 In assessing an impairment, the Supreme Court 
has considered such factors as whether the parties relied on the law 
heavily and reasonably and whether the law operates in an area 
already subject to regulation . 1 os As discussed in the due process 
analysis above ,  these factors favor retroactive application of C ER­
CLA.  Thus ,  even without an explicit indemnity provision,  C ERCLA 
would not impose a "substantial impairment, " and the courts should 
not have to "push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature 
and purpose" of the legislation 1 09 in order to decide whether the 
impairment was "reasonable and necessary to serve an important 
public purpose . " 1 1 0 
1 04 S ee ,  e . g . , Shelter Framing Corp .  v. Pension B enefit Guaranty Corp . ,  7os F. z d  1 5 0 2 , 
r s r: �- 1 3  & n . 1 2  1 9th Cir .  1 98 3 ! ;  L. TRIBE, supra note 84 , � 9-5 , at 465 n . 1 1 1 9 7 8 1 ;  Hochman,  
The S upYeme C o u rt and t l z e  Const i tu t ionality of R e t roactive Legislat ion ,  7 3  HARV. L .  REv.  6 9 2 , 
695 ( 1 96ol .  
1 0 -'  14  E N\'T L . L. REP.  ( E:'\\ 'T L L. INsT . I at 2 0 . 2 7 6 .  
106 See  i d .  Section I 0 7(e) ,  . p  C .  S . C .  � 9607 (e )( 2 )  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  pre\·ents a party from using a 
contract as a shield against l iability. but  docs not prevent such a party from using: the contract 
to seek reco\·ery from another part\·. 
1 0 7  4 3 8  U . S . 2 3 4 ,  2 44 l 1 9 7 8 l .  
l OS See id .  at 2 45 -4 6 ,  2 5 0 .  
109 !d.  at 2 45 . 
1 10 United States Trust Co .  \·. New Jersey. 4 3 1  U. S .  1 ,  2 5 ,  2 9  l 1 9 7 7 l .  Some argue that 
C E RC LA would meet such a test by pointing to C ERCLA's overall purpose of dealing with 
hazardous waste sites. S e e ,  e . g  . .  B laymore , supm note 69, at 3 9-40 (j ustifying C E RC LA under 
the analysis suggested by .-l llied Struc tural S teel ) .  The South Carolina Recycling defendar,ts 
correctly noted that this purpose is irrele\·ant to the constitutionality o f  the l iabil ity provisions .  
See  Memo,  supra note 8 2 ,  at 2 9 .  reprinted in  PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE at 36 r .  The interest 
i n  protecting public health and the em·ironment is met by government cleanup; the l iabil ity 
pro\·isions must be j ustified in their own right. Any substantial impairment imposed by C ER­
C LA would haH to be j ustified by the " important general social problem" that those p arti cular 
pro\·isions address. A llied S t ruc tural S teel .  43 8  U . S .  at 2 4 7 .  Although CERCL\'s l iability 
pro\·isions sen·e both efficiency and correcti\·e j ustice by forcing the chemical i ndustry to 
internalize the costs of c ieanup and pay for the harms it caused , see supra pp .  1 5 5 7 ,  1 5 5 9 ,  1 5 6 2  
n .  1 00 .  these purposes may be difficult  t o  characterize a s  "important" ginn the Supreme C ourt 's  
new solicitude for property in terests. see s upra pp.  1 5 5 5 -5 6  & n . 68 .  
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C .  Takings C lause Challenges t o  Government C leanup 
The chemical industry has also suggested that remedial action at 
waste sites may be a " taking" requiring j ust compensation under the 
takings clause . 1 1 1  Courts generally decide takings cases by performing 
"ad hoc , factual inquiries , "  weighing factors such as "the economic 
impact of the regulation ,  its interference with reason able investment 
backed expectations , and the character of the governmental action.  " 1 1 2 
Given the overwhelming state interest in public heal th and safety, 
courts will generally not find a "taking" when the government is 
eliminating a nuisance and not affirmatively exploiting the property. 1 13 
Hence , even assuming facts favorable to the site owner, courts bal­
ancing all relevant factors should find that cleanup measures are not 
"takings .  " 1 1 4 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp . 1 1 5 established the 
only exception to the balancing approach :  a "permanent physical oc­
cupation" is a " taking" of the owner's property, however minor the 
intrusion and whatever the public interest served .  The chemical in­
dustry notes that cleanup measures give rise to such an occupation 
by requiring the building of permanent structures to  contain waste , 
prevent  access , or  monitor ground water. 1 1 6 This rigid formalistic 
approach has no plausible justification in economics or common 
sense . 1 1 7 The hazardous waste site context illustrates the illogic of 
this rule :  the government could avoid a per se "taking" claim by 
1 1 1 U . S .  COKST . amend .  V ( "nor  shall p rivate property be taken for  publ ic  use  without j ust 
compensation") ;  see CHEMICAL M FRS . Ass'N , supra note 14 , at VI-7  5 to - 7 7  ( developing the 
takings c lause chal lenge to C E RCLA cleanup) .  For example ,  the industry claims that govern­
ment cleanup under � 1 04 or  private cleanup ordered by the government under * 1 06 may 
depri\·e the site owner of any remain ing valuable use of the property. See i d .  at VI- 7 6  to - 7 7  
& n . r r 5 .  Complete deprivation would make a "taking" claim plausible ,  because "the extent o f  
the diminution" in  property value i s  a significant factor i n  takings analysis .  Pennsylvania Coal 
Co.  v. Mahon, 2 60 U . S .  393 , 4 1 3 ( 1 9 2 2 ) . Most often ,  however, i t  is  the toxic waste itself that 
has rendered the land useless.  See B laymore, supya note 69 ,  at 44, 46 .  
1 1 2  Kaiser Aetna v .  U nited States, 444 U . S .  1 64, 1 7 5 ( 1 9 7 9) .  1 1 3 One discerns this  pattern in  the Supreme Court  cases,  although they do not expressly 
adopt this approach . S e e ,  e . g  . . Goldblatt V. Town of Hempstead, 369 U . S .  5 90, 5 95 ( 1 96 2 )  
(upholding a zoning regulation a s  a "safety measure"); Mil ler v. Schoene,  2 76 U . S .  2 7 2 ( 1 9 2 8) 
(upholding the governmental destruction of valuable cedar trees deemed a threat to neighboring 
apple orchards ) ;  see also B laymore . supra note 69 ,  at 45-46 ( using the "noxious use " approach 
to defend C E RCLA).  
1 14 See B laymore,  supra note 69 .  at 40-46 .  Much of this  balancing in  takings cases fol lows 
the due process analysis discussed above . For example ,  although investment-backed expectations 
are deemed relevant in this analysis .  see Kaiser Aetna v United State s .  444 U . S .  1 64 ,  r 74-7 5 
( 1 9 79) ,  reliance interests arc weak i n  the context of toxic waste disposal because of the obvious 
dangers posed by such wastes and the heavy regulation of disposal .  See B laymore,  supra, at 
43 · 
1 1 ; 45 8 U . S .  4 1 9 , ,.p 5-2 6 ( 1 982 ) .  
t t6  See CHBIICAL MFRS. Ass':< ,  s upra note 1 4 ,  at VI-75 to - 76 .  
1 1 ; S ee Lore t t o ,  458 U . S .  at 44 7-5 1 ( Blackmun ,  ] . , dissenting) .  
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ordering the private party to carry out the same cleanup or by com­
pelling the private party to purchase any permanent structure erected 
upon the property. Even if  applied ,  however, this per  se rule  would 
have minor practical consequences .  Little or no paymen t  may be 
"just" compensation for the taking,  especially in l ight of the fact that 
government cleanup confers benefits upon the owner by fulfill ing the 
owner's legal obligation to clean up the site , benefits much larger than 
any harms that cleanup might cause the owner. 
VII . NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 
A .  Liability Under CERCLA 
I .  Introduc tion 
Under CERCLA's primary liabil ity provision ,  section r o 7 , parties 
responsible for a release are liable for natural resource damages as 
well as for cleanup costs . Section r o7 (a)(4)(C) of CERCLA creates 
l iability for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources ,  including the reasonable costs of assessing such inj ury, 
destruction , or  loss resulting from" a release of hazardous substances . 1 
Section r o7(f ) provides that defendants are to pay damages to the 
United States and the affected states .  2 "Natural resources" are defined 
by section r o r ( r 6) as "land , fish , wildlife , biota, air, water, ground 
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging 
to , managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to , or otherwise con­
trolled by the United States . . .  , any State or local government, or 
any foreign government. "3 
The damages at stake in natural resource cases can be staggering. 
For example , the United States is seeking to recover as much as :i) r . 8  
billion from Shell Oil Company for natural resource damages at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado . 4 Claims by federal and state 
governments are proliferating. 5 Moreover, a recent district court hold­
ing that municipalities may also sue for natural resource damages6 
could further expand the use of these suits . 
1 4 2  U S  C .  � 960 7 (a) (4 ) (C)  { ! 98 2 ) .  
2 S e e  i d .  S 960 7 ( f  ) .  
3 !d.  � 960 1 ( ! 6 ) .  
� See United States \". Shel l  Oi l  Co . 6os F. S u p p .  1 064 , 1 084 ( D .  Colo.  1 98 5 ) .  
5 See W. FRA:-<K & T. ATKESON, BNA SPECIAL REPORT , SuPERFUc-iD :  LITIGATION AND 
CLEA:-.IUP 75 ( I 98 s J : B reen,  CER CLA 's Natu ral Reso urce D amage Provisions:  Wha t  Do vVe 
!\How S o  Far?, q ENVTL. L REP.  1 0, 3 04 ,  r o, 3o4 & n . z  ( 1 984);  :\'otc, Th eories of S tate  
Recovery Ullder CERCL.-1 for flljuries t o  the Enviroll mcnt ,  2 4  :-.lAT. RESOURCES ] .  r ro r ,  1 1 03 
& n . 2 0  ( 1 984) .  
6 S e e  Mayor and B el .  of Aldermen of Boonton v .  Drew Chern.  Corp . ,  6 2  r F.  Supp.  663 , 
667 ( D . N . J .  1 98 5 l .  
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2 .  R equirements for Liability 
(a) Timing R equirements . - Section I I 2 sets forth p rocedures for 
natural resource damage actions.  Section I I 2 (d) requires that claims 
be presented and actions commenced vvithin three years of the date 
of discovery of the damage . 7 Furthermore , section I O ? (f )  states that 
there "shall be no recovery . . .  where such damages and the release 
of a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have 
occurred wholly before December I I ,  I g8o . "8 Courts h ave held,  how­
ever, that this timing requirement will not bar liability as long as 
some damage continues after the enactment date . 9 
(b) The Requirement of a Nexus B e tween the R esource and the 
Government . - Some have read the definition of "natural resources" 
in section I O I ( I 6) 1 0 to require a special nexus between the government 
and the natural resource .  For example , the chemical industry reads 
this definition to include only publicly owned or controlled resources , 1 1  
because section I O I ( I 6) refers only to resources "belonging to , managed 
by, held in trust by, appertaining to , or otherwise controlled by" the 
government . 1 2  One commentator similarly argues that section I O I ( I 6) 
requires a "nexus" between the resource and the government,  although 
he interprets this requirement to include resources  that are directly 
regulated for environmental protection . 1 3 Under this view, unregu­
lated resources fall outside of the language of the statute , because "if 
Congress meant to include any resources within a government's geo­
graphic jurisdiction ,  it could easily have said so , and to read 'apper­
taining to' this broadly seems to make the other nexus descriptors in 
the statute redundant. " 14 
No special "nexus , "  however, should be required .  Other provisions 
of CERCLA appear to give broad reach to the cause of action for 
natural resource damage . Section I I I (b ) ,  for example ,  permits the 
7 See 4 2  U . S C § 9 6 1 2 {d )  { 1 98 2 ) . Damages discovered before the e n actment of C ERCLA, 
howe\·er, had to be presen ted and filed before December r I ,  r 983 . See id .  
" !d .  § g 60 7 { f l .  
9 S e e  Uni ted States v .  Shel l  O i l  Co . , 6os F. Supp .  I 064 ,  I o 7 6  ( 0  Colo .  r g8 5 ) ;  U nited States 
\". Wade, 20 ENVT L . L. RE P . ( Envtl . L. l nst. ) 2 0 , 43 5 .  2 0 , 4 3 6  ( E . D .  Pa. Feb .  2 ,  r g84J ;  U nited 
S tates \·. Reil ly Tar & Chern.  Corp . ,  546 F.  Supp. I r oo,  I r 2 o  {0.  Minn .  r g 8 z ) .  
1 o  See supra p .  r s 6 s .  
1 1  See CHEMICAL lVIFRs. Ass 'N,  St:PERFt.: N D :  KEY LIABILITY IssuEs at V-4 7  to -49 { r g 8 z  ) .  
The industry correctly notes that only the federal or state governments may reco\·e r, but this 
fact does not  imply that they may not recover for pr i\·ately owned resources .  See wp m p .  1 5 65 .  
1 2  42  U . S . C  § g6o i { r 6) ( r g8 z ) .  B u t  the statute on its face goes beyond mere ownership or  
control . For example. the  word "trust" i ndicates that th is  definition should inc lude not only 
resources owned or possessed bv the go\·ernment ,  but also resources i n  the ·'publ ic  trust . · ·  such 
as na\·igablc waters, wetlands.  and parklands. See generally R .  ZE P: E R . G t:IDE TO FEDERA L  
EN\'IRONi\IE'iT.U LAw 3 7 7 ( r gS I )  ( discussing the  notion of "public trust") . 
1 3 See  B reen . supra note 5 .  at I O . J 05 -o 6 .  Such resources would inc lude · ''"ndangered species ,  
coastal zones.  public water supplies , and air. " !d.  at  I O,J05 . 
1 4 !d .  at I 0 , 3o6.  
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U nited States to assert claims "as trustee" of any natural resources 
over which it has "sovereign rights , "  that is , the power to regulate . 1 5 
Section r o 7 (f )  establishes liability for damage to any natural resources 
"within the S tate or belonging to , managed by, controlled by, or 
appertaining to such State . " 1 6 This provision uses the disjunctive "or, " 
implying that the nexus terms expand upon mere sovereignty. The 
language in these sections indicates that Congress intended that CER­
C LA be construed broadly to reach all resources within the govern­
ment's jurisdiction;  a narrower reading of "natural resources" would 
require contorted readings of these sections .  Furthermore,  distinguish­
ing between privately and publicly owned natural resources conflicts 
with C ERCLA's goal of forcing defendants to internalize the social 
costs of natural resource damage , because all natural resources may 
provide services to, and be valued by, the publ ic . 1 7  
B .  Measurement of Damages 
I .  Use Value Versus R estoration Cost 
C ERCLA provides l ittle guidance in the measurement of damages.  
Section r o 7  merely indicates that the sums recovered "shall  be avail­
able for use to restore , rehabilitate , or acquire the equivalent of such 
natural resources . . .  , but the measure of such damages shall  not be 
limited by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such 
resources.  " 1 8  Rather than specifying more precise rules ,  section 
3o r (c) ( r )  directs the President to "promulgate regulations for the as­
sessment of damages for inj ury to , destruction of, or loss of natural 
resources .  " 1 9 Section 30 r ( c) ( 2 )  provides that these regulations shall 
specify "(A) standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring 
minimal field observation , including establishing measures of damages 
based on units of discharge or release or units of affected area,  and 
( B )  alternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual 
cases" that "shall take into consideration factors including,  but not 
limited to , replacement value , use value , and ability of the ecosystem 
I S  See 42  U . S . C.  S 96 1 1 (b )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  "Sovereign right' ' is  defined by B LACK'S LAW D ICTIONARY 
1 2 5 2  ( S th eel. 1 9 7 9 )  as the right that "the state alone, or some of its governmental agencies ,  can 
possess, and which it possesses in  the character of a sovereign , for the common benefit ,  and to 
enable it  to carry out its proper functions . "  In particular, this right is "distinguished from such 
'proprietary' rights as a state , like any private person ,  may have in property or demands which 
it  owns . "  !d.  
! 6 4 2  U . S . C .  � g6o7 (f ) ( ! 98 2 )  ( emphasis added) 
1 ; This is not to say that the law should not distinguish between public and private damages .  
See  inji-a p .  1 5 7 2 . 
IS C ERCLA S ro ; ( f ) .  4 2 U . S . C .  � g6o7 ( f ) ( r g8 2 ) .  
1 9 42 U . S . C .  s 96S I ( C )( I )  ( ! 98 2 ) .  
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or resource to recover. "20 The President delegated responsibility for 
promulgating these regulations to the Department of the Interior 
(D0l) , 2 1 and a consent order obtained in a lawsuit by New Jersey 
and others established a schedule for the promulgation of these rules. 2 2  
The rules proposed b y  the D O l  as o f  this writing illustrate some 
of the issues raised by natural resource damages .  The DOl stresses 
that C ERCLA requires these damages to be compensatory rather than 
punitive . 2 3 C ERCLA's broad directive alludes to two distinct mea­
sures of compensatory damages :  ( r )  restoration or replacement cost, 
or ( 2 )  diminution of use value . The latter is measured by the decrease 
in fair market value or  by some economic construct that similarly 
estimates the economic value of the services lost. Although some have 
suggested that C ERCLA favors restoration cost as  the appropriate 
measure of damages ,  24 the rules proposed by the DOl generally adopt 
2 0 !d.  � 96S I ( c )( 2 ) .  Type A assessments based on amount of discharge or  u nits o f  affected 
area are inaccu rate methods for estimating actual damage. These formulas u n realistically assume 
a " l inear damage function" - that is, they assume the harm is proportional to the q uantity of 
discharge or the area affected. See Yang ,  Valuing Natural Resoune Damages: E conomics joY 
CERCLA Lawyen ,  1 4  ENVT L .  L .  REP. 1 0 , 3 1 r ,  r o , .3 1 3  ( 1 984) .  Perhaps for this reason ,  C E R­
C LA's legislative history i ndicates that type A methods should only be used for "minor" releases. 
See S REP. No. 848 ,  g6th Cong . , zd Sess. 86 ( 1 980) .  
' 1 S e e  Exec.  Order No.  1 2 , ,3 1 6 ,  � 8 (c ) (J ) ,  46 Fed.  Reg. 42 , 2 3 7 ,  4 2 , 2 40 ( 1 98 1 ) . 
2 2 Pursuant to that order, the DOl proposed "B regulations" on December 2 0 ,  1 98 5 . See s o  
Fed . Reg. s 2 , 1 2 7  ( 1 985 ) ( preamble t o  rules proposed D e c .  20 ,  1 98 5 )  ( c iting N e w  Jersey v .  
Ruckelshaus ,  N o .  84- 1 668 ( D  N . J .  Feb. 5 ,  1 98 5 )  ( consent order) ) .  
2 3  See s o  Fed. Reg. 5 2 , 1 2 7-28 ( 1 985 ) ( preamble to rules proposed Dec .  20 ,  1 98 5 ) .  
2 4  S e e ,  e . g . , B reen,  supra note 5 ,  a t  I 0 .304 ,  1 0 , ,307-10 ;  Note ,  sup1-a note 5 .  a t  1 104 n . 2 4 ,  
I 1 05 .  These commentators cite C ERCLA § I 0 7 ( f l ,  4 2  U . S .  C .  § 9607 ( f )  ( 1 98 2  ) ,  which states 
that "damages shall not be l imited by the sums which can be used to restore or  replace such 
resources . "  in  support of their position .  They argue that this language suggests that restoration 
costs were intended as a minimal floor, and that Congress envisaged e\·en greater l iability. See  
B reen, supra .  at r o , .3 0 7 ;  Note ,  supra note 5 ,  at I I 03 n .  r6 .  This language merely rejects a 
cei l ing.  howe\'er, and does not exclude the possibility of smaller damages. The better reading 
of this  pro\·ision is that it  was in tended to al low recovery of use \·alue lost during the time 
when natural resources are being restored. The rules p roposed by the DOl e ffectively adopt 
this reading ,  allowing such recovery above restoration cost when restoration cost is  the appro­
priate measure of damages .  S e e  infnz p. r 5 7  I .  In determining restoration cost for comparison 
with usc \·alue .  this recovery above restoration cost should be included as part o f  the ·'restoration 
cost . ., 
The abo\·e commentators also cite the language in the Clean Water .-\ct ,  33 U . S . C .  * 
I 3 2 I ( f )( S )  I I 98 2 ) ,  which states that damages "shal l  be used to restore , rehabil itate , or acquire 
the equi\·alent. " and argue that C E RC LA adopts the same standard for damages. See Note, 
s upra note j .  at I I 0 2  n . I 6 :  see also Deepwater Port Act § r 8 ( i )( 3 ) ,  3 .3 U . S . C .  � I S I 7 ( i ) ( 3 )  ( 1 982 ) 
(pro\·iding that sums reco\'ered ''shall be applied to the restoration and rehabilitation" of natural 
reoources i ,  c i t e d  in B reen,  supra note 5 ,  at I 0 , 309 (arguing that C E RC L-\ adopts the same 
standard). Yet these other statutes show rhat Congress will expressly state any intended restric­
tion on the measure of sums reco\·e red. H ad Congress wished to fol low the standard in the 
Clean \Vater .-\ct .  i t  could easily have copied the phrase "shal l  be used . "  Other c\·idence cited 
b\· these commentators is discussed i nfra at notes 26 & 48. At best, their arguments demonstrate 
that the statute is ambiguous. 
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the common law approach of taking the lesser of restoration cost and 
lost value . 25 
This rule is supported by C ERCLA's legislative history and is 
generally consistent with economic theory. Senator Simpson stated:  
I also trust that the traditional l egal rules for . . .  damages for injury 
in tort will be observed as part of cost effectiveness.  For example,  
the law achieves cost effectiveness by awarding the difference in value 
before and after the inj ury, and where the injured interest can be 
restored to its original condition for less than the difference in value,  
the cost or [sic] restoration is used. 2 6  
The obj ective of the damage awards should be to  force private parties 
to internalize the social costs imposed by their hazardous waste re­
leases so that these parties will invest optimally in safety precautions .  
The proper measure of this damage is the actual loss suffered once 
society has efficiently mitigated the damage . If the lost resource can 
be restored at a cost less than its value , then the cost of restoration 
is the social loss . If the resource cannot be restored economically, 
then the use value foregone is the social loss . A still better policy 
would not limit the alternatives to full restoration cost or use value .  
The optimal policy would also consider partial restoration and would 
require the government to restore the resource only up to the point at 
which the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. The defendant 
would pay the costs of partial restoration plus compensation for any 
residual loss in use value .  For any case in which some restoration is 
optimal , this sum will be less than the total loss in use value when 
zero restoration is assumed . A more sophisticated rule would direct 
a court or agency to estimate this optimum, 2 7  but the proposed rules 
fail to provide for this more complex analysis . 
The proposed rules also carve out an exception to the general 
common law rule that limits recovery to use value when restoration 
costs exceed use value . This exception allows the trustee to seek 
2 5 See s o  Fee l .  Reg .  5 2 , 1 5 4  ( r g8S ) ( to be codified at 43 C . F. R. 9 I I . 3 5 (b ) ( 2 ) )  ( proposed Dec .  
2 0 ,  r g85 1 ,  expla i n e d  in id .  at 5 2 , q r  ( preamble to p roposed rules ) .  The chemical industry has 
a lso ach·ocatecl this common law approach. See  CHEMICAL MFRS.  Ass'N,  supra note I I ,  at  V-
35  to -46 .  
2 6 u 6 Co"c . REc . 3 o , g86 ( I  g8o)  (statement o f  Sen .  Simpson) .  Senator Mitchell described 
C E RCLA as prO\·iding for recovery of restoration cost, noting that the government can recover 
· 'the cost of repairing the damage" and "may be fully reimbursed from the fund for the cost of 
restor ing . " !d .  at .) 0 . 9 4 1 -4 2 ,  q u oted in  B reen,  supra note 5 ,  at I 0 , 308 .  U nl ike Senator Simpson , 
howenr. Senator �ilitc h e l l  did not specifically aclclrcss the situations in which actual restoration 
would not be 11·orth undertaking because restoration cost would exceed lost value .  
' ; S e e  Farm· 1 · .  B estfic ld Builders ,  Inc . ,  39 I  A . 2 d  2 I 2 ,  2 I 4 ( Del .  Super.  Ct .  1 9 7 8 1  (d irect ing  
the l o\\·er court to corL' i clcr whether awarding fu l l  restoration costs for damaged trees w2.s 
appropriate gi\'Cn "that their replacement cost may unreasonably exceed their marginal aesthetic 
value'" :mel that the plaintiffs could "have replaced the lost trees with less mature trees of a. 
somewhat lo-..n'r rcpiaccment cost but with an aesthetic value near to that of the lost trees"). 
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recovery of restoration or replacement costs when the natural resource 
is a "special resource , "  provided that such restoration or replacement 
is technically feasible and that these costs will not be "grossly dispro­
portionate to the benefits gained.  "2 8 A "special resource" is  defined as 
a resource set aside and committed to a specific use by law before the 
release was detected.  2 9 The DOI recognizes that this provision departs 
from the common law theory and explains that it applies only when 
the resource is set aside "consciously and clearly . . .  by elected rep­
resentatives . "30 
The DOI created the "special resource" exception to respect federal 
or state legislative determinations that "certain natural resources are 
worthy of protection even if their use values are relatively low, " 
because otherwise "these resources could be left unrestored or unre­
placed" contrary to legislative intent. 3 I  This exceptio n ,  then ,  should 
be invoked only when the legislature evinces clear intent .  The theory 
behind the exception is that the political process has attached a social 
value to these resources that exceeds measurable use value and that 
agenc1es should abide by this decision .  
2 .  Methodology for Determining Damages 
(a) R estoration Costs . - The proposed rules define restoration or 
repl2�cement damages as the costs necessary to return the resource 
services to the baseline level provided in the absence of damage . 3 2  
' '  S e "  s o  Fed.  Reg. 5 2 , 1 5 4  ( r gSs l ( to b e  codified a t  4 3  C . F. R .  § r r . 3 5 (d ) )  ( proposed Dec .  
2 0 .  c c: S � l .  
, . ,  i c e  i d .  at  5 2 . 1 5 0  ( to b e  codified at 43 C . F. R .  § I I . I4 (pp)) ,  expla i n e d  i n  i d .  a t  5 2 , 1 4 1  
( pr·.: ��IT,ble  to  proposed rules ! .  According t o  the D O l ,  this definition would include wildlife 
p:t, •:r-:c:i . '·'· hich «r� managed for resource preservation only, but not mil itary land, publ ic  
lzond:c .  u :· national forests . which arc managed for a variety of  uses .  The  definit ion also excludes 
;-cs•:-.ur·:es r:�o:.ec tcd by "regulatory statutes , " or those resources designated by administrative 
age:-,-:].-:,: '·.·� .;;icciai !)rotection . See id.  This language excludes endangered species,  which are 
l isct ,:l :'.dm;nis�rccti\·el,· and protected by statutes that establish specific civil and c riminal penalties 
fcl· :·::.��rn i r: ·�· �he  s p e c ies .  See  id .  at .) 2 , I. f i .  
"J ! d .  �'' .� : .  q i  i p r�arnble to proposed rules i .  
" ! d .  ' i  he DOl pro\·ides no guidance for identifying this intent in  any  particular statute . 
·'· 2 ::.:te id. at ) 2 . 1 69 l H )S s l  ( to be codified at 43 C . F. R. § r r . S r (c ) ( r )) .  This base l ine  includes 
i:: : .<·· ,.v·.' \ : :·: yo·•idecl to human:- and sen·ices pro,·idcd to the ecosyste m .  See id .  at 5 2 , 1 64 ( to 
be C 'Jdi heci at 4.l C .  F. R. � 1 1  ; r i c ) ) .  The DOl explains that nonhuman services inc lude "sup­
portinc� v: i ld i i fc .  C0!1trol l ing t1oods. assimilating wastes , "  and "any other services that may be 
t;-:lpo rt:\11l . . . but does not e:-:p lai n wh.1· these must be restored if they arc not ult imately of value 
to l1•Jmano:.  ire  id.  at 5 c ,  1 ,) S  (preamble to proposed rules) .  I nc lusion o f  nonhuman services in  
tl·,·.; �estc.r:;ciGn base l i ne seems to assume a duty to nature per se .  S e e  g e nerally Sagoff ,  O n  
1-' r,.· : c- ; ;_ · i <i 1 .!t e .\.a lu !'<l l  E il'i.' i ro n m e n l .  S4 Y A L E  L . J .  205 , 2 2 1-2 2 ( 1 9 7 ..1 )  ( arguing that natural 
objc :':s ha·:e right5 l ;  Stone. Should Trees HaDe Sta nding? - Toward Lega l R iglzts fo r Natural  
.+::: S C A L .  L RE\· . -ts o  l t 9 7 2 )  ( same ) .  This assumption is inconsisten t  with the rest 
or :l1c· UOI's  methoduicg,·, v:hich assumes duties only to humans. Usc ,·a luc .  for example ,  is 
bas�d •.; i: '"'n·ices oro,· ided only to humans. See 5 0  Fed. Reg . 5 2 , 1 7 0 ( r 9S5 )  ( to be codified at 
--!-.; C . -�- .R. �� : i . .S.� ( b l ) .  
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Damages are based upon the most cost-effective alternative for reach­
ing this obj ective , and the alternatives considered must include a "no 
action" option that relies upon natural recovery alone.  3 3  Damages 
also include the diminution in use value suffered before the resource 
is restored or replaced, and these social costs are included in the 
determination of the most cost-effective route to restoration . 34 
(b) Use Value .  - Measurement of lost use value depends on 
whether the resource is traded in a market. 35  If a resource is traded 
in a reasonably competitive market ,  the diminution in the market 
price of the resource shall be the measure of lost value .  36  This market 
value rule envisions a resource with primarily commercial uses , such 
as marketable uncut timber, so that use value may be represented by 
the price that private parties will pay for it ,  and the loss to the public 
by the revenue foregone.  3 7 
Courts should take care to distinguish between the market value 
of resources in the wild and the market value of the "harvested" good. 
The latter price includes the value added by the process of harvest. 
l\!Iany resources are sold in their "harvested" state but have no  com­
mercial value in the wild at all . Because a market for the "unhar­
vested" good does not exist, courts may be tempted to use the price 
33 See id. at 5 2 , 1 69 ,  5 2 , ! f0 (to be codified at 43 C . F. R. §§ 1 I 8 1 (d ) ( z ) ,  . 8 1 (0( 1 ) ,  . 8 z (d ) ( z ) ( i ) ) .  
34  See  id. at 5 2 , 1 69 ,  5 Z , I f0 ,  5 2 , 1 / 2 ( to be codified at 43 C . F. R. §§ 1 ! 8 1 (b) , . 8 z (d) (3 )( i i) (C) ,  
. 84( g) ( 1 ) ) . 
35 See  id .  at 5 2 , 1 70 ( to be codified at 43 C . F . R. 1i 1 1 83(a)( 2 ) ) .  
3 6  See  i d .  at s z , r j r  ( to b e  codified a t  43 C . F. R. § 1 1 . 83 (c )( 1 ) ) .  I f  t h e  market i s  n o t  reasonably 
competitive , but similar resources arc traded in  such a market. an appraisal techn ique is  used. 
See id. at 5 2 , I 7 r  ( to be codified at 43 C . F. R. § 1 1 . 83 (c ) ( z ) ) ,  expla ined in id.  at 5 2 , 1 4 2-43 
( preamble to proposed rules ) .  
3 ;  The DOl explains that although this surrogate measure "wil l  not always coincide with 
. the loss i n  social value , "  it "is widely recognized by courts as the measure of damages when 
a commodity is injure d . "  I d. at 5 2 , 1 4 2  (preamble to proposed rules) . See,  e .g . , C hevron Oil  
Co. \·. S nel lgroH , 2 5 3  .Miss .  3 5 6 ,  364-6 7 , I / 5 So .  z d  4 7 1 ,  4 74-75 ( 1 96 5 )  ( applying this measure 
to timber ) ;  Dep't  of Fisheries v. Gil lette , 2 7  Wash .  App.  S r 5 ,  8 2 2-2 4 ,  6 2 1 P. z d  7 64 , 768-69 
(Ct .  App .  1 980) ( applying this measure to fish in  a hatchery) .  I f  the resource has aesthetic and 
recreational values as well as commercial uses , this measure may undervalue the use \·a lue of 
the damaged resource . See  Note , s 11pm note 5 ,  at 1 1 1 2  & n . 7 2 .  The market price of these 
resources represen ts the opportunity cost of keeping them in the wild. I f  a state seeks to 
maximize :;oc ial welfare and chooses to sell any of the resource , it must perceive the margin al 
social benefit to be equal to the market price .  I n  economic terms, total use value  lost wi l l  
exceed market \·alue bv the "consumer surplus" ( the excess of the consumer's wil l ingn ess to pay 
over the market price ) .  Thus ,  for goods sold by the state ,  market price is a fair surrogate for 
use \·alue only if  this · 'consumer surplus" is smal l ,  as when substitute resources are readily 
a \·ailable .  
When a state chooses not Lo sel l  an\· of the good, i t  is possible that use value may exceed 
market price c\·en at the margin .  A state that chooses not to sell any of the good perceives the 
marginal social bencfi.t o f  the "unharnsted" resource to be greater than the market price it could 
obtain by sel l ing. In these situations. market price will  understate use value not  only by the 
usual amount of "consumer surplus, ., but also by the difference between marginal social ben(Ofl t  
and  market price . 
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of  the "harvested" good . The  use of  this price as  a surrogate for use 
value may lead to unreasonable results . A particularly absurd ex­
ample was the formula used by the district court in Puerto Rico  v .  
SS Zoe C olocotroni . 38 To determine the value of n inety-two million 
small marine invertebrates killed by an oil spil l , the court turned to 
the market prices of "harvested" organisms . B ased on prices found 
in biological supply catalogs , the court awarded damages exceeding 
$5 . 5 million .  The First Circuit vacated this award .  39 The market 
value rule should not include such organisms because they are not 
sold in their "unharvested" state , and thus their market value is largely 
due to the harvesting process . 
The proposed rules go on to provide that if the "marketed resource 
methodologies" are "inappropriate , "  a "non-marketed resource meth­
odology" must be used . 40 This framework is appropriate for measur­
ing the value of resources such as the C olocotroni organisms that are 
not traded in markets . The proposed rules suggest a variety of eco­
nomic techniques for measuring the willingness of individuals to pay 
for the lost service or to accept compensation for that loss . 4 1  
(c) Duplicate Damages .  - The proposed rules also take care to 
avoid the award of duplicate damages .  For example , damages are 
based on the inj ury to the environment remaining after the EPA h as 
taken response action .  42 This provision ensures that a defendant will 
not pay both for response costs and for damage cured by that response . 
The rules also allow recovery of only public use values ,  that i s ,  "value 
to the public of recreational or other public uses of the resource" or 
income lost by a public enterprise . 43 Income lost by private individ­
uals may be recovered in private lawsuits under other law. 44 
C. Use of Dmnages joY R estoration 
The rules as initially proposed also specify that all damages ,  
whether based o n  restoration cost o r  use value , must b e  used for 
restoration , replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent resources ,  
" in keeping with the emphasis in C ERCLA and the CWA [Clean 
Water Act] on restoration . "45 This rule is of questionable legality 
38 4 5 6  F. Supp .  1 3 2 7 ,  1 .344--45 ( D . P. R. 1 9 78 ) ,  a..f 'd in part,  vacated in part ,  6 2 8  F. z d  65 2 
( ! st Cir. 1 980 ) ,  cert .  den ied,  450  U . S .  9 1 2  ( 1 98 1 ) . 
39 6 2 8  F. z d  at 6 7 7 .  
�0 S e e  s o  Fed. Reg. s z , q r  ( 1 98 5 )  ( to  be codiftecl at 4 3  C . F. R .  � I I  83(d ) ( I )) ,  explained in 
id.  at 5 2 , 1 43 ( preamble to proposed rules) .  
� 1 S ee i d .  at ) 2 , 1 / I  ( to be codified at 43 C . F. R. � r r 83 ( cl )( 2 )-( 6 ) l .  
�2  S e e  i d .  a t  5 2 , 1 7 1  I t o  be codified a t  4 3  C . F. R. * 1 1 . S4(c ) ( 2 ) ) .  
� 3  S e c  i d .  at  5 2 , 1 70 ( to be codified at 4 .3  C . F. R. � r 1 . 83 (b) ) .  
� � See  i d .  at 5 2 , 1 43  ( p reamble to proposed rules) ;  see also B reen , supra note 5 ,  at I O , J T O  
n . Ss ( noting that courts may b e  reluctant to recognize a possibly redundant right o f  the govern­
ment to rCCll\·cr for damage to private p roperty) .  
�5  s o  Fed.  Reg. ) 2 , l .) /  ! p reamble to  proposed rules) ( 1 985 )  ( explaining i d .  a t  5 2 , 1 7 3 ( to b e  
codiiled a t  4.) C . F. R. � �  J l . <) 2 ( e ) , · 93 (a) ) ) .  
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because the DOl's statutory mandate , section 3o r (c) ,  does not include 
the authority to restrict the government's use of damages recovered .  
That statute authorizes only "regulations for the assessment of dam­
ages ,  "46 not regulations regarding restoration decisions .  
Furthermore , this rule makes little sense as a policy matter, be­
cause it requires the government to pursue restoration regardless of 
how little use value is gained thereby. When full restoration costs 
exceed use value,  and damages are therefore based on use value , there 
is no guarantee that any degree of restoration will yield benefits ex­
ceeding costs. The government should instead be permitted to use 
such damages in whatever way it believes yields the greatest public 
benefit. 47 The proposed rule will both force the government to waste 
these funds in suboptimal uses and reduce i ts incentive to bring suits . 
The DOl seems influenced by the statutory language suggesting 
that C ERCLA favors restoration cost as the proper measure of dam­
ages .  B ut this reading of CERCLA is no more persuasive in dictating  
the use  of  damages than it is  in dictating  the measure of  damages .  48 
Indeed,  C ERCLA obviously contemplates that some damages may be 
put to other uses . Section r o7 (f ) ,  for example , allows for damages 
exceeding the sum that can be used for restoration or replacement;49 
these excess damages ,  by definition ,  cannot be used for restoration .  
Given that C ERCLA does not specify how governments are to use 
the sums recovered,  the DOl should leave the restoration decision 
solely to the discretion of the government. 
VIII . BANKRUPTCY AND INSURANCE ISSUES 
After the legal system assigns liability for a tort claim or a cleanup 
action to a responsible party, it must determine who - among the 
responsible generators and disposers , their insurers, the government, 
and the victims - will actually bear the cost of that liability. The 
�6 S e e  4 2  U . S . C  § 965 r ( c ) ( r )  ( 1 982 ) .  
4 7  See Note ,  supra note 5 ,  at I I q ( noting that the state "might prefer funds earmarked for 
research aimed at improving scientific capabi l i ty of cleaning up releases of hazardous substances, 
or  other projects on poilution contro l ,  management of natural resources, or other significant 
public interests" ) .  
�s See  supra note  24 .  Section r o ; ( [ ) ,  .p  U . S . C  � 96o ; ( f l  l r 98 2 ) , for example, states that 
damages "shal l  be a\·ailable for use to restore, rehabil itate , or acquire the equivalent" of the 
injured resources ,  but the phrase ·' shal l  be a\·ailable" does not exclude other uses .  Section r 1 1 (c )  
also states that the  "uses" of  the  Fund ''include" the  "costs of Federal or State efforts in the 
restoration , rehabilitation .  or  replacement or acquiring the equivalent" of injured resources. 4 2  
U . S . C  § 96 1 r ( c )( 2 l  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  c i ted in B reen,  supm note 5 ,  a t  1 0 . 307  Again , th is  language need 
not  be read to  exclude a l l  other  uses for  the  sums rccoHrecl. EPA regulations. howe\•er, have 
specified that on ly those costs necessary· for restoration and damage assessment may be reim­
bursed from the F u nd .  See s o  Feel. Reg. 5 1 , 2 1 6  ( 1 98 5 )  ( to be codified at 40 C .F.R. § 306. 2 r (a) ) .  
Even if S r 1 r ( c )  is read as an exhausth·e l ist of uses .  i t  l imits only damages paid out of 
Superfund and need not constrain trustees who recover directly from defendants. 
�9 See � 2  U .S C .  8 g6o; ( f l ( l g8 2 ) . 
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same determination i s  important for firms prospectively estimating 
their liability costs . 
A firm facing the risk of environmental liability - liability for tort 
claims or cleanup costs arising from improper h azardous waste dis­
posal - can purchase insurance against that risk. 1 Alternatively, it 
can fail to insure adequately and assume the risk of insolvency. 2 In 
this sense , bankruptcy and insurance are different aspec ts of the same 
question:  how does a firm finance its liabilities for the infliction · of 
waste-related injuries?  The answer to that question ,  and the attendant 
consequences for society, are shaped by the legal doctrines that define 
bankruptcy and insurance systems. If  either system allows a firm to 
pay less than its full liabilities ,  the firm will finance its l iabilities 
through that system and produce more injury costs than would an 
efficient market . 3 
A .  Insurance 
Those who risk incurring liability for mJuries can purchase , for 
periodic payments , the promise of an insurer to pay the costs of those 
mJuries. To avoid sudden overwhelming liabilities, w aste-handling 
firms often purchase insurance covering potential payments to tort 
victims as well as the costs of waste-site cleanup .  4 This Section 
examines the recent crisis in the market for environmental liability 
insurance ,  the kinds of insurance now being offered for sale , and the 
litigation that has resulted from ambiguities in current insurance pol­
icies . 5  
I .  The lnSU1'ance CYisis 
Environmental liability insurance has recently undergone a shift 
from apparent under-deterrence to apparent over-deterrence of envi-
1 See Sparrow, Hazardous  Waste Insurance Co'i_oerage: Unex.!Jected Past ,  Uncerta in  Fu t u re ,  
6 4  MICH. B.\R ] .  1 69 ( 1 985 ) :  Hilder, Changes in Liability Insurance Spur Confusion ,t mong 
B usiness Clien ts ,  Wall St . ] . ,  Nov. 2 0 ,  1 985 , at 3 3 ,  col. 4 ·  
2 See Drabki n ,  l'vloorman & Kirsch ,  B a nkruptcy and tlze Clean up of Hazardous Waste :  CatJeat 
Creditor, IS ENVTL. L R E P .  r o , r 6S ,  I o . r 69 ( E NVTL. L INST . )  ( r 98 5 ) .  I n  New Jersey in  recen t  
years, r o  major cases per year ha\·e im·oh-ed bankruptcy fi lings b y  firms seeking shelter from 
the enforcement of em·ironmental regulations and related tort rules. See Note , Cleaning Up in 
B ankrup tcy: C u rbing A b use of the  Federal  B an kruptcy Code by Indust rial  Pollu ters , Ss COLUl\l .  
L. RE\'. 870 ,  8 7 1  n .  q ( 1 98 5 ) .  
3 The efficient pre\" Cntion of i nj uries requires not that a l l  injuries be prevented but that the  
sum of accident costs and a\·oiclancc costs be  minimized . See Rosenberg,  The Cuusa l  Connec t ion  
in :Vlass Exposu re Cases: .-! "Public Lm.c"' Vis ion of tlze Tort Syste m . 9 7  H A R V .  L. R E v .  8 4 9 ,  
8 6 r  ( ! 984) .  
� S ee  Meyer, Compensa t ing Ha:ardo us ll"aste Vict ims:  RCR.-1 Insurance Regulat ions and a 
Xot So "Super'' Fund A c t ,  I I E'\VT I . .  L. 6 8 9 ,  705 ( r gS r ) . 
5 This Part does not e:-;aminc alte rn a t i \'\· forms of insurance , such as a victims' compensation 
fund. This form oi insurance  is d iscu ,;scd in dl: la i l  in Part X below. 
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ronmental damages .  In the past, insurance was available at prices 
that did not reflect the full environmental risks of each insured firm. 
Insurers had little incentive to tailor premiums closely to an individual 
firm's risk profile , because such tailoring requires the expense of mon­
itoring each firm6 and because insurers did not expect courts to impose 
significant waste-related liabilities . 7 Instead of forcing the insured to 
internalize its risk costs by tying premium rates to the firm's safety 
record ("experience rating")8 or by threatening to deny coverage , 9 
insurers arranged insureds in broad risk categories at ilxecl p r 2 n1: L� :-·-c:: . 
Without premiums tied closely to risks , the insured had insufficient 
incentives to avoid risky activities . 1 o 
In recent years , however, the sharp increase in environmental 
liability litigation and the courts ' broad construction of insurance 
policies 1 1 have combined to shock the insurance industry. 12 Facing 
massive awards to insureds who had paid low premiums 1 3  and fearing 
further surprises , most insurers have withdrawn from the environ­
mental liability market . 1 4  Forcing insurers to pay for the liability 
from toxic waste operations covered under old insurance policies has 
6 See Sugarman , Do ing A way Wit h  Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L .  REV . 5 5 5 ,  5 75 -7 6 ( r 9S5 J .  
7 Insurers believed both that environmental risks .were small ,  particular]:; before the startling 
news of waste-site leaks, and that liability for those risks was unl ikely. particularly b·:fon: the 
enactment of new environmental laws in the last decade. See Meyer, supra note 4 ,  at 6g"-9.3· 
Insurers also believed that they had excluded environmental pollution from their insurance 
policies. See i nfra pp. 1 5 8 2-83 .  
8 S ee Sugarman, supra note  6 ,  at  5 7 5 ·  
9 S ee id.  at 5 7 9  
1 ° Cost internalization i s  frustrated b\· insurance premiums that are fixed across ca�egcr:es 
or across time . \Vhen a premium is tied to a broad category of insu reds instead c•f to u.n 
individual firm , it is  insensitive to variations in risk generation within the category. and the 
correlation of premiums with risks is  often too weak to be an effective deterrent .  Sec Sugarman.  
supra note 6 ,  at 5 7 5- 7 8 .  When the premium is not adjusted to \'ariations in  the ftrn;'s generation 
of risk over time, the insured has an incenti\·e to take on additional risks not contempl?.ccd in 
the original p remium price but covered by the insurance policy. See Note , Tort C;-edi�or Prio;·i t -'' 
in the S e C llYed Credit System: A sbestos Ti mes ,  the  vVorst of Times ,  36 STAN. L. R:sv. r o.;.s . 
I O / I & n . r r 2  ( r 984) .  These shortcomings were powerful enough to persuade the state of l\i;; ·,,· 
York ,  for a time, to prohibit pol lution  liability insurance in an effort to make po!lutero in:en:aiize 
all costs . See Fields,  S upe1jund: Th e C o u rt S e a rch fo v I n s u ra n c e  :Honey. B RIEF,  Fall 1 984,  at 
7 ,  9 
1 1  S e e  infra pp .  1 5 78-79 .  
1 2  See Sparrow. supva note 1 ,  at 1 6[) .  
1 3  In  the  last scHral years, intense compe tition pushed insurers t o  c u t  premiums <end rei:: 
more heavily on investment income. The recent decline in interest rates has forced inourcrs to 
raise premiums sharply. See Madden .  Liability /ns ;mwc e  Cost Is Soaving fo;- Locdit i.e s .  �; Y. 
Times,  Sept .  30 ,  1 985 . at B 1 ,  col .  s 
1 � Sec B us inesses S t ruggling to A dap t as ! n s u m w e  C visis  SfJveods . \Nail S t .  J . ,  1 1 .  
1 986 , at 3 1 ,  co l .  r ;  Angelo & Bergeson, The E.rfJanding S cope of Liability for En:•i;·o;• ;; !cn!a! 
D a m age a nd I ts I mpact o n B usiness Tmnsa c t ions ,  S CORP. L. REv. r o r , r r 6- 1 7  ( 1 9S5 ) ( not ing  
that  on ly nine firms offer such insurance now and that the  number  ' 'wil l  u:Jcioubtedly cc:Jti n u e  
to  decrease'') . 
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required much litigation . 1 5  New liability insurance policies are  rarely 
available and often prohibitively costly. 1 6 Until environmental risks 
and the courts' construction of insurance policies covering those risks 
become more predictable , insurers are l ikely to litigate many e nviron­
mental liability claims and to demand extremely high premiums for 
very l imited coverage . 1 7 
The high cost of purchasing environmental insurance ,  coupled with 
waste handlers' large liability exposure , is driving some firms to in­
solvency. 1 8 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
requires such firms to establish that they are at least p artly insured 
against the risks involved in waste handling; 1 9 the high cost of even 
that limited responsibil ity has forced some waste handlers to cease 
operations.  2 0  
2 .  Types of Insurance Available 
The changing problems of the market for environmental liability 
insurance have encouraged insurers to devise new policy forms. The 
oldest form is the comprehensive general liability (CGL) form,  which 
provides coverage for all "occurrences" causing damage or injury. 2 1 
Most CGL forms contain a "pollution exclusion" clause exempting the 
insurer from coverage for gradual polluting leaks; these exclusion 
1 5  See  Rodburg & C hesler, Beyond the Pollu t ion Exclusion: E merging Parameters of Insur­
ance Coverage for S upeJfund  Liabili ty ,  in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE , HAZARDOUS WASTE 
LITIGATION 34 7 ,  34 7-48 & n .  I ( I  985 ) (c it ing cases) .  One insurance company now writes  
insurance for the costs of l itigating against one's own insurance company. See  Smith ,  E nv iron­
mental Damage Liability Insu rance � A Primer, 39  Bus . LAW. 3 3 3 ,  334 n . 4  ( 1 98 3 ) .  
1 6 See B acas, Liab ility: Trying Times , NATION's B us . , Feb. I 9 8 6 ,  at cover ( "The l iability 
insurance crisis is the most serious threat to business today. " ) ;  Sparrow, supra note r ,  at l / l­
I /4 ;  Sorry, A merica, You r  Insurance Has B een  Canceled, TIME , lVIar. 2 4 ,  I 98 6 ,  at cover;  
B usinesses S tmggling to A dapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads , Wall St .  J . ,  Jan .  2 I ,  I 98 6 ,  at 3 I ,  
col . I ( "The soarin g  cost and worsening shortage of l iability insurance are taking their toll on  
businesses, professionals and  local governme nts across the  country. " ) .  
1 ; See  Sparrow, supra note  I ,  at r ;  I -7 4 ( suggesting that  as  insurers regain confidence in  
the ir  ability to predict l iabil ities ,  they wil l  resume sell ing environmen tal l iabi l i ty insurance ) .  
1 5 See Note, supra note 2 ,  at 8 7 1 ;  Wall .  St .  J . .  Jan .  2 I ,  I 98 6 ,  at  3 I ,  co l .  I .  More  comple te 
insurance coverage could help responsible parties and tortfeasors avoid insolve ncy. S e e  Drabki n ,  
Moorman & Kirsch , supra note 2 ,  a t  1 0 , 1 74 ·  
1 9 See Meyer, supra note 4 ,  a t  6 8 9 .  RCR.A's specific financial responsibil ity requirements 
are codified at 40 C . F . R. � �  2 64 . 1 40-. 1 5 I ,  2 65 . 1 40-. I S O  ( I 984) .  
20 See  Shabecoff. :Host Toxic Waste  Dumps Violate Deadline, N . \' Times,  Dec .  7 ,  1 985 , at 
I ,  col .  I .  Forty-fl\'e waste disposal faci l ities were forced to close because , ai th ough they wne 
e\·idently operating properly, they could not obtain the required insurance .  See id. a t  g, col . 
2 .  
2 1 See  )iote , The Applir: ab ility of Geneva !  Liab ility Insurance to Hazardous fVaste 
5 7  S .  CAL. L .  REv. 7 .\S · 749 ( I 98 4 ) .  An "occurrence" may be defined as '"an accident,  including 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,  which results in bodily inj ury or pwpert\· damage 
neither expec ted nor intended from the standpoint of the insured . "' !d. at 7 "t9 (quoting 3 R. 
LONG , THE L-\\V O F  LIABI LITY INSURANCE at app. 6o ( l g8J ) ) .  
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clauses ,  however, also contain an exception providing that "sudden or 
accidental" events remain covered by the C GL. 2 2  
To cover the gradual events apparently excluded by the  standard 
CGL,  the environmental impairment  liability (EIL) policy was in­
vented in the late r 970s . 23  While explicitly expanding coverage to 
include all events , sudden or gradual , 24  the EIL restricts coverage to 
a narrow slice of potential claimants : the EIL policy covers all c laims 
made during the period of the policy, rather than covering all occur­
rences during that period. 2 5  The EIL form thus provides the insurer 
repose when the policy period expires . The EIL generally also has a 
"retroactive date" - usually the starting date of the first EIL policy 
written by the insurer for a particular insured.  The insurer will not 
cover claims based on events that occurred before the retroactive 
date . 2 6 Although this provision protects the insurer from paying for 
injuries resulting from long past events , it does create a gap in cov­
erage when the insured changes insurers: the new insurer will pay for 
all claims made during the new policy's duration , if the claims are 
based on events occurring since the new policy was purchased,  but 
will not pay for claims arising out of occurrences during the old 
insurer's policy. And the old EIL insurer will not pay for claims made 
after the old policy has ended. Thus , events in the past producing 
latent inj uries that appear only after the insured has switched insurers 
are not likely to be covered by any EIL policy. 2 7  
The EIL form i s  an effort to limit the duration o f  the insurance 
policy and to tie premiums more tightly to risks , in response to the 
sharp increase in environmental liability claims over the last decade . 
The EIL does not guarantee long-term coverage , because insurers , 
wary of even short-term increases in l iabilities ,  usually write the EIL 
in one-year policies only. 2 8 The one-year duration forces the EIL 
premium to be revised and tailored to risks much more closely than 
would a long-term policy. 2 9 As a result of this annual monitoring, 
and because the EIL covers claims from gradual impairments, 30 it is 
often quite expensive . 3 1 
2 2  S e e  Sparrow, s up ra  note I , at I 70 .  
"' See Angelo & Bergeso n ,  s u p m  note q ,  at  I I ) .  
2 4  See Smith , supra note I ) ,  at 349 · 
z s  See S parrow, supra note I ,  at I 69�I 70 .  
26 S ee H ilder, supra note I .  It may be possible for firms to purchase "tail" insurance covering 
events before the retroactive elate , but " tail" policies arc often twice as expensive as i nitial EIL 
insurance.  S e e  id.  
2 7 S e e  A ngelo & B ergeso n ,  supra note q, at I ! 5 � 1 6 .  
2 s  S e e  Smith , supra note I 5 ,  a t  34 1 .  
29  The EIL also requires the insured to inform the insurer q uickly of any material change 
in  the insured's risk profile , so that the insurer can monitor risks and manage the insurance 
accordingly. See id .  at 35 2 .  
30 S e e  id .  at 343-46,  349 
.\ 1 S e e  Angelo & B ergeso n ,  supra note  q ,  at I I / ;  Sparrow� supra note 1 ,  at I / 3 · 
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A third kind of policy is that prepared by the Insurance Services 
Office (ISO),  the insurance industry rating  organization . The ISO 
form covers all claims made during a defined period , like the ElL,  
and covers both sudden and gradual events . 3 2  But  unlike the EIL, 33  
the ISO also explicitly covers cleanup costs recovered by the govern­
ment. 34 Coverage for cleanup costs is  often extremely expensive . 35 
3 .  Litigation Concerning the Farms 
To this point, little or no  litigation concerning the terms of an EIL 
or ISO form has been concluded . 36  Litigation regarding the CGL 
form , however, has been extensive . Because the ElL and ISO forms 
are recent developments and have been used infrequently, most of the 
litigation in the near future is also l ikely to involve the CG L form.  3 7 
Thus,  this Section focuses on  recent decisions involving the CGL,  and 
suggests that litigation involving the ElL and ISO forms will exhibit 
similar patterns .  
The recent insurance cases show a clear trend  toward maximizing 
the coverage provided by insurance policies .  The driving force behind 
this trend has been the presumption that any ambiguity in the terms 
of an insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured .  38 
One rationale for this result is contractarian : because the insured has 
little power to bargain over the standard forms and must accept 
whatever ambiguities they contain , the insured should receive the 
benefit of the ambiguities . 39 A second rationale is b ased on efficiency: 
compelling insurance companies to pay will eventually force them to 
impose the full cost on the insured ,  by means of carefully calculated 
and frequently revised premiums,  which will in turn encourage the 
insured to operate at an efficient level of accident  prevention .  40 Al-
3 2  See Angelo & Bergeson ,  s upra note q, at I 1 5 ;  Smith, supra note 1 5 ,  at 349 ·  
33 EIL policies generally do not  cover  c leanup costs except to the extent  that the c leanup 
removes waste that  h as migrated to  improper areas. S ee Sparrow. s upra note 1 ,  at 1 70. 
34 B ut the ISO l imits this co,·erage to costs resulting from "direct" releases of vvaste .  See 
Smith , s upra note 1 5 ,  at 34 7-49 . The import of  this language i s  not  yet apparent.  
35 See Lockett,  E n·i) i ro n m e n tal Liability E !(/"0 1u111 e n t  and tlze B ankruptcy Act of I 9 7S: ..l 
S t udy of H . R .  2767,  the "S uperlien " Provis ion , 1 9  REAL PROP. PROB.  & TRUST J .  85 9 , S6o 
( I C)84) . 
.36 A complete search of the Al lfeds and :\llstates databases of WESTLAW on i.Vlarch 2 2 ,  
1 986 ,  using for search terms the abbre,·iations EIL and ISO and their ful l  spel l ings,  found n o  
cases referr ing to either pol icy form in any l itigation re]e,·ant to toxic waste issues .  
3;  Cj. Sparrow, supra note I .  at r ; o ,  1 7  2 - 7 -' .  
38 S e e  Liverpool & London & Globe I n s .  C o .  , .. h.carney, 1 80 U . S .  1 3 2 , 1 3 5-36  ( i go r ) : 
Ostrager & Ichel , R ules of Conslmction .-!ffccting the B usiness fnstn·altcc Policy , in l>:SL' RA."-:0:,  
EXCESS AND REI:-.!SURA:-<CE COVERAGE DISPUTES I 984 ,  at  1 .)-1 5 ( B .  Ostrage r  & T Ne,,·man 
eels. r g84 ) .  
3 9 S e e  Note , supra note  2 ! .  at 7 5 6  
40 I n  the effort to impose o n  waste-handling t'irms the full costs o f  the risks they gencnt� . a 
regime of ful l  i nsurance with premiums tailored tightly to risks is p re fc rabie to a regime of no 
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though this rule does motivate efficient decisions in the future , in  
transition cases the new rule works only to compensate the victims of 
the inj urious occurrence .  The outcry from insurers against many 
recent decisions4 1 can be seen as a transitional response that will 
subside when the law is again predictable .  
(a) Occunence:  B odily Injury . - Fixing the date of an injurious 
occurrence is crucial to determining which of the several insurers in 
a company's h istory must bear the liability for an environmental 
mcwer:.t. Inj uries from toxic wastes usually evolve slowly, and thus 
it is  difficult to define the date on which an occurrence triggers l iability 
for insurance purposes . Many years may pass from the time a toxin 
enters the body until the time the toxin's presence manifests itself in 
the form of a disease . The word "occurrence" itself is  ambiguous 
because the inj ury process is not a definite , discrete event. Courts42 
have set the time of occurrence in three ways : at the date of exposure , 
at the date of manifestation ,  and over the continuous period from 
exposure to manifestation (the "continuous trigger" rule) . 43 
insurance with firms d i rectly bearing all l iabilities. The insurance industry i s  expert i n  collecting 
and evaluating risk data, identi fying methods of risk reduct ion ,  and charging premiums that 
reflect broad r isk experience. S e e  Sparrow, s upm note I ,  at 17 3 · Individual fi rms lack such 
expertise , and society would pay large transaction costs if  each firm had to determine the proper 
price of e\·erv r isk i t  i ncurred. In addition ,  l arge insurance pools p rovide for the compensation 
of tort \· ictims and the funding of cleanup agencies,  whereas individual firms are often over­
whelmed by their \\·aste-reiated l iabil it ies, see supra note 2 .  
For arguments challenging the notion that insurance premiums can force firms t o  i n ternalize 
costs, sec Kunzman .  Tlz e Insurer as S u rrogate  R egulator of the Hazardous Waste Industry: 
So!utio; z  ov Pen,evsio n ? ,  20 FORliM 469 . 4S I -88 ( I 98s l .  
4 1  See Sparrmv, s upra note I ,  at  I i0-7  1 ( reporting that insurers bel ieve the  coverage decisions 
are moth·ated by · ·s imple political assumptions as to the proper role of insurance" entit l ing the 
insured to ''every imaginable benefit within the contractual framework" and "ignor[ing] accepted 
rules of  contract interpretation in  fa\·or of the socially desirable goal of finding coverage"). 
42  The leading cases on occurrence theory are federal court of appeals cases i nterpreting 
applicable state insurance law. The District of  Columbia Circuit made clear the importance of 
state Ia\\' \\·hen.  u ncertain of Indiana's \· iew on the occurrence theory, i t  certified that question 
to the Indiana Supreme Court. S ee Eli Lilly & Co. \· . Home Ins .  Co. , 7 64 F.  2d 8 76 ,  884-85 
(D. C .  Cir .  I 985 l .  In most cases, courts of appeals han inferred what state law is, even when 
no c lear ruling by the state's highest court was aYailable .  See Hancock Laboratories \· . A.dmiral 
Ins .  Co. , 7 7 7  F. 2 d  s w . 5 2 3 n n . 6  & 8 ,  5 2 5  n .  r o  l gth Cir. r 98 5 l .  
4·' T h e  Second Circuit  has ruled that a n  insurance policy setting the occurrence at t h e  date 
oi inj ury is unambiguous and triggers co\·crage at the elate of the " injury in fact . " S e e  American 
Home Prods.  Corp. \ · .  Liberty lVlut .  Ins .  Co . .  748 F. 2 cl 760, 764 ( 2 d  Cir. 1 984) .  The injury in 
iact is  e\·identiy the point between exposure and manifestation when the exposure actually 
results in disease. See id. at 764-66 .  The court did not explain how that date could be 
ascertained.  except to say that ·'it ma�· be possible after diagnosis to infer that the harm must 
han begu n some time prior to diagnosibil ity. ·· id. at 7 6 5 ,  and that " 'a  real but  undiscovered 
i nj u r\·. p ron:d in  retrospect to ha\·e existed at the rclc\·ant time, would establish coverage , "' id. 
at 766 !quoting A.merican Home Prod;; . Corp , . . Libe rty i\Jut .  Ins. Co. , 565 F. Supp .  1 485 , 
1 4 9 7  l S . D . ?\ . Y. r 98.3 l .  aff'd as 111 0d({zo! . 7 .1 c: :· . 2 d  760 ( 2 d  Cir .  1 984) ) .  Given the current 
inaccuracy of medical " in ferences" of clise:i:ie c u .' .: ,: . .  � and tim i ng , see infra p .  I 6 r 8 ,  the Second 
Ci rcuit 's standard is of l imited usefulness .  
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The exposure theory holds that the date of occurrence i s  the date 
on which the injury-producing agent first contacts the body. The 
leading case espousing this view is the Sixth C ircuit's decision in 
Insurance C o .  of North America v .  Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc . 44 
The court in Forty-E ight found that the occurrence was the immediate 
contact of an asbestos fibre with the lungs, even though the disease 
took some time to develop . 45 The court's central purpose was to 
maximize coverage : it chose the exposure theory because the plaintiff 
was effectively uninsured after 1 9 7 6 ,  and any other theory would have 
put the date of occurrence after 1 9 7 6 . 46 In most toxic waste cases , 
however, when exposure is not discoverable until many years after 
the fact ,  the exposure rule will not provide a feasible method for 
insurers to monitor risks and charge appropriate premiums . 47 
Courts have similarly adopted the manifestation  theory for its 
expedience in maximizing coverage . In E agle-Picher Industries v .  
Liberty Mutual Insurance C o . , 4 8 the First Circuit argued that the 
injury resulting from inhalation of asbestos fibres did not "occur" until 
the disease manifested itself. The court took note of the Forty-Eight 
opinion but distinguished it on the ground that, given the particular 
facts before the court, the manifestation  rule would maximize cover­
age . 49 In  most cases , however, a manifestation rule would reduce 
coverage :  insurers would refuse to write new insurance for the insured 
when it became apparent that the period of manifestations ,  and hence 
a flood of claims, was approaching.  The insured would be left without 
coverage for victims whose diseases were not yet manifested .  s o 
44 633 F . 2 d  1 2 1 2  ( 6th Cir .  I 98o ) ,  clm·ified in part , 6 5 7  F. 2 d  8 q  (6th C i r. 1 98 r ) , cert . denied,  
455 U . S .  1 009 I I 98 2 ) .  
The Ninth C i rcuit has recently followed the Sixth Circuit i n  adopting the exposure theory. 
See Hancock Labomtories,  7 7 7  F . 2 d at 5 24-25 ;  see also Galante , "T1·igger of Coverage" S tarts 
With Exposure ,  NAT'L L .J . , Dec .  30-]an . 6 ,  1 985 , at 3, col. r (statin g  that the Hancock 
Lab01·atories decisior. "could be p ivotal" in resolving coverage issues in  pending asbestos and 
similar cases ) .  The F ifth Circuit  has also supported the exposure theory. See Porter v. American 
Optical Corp . ,  64 1 F. 2 d  1 1 2 8 .  I I 45  ( 5 th Cir. ) ,  ceYt. denied, 454 U . S .  1 1 09 ( r 98 r ) .  
45 See Forty-Eight ,  633 F .  2 d  a t  I 2 I 8-20 .  The court noted that the typ ical  asbestosis victim 
has been exposed to asbestos for 20 or  more years . See id. at 1 2 I 5 .  
46 See id.  at 1 2 1 5 n . 6 .  The court i n  Hancock Laboratories also chose a n  exposure theory 
because i t  "provides coverage �mel enables the insurance companies to determine  their l iab ilities . '' 
Hancock Laboratories , 7 7 7  F. z d  at 5 2 4 .  
4 ; I n  addition .  using the exposure theory to  shield an uninsured firm from l iabi lity wil l  
frustrate deterrence .  See infra p .  1 584 .  
48 682  F . z d 1 2  ( r st C i r .  1 9 8 2 ) ,  cert . denied,  460  U . S .  r o 2 8  ( 1 983 ) .  
49 See id.  at  2 3 .  
5 0 This argument prompted the Ninth Circuit to reject the man ifestation rule .  See Hancock 
Laboratories \ ' .  Admiral Ins .  Co . , 7 7 7 F. 2 d  5 20 ,  5 2 4-25  (9th Cir. 1 98 5 ) ;  see also N otc , supra 
note 2 1 ,  at 7 53 (concluding that the manifestation rule would probably result in "virtually no 
coverage at all" ior the entire group of industries l ikely to incur "immense l iabi l ity" by producing 
hazardous substances ) .  
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The continuous trigger theory has also been j ustified by its ability 
to maximize coverage in particular cases .  In Keene Corp . v. Insurance 
C o .  of North A merica , 5 1 the District of Columbia C ircuit held that 
because asbestos-related disease develops slowly, the date of the oc­
currence should be the continuous period from exposure to manifes­
tation . It held all the insurers over that period l iable for the contin­
uous development of the disease . Again ,  the court relied on the 
presumption of maximizing coverage . 5 2  Because i t  avoids the dangers 
of the manifestation rule , and because it encourages all insurers to 
monitor risks and charge appropriate premiums,  the continuous trigger 
rule appears to be the most efficient doctrine for toxic waste cases .  
That these incongruent results all emerged from the same rule of 
construction - requiring that ambiguity be construed to maximize 
coverage - suggests that, when courts interpret insurance policies ,  
the rule of  construction is more important than the scientific descrip­
tion of the disease process. If so, future litigation on this point will 
not be determined by new understanding of the disease process so 
much as by an effort to allocate as much of the liability costs to 
insurance companies as possible .  53 And when the ElL and ISO forms 
are litigated, any ambiguities in their terms will likely be interpreted 
in the same way. 
(b) Occurrence :  Property Damage . - Similarly, courts have gen­
erally imposed property damage costs on insurers whenever ambiguity 
exists in the policy's occurrence clause.  The standard rule for property 
damage caused by hazardous waste has been that the occurrence is 
continuous , extending from disposal to manifestation of the damage . 54 
As in the context of bodily inj uries, the continuous trigger rule pro­
motes efficient risk reduction by encouraging insurers to monitor in­
sureds' risks and to charge appropriate premiums. 
In a recent cleanup case , a court adopted a new rule,  holding that 
property damage is not found to occur until the time that the govern­
ment incurs response costs . 55 At the least , this holding ought to be 
5 1  6 6 7  F. 2 d  1 03 4  ( D . C .  Cir. r g8 r ) , c eYt. de nied ,  455 U . S .  1 007  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
5! S e e  i d .  a t  1 04 r .  The C ourt in  Hancock Laboratories would evidently support the contin­
uous trigger theory when the date of exposure cannot be determined. See  Hancock LabomtoYies ,  
7 7 7  F. z d  at 5 2 4 . I n  the context of hazardous wastes ,  most  inj u ries are l ike ly to result from 
exposures that took place at uncertain and continuous times. See inji·a p. 1 6 1 8 .  
5 3  S e e  American Home Prods. Corp.  v .  Liberty Mut .  Ins .  C o  . . 5 6 5  F .  Supp.  1 485 , 1 ..19 1-92 
( S . D . N .  \.'. 1 98 3 )  (observing that the presumption of  maximum coverage "appears to be the single 
factor that u nifies the discordant opinions applying the C G L  and its dcrivati\·es to insidious 
diseases") ,  qff'd as m odified, 748 F . z d  i6o (2d Cir. 1 98-!l .  
·' ·1 S ce ,  e . g . ,  Groul Constr. Co .  \ · .  Insurance Co .  of N.  Am . ,  r r \Vas h . . -\ p p .  63 2 ,  633-36,  
5 24 P. 2 d  42 7 , 42 9-30 ( 1 9 7 4 )  ( involving rot damage to a building). 
5 ;  S e c  Continental Ins. Cos. \'. Northeastern Pharm & C hern .  Co , No. 84-5034-CV-S-4 
( W  D :.Vlo .  June 2 5 ,  1 98 5 )  ( available Feb. 1 2 ,  1 986 on LEXIS,  Genfed l ibrary, Dist file) If 
such a holding depends on the gonrnmcnt taking c leanup action ,  its effects would be pen·erse . 
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read broadly to  mean that insurable property damage "occurs" at  the 
time cleanup costs are incurred by any party, not just the government.  
Then insureds would be encouraged to clean up as soon as they 
discover leaking wastes ,  before their insurers have a chance to cancel 
the policy and depart. Insurers of waste disposers would try to esti­
mate the risk of future cleanup costs and would have incentives to 
tailor premiums to those estimates . But even this broad reading of 
the rule has serious problems: insurers would have incentives to desert 
the insured when large liabilities appear imminent ,  and insurance 
recovery would be predicated on a race to clean up , which might 
encourage hasty and imprudent cleanup methods . In  light of these 
drawbacks , the standard continuous trigger rule is preferable . 
(c) O ccurrences: S ingle or Multiple . - Because most insurance 
forms limit the total amount that may be paid per c lai m ,  and many 
include deductible amounts , the number of occurrences i s  an impor­
tant determinant of the total award paid to the insured. Courts 
construing a policy to maximize coverage can make use of the dis­
tinction between single and multiple occurrences:  if  the insurance 
policy has a relatively low limit on the amount paid per occurrence , 
a court can find that multiple occurrences took place ;  if the insurance 
policy has a relatively high limit per occurrence but a large deductible ,  
the same court could find that one  occurrence took place .  5 6  This 
flexibility encourages insurers to tie premiums very closely to likely 
liability, no matter what the other features of coverage . Although 
only a few cases have addressed the number of occurrences in the 
hazardous waste context, at least one recent case has held that re­
peated daily acts of improper disposal over a six-year period constitute 
multiple independent occurrences . s 7 
(d) The Pollution Exclusion.  - The pollution e:�clusion is an 
attempt to remove gradual pollution from the coverage of th'2 com­
prehensive general liability policy. :Most pollution exclusion clauses , 
however, contain an exception for sudden and accide!}tal releases of 
waste . 5 8  The great maj ority of courts have interpreted the "sudden 
and accidental" provision quite broadly, to include the kinds of re-
Such a ru le  would discourage the f i rm from cleaning i ts own 11·astes, because >·.:lf-cleani:!:z: ;;•ot!ld 
el iminate any insurance reco\·ery: once the insured cleaned up, the government -,,·auld never 
clean up ,  and co\·eragc would never be triggered . 
The EIL does not generally pro\·icle any co\·cragc at all for cleanup costs, ·.\·hether incurred 
at the order of the go1·ernment or  \·oluntari ly. See Sparrow. s upra note 1 ,  at 1 ;o. Only �he 
ISO is c lear in its application to c leanup costs. See Smith , supra note I S ,  at _:;..;S--t9 · 
56 See  Roclburg & Chesler.  s upra note r s ,  at 3 7 8 .  
; ;  S e e  Townsh ip o f  Jackson v.  American Home,  N o .  L- 2 9 2 ,36-8 ( N . J .  Super. C t .  L:l\\" Di\· . , 
:\ug.  3 1 ,  r gS ..; l ,  cited in Rod burg & Chesle r, s upra note 1 3 ,  at :l l r . 
50 See  Note , s upra note 2 r ,  at 763  (quoting 3 R. LOc<G ,  supra note 2 I .  at app.  6S J .  Co\·eragc 
for sudden and accidental e1·ents is thus retained under the exception to the pol lution e:·:clusio n .  
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leases that insurers meant the pollution exclusion clause to exclude 
from coverage . 5 9 
This judicial strategy has gutted the pollution exclusion clause . 
Focusing on the term "accidental , "  the courts have examined whether 
the release was intentional or not,  with the view that an unintentional 
release must be accidental and hence covered by the insurer. 60 The 
standard for showing intent has in turn become quite high . The 
insurer must show that the insured intended to dispose of the waste 
and to have the disposal result in an improper release . 6 1 The rule 
now appears to be that coverage will be denied only if the damage 
resulting from the particular course of action of the insured could have 
been foreseen with a high degree of certainty. 62 In sum , the pollution 
exclusion clause has been circumvented except in cases involving es­
pecially compelling factual situations.  63 
One possible consequence of the weakening of the pollution exclu­
sion clause is that the CGL will begin to contain a complete pollution 
exclusion ,  without an exception for accidents . 64 Because the liabilities 
in the toxic waste field are mostly latent, new policies of this kind 
would not have an effect  for several years . A CGL of this kind would 
presumably be worth less to insureds, but the insurance industry might 
be willing to bear the losses in premiums because of its fears of being 
overwhelmed by pollution liability claims. 65 
(e) Appoytionment of Damages .  - When more than one insurer is 
liable for an event or a series of events , damage payments must be 
apportioned among them . Two features of an insurance policy influ­
e n c e  the apportionment: the duration of the policy and the policy's 
liability limits (such as deductibles and ceilings) . Dividing liability 
into equal shares would be unfair to insurers who contracted for lower 
liability e:xposure or shorter periods of coverage than did the other 
insurers . A fair .:: 1d eff1cient method of apportioning damages would 
allocate contributions among the liable insurers in proportion to their 
5 "  See Sparrow, s upra note r ,  at 17 r ;  Note , supra note 2 1 ,  at 7 63-64 
w See .  e . g  . . . -\l lstatc Ins .  Co . \·. Klock Oil Co . , 7 3  .-\ . D . 2 d  486 ,  488-89 ,  4 2 6  N . Y. S . z d  603 , 
6o4-05 ( I  gSo i ;  Note , s upra note 2 r ,  at 7 64-65 ( c iting cases). 
il l See  Jackson Township Mun .  Uti! . Auth .  \ ' .  Hartford Accident & Indem.  Co . , r 86 N . j .  
Super.  r s 6 .  r 64 .  45 1 A . z d  990, 994 ( r 98 2 J ; s e e  also .-\sh land O i l  v .  Mil ler O i l  Purchasing Co. , 
6 78  F 2 d  1 2 9 .3 , 1 3 r 7 - r S  ( :; th C ir. r g8 2 ) ( finding that a naturally foreseeable contami n ation was 
inccntional and therefore not covered) .  
c 7  Sef  Rynearson . Exclusion of Expected 01· In t ended Personal Injury or  Property Damage 
Cndcr !lif Occ / lrre nce  Definit ion of the Standard Comprehensive General Liability Policy. r g  
FoR:;:�; s r .) ,  5 30-3 1 ( 1 984 1 . 
' ' ' 5 <'�' F ie lds . supra note r o ,  at 9 ·  
fJ-1 S' ee i d .  a t  1 0 .  
''·' See  i d .  .-\!though a complete pol lu tion exclusion would force waste handlers themselve s  
t o  hear fu ! l  i iabi l i t ies for their polluting acti\·i ties, a system o f  insurance i s  preferable to such 
a'1 e :·;c !usion in se,:eral ways . See supra note 40 .  
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policy l imits and the time periods their policies covered .  6 6  Some courts 
have adopted this approach .  6 7 
An additional problem is raised when the insured was uninsured 
or self-insured for a time :  how can the court determine the "policy 
liability l imits" - such as deductibles and ceilings - of an u ninsured 
actor? Uncertainty about the liability limits of a self-insured actor 
could be resolved by inferring that no liability l imits exist and by 
assigning the actor r oo% of the liability for that time . One court,  
however, has held that where there was no self-insurance policy form 
to examine to determine the contours of the insured's self-insured 
liability, there should be no l iability burden on the insured. 68 Given 
the goal of deterring improper disposal , the court's decision seems 
clearly wrong .  The court should have held that self-insurance  is not 
l imited and should have imposed total l iability on the firm during its 
period of self-insurance ;69 otherwise , the insured escapes all liability 
by failing to carry insurance - the opposite of a rational deterrence 
scheme . 
4 .  Future Developments 
The burgeoning l iabilities for toxic waste disposal accidents and 
the courts' insistence on broad insurance coverage are l ikely to con­
tinue in the foreseeable future , regardless of what type of insurance 
policy is sold to waste handlers . This trend is forcing insurers to raise 
rates drastically and to restrict the terms and duration of coverage .  
Insurers are developing new policy forms , such as the EIL and I S O ,  
to implement those changes . I f  efficient and stable legal rules are 
widely adopted by the courts in the near future , insurers will sell 
environmental liability insurance at rates that accurately reflect risk 
costs . In the meantime,  insureds are beginning to turn to self-insur-
66 S e e  �ate , supra note 2 r ,  at 760-63 .  Spec ifically, each insurer, constrained by the terms 
of its policy, would be liable for its share of the total time during which occurrences took p lac e .  
For example ,  i f  Firm A exposed victims in  1 960 and those \·ictims manifested disease i n  1 980,  
and Insurer X had insured Firm .-! from 1 97 0  to 1 97 4 .  then under a continuous trigger theory 
Insurer X would be responsible for four-twentieths of the damages .  Assume the total damages  
-.;·ere S1o mil l ion, so that  Insurer  X owes S2 mi l l ion .  Then,  if A 's pol icy with X had n o  
maximum l imit but contained a S r oo , ooo deductible , X would pay S r . g  mil l ion .  Insurer Y, 
who cover·cd A from 1 960 to 1 964 with no deductible but a S r  mil l ion l imit ,  would pay :il r  
million . The same analysis would be repeated for each insurer. 
6; See Keene Corp. v. I nsurance Co. of X A m . , 6 6 7  F. 2 cl 1 034 ,  1 0 4 7-50 ( D . C .  Cir. 1 9 8 r ) ,  
ccrt .  denied,  4 5 5  U . S .  1007 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
llo S e e  id .  a t  1 048-49 ·  
6 9  The same apportionment theory should appl)· to  legal defense costs .  See Insurance Co .  
o f  :-.J. Am. \·. Forty-E ight I nsulations . Inc . .  633  F. 2 cl 1 2 1 2 ,  1 2 2 5  ( 6 th  C i r .  r g8o).  clarified i n  
,burt .  65 7 F. 2 cl 8 1 4  ( 6 t h  C ir. r g8 r ) ,  cert . denied,  4 5 5  C . S .  1 009 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
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ance through mutual pools. 70 These pools will provide yet another 
battlefront for toxic waste insurance litigation : parties will disagree 
over which events in the past are covered by the pool, how to treat 
firms who enter or  leave the pool , and how to resolve similar ambi­
guities in the pool agreement. 
B .  B ankruptcy 
The ultimate in self-insurance - simply "going bare" and risking 
bankruptcy - is increasingly the route chosen by firms facing large 
hazardous waste liabilities . This Section analyzes the reasons for that 
choice and its implications for society, and proposes alterations in 
bankruptcy law that will bring private choices better in l ine with 
social needs.  
Businesses  e nter bankruptcy when the present value of their lia­
bilities exceeds the present value of their assets and they do not expect 
routine future operations to improve that situation . 7 1 B ankruptcy is 
a system for sharing a firm's assets among the owners of the firm's 
liabilities , either by liquidating the firm or by reorganizing it .  7 2  A 
bankruptcy proceeding stalls the enforcement of most claims against 
the debtor firm, and institutes a collective process73 to identify who 
has claims of what type against the firm and to distribute the firm's 
assets or equity to the creditors according to a defined priority sys­
tem .  74 Bankruptcy thus attempts the orderly and equitable distribu-
;o M utual self-insurance pools are being formed by local municipalities. see Madden,  supra 
note 1 3 ,  at B I ,  col .  5 ,  and by industry groups,  see Businesses Struggling to A dept as Insurance 
C risis Spnads , Wall St . ] . ,  Jan.  2 1 ,  r g86 , at 3 1 ,  col .  1 .  
7 1 The new B ankruptcy Code , enacted as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1 978 , Pub.  L .  No. 9 5 - 5 9 8 ,  g::  Stat .  2 5 49  ( codified at 1 1  U . S . C .  § §  I O I- I ) I , J 2 6  and scattered sections of  28 U . S . C .  
( 1 98 2 ) ) ,  has omitted any strict requirement that a firm be insolvent  i n  order t o  reorganize .  See 
Hoffman,  Environmental Protection and B ankruptcy R ehabilitation: Toward a Be tter  Compro­
mise ,  I I  ECOLOGY L . Q .  67 1 ,  6 7 1  n . 8 , 676-7 7 ( 1 984 ) .  Nevertheless, a firm has little incentive 
�" enter bankruptcy u nless it is  insolvent. As long as the creditors can be paid in fu l l  out of 
the firm's assets, bankruptcy is not helpful to the firm, because bankruptcy is essentially a 
method for sharing inadequate assets. Faithful directors of a solvent firm would not enter 
bankruptcy, because the shareholders are ranked last in the priority of distributions.  See 
Kenn�dy, Creath•e B ankruptcy? Use and A buse  of the Bankruptcy Law - Reflection on  Some 
Recent  Cases ,  71 IowA L. REv. 1 99, 202 ( 1 985 ) .  
72  In a l iquidation , under chapter  7 of  the  Code, I r U . S . C .  § §  70 1 -766  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  the  assets of 
the firm ar e sold,  and the revenues are distributed to the claimants. In  a reorganizatio n .  under 
chapt•cr I I  of the Code, 1 1  U . S . C .  § §  I I O I - I l 74 ( 1 982 ) ,  the firm generally reassigns its equity 
(n\' ntr::::h ip to c laimants. 
7·' Sec .Tackso n ,  .·11:oiding Pmvers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. i 2 S ,  7 2 7-2 8 ( 1 984) .  The 
::o i lcct i\·t: p rocess has t\\·o main elements: an orderly distribution, so that no cred i tor  is  left out 
be cause other creditors arrived first ;  and an equitable distribution , so that creditors arc paid 
acccrdir•g to their priority status. See Kennedy, s upra note 7 r .  at 2 0 1 . 
74 The bankruptcy distribution should approximate the agreement the creditors would have 
made had they bargained among themselves before the debtor approached insolvency. See  
J;::.c !'.s�:·;L Bunkruf'•tcy, .\'on-Bankmptcy E n titlements ,  and the Creditors'  Barga in ,  g r  YALE l" . J .  
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tion of  the firm's value . By authorizing partial payment and settling 
the claims permanently, bankruptcy also enables debtors to rehabili­
tate themselves financially and resume productive activities .  75 
In the field of hazardous waste litigation , two major  areas of 
bankruptcy policy have been challenged by environmental claimants : 7 6  
the current rules for including all claimants and the  current rules for 
prioritizing the claims.  This Section considers these two areas and 
concludes that, although bankruptcy law may be made consistent with 
the goals of environmental policy, current rules often frustrate those 
goals .  Present bankruptcy law fails to include every claimant:  it often 
ignores as yet unidentified victims of toxins already released into the 
environment, and it may permit the bankrupt firm to abandon waste 
sites without including the cleanup costs owed the government in the 
bankruptcy distribution .  Moreover, even when all claimants are in­
cluded in the bankruptcy distribution , present law ranks environmen­
tal l iabilities near the bottom of the priority list, further insulating 
bankrupt firms from the costs of their activities . 
r .  Including A ll Claimants 
Inj uries caused by firms generating or disposing of toxic substances 
may not manifest themselves until several years after the contaminat­
ing incident. If a firm becomes insolvent before the victim sues ,  then 
85 7 ,  85 9-60 i r 98 2 ) ;  Note ,  Good Faith Inquiries Under the Bank-ruptcy Code:  Treating the 
S vmptom. , ,\'ot  tlze Cause,  52  U. CHI .  L.  REv.  7 9 5 ,  7 98-802 ( 1 98 5 ) .  C reditors would presumably 
contract for a collective proceeding rather than risk being beaten to the courthouse by another  
c redicor 1;•ho fo re:-aw the debtor's weakness sooner. Creditors would rather share  the assets 
tha'1 tla\·e to incur the large costs of constantly monitoring and pursuing every cl ient in  order 
to be the Erst to know of and act on the client 's imminent insolvency. See D. BAIRD & T. 
].o.c-:so�,  CASES, PROBLEi\l S ,  A)ID MATERIALS 0"' BANKRUPTCY 3 1 -35 ( 1 98 5 ) .  
; s  Sec  Roe, B.:mkruptcy a n d  Mass Tort , 8 4  Coun1. L .  REv. 846 , 8 5 5 -6 2  ( 1 984) (observing 
c�.,u cid:;ccr  rehabil itation presen·cs the worth of the firm as a going concern) .  B u t  cf J ackso n ,  
Th e F;-csli -S tart Policy in B ankruptcy Lmv , 98 H..>.RV. L REv. 1 3 93 , qo4- 1 4 ,  q r 6- 1 8  ( 1 985)  
l<.l.rg;.;ing ti-,c.t the pr inciple  of debtor rehabil itation appl ies  wel l  to individuals , because they often 
mzi:·�e imp;1bin� decisions based o n  their systematic underestimation of risks, but  applies poorly 
to business tirms , because the market approves of weeding out firms that make bad decisions 
and nf reallocating resources to firms that calcu late risks and benefits better) .  
; ' .  I n  crder for a party to share at all in the bankruptcy distribution ,  the party must have a 
"claim·· a:�ainst the estate. Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that governments bringing 
\·a.lid c l e a n :1 p  cost rcconry actions do have ' 'claims'' within the meaning of the B an kruptcy 
Cock. Se� Ohio \· . Km·acs. 1 05 S. Ct. 705 ( r c;S s l  ( Ko\·acs I l ) .  Strangely, after the trustee had 
atte;r1plecl Lo discharge the S tate of  Ohio's claim, the state argued that it did not h aH a c laim 
:.\ncie c- 1 1  L: . S . C .  � I O T ( .f )  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .  Ohio e\·idcntly reasoned that if its action were not a clai m ,  
the �ictiUl: cuuld n e t  b e  resoh·ed b y  t h e  bankruptcy proceeding and would therefore be free o f  
t h e  tn;stce's a\·oiding po11·ers. T h e  Court .  sa\· ing Ohio from itself, insisted that Ohio's action 
v;as 2 c la im:  Xo;:acs im·olHd an individual in l iquidation ,  and absen t  a c lai m ,  the state would 
rec.;i·:e n u th i n � .  See 1 05 S. Ct. at 7 1 2  ( O 'Connor .  J . , concurring) .  Ohio's argument was a 
" tninciicssi' lite ral " interpretation of the Code . See B ai rd & Jackson . Kovacs and Toxic Wastes 
in B a ;:kmpi c \' .  3 6  ST,\�.  L .  REV. 1 1 99 .  1 2 04 ( r 984l .  
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the victim may be left uncompensated.  Similarly, the doctrine of 
abandonment, if construed to permit a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid 
bearing cleanup costs by discarding waste disposal sites , would pre­
vent recovery by those who eventually clean up those sites .  A firm 
calculating its operating costs will discount the costs of injuries by the 
likelihood that i t  will avoid those costs through bankruptcy, and the 
systematic underinclusion of relevant costs is l ikely to lead to industry­
wide underdeterrence . 7 7  To prevent such an outcome , a firm must 
bear the cost of all injuries i t  causes at or  before the time it ceases 
operations. 
(a) R epresenting Future Claimants . - In bankruptcy, an auto­
matic stay forces early claimants to wait for later claimants . 7 8 The 
stay prevents the prosecution or enforcement of most actions against 
the debtor until the bankruptcy proceeding has equitably resolved all 
demands on the estate . 7 9 The stay thus protects the claims of future 
tort victims against depletion of the estate by early victims . 80  But 
the stay does not adequately protect as yet unidentified future victims , 
because if the legal system does not arrange representation for them 
in the distribution of assets , they receive nothing from the bankruptcy 
proceeding.  It  is crucial to a fair system of bankruptcy that future 
claimants not be divested of their rights to compensation merely be-
; ;  By inte rnalizing the full present and future costs of their activities, firms wi l l  produce the 
optimal amount of each p roduct at the optimal level of safety. See Rosenberg, supra note 3 ,  at 
9 1 9-20;  supra pp .  !..! 7 7-78 .  
;� See I r U.S .  C .  § 362  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
;9 S e e  Hoffman , supra note / I .  at 6 7 4  & n . z s .  Hoffman argues that the stay inju res c leanup  
agencies and  tort victims by  delaying their su i ts for compensation .  The  main e ffec t  of a stay, 
howe\'Cr .  is to put all c reditors on equal footing .  It is true that some early suits are delayed ,  
and these suits might ha\'C been  brought by environmental authorities or by tort \· ictims; but  
these early suits might just  as  easily have been  brought by  trade creditors. In  the latter case, 
the stay would benefit environmental victims who had not yet brought claims. See Kennedy, 
supra note 7 I .  at 2 04-05 . Stays can also aid debtors by preventing them from being forced 
into dissolution or l iquidation . This ad\·antagc to the debtor can also help environmental victims: 
if  the firm is worth more to c reditors as a going concern . all claimants may receive larger 
d istributions. 
£,·en if em·ironmental  \·i c tims are more harmed than helped by the stay, howe\·er. there are 
a\·en ues for mitigating that harm. In the most serious cases, c laimants may get relief from the 
stay for cause under I I C S . C .  � 3 6 2 ( d )  (! 982 ) . See Kelley & Kastanakis .  JV/zat  t o  D o  Wh e n  
tlzc Deep Pockfl G oes Under .  69 A . B . A .  ] .  740 ,  743  ( 1 983 1 .  But  e\'Cn without such relief, 
courts can permit prosecution of cases to judgment ,  while refusing to allow enforcement of those 
j udgments.  See Hennigan . :l cconull o dating Regulatory E nfo rce m e n t  and B a n kruptcy Protecti o n ,  
5 9  :\ �1 . BA:--<KR. L.] .  I ,  3 5 -.) 7 I I 9S s ) ;  Hoffman.  s upYa note 7 1 ,  a t  68S .  
so Exact!,· this purpose 1\'as in\·oked by a bankruptcy court  in  one of the Manvi l le  asbestos 
cases : the court upheld a stay because a suit th reatened to divert substantial portions of 
i.\Jan,·i l le 's assets from the claims of potential tort ,·ictims. See U nited States \·. Johns-Mam·i l le  
Sales Corp . rS Ec-:\·'T REP. ( B N .-\) 1 1 7 7 .  I 1 8 1  ( D . N . H .  I 9S 2 ) ,  appeal dismissed ,be r  s t ip u la t i o n ,  
No. 83- I  1 5 2  I I st Cir. I\lar. 2 9 .  1 983 ) ;  Henniga n ,  supm note 79 ·  at  2 7-28 .  But because the suit 
stayed was a cieanup order. the court's decision may ha\'C undermined efficient inj ury prc,·en­
tion . S t'C i nji·a note q6.  
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cause those claimants are not yet individually identified .  Moreover, 
failing to consider the full present value of all liabilities will underdeter 
the behavior that causes inj uries .  8 1  
To account for future liabilities from prebankruptcy acts82 in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, 83 bankruptcy courts should establish funds for 
the compensation of future plaintiffs . 84 A trustee would oversee such 
a fund in the bankruptcy proceeding and thereafter. The amount of 
the fund would be the discounted present value of the estimate of 
future claims,  85 adjusted by the priority of these claims relative to the 
claims of other creditors. The fund would then distribute money to 
plaintiffs as they arrived to pursue their claims , reserving money for 
remaining potential plaintiffs . 8 6  
8 1  S e e  Note , s upra note ro ,  a t  1 06 7  n . 9 7 .  
82 Prebankruptcy acts (acts done before the petition i s  filed) should be  compensated o u t  o f  
the bankruptcy distribution , regardless o f  when the injury caused b y  the act i s  manifested .  I f  
claims based o n  postbankruptcy injuries caused b y  p rebankruptcy acts were treated a s  post­
bankruptcy claims,  the claimants of such injuries would receive noth ing ,  no matter what their 
legal pr iority, i f  the firm ceased to exist after bankruptcy. This result would encourage firms 
to liquidate when they faced large impending l iabil it ies ,  effectively evading the costs of their 
accidents. S e e  Hennigan , supra note 7 9 ,  at 2 9-30. 
Acts done by a firm while i n  bankruptcy (that i s ,  after fil ing of  the bankruptcy petition but  
before final l iquidation or  emergence from reorganization) are paid as  administrative expenses , 
ahead of all other unsecured c reditors. S ee r I U . S . C. § 507 ( 2  )( I ) .  B ecause latent harms may 
not be discovered until long after the bankruptcy proceeding is c losed ,  a future c laimants' fund 
ought to inc lude an estimate of  the l iabilities result ing from the ongoing acts of the firm in 
bankruptcy. 
The difficulty with this analysis is in  determining the discrete date of  the act that produces 
liability. For  a discussion of the problems of continuous events, see note 1 43 below. 
83 Because many businesses fail  without going through bankruptcy p roceedings,  optimally 
all dissolutions should require some representation of  future claimants . State law should compel 
all dissolving corporations to set up funds similar to those described here .  
8 4  See ,  e . g . , Note , A llocat ing the Costs of Hazardous  Waste  D isposal,  94 HARV. L .  REV. 
584 ,  5 9 7-6oi ( r 98 r l  (advocating funds for compensation of  future plaintiffs against bankrupt 
firms) ;  Note , Toxic Torts and Chapter I I Reorganization:  The Prob le m  of Fu ture C laims , 38 
VAND . L .  REv. I 3 6 9 ,  r 3 88-93 ( I 98 5 )  (same) ;  Note , supra note 7 4 ,  at S I S  (same) ;  see  also 
Rosenberg,  supra note 3, at 9 1 9-24 (advocating insurance fund judgments in  actions by victims 
of latent  diseases ) .  In addition to satisfying the c laims of tort plaintiffs , such funds might be 
established to pay for the government's future cleanup costs resulting from p rebankruptcy waste 
disposal . 
It is clear that funds should be created for future plaintiffs whose injur ies  are statistically 
predictable ,  based on past exposures to known toxins ,  but who are as yet i ndividually uniden­
tiflcd. A more difficult  p roblem is presented by future plaintiffs whose inj uries are now unfo­
reseeable because they h ave been exposed to a substance not yet known to be toxic. Such 
plaintiffs may never  be compensated b\· a firm that  goes bankrupt before the i r  injuries are 
unclerswod.  
s_; See  Roc , s upra note 7 5 ,  at  866 .  Bankruptcy Code section 5 0 2 ( c ) ,  I I  U . S . C .  � 50 2 ( c )  
1 ! 98 ::! ) .  appears to  require the  estimation of the \·alue o f  large future c laims .  A bankruptcy 
court should expedite estimations of  these claims when their large n u mber or great complexity 
render ful l  adjudications imprac tical . See Nocc , Pmcedures for Est imat ing Contingent oY Un­
liquida ted Claims in B ankruptcy, 35 STA:--.1 . L .  RE\'.  I S J ,  I 5 8-73 ( I g8 2 ) .  
5 6  Problems of estimating the proper fund  size can b e  addressed b y  using complex payment  
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These funds , in addition to benefiting the group of future claimants 
that would otherwise be omitted,  would ration that group's share of 
the firm's assets among the members of the group.  8 7 In this way, the 
funds resemble limited fund class actions ,  which join claimants when 
it is likely that early individual claims would impair the ability of 
later claimants to secure their interests . 88 The fund device institutes 
a collective proceeding to avoid the possibility that individual suits 
will threaten other claims merely by coming first, 89 and it thus sup­
ports central policies of the bankruptcy system. 90 
The courts have approved of such funds in the asbestos cases . At 
the urging of the bankruptcy court, one debtor, Manville Corporation , 
has established a fund to pay the present and future claims of asbestos 
plaintiffs . 9 1 In two other asbestos cases, involving UNR Industries 
and Amatex Corporation , the bankruptcy courts originally refused to 
appoint representatives for future plaintiffs92 but later were ordered 
to appoint representatives93 after the Seventh Circuit criticized the 
lower court's opinion in the UNR case .  94 
Although these cases illustrate the power of the bankruptcy courts 
to fashion appropriate remedies for prospective environmental liabil-
methods. See  Roe , supm note 7 5 ,  at 864-7 9 .  A simple pension fund,  having a fixed aggregate 
size and making lump-sum pay·ments to claimants, could over- or under-compensate the claim­
ants if the i nitial aggregate size does not match the eventual total of claims. See  id .  at 865 & 
n . 5 6 ,  8 70 .  The risk of this error can be reduced by offering a stream of payments and 
periodically revising them through a variable annuity fund .  The fund  would be similar to an 
investment portfol io ;  claimants would hold shares in the fund and receive annual payments 
instead of lump-sum judgments. The payment each year would be based on a payout ratio of 
the fund value divided by the estimate of  claims ,  and this ratio would be revised periodically 
( pe rhaps daily, monthly, or annually) as new information was acquired about the fund's expected 
value and the expected value of future c laims. The eventual payment stream would thus afford 
each annuity recipient a pro rata share of her damages and would minimize the risk of 
inequitable compensation .  See  id .  at 8 70 - 7 9 ·  
87 See Roe ,  supra note 7 5 ,  at  8 7 0-74 .  Such  rationing cou ld  also be accomplished by court­
ordered damage scheduling.  See Rosenberg, supra note 3 ,  at 9 1 7- 1 9 .  
8 8  See  FED.  R CIV .  P. 2 3 ( b)( r )( B ) .  
89 S e e  Transgrud ,  Joinder A ltematic'es i n  Mass Tort Li t igat ion ,  70 CORNELL L. REV. 7 7 9 ,  
7 94-8o r ,  8 r s - r 6  ( 1 98 5 )  ( arguing that certification of a l imited fund  class action i s  always 
appropriate when failure to do so would lead to a "race to the courthouse" impinging on later 
plaintiffs' c laims ) .  
00 Recognizing the usefulness of  the  class action dn·ice , the  Bankruptcy Rules explicitly 
authorize the use of c lass actions for handling claimants. See I r U . S . C. app. rule 7 0 2  3 ( r 984 ) .  
9 t See Joseph .  Judge Urges Afanvi lle Have 20- Year Fund for Payment of Fut u re Asbestos 
Claims , Wall St . ] . , Oct .  2 6 ,  1 98 3 ,  at r 6 .  col . r .  
9 2 See  I n  Ye UNR Indus . . 2 9  B ankr .  7 4 1 ,  7 4 4  ( B an kr. N . D .  Il l . 1 98 3 l ;  I n  re Amatex Corp . ,  
30 Bankr. 3 0 9 ,  .) I I  ( Bankr.  E . D .  Pa. ) ,  ajf'd, 3 7  Bankr. 6 1 ,3 .  6 q  ( B ankr. E . D .  P a .  r g8 3 l .  The 
bankruptcy courts initially feared that the fund would not provide its unidentified claimants 
with constitutionally required notice and due process. See UNR . 29 B ankr. at 744 -
9·' See  I n  re Amatex Corp . ,  755 F. 2 d  1 03 4 ,  1 043-44 l y l  Cir. 1 98 5 ) ;  In  re UNR Indus . , 46 
Bankr.  6 7 1 ,  675 ( B an kr .'-J . D .  I ll  r gSs l .  
9" S e e  In  re U N R  Indus . , 7 2 5  F . 2 cl r r r r ,  r r 1 6-n ! 7 th C ir. r g84 ) .  
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ities ,  it 1s not  yet clear that bankruptcy courts are obligated to  take 
such action .  Arguments may be made under two sections of the 
Bankruptcy Code that representation for future claimants is manda­
tory. 95 First, future claimants may be creditors under section 1 0 1 (9) 
of the B ankruptcy Code and ,  as suc h ,  not excludable from the b ank­
ruptcy proceeding.  96 A "creditor" is an "entity that h as a claim against 
the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief 
concerning the debtor. "9 7 Although the claims of future plaintiffs are 
contingent on future manifestation of injury, such contingent claims 
would still be claims under the Code . 98 The court would then be 
required to ensure that the future claimants are represented in the 
bankruptcy proceeding.  
The second argument for mandatory inclusion of future claimants 
stems from the requirement that any plan of reorganization be "fea­
sible .  "9 9  The plan must resolve all claims against the debtor firm and 
not leave it vulnerable to future liability problems . 100 A plan that 
95 See Note, The lvlanville B ankruptcy: Treating i'vlass Tort Claims in ChapteY I I  Pmceedings , 
96 HARV. L .  REv.  1 1 2 1 ,  I I 3 r  n . 5 2  ( I 983 l .  
96 S e e  r r U . S . C .  � I q r ( a ) ( I 98 2 ) .  
g ;  I I C' . S . C . � 1 0 1 ( 9 )  ( I 98 2 ) .  
9 �  S e e  I I  U . S . C .  § r o i ( 4 )  ( I 98 2 )  (defining a "claim" as, inter al ia ,  a " right t o  payment ,  
whether o r  not such right is  reduced to j udgment, l iquidated, unl iquidated , fixed , contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed , legal, equitable, secured , o r  unsecured") . The 
legislative history of the definit ion of "c laim"  indicates that the "broadest possible" reading was 
intended, to include "all legal obl igations of the debtor, no matte r how remote or contingent . "  
S .  REP. N o .  989,  95th Cong. , 2 d  Sess. 2 2 ,  reprinted i n  1 9 7 8  U . S .  CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
5 78 7 ,  s 8o8 ;  H . R. REP.  No. 5 95 ·  95 th Cong . .  r st Sess. 309 ( I 9 7 / ) , repYin ted in  1 9 7 8  U . S .  CODE 
CO:-iG . & .\D .  NEWS 5 96 3 ,  6 2 6 6 .  Indeed ,  the Code requires contingent claims to be estimated 
so that the bankruptcy proceeding can include those claims without delay. See r I U . S . C  � 
)02 (c )( I )  ( I 98 2 ) ;  Roc , supra note 7 5 ,  at 893�96 .  
Arguments for  excluding future claimants because the i r  claims have not yet  "arisen"  u nder 
state law are u n persuasiH . Because the act producing the eventual claim for damages h as 
already occurred, the aggregate amount of future claims should be included as a set of c laims 
that ha\·c arisen ,  i n  o rder to make the debtor internalize the costs of  its p rebankruptcy acts.  
See  supra note 8 2 .  :\nd because the fund is inherently a prospcc ti\·e remedy, i t  does not require 
that the claims be vested at the time of bankruptc�·. In order to collect from the fun d ,  individuals  
wil l  still haH to demonstrate \·alid state-law claims in the  futu re. One of  the c rucial parameters 
of the estimate of the size of the fund II'Ould be the l ikelihood that these future state-law c laims 
wi l l  be successful i n  courl .  S e e  Roe, mpra note 7 5 ,  at 896�g8 .  
99 The Code requires that · ' [c]onfirmation of the plan is not l ike ly to be fol lowed by the 
l iquidation . or the need for further financial reorganization . of the debtor  o r  any successor to 
the debtor under the p lan ,  unless such l iquidation or reorganization is p roposed in the plan . "  
1 r C S . C  * I 1 2 9(a)( r r )  ( 1 98 2 ) .  The feasibi l i ty theory i s  the main ground o n  which the Se,·enth 
C i rcuit  c riticized the original USR decision .  ! 11 re UNR Indus . .  7 2 5  F . 2 d  I I I I ,  r r r g�2o ( 7 th 
C ir. 1 9S4 l .  
1 1 10 S ee In r e  Pizza of  Hawai i ,  40  B an kr. 10q ( D .  Hawa i i r gS c� l .  :\'ott that the feasibi l i ty 
theory applies only to reorganizations and not to l iqu idations,  because a l iquidating f1rm need 
not fear for its fu ture cash 110\\·. In  addit ion .  th.: feasibil ity theory does not necessarily requ ire 
inclusion of  cm·i ronmental l iabi l i t ies that are small relati\·c to the fi rm's net value .  
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failed to deal with future claimants would expose the rehabilitated 
firm to another liability crisis . It would be perverse to admit the firm 
to bankruptcy proceedings partly because of its large future liability, 
but to exclude that liability from the proceedings' settlement of the 
estate . 
Even if bankruptcy courts must establish funds for future claim­
ants , a currently solvent firm might not be driven to enter bankruptcy 
on behalf of the future ,  unknown plaintiffs . B ankruptcy is normally 
initiated by the debtor firm or by its creditors . But no existing creditor 
has an interest in forcing the debtor to enter bankruptcy to satisfy 
future claimants , because the existing creditor would then have to 
share the bankrupt firm's assets with those future claimants . 1 0 1 Thus ,  
firms whose assets are sufficient to pay present claimants , but who 
are so financially vveak that they cannot pay future claimants , may 
not enter bankruptcy. 102 If the firm avoids bankruptcy, it may quietly 
dissolve or be depleted before the as yet unidentified victims assert 
their claims .  One proposed remedy is to amend or interpret the 
Bankruptcy Code so that public agencies and representatives of as yet 
unidentified tort claimants can trigger reorganization , provided that 
they make a preliminary showing that the contingent claims represent 
a large fraction of the firm's net value . 1 03 Although this remedy is 
imperfect because it ignores contingent claims that are small relative 
to the firm's net value , it is at least a useful starting point for effective 
representation of future victims .  
The alternatives to bankruptcy are clearly deleterious to the  inter­
ests of future claimants . Depletion of the firm's assets by current 
creditors will exclude future claimants . And nonbankruptcy dissolu­
tion under state law does not provide the collective safeguards of the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 1 04 Dissolution allows an "escape" from envi­
ronmental liability with no protection for future claimants .  
1 0 1  See Roe. supra note 7 5 .  at 905 � 1 7 .  
102 B an kruptcy fil ings by c urren tly solvent firms. howc\'er, may become more common . Th;o 
Mam·il le case is an example of a currently solvent firm which entered bankru ptcy because 
accounting rules required it to list its future l i abilities on its financial statements and to set up 
a resen·e to paY them.  See I\..enncd\·, supra note 7 1 .  at 2 03 .  Like :.Vlanvi l le .  firms with iong:­
range interests \\' i l l  want to satisfy future c laimants now in order to prc\·ent the f:r::; from being 
incapacitated by the threat of future l iabilities: firms carrying large future liabilities will shrink 
and col lapse as they are u nable to find new creditors or customers. and a s  the:: di\'(::·t r:>:<Jurces 
to managing the liability instead of  to conducting the f� rm's normal operatil)ns Sec Ro� .  supra 
note i S · at Ss s .  86 2 .  In these cases . early bankruptcy is bene!-icial to future da.imants. who 
share in the firm's worth before it shrinks .  Employees and shareholders of the flrm ;;.ls0 bc,nefll 
because the fi rm's ability to continue operating is presc rYccl .  
1 0.i S e e  Roc ,  supra note 7 5 .  a t  9 q� c o .  
1 0" S ee Baird & Jackson .  supra note 76 .  at  1 2 02 . r 2 oS ; supm note 7 3 .  Cf course .  a disc;ol\·in:;: 
corporation is regulated by state corporate law: it could not.  for example.  \·io!at: fraudulent 
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A system designed to  include all claimants would serve the fun­
damental purposes of b ankruptcy law. The establishment of  funds 
for future claimants and early resort to bankruptcy will p rotect as yet 
unidentified claimants from being deprived of their claims against the 
debtor firm . In turn , the firm will internalize the future costs of its 
operations and will thus be encouraged to minimize accident and 
avoidance costs. 
(b) A bandonment.  - The inclusion of all claims also requires that 
a trustee in bankruptcy finance the cleanup of the debtor firm's waste 
site . Avoiding cleanup p ayments would effectively disenfranchise one 
claimant on the estate , the cleanup agency. Under section 5 5 4 of the 
Code , the trustee of the bankrupt debtor's estate may abandon a 
property if the property is  "burdensome to the estate o r  . . .  of incon­
sequential value to the estate . " 1 05 The property then reverts to a 
person with a possessory interest in it ,  1 06 usually the debtor. 1 07 In 
most cases ,  the debtor has few or no assets ,  and the abandonment 
effectively separates the waste site from the finances that could be 
used to clean it up . 1 os If a government agency steps in  to clean up 
the waste site , abandonment excludes i t  from sharing in the ban k­
ruptcy distribution.  The government and the taxpayer are forced to 
bear the costs of cleanup . 109 
In JYJidlantic National B ank v. New JeYSey Department of E nvi­
ronmental Protection,  1 1 0 the Supreme Court held by a 5 -4 vote that 
abandonment is not permitted "in contravention of a state statute or  
regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or  
safety from identified hazards . " 1 1 1  In LHidlantic ,  the trustee of Quanta 
Resources Corporation was faced with a $2 . 5 million bill for cleanup 
costs at a New York site 1 1 2 and an administrative order to clean a 
site in New Jersey. 1 13 The trustee abandoned the sites .  The Supreme 
conveyance doctrines by using dissolution to transfer its assets to p referred creditors for less 
than ful l  consideration .  See B aird & Jackso n ,  s upra note 7 6 ,  at I �02  n . g .  
l OS I I u . S .  C .  § 5 5 4(a)  ( I 98 2 ) . 
106 5 ee Ohio v. Ko\·acs. 105 S .  Ct .  705 , / I I  n . I 2  ( r 9S5 ) .  
1 0 ;  Sec  Drab kin , Moorman & Kirsc h ,  supm note 2 .  a t  I 0 , 1 7 2 .  
10s See id. at r o , 1 7 2 ,  r o , r So .  
10'j The  power to  abandon is important only in l imited circumstances .  I n  suits against  
tortfcasors, waste generators,  or  past  s i te owners ,  where no property can be discarded to alienate 
the l iabi lity, abandonment is useless .  Waste site owners can generally take ad\·antage of aban­
donment only in liquidations , because 2 8  U . S . C .  � 959  c learly prohibits abandonment in a 
reorganization if the abandonment would be an i l legal disposal of wastes .  S e e  :'>lotc ,  s upra note 
2 .  at 88o-8 r & n n . S r-83.  
1 1 0 r o6 S .  Ct .  7 5 5  ( r g86 )  (decided with O'i\'eill <•. City of ,\'nc' York) 
1 1 1 /d.  at ; 6 2 .  
1 1 2 See !11 re Quanta Resources Corp . .  7 .3 9  F. 2d  9 1 2 ,  9 1 4  (3d Cir .  r gS.t l .  aff'd �- u b  n o m .  
Mid!antic Nat'! B ank \'. N e w  Jersey Dep't of Em·tl .  Protection. r o6 S .  Ct .  7 5 5  ( 1 98 6 ) .  
1 1 3 S ee In  re Quanta Resources Corp . , 7 :l 9  F. 2 d  9 n .  9 2 8  ( 3 d  Cir .  I 98 .f ) .  aff'd s u b  l l O IIl . 
Midlantic l\'at'l B an k  v. New Jersey Dcp't  of Envtl .  Protection, 1 06 S .  Ct .  7 5 5  ( r C) 8 6 ) .  
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Court, in  holding the abandonment illegal , ruled that Code section 
5 54 codified "the j udicially developed rule of abandonment" and there­
fore "presumably included the established corollary that a trustee could 
not exercise his abandonment power in violation of certain state and 
federal laws.  " 1 14 The Court emphasized that these "certain" laws are 
only those "calculated to protect the public health or safety from 
imminent and identifiable harm . "1 1 5 The maj ority also drew support 
from 2 8  U . S . C .  § 95 9(b) , which provides that the trustee in bank­
ruptcy must "manage and operate the property in his possession . . .  
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which 
such property is situated. " 1 1 6 
Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist questioned the basis of a 
public health exception to the abandonment provision .  He insisted 
that B ankruptcy Code section 5 5 4  is clear and unequivocal in granting 
a right to abandon without exception, 1 1 7 and that 28 U. S . C .  § 95 9 
applies to the actual operation of the business as a going concern and 
to reorganization proceedings , but not to abandonment in a l iquidation 
proceeding. 1 1 8  
The holding i n  NI idlantic turned i n  large part on the Court's 
interpretation of Congress's intent in codifying abandonment in section 
5 5 4  in 1 9 7 8 .  The majority believed that Congress meant the term 
"abandonment" to include judge-made exceptions; 1 1 9 the dissent dis­
puted the extent of those exceptions 1 20 and believed that Congress's 
simple language meant to give the trustee an unconstrained right to 
abandon burdensome property. 1 2 1 The majority's holding was "a nar­
row one , "  restricting abandonment only when it conflicts with laws 
that protect the public from "imminent and identifiable harm. " 1 2 2 
Because CERCLA is certainly one such law, the Nfidlantic holdin g  
lays the basis for denying abandonment i n  CERCLA cases .  Indeed , 
the majority saw the enactment of RCRA in 1 9 7 6  and CERCLA in 
1 980 as persuasive indicia that Congress could not have meant to 
allow polluters to escape from environmental regulation when it cod­
ified abandonment in 1 9 7 8 . 1 2 3 
1 1 4 !Vlidlant ic ,  r o6 S. Ct .  at 7 5 9 ·  
1 1 5 !d .  a t  7 6 2  n . g .  
1 1 6 2 8  LT . S . C .  � 959 (b )  ( r g8 2 ) .  
1 1 7 See  lvlidlantic ,  r o6 S .  C t .  a t  7 63  ( Rehnquist ,  ] . ,  dissenting)  ( arguing that t h e  majority's 
interpretation of  § 5 5 4  "rests on a misreading of three pre-Code cases, the elevation of that 
misreading in to a ' \\·el l-recognized' exception to the abandonment power, and the unsuppor ted 
assertion that Congress must ha\·e meant to codify the exception") .  
t t s See  id .  at 7 6 6 .  
1 1 9  See  i d .  a t  7 5 9-60 
t 20  See  id .  at 7 6 -t-6 6  ( Rehnquist ,  ] . , dissenting) .  
1 2 1 See  id .  at 7 63 - 64 ( noting that � 5 5 4  is "absolute in  its terms [and]  makes no mention of 
other factors to be balanced or weighed" ) .  
t ! I 1 06 S .  Ct .  at 762  n . g .  
! 23  S e e  id.  a t  7 6 2 . Justice Rehnqu ist's \·icw o f  C E RCL:\ was less c lear .  H e  admitted that 
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A more restrained but equally effective restriction on section 5 5 4 
would be to allow abandonment but to require that the estate be liable 
for cleanup costs attached to a property and for compliance with 
cleanup orders , even after the property is abandoned . 1 24 Under this 
rule ,  the trustee would be empowered to abandon the property but 
would not be rid of the obl igation to pay the cleanup costs .  Aban­
donment could be used to escape other costs of administering the land ,  
but not  costs imposed by  laws calculated to prevent imminent and 
identifiable harm to the public health . 1 2 5 Such a rule would preserve 
the integrity of the bankruptcy process while forcing firms to inter­
nalize the costs of their disposal activities .  
The real issue of debate in the abandonment cases is who will p ay 
for cleanup.  Allowing abandonment forces the government to assume 
the cost of cleanup.  B ut although restricting abandonment is a pre­
requisite to making the polluter pay at all ,  restricting abandonment 
does not resolve the priority status of the duty to pay cleanup costs . 1 2 6 
2 .  The Priority of Claims 
Creditors sharing in the bankruptcy estate do so according to a 
defined priority system . B ecause bankruptcy is mainly a collective 
proceeding to enforce rights that arise outside of bankruptcy, the 
priority system is mainly derived from the state property law that 
defines those rights . 1 2 7 This law generally places secured creditors 
first, followed by unsecured creditors , and then shareholders . The 
claims of tort plaintiffs and, to some extent, government orders to 
clean up waste sites ,  are given low priority in the scheme of bank-
if C E RCLA and RCRA. barred abandonment, ' 'this might be a d ifferent case . "  Id .  at 7 6J. n . 3  
(Rehnquist ,  ] .  , dissenting ) .  B u t  he added that the federal laws ·'do not bar abandonment , "  id  . . 
without explaining his reasoning.  
1 ' 4  Current l aw may already make the trustee l iable for C ERC LA costs , e\·cn after aban­
donment,  as an "owner" of the property. See  . p  l' . S . C .  � g6o1 I 2 o) (A)  ( 1 980)  (defining "owner" 
of a disposal faci l i ty to include any person who O\\·ncd or operated an abandoned facil i ty 
immediately prior to its abandonment ) :  In re T. P. Long Che rn . , 45 B ankr .  2 7 8 .  2 8-t-35 ( :"i D.  
Ohio 1 98 5 ) : D rabki n ,  Moorman & Kirsch .  supm note 2 ,  a t  r o . I S I .  
1 2 ;  This distinction appears to ha\·e been fa\·o red b\· a unanimous Court i n  Ohio , . .  Kovacs ,  
T O) S .  Ct.  705 l r g8 5 ) ,  \\·h ich stated both that ' ' the bankruptcy trustee must comply with 
the environmental laws of the [state ] , " id.  at 7 1  r - u .  and that the trustee could abandon a 
waste site . id .  at 7 I I n . u .  
1 2 6  The  lvfidla ntic  maj ority careful ly  noted that it \\'as not dec id ing the prioritv issue .  See  
Mid/antic .  r o 6  S .  Ct .  at 758  n . 2 .  S e e  a lso D .  B .-'d RD & T. jACKSON .  s ujmr note ;� . at 3 7 9-So 
!distinguishing the power to abandon from the priorit\· accorded c laims attaching to unabandoncd 
property). 
1 2 ;  See B aird & Jackso n ,  supra note 7 6 .  at T 2 0) . u o S - r o .  1 2 1 2 ,  1--:.cnnccl::, s u p ra  note / I .  at 
2 r r .  The priority of  different categories of creditors is p rimarih· dete rmined o\· artic k  nine of 
the Uniform Commercial Code . which establ ishes the rights of secured c red i t  in states where it 
is adopted S e e  Note , supm note r o ,  at r o-t 6 .  r o-t 7--t9 ·  Within t h e  cat egon· of unsecured 
creditors ,  priorities are determined by � 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. r r U S . C . -� 507 ( r g3 2 ) .  
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ruptcy distributions.  Tort plaintiffs recover as  general unsecured cred­
itors,  just before shareholders . 1 2 8 The priority of actions by the gov­
ernment is in dispute : orders to clean up are exempt from the 
automatic stay, 1 2 9 whereas orders to spend money in cleanup activities 
are not, but the distinction between the two is unclear. 1 30  In general, 
tort victims and cleanup agencies usually stand a very small chance 
of collecting any funds from the estate . 1 3 1 
This Section proposes exempting all government regulation of toxic 
wastes from the automatic stay, to promote efficient cleanup activities .  
It then advocates changing state property law to give involuntary 
creditors , such as future tort plaintiffs , top priority in the bankruptcy 
distribution . Finally, the Section examines statutory superliens as 
another mechanism for engineering the high priority of environmental 
claims. 
(a) Exernpting Cleanups from the Automatic S tay . - Under the 
Bankruptcy Code,  all actions against the debtor are automatically 
stayed so that all claimants can equitably share the limited assets of 
the bankrupt firm . 1 3 2  But the stay is not intended to provide an 
escape from the laws and regulations governing businesses outside 
bankruptcy. 1 3 3 Thus , the enforcement of important regulatory goals 
is exempt from the stay: B ankruptcy Code section 3 6 2 (b)(4) provides 
that the stay does not apply to "an action or proceeding by a govern­
mental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory 
power. " 1 3--1 To avoid giving the government effective priority when it 
acts as a creditor recovering on its claims , section 3 6 2 (b) (5)  provides 
that suits by the government for "money judgment[s]" are not exempt 
from the stay. 1 3 5  That is , the government is not stayed in its attempts 
to regulate activity, but it is stayed if that regulation takes the form 
of a demand for a money j udgment.  
There has been much dispute over whether government cleanup 
orders can be stayed. Because orders to firms to clean up their own 
waste sites are efforts to enforce environmental policy, 1 3 6  they seem 
1 2 � See :--.io t c ,  supra note ro,  at 1 046 . 
1 2 9 Fo r  a discussion of the automatic stay under I I U . S . C . � 3 6 2  ( I 98 2 ) ,  see above at p .  
I 5 8 7 .  
1'0 S e e  infra pp .  1 5 95-9 7 .  
1 .\ l  S ce Drabki n .  Moorman & Kirsch , s upra n o te 2 ,  at r o , r ; r -7 2 .  
1 .1 2 Th e  automatic stay is codified at I T  lJ . S . C .  'i 36 2  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 33 S e e  D .  BAIRD & T .  jACKSON.  supra note 7 4 ,  a t  3 7 8 .  
! 3 4  r r C S . C .  � 3 6 2 ( b lL \ l  ( 1 98 2 ) . 
U o Congress meant to i nclude em·ironmcntal policv in the exemption for regulatory acts. 
Sec S. REP i'�o .  989,  9 5 t h  Cong , z cl Scss. s .  reprinted in 1 9 7 8  U . S .  CODE C o N e .  & :\D . .'-i £\VS 
5 7 8 7 . 5 83 8  (s tating t hat · ·en\·ironmcn tal protection . . .  is not stayed under the automatic stay") ;  
H . R. Rr:r .  :--.io .  5 9 5 .  9 5 th C o n g . , zd Sess . s .  reprinted in 1 9 7 8  U . S .  C O D E  CoNe. & :'I.D .  N E WS 
5 063 . 6 2 99 l samel . 
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exempt from the stay; but because the act  of cleaning clearly involves 
the expenditure of money, those orders may not be exempt.  In In re 
Kovacs (Kovacs I),  1 3 7 the Sixth Circuit ruled that an order to clean 
up a waste site was a demand for a money judgment because it 
required the debtor to pay for the cleanup endeavor;  the court there­
fore approved the application of the stay. Shortly thereafter, in Penn 
Terra Ltd.  v .  Department of E nvironmental Resources , 1 3 8  the Third 
Circuit concluded that an order to clean up a waste site was not a 
request for a money j udgment and thus could not be stayed. 
These conflicting rulings may be reconciled in two ways. The 
special facts of Kovacs I suggest one answer: in that case , all of the 
debtor's assets were in the control of a court-appointed receiver. The 
court emphasized that the government could not have asked the debtor 
to clean up property he did not control and could only have asked 
the debtor to pay money to the receiver. 1 39 The legal inability of 
Kovacs to do anything but pay money distinguishes his case from 
Penn Terra . 1 40 There , no such receiver was appointed, and the firm 
could have cleaned up the waste site itself. 
These cases may also be distinguished by the view the courts took 
of the timing of the act for which the government sought a cleanup 
remedy. B ecause the stay does not apply to postbankruptcy acts , 1 4 1 
an order aimed at postbankruptcy events - such as an order to cease 
polluting - is not subj ect to the stay. 1 42 In Kovacs I, the Sixth 
Circuit saw the cleanup order as aimed at the prebankruptcy act of 
dumping the waste and therefore as subject to the stay. In Penn 
TeYra , on similar facts , the Third Circuit saw the order as aimed at 
the prevention of future harm and denied a stay. 143 Several courts 
have followed Penn Terra's reasoning.  144 
1 3 ;  68 1 F. 2 d  454  (6th C ir. 1 982 ) ,  vacated and remanded, 4 5 9  U . S .  I I 6 7  ( ! 983 ) .  The Court 
vacated the case because it bel ie\·ed that the issue of  discharge, decided in  Oh io v. Kovacs, 1 05 
S .  Ct. 705 ( 1 985 ) (Kovacs !I),  might moot the stay issue .  
1 38  733 F. 2 d  : 6 7  (3d Cir .  1 984) .  
1 3�  See Kovacs II,  r os S .  Ct .  at 7 1 0-1 1 & n . 1 1 .  
1 40 See id.  at 7 1  r n .  1 1 ;  Note ,  Clean- Up 0Yden and the Bankruptcy Code: A n  Exception to 
the A u tomatic S tay, 5 9 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 2 9 2 ,  2 95 -96 n . q ( I g8s) .  
1 4 1  See Baird & Jackso n ,  supra note 76 ,  at � 2 09 .  If  the stay appl ied to postbankruptcy acts , 
the newly reorganized firm would effecti\·ely be immune from liability for its inj urious acts. 
1 42 S ee B aird & Jackson ,  supra note 7 6 ,  at 1 209 ;  Note , supra note 1 40 ,  at 3 1 0- r r .  
143 See  Penn Ten-a , 7 3 3  F .  z d  at 2 7 8 .  This argument has been inappropriately c riticized for 
confusing future acts with future hanns. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 74 , at 3 7 9  . 
. -\ continuously leaking waste site is a present act that predictably im·oh-es future acts as well  . 
. -\n order to clean a leaking site , even if the original disposal took p lace long ago , is an order 
to remedy future , postbankruptcy releases for which the debtor is independently liable .  This 
kind of order is more l ike an injunction against fu ture leakage than a punishment for past 
disposal See Cnited States v. Price , 688 F. 2 d  2 04 ,  2 1 2  ( 3d  Cir. 1 982 ) . 
1 44 See In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. , 2 2  Envt.  Rep. Cas.  ( B NA) 1 069 ( Bankr. 
\V. D .  Tex. r gS s J ;  I ll inois \'. Electrical Utilities, 41 Bankr. 874 (N D Ill 1 984) ;  see a lso Ohio 
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The best rule would accord environmental cleanup the equivalent 
of top priority145 in bankruptcy by exempting from the stay all cleanup 
orders and all suits for recovery of cleanup costs . None of those 
actions would be deemed requests for money judgments , and none 
would be stayed .  This result would be ideal because it would effec­
tively place cleanup actions ahead of even secured creditors , 146 and 
the c redit market would respond by charging higher interest rates to 
firms more l ikely to incur cleanup costs . l 4 7  
(b) G iving Tort Victims High Priority . - The Uniform Commer­
cial Code (U. C . C . )  and state property laws should be amended to 
place involuntary plaintiffs at the top of the priority ladder. 1 48 E ach 
state should amend its property law to  rank victims of  toxic waste , 
or perhaps all involuntary tort creditors , first in  line in claiming the 
assets of the responsible party. This change would improve the prior­
ity system's efficiency in  minimizing accident and avoidance costs and 
its fairness in compensating victims . 
The priority system as it now functions - ranking the victims of 
hazardous waste activities below most other creditors -- is ineffi­
cient . 1 49 Placing environmental liability at the bottom of the priority 
scheme allows a firm in bankruptcy to pay no environmental i nj ury 
\·. Kovacs, ros S C t .  705 , 7 1 1  n . r r  ( 1 98 5 )  (dicta approving  of t h e  holding in Pen n  Tena); I n  
re C anarico Quarries, I nc . ,  4 6 6  F. Supp.  1 333 ( D . P. R. 1 979 )  (predating Penn Terra but  applying 
similar reasoning) .  
1 45 The exemption to the automatic stay accords c leanup orders the "equivalent o f  top 
priority'' because it giYes cleanup agencies an opportunity to recover costs ahead of  other 
claimants.  Technical ly, the term "priority" refers to the rank of claims sharing in the bankruptcy 
distribution . not those exempt from the bankruptcy process. 
1 46 Tort claims should be ranked at the top of  the priority l ist ,  see infra pp .  1 5 9 7�99, and 
cleanup orders should be given at least equal rank with tort actions, because both kinds of 
action represent  the claims of involuntary victims of  the waste disposal process. Cleanup orders 
should be ranked even higher than tort \· ictims because the preventive \·alue of cleanup is l ikely 
to exceed the deterrent value of current tort recovery. See Roe. supra note 7 5 .  at 855 (stating 
that there is "expert consensus that a dollar spent on [compensating current victimsj wil l  save 
fewer l i \·es than a dol lar spent on [preventing injuries to future \·ictims ]")  Fu rth e r  study of  the 
particular prevention strategies and deterrence strategies in  the toxic waste field (or individual 
determinations by bankruptcy courts) should further i l luminate the proper choice. 
1 ·1 7 S ee infra p .  r s gS .  
1 4�  See Note . supra note r o , at  1 083�84 . As long as th is  superpriority arrangement applied 
outside bankruptcy as well  as inside bankruptcy, the courts would be l ikely to approve o f  it .  
Priority laws apph·ing: only inside bankruptcy may be held invalid pursuant to I I lJ . S . C .  � 
5 45 i 1 )  ( 1 982 l .  S e e  D .  BAIRD & T. }ACKSON , supra note 74 ,  at 1 99�2oo; In re Telemart 
Enterprises, 5 2 4 F. z d  7 6 1 ,  7 64�65 ( gth  C ir. 1 9 7 5 )  (dicta) .  Moreo\·er, priorities that operate o n!;· 
'.vithin ban kruptc\· should be eschewed because they would provide incenti\·cs for corporations 
to clissol\·e under state law. See Note , supya note 1 0 ,  at 10 76  n . 1 3 6 .  1 084 n .  ; 6 r .  
1 49 This cnalysis applies equally to all torts . Low priority for any tort resuits in that cost 
being discounted b\· the firm and hence in  inefficient accident prn·ention.  By the same rationale.  
government c lean u p  actions should also have top priority. S e e  supra note q6 
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costs i f  its other liabilities exceed its assets . 1 5° Knowing that it  will 
not have to pay waste victims their damages if it  enters bankruptcy, 
the firm will discount those damages by the likelihood that it  will  
enter bankruptcy, and will thus be underdeterred . 1 5 1  Placing hazard­
ous waste victims at the top of the priority list - giving those claim­
ants "superpriority" - would generate an efficient level of accident 
costs . If environmental victims had top priority, then the voluntary 
creditors of a waste-handling firm would monitor the firm and would 
charge a premium for the risk that they would lose to environmental 
claimants in case of insolvency. 1 5 2  This premium would be equal to 
the expected value of the cost to the creditor of the environmental 
claims. 1 S 3 Firms more likely to cause injury would be forced to pay 
more for their credit and would thus internalize the costs of hazardous 
waste disposal . 1 54 Giving environmental claims the highest priority 
ensures that all creditors will charge appropriate risk premiums , thus 
creating the most complete and most efficient cost internalization pos­
sible . 1 5 5  
Low priority for the  victims of hazardous wastes is also unfair. 
Those victims are unlikely to be compensated because the assets of 
the bankrupt firm are unlikely to be sufficient to pay the low ranking 
claimants . And those victims do not have the chance to bargain and 
receive payment in advance for their risk , as voluntary creditors do . 1 5 6  
Giving waste inj ury victims top priority i n  bankruptcy would ensure 
that the victims are paid the present value of the compensation they 
I SO See Note, supm note r o, at r o6g.  
l S I  See Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The L i m its of Tort Lau..• a n d  Go·uemment Regula t ion ,  3 3  
VAND .  L .  REv . r 2 8 r ,  I .3 0 I-02  ( r g 8o) .  
1 5 2  See Roe , supm note 7 5 ,  at 920 n . 2 3 6 ;  Note,  supra note r o . at r o ; 6 .  Creditors w ill also 
be forced to charge risk premiums when they are held directly l iable for the waste-related 
liabilities of their solven t  debtors. Creditors who are significantly invoh·eci in the day-to-day 
management of a debtor's waste disposal faci l i ty have been held l iable for cle;:;.r;up costs as 
"owners" under CERCLA. See u nited States v .  Mirabi le ,  No. t>4-2 2 So ( E .  D. Pa. Sept. 6 ,  r gS s l  
(a\·ailablc Feb .  2 0 ,  r g86 , on LEXIS,  Genfed l ibrary, Dist file ) ;  Legal Timfs .  D e c .  2 3 -30.  r g3s , 
at 1 3 .  col .  1 .  Such lawsuits encourage creditors to mc;nitor firms for li kely cleanup l iabil ities, 
see id .  at r 7, co l .  3,  and thus help impose those costs on hazardous \\·aste handlers .  
1 53 The cost of em·ironmental c laims to the creditor is the cost of  the c laims to the firm, 
weighted b\· the relati\'C priority of the creditor. :\ secured cred itor, second in l ine to em·iron­
mental claims under the proposed ranking system ,  will see each dollar of  em·ironmental l iabil ity 
as a lost dollar of credit repayment .  A trade creditor, farther down the priority i ist .  wil l  see 
en\·ironmcntal claims as lost repayment but will discount that loss by the l i kelihood that the 
secured creditors 11·ould h a\·e exhausted the firm's assets in any case . 
1 5 4  See  Drabkin . Moorman , & Kirsch ,  supra note c ,  at r o . r So .  r o . 1 S4 :  Note, supn1 note c ,  
at SgL )/ote , supra note 1 0 .  at 10 7 7-7 8 .  
1 3 5  Se e  Kennedy. supra note 7 1 ,  a t  e l l : )/ote. supra note 1 0 . at r oS r .  I f  \·o luntary creditors 
arc cxcessi\·el)· risk-aHrse ,  howc\·cr, they rna)· charge risk premiums s o  large that J1 rms arc 
o\·crclcte rred from hazardous waste acti\·itics. 
!5 6 See G. C.-\L\BRESJ , THE CosTs OF :\ccmE:--:Ts go ( 2 d  eel. r g ; o) ;  R.  ?os:o;ER,  Ecoxo �IIC 
Al\.-\LYSIS OF L-\\\' 2 93 ( 2 cl  eel 1 9 7 7 ) : Note , supra note ro .  at r o ; 6 .  
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would receive if they could seek damages in court .  Voluntary creditors 
would not be inj ured by being subordinate to these victims ,  because 
voluntary creditors could charge higher interest rates for credit ex­
tended to risky firms . 1 5 7 
(c) E nacting PrioYity Liens . - As a substitute for the in-bank­
ruptcy priority mechanisms just discussed,  and as an additional 
method for forcing cost internalization outside of bankruptcy, govern­
ments may enact liens on the property of firms responsible for inju­
rious disposal activities .  In bankruptcy, the lien would be a functional 
replacement for changes in the U . C . C .  or exemptions from the auto­
matic stay for government suits , because holders of priority liens 
collect ahead of all other creditors . Outside of bankruptcy, the lien 
would add a new avenue for recovering cleanup costs and tort dam­
ages .  
A lien creates a legal right to collect from a debtor by attaching 
specified assets . To collect its debt, the creditor has a right to take 
possession of and sell the specified property. A lien is in this respect 
much like a secured interest, which also attaches to specific assets . 1 5 8 
Several states have enacted,  1 5 9 and the federal government has con­
sidered, 1 60 a statutory lien that would allow the government to recover 
the costs of waste cleanup ahead of other creditors , including secured 
creditors . 
The power of a lien to enforce environmental law depends on the 
time at which the lien applies and the specific property to which the 
1 ; :  Moreo\·er. \'oluntan· c reditors (or any firms in a market economy) are fairly burdened 
when they make unprofitable business decisions .  See B rief of Respondent :-Jew Jersey Dep't of 
Em·tl.  Protection at -to-.:p , :\licllantic Nat'! B an k  \' .  New Jersey Dep't of Em·tl .  Protection ,  
r o 6  S .  C t .  7 � '  ' r q8 6 i  C�o .  8.-t-i'•O J ) . 
I SS S ee ] .  EDLh ( .. � · .  \\' 1 � :o :·l !P ,  Co�rMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 1 0 2-03 & n . 2  ( r gS s J .  Liens 
may be c reated b\ ·  statute ( such as a tax lic n i ,  at  common law (such as a mechanic 's  l ien on  
repaired property), and by contract ( such  a s  secured c redit) .  See  id .  at  102  n . 2 ,  3 5 3  
In efforts to  e\·ade liabilities and  attachment mechanisms l ike l iens,  some corporations have 
c-eatec! subsidiary corporations  to carry out the parent's waste-related acti\·it ics .  In these cases , 
cou rts shGuld pierce the corporate Hil  to reach the assets of the parent .  See Note, L iability of 
Pare1 1 /  Corpora t io11s for Hazardous Wast e  Clea n up a n d  Da mages,  9 9  H .:..Rv.  L REv. gS6 ( 1 98 6 ) .  
1 5 ' '  S N .  e . g . , :\lASS .  G D ! .  LAWS A :>� N .  ch .  2 r E ,  � 1 3  ! West r q83 l :  N . H .  REv. STAT. :\N N .  
� q ; - B : r o  1 Supp .  r gS j ) ;  :\" J STAT. A N N .  c h .  s s ,  � I 0- 2J - I I ( f )(e )  (West 1 98 2  & Supp .  1 98 3 )  . 
.-\t least ten other states also ha\·e such pro\·isions .  S e e  Note , s upra n ote 2 ,  at 8go n .  r s o .  
Jmtice  O ' C o nn o r. i n  dicta. has recently approved of state l iens for waste cleanup cost 
rcco1-e r::. See Ohio \'. l:\.ovacs ,  1 05 S .  C t .  ;os , 7 1 2  ( r gS s l  ( O'Con nor. J . , concurring) ( noting 
chat " a  St�cv: may protect its interest i n  the e nforcement of its envi ronmental la1vs by giving 
ciean u u  judgments the status of statutory liens o r  secured claim s'' ) .  
1 ',..! _\lost recen th·. the  Senate and  the House of Represen tati\'Cs passc:d identical l i en  pro\·i­
s ic' n o ,  11·h ich arc no11· in  conference \Nith the rest of the C ERCL-\ reauthorization .  For a text 
cf the l ien  pro\·ision .  inserted by the Senate as C E RCL\ � ro; (m)  and by the H ouse as CERCL\ 
� i O / I K I .  s ec 1 3 1  C O N G .  REC . H 1 1 . 6 o 6 ,  H r r . 6 2 -1 !daily ed.  D e c .  1 0 ,  r gS s l .  In 1 9 83 C o ngress 
considered but did not enact  a superpriorit1· l ie n .  For a detailed analysis of the r 983 bi l l ,  see 
Loc k c � t .  sup;·a note ,:; s :  :\'ote . supra note 2 ,  at S g o .  
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l ien attaches . A statutory lien is generally perfected 1 6 1 either at the 
time actual notice is filed ,  or by implied notice on  the date of enact­
ment .  In the latter case , the lien may be superior to all other property 
interests and thus may be labeled a "superlien . " 1 6 2 The time-depen­
dent lien rests on the idea that within a class of property interests 
under the B ankruptcy Code , unless otherwise specified , all members 
of a class share on a "first in  time,  first in right" basis . Hence the 
date of perfection of the lien would determine its p riority as against 
other secured creditors . 1 63 The superlien ,  perfected on the date the 
statute was passed ,  is clearly more powerful .  
In addition to a date of perfection , liens must specify the property 
to which they attach .  The toxic  waste cleanup l iens already in force 
generally apply either to the cleaned property 1 64 or  to all of the 
property owned by the responsible party. 1 65 Because the cleaned 
property is usually a waste disposal site , a l ien applying only to 
property subject to cleaning will generally only affect disposers and 
not waste generators or  transporters . More importantly, because the 
waste disposal site itself may have very little value , 1 66  a lien limited 
to that property may not force payment of the e ntire cleanup cost 
bill .  1 67 A lien on all p roperty of the responsible party, on  the other 
hand,  enables the l ienholder to acquire any property, whether or not 
it  is involved in the waste activity. 
The most significant problem with powerful l iens appears to be 
that they may disrupt the real estate market. In  Massachusetts , for 
ex8.mple ,  after the state enacted a lien attaching to "all  property owned 
1 6 1  A l i en is perfected when its r ight  of  priority is  secured .  Perfection usual ly occu rs when 
the  debtor is g iven actual or impl ied notice of the l i en .  See ] .  EDDY & P. WINSHIP, supm note 
1 5 8 .  at r oo�o 1 .  
1 6 ' The failed 1 983 bi l l  authorized such a superl ien .  See  Lockett ,  supm note 3 5 ,  at 8 7 7 -
>Jcw Jersey's l ien i s  a superl i en ,  authorizing " a  first priority claim and l i en  paramount  to all 
other claims and l iens , "  N . J .  STAT. ANN. ch .  5 8 ,  � r 0- 23 - I I (f )(e )  (West r g8z  & Supp. 1 983 ) .  
1 63 The proposed C ERCLA l i en  is perfectable and  prioritized by the date on wh ich  notice 
Df it was give n .  See 1 3 1  CONG. REC. H I I ,6o6 , H r 1 , 6 2 4  (daily ed.  Dec. 1 0, 1 985 ) .  This kind 
of l ien is vulnerable to the trustee's avoiding powers under r r U . S . C . � 5 4 5 ( 2 ) ,  if the l ien is not 
perfected by the date of  the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. An avoided lien converts to 
an unsecured claim. See Lockett,  supra note 3 5 ,  at 882�8 3 .  
1 "4 S e e ,  e . g . ,  O H I O  REV. CODE ANN. � §  3 734 - z o( B ) ,  3 734 2 2  ( Page S u p p .  1 984 )  (enacted i n  
q�:o. after the causes o f  action  in  Kovacs I & II accrued, and plac ing a l ien against "the 
property on which the [waste disposal] facility is located '') . Similarly, the proposed l ien under  
C: ERCL\ would apply on ly  to "al l  real property and rights to  such property which - (A)  belong 
to ( 8. l iable] person ; and ( B )  are subject to or affected by a removal or  remedial action . "  See 
1 _; 1  Co:-; c .  REc. H r r , 6 2 4  (daily ee l .  Dec.  r o ,  r g8 s l .  
i oo See,  e . g . , N . H .  REV. STAT. A N N .  � q ; -B : 1 o  (Supp .  1 983 )  (entitl ing t h e  state t o  ''a l ien 
:_l r ;or. business revenues and all real  and personal property" of  a responsible party ) :  N.J .  STAT . 
. \ :-: :·' - ch _:; 8 , � I 0-2 J - I  l ( f )( e )  (West 1 98 2  & Supp .  1 983 )  (enacting a l i en  against "the rennues 
and ai l  real  and personal property of the discharger. whether or not the discharger is i nsolvent" ) .  
i c>i> S rc supra p. 1 5 9 2 .  
' , ; S t c  Lockett, supra note 3 5 .  a t  8S r .  
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by persons liable , " 1 6 8  the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
withdrew from the condominium and apartment mortgage market ,  
and banks began requiring expensive contamination assessments for 
all real estate transactions before granting loans . 169  Massachusetts 
then exempted "real property the greater part of which is devoted to 
single or multi-family housing" from the superl ien . 1 70 Such exemp­
tions should minimize the harm to the residential real estate market 
while preserving the lien's force against the industrial property of 
waste handlers . 
Designing a lien to protect the interests of present and future tort 
victims may require some creativity. A "tort lien" could be applied 
in favor of the government as trustee for the future plaintiffs . Or a 
fund representative ,  1 7 1  appointed to administer the fund on behalf of 
those plaintiffs , could administer the lien .  It is important to specify 
a current trustee for the l ien ,  because many of the future plaintiffs 
will not be identified for many years , and the property may need to 
be attached and sold at the time of bankruptcy to finance an adequate 
fund and to deter the target party appropriately. The lien would be 
for the estimated total present value of damages to be paid to all 
plaintiffs , present and future , who have yet to recover. 
C. Conclusion 
Firms attempting to finance their expected l iability from hazardous 
waste inj uries face difficult choices . They are often b urdened by 
liabilities far in excess of their net worths . Private insurance is ex­
tremely expensive and difficult to obtain .  The main alternative is  se l f­
insurance , with the attendant risks of insolvency when claims sud­
denly arise . The ideal solution to this dilemma is a system of credit 
and insurance policies that forces firms to pay the full expected costs 
of their activities in predictable ,  periodic payments , and that compen­
sates all  claimants fairly. Insurance policies that tie premiums tightly 
to risks ,  and bankruptcy rules that include all claimants and encourage 
voluntary creditors to charge risk premiums , are essential for the 
implementatio n  of that ideal . If either the insurance system or the 
bankruptcy system fails to force cost internalization,  or fails to offer 
predictable methods for financing risk, firms will shift their investment 
to the less costly system and society will fail to prevent toxic waste 
inj uries efficiently. 
' " '  lVL;,s s .  GEi\" L..:..\VS .-\ r m .  ch .  2 1 £ ,  * 13 (\Vest 1 983 ) .  
! f,o S e,· Lockett.  sup ra note 35 .  at  863 ;  Note , supra note 2 ,  at  890 n .  1 5 2 .  
n; S e c  :vhs s .  G Di .  LAWS ANN. ch .  2 r E ,  � 1 3  (West 1 983)  ( enacted l'>'lar. 2 4 ,  1 98,) ,  re\·i:,:ed 
by C<11ergenc\' act Dec .  r 5 ,  r 983 ) .  
1 ; 1 S N  su pra pp .  1 5 88-89 . 
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IX . COMMON LAW PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERY 
Compensation of toxic waste victims and deterrence  of future per­
sonal injuries stemming from exposure to hazardous substances pre­
sent a serious challenge to our society. Hazardous waste sites are 
increasingly located in  residential communities ,  and environmentally 
induced cancers are now considered a major public health problem. 1 
Although Congress h as begun to confront the social problem of toxic 
waste disposal by providing for industry regulation and cleanup mech­
anisms at the worst sites , private remedies for the victims of toxic 
waste are "[c]onspicuously absent" from the scope of all the federal 
environmental statutes . 2 Furthermore , the Supreme C ourt has ruled 
out recoveries based on an implied cause of action arising out of a 
violation of federal environmental legislation .  3 At the state level , 
statutory remedies that provide compensation for persons suffering 
injuries from hazardous waste exposure are virtually nonexistent .  4 
Thus,  common law tort actions appear to provide the sole legal rem­
edy for such victims.  s 
It is becoming increasingly apparent,  however, that common law 
tort doctrine is inadequate to provide remedies for the growing number 
of toxic waste victims .  The few reported hazardous waste cases6 have 
1 See Comment, Penonal l nju r_v Hazardous Waste  Lit igation: A Proposal for Tort R eform, 
ro B . C .  ENVTL. AFF. L. REV . 7 9 7 ,  798 & n 7 ( I 983 ) .  
2 Comment ,  "Close E ncounten of t h e  Toxic Kind" - Toward an  A melioYat ion of S u bstantiw 
and Procedural B arriers joY Latent Toxic Injury Plaintif s , 54 TEM P .  L . Q .  82 2 , 823 ( 1 98 1 ) .  
The  Senate version of C E RC LA would have created a federal cause of action for i ndividuals 
i njured by exposure to toxic waste and imposed retroactive strict l iabil ity o n  defendants. See 
S .  qSo, 96th Cong. , 2d Sess . � -t(a)  ( 1 98o l .  These provisions ,  however, were deleted from the 
\'Crsion of the bi l l  that became la\\·. See F reeman , Toxic Torts, Hazm·dous Hiaste and the 
S upelfund, 2 ] .  PROD .  L.  149,  L t9 ( 1 983 ) .  
l S ee Middlesex County Sewerage :\uth .  \' . National Sea  Clammers Ass ' n ,  -153  U . S .  r ,  I I­
I S  l r 98 1 )  (holding that neither the Federal Water Pollution Control Act  nor  the M arine Protec­
tion , Research , and Sanctuaries .\ct proYides an implied right of  action for personal inj u ries) .  
The S upreme Court has also c losed the door to expansion of the federal common law of nuisance 
as a remedy for pr i\·ate party damages . See i d .  at 2 c -2 2 ,  City of  M ilwaukee v.  Ill inois, 45 1 
U . S .  304, 3 1 7  1 r 98 r ) . 
" See  Grad, Inju ries }i'om Expos u re to Hazardous Waste :  Can the Victim Recover? , 2 ] .  
PRO D .  L .  1 33 ,  1 36 ( 1 983 ) .  O nly Alaska, :'�orth Carolina. North Dakota, a n d  Rhode Island have 
created p ri \-ate statutory causes of  action .  See SENATE COli!M ON ENVIRON ME:"JT AND PUBLIC 
\VORKS, 97TH CONG . .  2D S E SS . ,  l :--iJUR!ES _-\NO DAMAG ES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS 
A:--ID lM PROVEi\IEKT O F  LEGAL REli ! E D ! E S  7 5 .  1 4 1  n . 96 (Comm. Print 1 9 8 2 )  [hereinafter cited 
as C ERCL\ REPORT] ( primari ly authored by Frank P. Grad and Patric ia A .  Porter for the 
Superfund Section .) O I ( e )  Stud�- G roup ) .  
5 Other compensation mechanisms . ho\\'C\·cr. such as social security, workmen's compensa­
tion . and Ivlecl icare , may pro\· ick rel ief to certain toxic waste victims . 
6 There are few reported hazardous waste cases of any kind because the public h as on ly 
recently begun to appreciate the problem of toxic waste management and the dangers of i nj ury 
from exposure.  See C ERCLA REPORT, s u p ra note 4, at 4 1 ;  D i B enedetto , G e n e rtL/.or Liabilit.y 
Undu t l1 e  Commoil LaLi' and Federa l  and St.ate Statutes .  39 Bus .  LAW. 6 1 1 ,  6 r 2  ( 1 984) .  The 
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revealed a host of barriers to recovery in personal injury toxic waste 
litigation . Toxic waste injuries are "fundamentally different" from the 
individualized, immediate wrongs for which, and through which , tort 
law developed. 7 These differences , such as the ambiguous etiology of 
many diseases associated with exposure to toxic substances and the 
long latency periods between exposure and the manifestation  of in­
jury, 8 create serious doctrinal and practical problems for the toxic 
waste victim seeking recovery. 9 Thus, under traditional tort doctrine ,  
latent inj uries from toxic wastes remain uncompensated , and danger­
ous activities remain undeterred . B ecause courts have long recognized 
their obligation to do corrective j ustice by compensating innocent 
victims and ,  more recently, to deter wrongdoing by compelling those 
who create harms to bear the costs , the courts must adapt the common 
law to the realities of toxic waste litigation . 
This Part analyzes the three major  barriers preventing recovery 
for toxic waste personal inj uries and discusses the reforms necessary 
to remove them.  l O  Section A describes the first of these barriers: 
number of cases involving toxic waste personal injury is  extremely low. Reported cases include : 
Chappell v. SCA Serv. , 5 40 F. Supp .  1 0 8 7  ( C . D .  I l l .  1 98 2 ) ; C rown Cork & Seal Co .  v. Vroom , 
480 So .  2 d  I 08 ( Fla .  Dist .  Ct .  App.  1 98 5 ) ;  Windham v. Florida Dep't  of Transp . ,  4 7 6  So.  z d  
7 3 5  (F la .  D ist .  Ct .  A p p .  I 98 5 l ; Johnson v .  Tipton ,  1 03 I l l .  A p p .  3d 2 9 I ,  43 1 N . E . 2 d  4 6 4  ( I 98 z ) ;  
"Kenney \·. Scientific, I n c  . . 2 0 4  N . J. Super. 2 2 8 ,  4 9 7  A . z d  I J I O  ( Super. C t .  Law Div. 1 985 ) ;  
Ayers \'. Township of  Jackson .  r 89 N . J .  Super. 5 6 1 ,  4 6 I  A . zd  r 84 (Super. Ct .  Law Div .  1 983 ) ;  
Askey v. Occidental Chern.  Corp . , 1 02 A . D . z d  1 30 , 4 7 7  N . Y. S . 2 d  2 4 2  (App.  Div .  I 984 ) ;  Wilson 
v. Key Tronic Corp . , 40 Wash .  App .  8o2 , 701 P. 2 cl 5 1 8  ( 1 98 5 ) .  To elate , toxic waste actions 
for major disease personal injury have been virtually nonexistent. See Christian Sci. Monitor, 
Feb. 1 9 .  I g86 .  at 3 (describing the Woburn plaintiffs' suit (Anderson v .  Cryovac, Inc . ,  No. 8z ­
J 6 i 2  ( D .  Mass. riled iVIay 1 ,  1 98 2 ) ) for latent injury damages as  the  first toxic waste su i t  of its 
kind "enr to fight its \\·ay in to a courtroom") . At  the same time , dozens of cases have recently 
been filed, and the potential liabilit�· of defendan ts is enormous. See Legal Times. Oct. 2 2 ,  
1 984.  at r .  co l .  2 .  
; See Note. The Inapplicability of Tmdit ional Tort A nalysis to E n·uironmental R isks: The 
Example of Tox ic Waste  Pollu t ion  Victim Co mp e ns at ion , 35 STAN. L REv. 5 7 5 ,  5 7 5 ( 1 983) .  
8 No clear consensus has formed on the length of such latency periods, but  sources set  the 
range at between 15  and 30  years . See ,  e .g  . .  Comment ,  mpra note r ,  at S r r  (estimating I 5 -2 0 
years between exposure and manifestation of inj ury) ;  Note. Denial  of a Remedy: Fonn e r  R es i­
dents of Hazardous Waste S ites and Xn<• York's S t a tu te of Limitat ions ,  8 COLU M . J .  ENVTL.  
L. r 6  r .  1 63 ( I  982 ) ( estimating a 20-30 year latency period between exposure and manifestation 
of injury) 
'·' Practical problems are often o\'Crlooked. Sometimes there is no ' 'deep pocket'' from which 
to reconr b\ ·  the t ime the \' ictim learns of  her inj ur ies .  In the I 5-30 year interim between 
exposure and manifestation of injurv. the gennators, haulers. and disposers rna\· all have become 
defunct or insoh·ent. See Note . supra note i, at 5 84;  supm Section B of Part VIII .  
1 0 Because numerous commentators have already clescribecl the mniad barriers facing a 
plaintiff in toxic waste personal injury litigation ,  see ,  e . g . , C E RCLA. REPORT, supra note 4 ;  
Note . Ha:tl l'dous Waste  Disposal:  Is Tlz eye S ti ll a Role for Common Law? ,  1 8  TULSA L.J .  448 
( 1 983 ) ,  this Part wil l  not repeat that task in its ful l  scope . Examples of barriers discussed 
thorou�hh· in other essavs include: the doctrinal l imitations of  trespass. pri\·ate nuisance,  and 
public nuisance: the absence of implied and statutorily created causes of action; and difficulties 
im·oh·ing joinder of defendants. 
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overly restrictive statutes of  limitations and repose . This Section ar­
gues that courts should adopt a liberal "discovery rule" that delays 
the running of statutes of limitations until the plaintiff discovers her 
cause of action , and that legislatures should refrain from passing 
statutes of repose that unduly protect a causally responsible defendant 
at the expense of an innocent plaintiff. Section B describes the second 
barrier :  the requirement in most jurisdictions that a victim prove 
negligence in order to recover for personal inj ury from exposure to 
toxic waste . Section B analyzes the defects of applying negligence 
doctrine in the toxic waste context and argues that the courts should 
apply strict liability against the generators and disposers of hazardous 
waste . Section C addresses the final barrier: traditional tort causation 
doctrine .  Although a strong causation requirement is deeply embed­
ded in common law tort doctrine ,  courts can reduce this barrier to 
compensation and deterrence by accepting statistical evidence at face 
value , by allowing proportional recovery when a plaintiff is able to 
produce only statistical evidence ,  and by adopting an expanded ver­
sion of  enterprise liabil ity in order to impose j oint liability on defen­
dants . 
A .  S tatutes of Limitations and R epose 
Every tort action must be brought before it is barred by the state 's 
statute of limitations or  repose . 1 1 Statutes of limitations typically bar 
actions not brought within two to four years from the time the cause 
of action accrued.  12 Under the conventional interpretation of these 
statutes ,  a cause of action accrues at the time of the defendant's 
tortious conduct or at the time of harm rather than at the time the 
victim discovers her injury. 1 3  Statutes of repose begin to run at the 
I I  Statu tes  o f  repose differ from statu tes of l imitations in two i m portant respects. First,  
statutes of  repose unamb iguous l y  begin to run at the time of the defendant's act or  neglect. See 
V•i. KEETO N ,  D .  DOBBS,  R .  KEETON,  & D .  OWEN, PROSSER .-\. ND KEETON O N  THE LAW OF 
TORTS � 30 .  at 1 68 ( .) th eel .  1 984)  [ he reinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON) .  In  contrast, 
statutes of l imitations begin to run when the cause of action ·'accrues , "  wh ich  in most jurisdictions 
is not unti l  the the h arm from the defendant's conduct results .  S e e  i d .  � 30,  at r 6 s .  Second,  
statutes of repose run for a longer  per iod of time than do statutes o f  l imitations. See id.  � 30.  
at  r 68 .  
1 2 S e c ,  e . g , ARIZ. REV .  STAT. A N N .  � 1 2 - j.p  ! Supp.  1 985 ) ( 2  years) ;  FL\. STAT . ANN .  � 
95 · 1 I (iNest I 98 2 )  (4 years); ILL.  A N N .  STAT. c h .  8 3 ,  � 1 5  ( Smith-Hur d  I 966 l  ( 2  years) .  
1 3 Courts may ho ld  tort actions  to  accrue a t  three points in  t ime :  ( I )  when  the  defendant 
commib a breach of conduct i by al lowing toxic sub,;tanccs to escape and exposing victims ) ;  ( 2 )  
\i·hcn the breach o f  conduct results i n  some harm to the \· ictim ! when  cancer cel ls begin to 
c1 cvclop ) ;  or  1 3 )  when the victim cliscoYcrs her injury. ConYentional inte rpretations of statutes 
of l imitation hold that a cause of action accrues either at point ( I ) ,  s e e ,  e . g . , H. Hirschfield 
Sc>ns Co .  \ · .  Colt Indus .  O perating Corp . , 1 0 7  l\Jich . .  \pp. 7 2 0 , 309 r·� . \V. 2 cl i r.t ( r g8 I ) ;  
Ste inhardt \·. Joh ns-Manvi l l e  Corp . , 5 4  N . Y. 2 d 1 0oS ,  430 X E . 2 d  1 2 9 7 ,  -1-16 N Y. S . 2 d  2 -14 
( 1 98 1 ) . nppeal dis m issed, 4 5 6  C . S .  967  I I 98 2 ) ,  or at point ( 2 ) , see PROSSER _-\.ND KEETON , supra 
note I I ,  � 30 ,  at 1 6 5 .  
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time of the defendant's conduct and generally run for a maximum of 
twelve years . 1 4 Time-bar statutes present little difficulty for an atten­
tive plaintiff when a defendant's act causes harm that is immediately 
apparent. In latent injury toxic waste litigation ,  however, an injury 
may not manifest itself until many years after the defendant tortiously 
allowed chemicals to escape . 1 5 The long latency period often means 
that the plaintiff 's action will be b arred before she knows she had a 
cause of action . 1 6 Furthermore , several years may pass between the 
time a victim develops a disease and the appearance of symptoms that 
enable her to identify her condition .  Statutes of limitations and repose 
can , therefore ,  present a "substantial barrier" to recovery in toxic 
waste litigation . 1 7 
Moreover, even if a plaintiff discovers her injury before it is time­
barred,  she may fail either to recognize the causal connection between 
her injury and past exposure to toxic waste or to identify a liable 
defendant before the time limitation has run .  Courts should ,  there­
fore , interpret the date of "accrual" in personal inj ury toxic waste 
litigation as the date on which the plaintiff discovers her cause of 
action,  and legislatures should refrain from passing statutes of repose 
covering latent toxic injury actions .  The benefits of compensating 
innocent victims and the resulting deterrence of dangerous activity 
will exceed the burdens that defendants must bear in defending older 
claims .  
I .  S tatutes of Limitations 
Courts have traditionally understood statutes of limitations to run 
from the time of the tortious act or the time of the resulting harm . 
Neither of these interpretations responds to the problems associated 
with latent inj uries .  The traditional rules rest on the assumption that 
a tort cannot occur without immediate "symptoms , "  an assumption 
that is patently false in cases of latent inj ury. 1 8 Recognizing that the 
falsity of this assumption undermines the traditional policies support­
ing a statute of limitations , the Supreme Court has held, in the context 
of the Federal Employers ' Liability Act (FELA) , that the statute of 
limitations does not begin to run on latent inj uries until the victim 
discovers the disease with which she has been affiicted . 1 9 The rna-
1 4 S e e  PROSSER AND KEETON. supra note I I , � .)0. at 1 68 n . 3 1 .  
1 5 S e c  s upra note S .  
l o  S e e  CERCLA REPORT . s u p m  note .f ,  at 43 :  Comment, supra note 2 ,  a t  843-45 . 
1 ; See DiBenedetto .  supra note 6. at 6 2 3 :  Note, The Fairness and Constitutionality of Stalu ies 
of Lim itat ions for Toxic Tort S u its .  96 HAR\'. L. REv. 1 683 ,  r 683 ( 1 983 ) .  
I S  See Commen t .  supra note r .  at 82 8 . 
1 9 See Crie , .. Thompso n .  3.\ i C . S . r 63 .  r ;o ( 1 949) :  Note . . wpra note 8 .  at r 6 9-70 .  The 
Supreme Court's decision \\·as neither binding on courts interpreting state statutes of l imita t ions 
nor applicable to all federally c reated statutes of limitations.  The holding in  Urie applied c)n \�· 
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jority of state courts , and a few state legislatures , have acted to  
remove the barrier that statutes of  limitation can present to  latent  
injury victims by adopting the "discovery rule ,  "20 which holds that a 
cause of action does not "accrue" until the victim discovers her injury. 
The statute of l imitations for a toxic waste exposure victim in  a 
jurisdiction employing the discovery rule would ,  therefore ,  not begin 
to run until the latent  injury manifested itself and became discover­
able .  
General acceptance of the discovery rule will not ,  however, elim­
inate the problem of time-barred toxic waste actions .  2 1 A standard 
discovery rule bars a victim from gaining compensation if she fails to 
bring her action soon after she discovers her inj ury. Yet a victim 
who discovers she h as cancer, for example ,  may h ave no idea that 
the possible causes include numerous environmental factors . 2 2  She 
may reasonably assume that she was unfortunately prone to the dis­
ease . And as the New Jersey Supreme Court observed ,  there is a 
significant difference between knowing the cause of an inj ury and 
knowing that the injury is "attributable to the fault or  neglect of 
another. "23  A toxic waste victim may need a substantial period of 
time both to discover the cause of her inj ury and to discover that 
another party may be legally responsible for it .  It is unreasonable to 
require a toxic waste victim to make both of these discoveries within 
to FEU\ actions .  Since 1 94 9 ,  the Court has noted approvingly the extension of Urie's holding 
by many circuits to delay the running of the statute of l imitations for medical malpractice c laims 
under the Federal Tort C laims Act  un ti l  the plaintiff d iscovers her  injur\·. See U nited States 
\·. 1\..ubrick,  444 U . S . r r r ,  1 2 0-2 1 &: n . 7  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
2 0 A s  of 1 98 2 ,  39  states had adopted t h e  discovery rule .  S e e  DiBenedetto , s upra note 6 ,  a t  
6 2 .3 n . 8 8 ;  C E RC LA REPORT, supra note 4 .  a t  4.3 . 1 .3 3  n . 4 .  F o r  a state-by-state analysis ,  see 
Appendix B to the C ERCLA Report.  In  most states ,  the discovery rule was j udicially adopted; 
1\..ansas and Missouri , however, have legislatively adoptee! a general discovery rul e .  See KAN .  
STAT . A N N .  � 6o-5 13 (b )  ( 1 98.3 ) ;  M o .  A N N .  STAT . � 5 1 6 . 1 00 (Vernon 1 95 2 ) .  A n d  Alabama has 
legislatively adoptee! a discovery rule specifically for asbestos injuries and p roducts l iabil ity 
injuries arising from exposure to toxic substances. S e e  ,-\LA. CoDE � �  6->.JO(b ) ,  6-5 - 502 (b )  
iSupp. r 985  ) .  
Some state courts, although recognizing the  inequities inherent in  the traditional ru l e ,  have 
insisted that any c hange must come from the legislature . See, e . g . , Garrett v .  Raytheon Co . , 
368 So.  2 d  s r 6 (Ala. 1 9 7 9 ) ;  T hornton v. Roosevel t  Hosp . , 4 7  N . Y. 2 d 780 ,  7 8 1 -82 , .3 9 1  N . E . 2 cl 
100 2 ,  1 003 . 4 1 7  N. Y. S . 2 d  9 2 0 ,  9 2 2  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  The Maryland Supreme Court rej ected this argument  
in Harig \·. Johns-.Mam·ille Prods .  Corp . .  2 84 :Vld .  ; o  . .394 A . 2 d  2 99 ( 1 9 7 8 ) .  The  court argued 
convincingly that the legislature's statute of l imitations merely provides that an action must be 
brought within a specif1cci number of  years after it "accrues , '' whereas the "question of when a 
cause of action accrues is left to j u dicial determination . "  !d.  at 7 5 ,  .3 94 A 2 cl at ,)0 2 .  
! i S ee C E RCLA REPORT, supra note 4 ,  at 4.3. 
22 See  Zeleznik \". United States .  7 70 F. : cl 2 0 ,  2 2  i :;d  Cir. 1 9 8 5 )  ( stating  that "a person may 
kno\v that he has been injured but not be suftlcicntly apprised bv the mere fact of inj ury to 
understand its cause" ) ,  pet i t ion  for rert .  fi led, 54 u . S . L. W  . .3393 ( U . S  �)O\' . 2 0 ,  I 9SS ) (No .  8 s -
88j )  
n See  Lopez \·. Swyer. 6 2  N.J .  2 6 7 ,  2 74 ,  .300 A . 2 d  5 63 ,  5 6 7  ( 1 9 7 .3 l .  
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the relatively short period of time allowed by statutes of l imitations .  
Thus, even in a j urisdiction that has a discovery rule ,  toxic waste 
victims may be deprived of compensation through no fault of their 
own . 
It is essential that courts respond to this inequity - as they have 
to the inequities engendered by conventional interpretations of statutes 
of limitations - by extending the discovery rule .  Very few courts 
have taken the first step and held that the statute of limitations does 
not begin to run until a plaintiff discovers her inj ury and its immediate 
cause . 24 Even fewer jurisdictions have taken the second step and held 
that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the victim 
discovers that another party may be legally l iable for her inj uries. 2 5 
To ensure that the special difficulties in bringing toxic waste tort 
actions do not bar meritorious claims, the scope of the discovery rule 
should be further expanded so that the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers her cause of action . 2 6  
In  toxic waste personal injury litigation , fairness dictates that 
plaintiffs not be systematically barred from litigating their tort claims 
on the merits . Toxic waste victims cannot be said to be "sleeping on 
their rights" when they fail to bring a timely suit because they were 
ignorant of their injury or cause of action .  2 7 Defendants who would 
otherwise be l iable for generating and tortiously disposing of toxic 
waste should not escape liability merely because of the latent character 
of the harm they create and the difficulty of identifying a legally 
responsible party. Thus, defendants, rather than innocent victims, 
24 Some federal courts ha,·e interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in  United States v .  
:Kubrick ,  444 U . S .  1 1  I i I 979 ) .  as  p ro,·iding for  something more than the  traditional discovery 
rule .  In Z c ie:nik , the court held on the authority of Kubrick that a c laim "accrues" for statute 
of l imitations purposes when the inj u red party learns of ''the injury and its immediate cause . "  
7 70 F .  2 d  a t  2 .3 .  The court apparently did not consider this a n  extension o f  the discovery rule ,  
but rather the product  of Kubrick's reasoning that it  is  unfair for  a statute of l imitations to 
begin t o  run until a plaintiff is put ''on notice" that a wrong h a s  been committed and t h a t  she 
needs to investigate a\·enues o f  redress. See id. 
2 5  Two j u risdictions that do delay the running of the statute of limitations until the plaintiff 
disco,·crs her cause of  action are :\few Jersey. see Lopez v. S11·ycr, 62 N .J .  2 6 7 .  2 74 ,  3 00 A . 2 d  
s 6 3 ,  s 6 7  ( 1 9 7 3 1 ,  and South Carolina,  s e e  S . C .  (ODE ANN. � 1 .) -3-5 35  ( Law Co-op 1 985  Supp . ) .  
2 6 As the  discussion abo,·e suggests, a plaintiff discovers her  cause of action when  she  
discovers, o r  reasonably should disco1·er, ( I I  that  she  is injured .  ( 2 )  the  cause of that inj u ry in 
the narrow medical  sense.  and ( .3 ) that the cause of  the injury may be attributable to the tortious 
conduct of another. Although two or more of these discoHries may occur simul tancousiv. often 
each wi l l  occur at a distinct time. A ,·ictim discovers she is inj ured 11·hcn the first symptoms 
of disease appear. She knows the cause of her inj u ry (to the extent this is  possible) \'.·hen a 
doctor informs her of the possible factors that may ha,·e contributed to her condition . .  -\ ,· ictim 
discovers that the cause is attributable to the tortious conduct of another only when she clisco\'Crs 
that the chemicals described by the doctor seeped from a toxic 1vaste site ncar her home and 
that those responsible for the site had some du t ,· to prn·ent the escape. 
2;  See Note. supra note I f .  at 1 685 ; Note , supra note S .  at 1 66 .  
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should suffer the inconveniences stemming fro m  the defendants' 
unique activity. 
Extending the concept of "accrual" is also efficient because restric­
tive time-bar statutes under-deter toxic waste generators and dispos­
ers . The limited discovery rule bars not only the occasional unfortun­
ate toxic waste plaintiff, but a significant percentage of all latent inj ury 
victims of toxic waste . 2 8 The systematic insulation of generators and 
disposers from liability necessarily means that m any will not inter­
nalize the full cost of their activities and will , therefore , fail to reduce 
their dangerous activity to the socially optimal leve l .  2 9 
Statutes of limitations do promote some legi timate interests of 
defendants and the j udicial system .  First, a statute of limitations 
protects defendants from claims for which "evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.  "30 This pro­
tection saves defendants from potential injustice and conserves the 
courts' resources for claims more likely to prove successful .  Second, 
statutes of limitations enable defendants to plan their affairs without 
worrying about a sudden reemergence of ancient claims.  3 1  Statutes 
of limitations should , however, be tailored "to resolve the competing 
interests of plaintiff and defendant. "3 2  Not only is a liberalization of 
time limitations a precondition to allowing recovery for latent toxic 
waste inj uries , but the evidentiary problems and potential for surprise 
that j ustify time limitations are greatly mitigated in the toxic waste 
context . 
The stale evidence rationale for barring actions is less convincing 
when applied to toxic waste actions because much of the crucially 
relevant evidence is still fresh many years after exposure . 33  Although 
memories fade , evidence of the seepage often remains on the site , and 
documentation of periods of exposure for plaintiffs is often available 
from municipal records. 3 4  Indeed,  the delay characteristic of latent 
injury suits actually places courts in a better position to decide difficult 
questions of medical causation,  because "fresh" epidemiological studies 
will be available at trial that would not have been available at the 
time of exposure .  
As for the surprise the defendants may face when forced to litigate 
claims originating years in the past, some disposers and generators of 
toxic waste have known for several years , and perhaps decades, that 
2 o S ee �ote , supra note 1 7 .  at r 685  
2 9  See i;ifra p p .  r 6 1 2- 1 3 ;  cf i\'ote, supra note ! i , at  1 690 ( noting that insufficient deterrence 
leads to h igher risk of injury and more torts) . 
.lO Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agencv. 3 2 1 U . S . 342  • .  3-+9 ( 1 9-f+) .  
·' 1 S e e  Note. supra note 1 7 ,  a t  1 684-85 
-' 2 �ote, supra note 8, at r 66 .  
·'·' Sec  �ote , supra note 1 7 .  a t  r 685 . 
·'··• S e e  Note . wpra note 8 .  at r 66 .  
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exposure to the wastes they handle will cause a statistically predictable 
number of latent diseases .  35  Moreover, it is important to distinguish 
specific and generalized expectation of risk.  Although disposers and 
generators might legitimately be surprised when a specific agent that 
they have processed is discovered to be a carcinogen ,  most disposers 
and generators have long been generally aware that chemical wastes 
are potentially carcinogenic . 
2 .  S tatutes of Repose 
Although statutes of repose have become increasingly common , 3 6  
they do not currently constitute a barrier to recovery in toxic waste 
personal injury actions because few statutes of repose apply to toxic 
waste litigation.  Statutes of repose commonly apply only to specific 
pockets of liability, of which the most common are architects' and 
contractors' l iabil ity, medical malpractice , and products liability. 3 7  
Few states have enacted a general statute of repose.  3 8  B ut if courts 
reform the rules for statutes of limitations, and plaintiffs that were 
previously barred begin to recover, state legislatures might respond to 
the complaints of disposers and generators39 and "whittle[] away"40 
these reforms by enacting statutes of repose to cover latent toxic waste 
inj uries. Statutes of repose represent a return to the "traditional form 
of time-bar statutes .  "4 1 They characteristically set time limitations 
that, although longer than statutes of limitations, are shorter than the 
average latency period for cancer and other diseases . 42 The introduc-
35  There is  considerable evidence.  for example,  that asbestos manufacturers knew as earl\' 
as 1 93 3  that asbestos caused asbestosis and as early as 1 95 5  that it  caused cancer. See Nott , 
supra note 1 7 ,  at 1 685 & n . r o .  
3 6  O v e r  40 states n o w  have statutes of repose covering specific areas of  tort l aw. See 
McGovern ,  The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability S tatutes of Repose-. 
30 AM. U . L . REV. 5 7 9 .  5 8 7-88 ( 1 98 1 ) . 
37 For example ,  in 1 9S r  over 40 states had statutes of repose covering architects and con­
tractors ;  more than 2 5 states had medical malpractice statutes of repose; and over 20 states h2.d 
products liability statutes of repose . S e e  id. 
3S Oregon is one state that does ha\"C a general statute of repose. S e e  OR. REV. STAT. ·� 
1 2 .  1 1 5( I )  ( 1 98 5 )  (barring "any action for negligent injury to person or property of anoth10r 
. . .  commenced more than 10 years from the date of  the act or omission complained of ") .  The 
statute: has been interpreted to apply to actions u nder a theory of str ict  l iability as well  as 
negligence .  S e e  Johnson \'. Star Mach . Co. , 2 70 Or. 694,  700-og ,  530 P. 2 d  5 3 ,  5 7-6 1 ( 1 9 7 .1 1 .  
3 9  One authority has suggested that ,  in enacting statutes of repose, legislatures a re  responding 
as much to the political power of  the parties affected as to the hardship of unexpected l iabil ity. 
S e e  PROSS E R  . .>.ND KEETON, supra note I I .  § 3 0 , at 1 6 7 .  
40 :"-Jote . S tatu tes of Lim itations a n d  the  D iscoveYy R u le i n  Latent fnju1·y Claims :  A n  Excep­
tion o r  the La·;;.• ! ,  .+3 C. PITT. L .  RE\'. 5 0 1 , 5 2 1  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
l l  Note , supra note 1 ; .  at r 683 . 
42 Statutes of repose begin to run  at the time of the defendant's conduct and range !n le!!gth 
from 2 to J :' years. S ec PROSSER . .>.ND KEETO:-<, supra note r r ,  § 30 , at r 68 & n . ::; r .  ".':'1-:e 
latenc\· period for disease ranges from r 5 -30 years. See  supra note 8 .  
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tion of statutes of repose covering latent toxic waste m; uries would 
again deprive many plaintiffs of recovery before they even discover 
their injuries .  43 The fairness and efficiency costs of  systematically 
barring actions and insulating disposers and generators from liability 
would outweigh the benefits of repose . 44 
B .  Doctrines of Liabili ty 
The second maj or barrier to the efficacy of the tort system in the 
context of toxic waste personal inj uries is the ineffectiveness of those 
doctrines of liability that are available to plaintiffs . Toxic waste 
victims have attempted to invoke a number of liability doctrines ,  
including trespass , nuisance ,  negligence , and strict liability. 45 Of these 
doctrines , only strict l iability serves the tort system's  functions of 
compensation and deterrence . Most courts, however, have refused to 
apply strict liability to the disposers and generators of haz ardous 
waste , 46 and have required plaintiffs to rely on theories of trespass ,  
nuisance ,  or  negligence .  
Although some plaintiffs have recovered damages for personal 
inj ury under both trespass and nuisance ,  4 7 neither doctrine meshes 
conceptually with the issues presented in personal inj ury cases involv­
ing latent disease . Trespass and nuisance actions are designed pri­
marily to combat invasions of property interests . 48 Therefore , most 
43 See PROSSER AND KEETON ,  s upm note I I ,  § 3 0 ,  at 1 68 .  
44 See supm pp .  1 6 0 7-09 . 
45 See,  e .g . , Kenney , .. Scientifi c ,  Inc . ,  2 0-1 N.J .  Super. 2 2 8 .  2 45 -4 6 .  -t9 7  A . 2 d  I J I O .  1 3 I 9  
( Super. Ct .  Law D i,·. 1 98 5 )  ( noting that the "plaintiffs' theories of l iabi l ity against the generators 
appear to inc lude strict or absolute liability. negligence, nuisance ,  trespass. breach of warranty, 
battery and fraud") .  
4 6  See Pollan , Theories of Liability,  in TOXIC TORTS: LITIGATION OF H AV.RDOUS SUBSTANC E  
CASES 3 0 0 ,  3 I 8- 1 9  ( G .  Nothstein ed .  1 984) .  Although the  rclC\·ant cases im·olved claims for 
property damage rather than personal inj ury, most state courts that ha,·e considered the q uestion 
have refused to impose strict l iabil ity on disposers and generators of toxic waste. S ee,  e . g . , 
Ewell v. Petro-Processors of La. , Inc . , 364 So .  z d  6o-t ( La. Ct .  App.  1 9 7 8 1 ,  cert .  denied,  3 6 6  
S o .  z d  5 7 5 ( La. 1 9 7 9 ) ;  Ba§':lcy v.  Controlled Env't Corp . , 5 0 3  i\. 2 d  8 2 3  I N  H .  1 986 ) .  Two 
jurisdictions, however, ha,·e applied strict liability. See Ashland Oil ,  I n c .  \ ·  . .l\'l il ler Oil  Pur­
chasing Co . , 6 7 8  F . z d  1 2 93 ,  I.)Oj-oS ( 5 th .  Cir 1 98 2 )  (appl,·ing Louisiana !awl ;  Langlois \'. Al lied 
Chern. Corp . .  2 5 8  La. 1 0 6 7 ,  r o83-84,  249 So.  2d 1 ,) 3 .  1 3 9-40 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ; New Jersey, Dept .  of  
Envtl . Protection , . . Ventron Corp . 94 N.J .  4 7 3 ,  488 ,  468 A . 2 d  1 5 0 .  1 5 7  1 1 98 3 1 .  
4 7  S e e  Vestal \' . G u l f  Oi l  Corp . ,  I..J9 Tex. -18 7 ,  2 3 5  S . W. 2 d  ..J..!O l r gs r J  (a l lowing recoHry of  
personal inj ury damages in a nuisance action ) ;  Nitram Chems .  \ ' .  Parker, 2 00 So .  2 d  2 2 0  ( Fla .  
Dist. Ct.  App.  1 96 7 )  (same) ;  Rogers , . . B oard of Road Comm'rs, .) 1 9  .\lic h .  66 1 ,  30 N . W. 2 d  
3 5 8  ( 1 948) (a l lowing action to reco\'er personal inju ry damage:; i n  trespass action ) ;  Kopka \·. 
Bel l  Tel .  C o . , 3 7 1  Pa. H..J , 9 1 A . z d  2 3 2  ( 1 95 2 )  ( al lowing reconry of personal injury damages 
in  trespass action )  
48 Actions for trespass - a direct physical im·asion of  the plain tiff 's right t o  t h e  e:-;c lusiYc 
possession of  property - are wholly unsatisfactory because 1 1 )  the requirement of d i rect pit:,•s ical  
in\·asion of a property inte rest rules  out actions fo_r im·asion by many "intangible" toxic  agents,  
see Comment, supm note 2 .  at 83  r ;  ( 2 )  the requirement of in terference with 3. property in terest 
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personal injury victims are forced to base their claims on a theory of 
negligence .  49 
Although no conceptual conflict exists between negligence doctrine 
and personal injury recovery, four arguments suggest that courts 
should reject the negligence standard for toxic waste tort actions in 
favor of strict liability for disposers and generators : because of the 
extreme difficulty of proving negligence in latent injury toxic waste 
litigation ,  even negligent disposers and generators escape liability; 
strict l iability better serves the goals of cost internalization and loss 
spreading for toxic waste harms; the storage of toxic wastes meets the 
requirements of Rylands v. FletcheY50  for imposing strict liability on 
those who engage in dangerous activity inappropriate to the surround­
ings; finally, the disposal and generation of hazardous waste qualify 
as abnormally· dangerous activity under the Restatement of Torts test 
for strict liability. 
I .  The Difficulty of Proving Negligence 
Even when a defendant has been negligent, it  is extremely difficult 
for a toxic waste victim to prove either that the defendant's conduct 
was unreasonable or that the plaintiff 's harm was foreseeable . In 
order to find that a particular risk was "unreasonable , "  the finder of 
fact would have to determine that on balance the cost of taking 
precautionary measures would have been less than the probability and 
gravity of an accident. 5 1  This balancing test has proven especially 
rules out actions by plaintifis who lack a possessor\· interest in the property im·aded; and (3 )  
the  current law of trespass requi res the  plaintiff to  prove that the  im·asion was a result of the 
defendant's negligent or ultrahazardous acti\·ity, see  PROSSER AND KEETON,  supra note 1 r ,  � 
1 3 ,  at 69 ,  which means that the plaintiff will l i kely have to make out an independent case of 
negligence or strict l iabilit�· anyway. Although nuisance ,  a "nontrespassory im·asion of another's 
interest in  the pri\·ate use and enjoyment  of land , "  se e REST.-\TEl\IENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS § 
S 2 1 D  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  appears more applicable to toxic waste l it igation than does trespass ,  the standing 
requirem�nt of a present or  future possessorv interest in  land remains. See id . � 8 2  r E .  More­
over. the defendant is subject  to l iability only if the invasion is either ( r )  unintentional and 
otherwise actionable under doctrines of negligence or abnormcJly dangerous activities ,  or  ( 2 )  
intentional and unreasonable .  S e e  id.  � S n .  The first requirement i s  similar to current trespass 
law in that it effecti\·elv demands that a plaintiff independently prove negligence or  strict 
l iability. The second requirement may amount to the same standard because the plaintiff sti l l  
must pro\·e that the defendant's in\·asion was ·' unreasonable . "  in  other words, that the invasion , 
measured ex post. is negl i;:ent. B u t  see R. E PSTEIN, C G REGORY & H .  KALVEK,  C.\SES AND 
.:vLHERIALS 0 );  TORTS 6oo-03 (4th eel .  1 98-\J ( suggesting that "unreasonable" in  the nuisance 
context means only "substantial'' ) .  
4 9  .�. negligence cause o f  action consists o f  ( I )  a dut�· o r  obl igation recognized b y  law, ( 2 )  a 
breach of that duty. ( 3 )  a proximate causal connection between the breach and plaintiff 's  injury. 
and ( 4 )  actual lo:;s or injury to plain tiff See PROSSER AND KEETON. supra note I r .  � 3 0 .  at 
r 6..;-6 s .  
50 :; L . R . - E .  & I :\pp .  330 ( H  L r S6 S )  
5 1 See  REST.HHIE:\'T ! S ECOKD) OF TORTS � 2 9 1  ( 1 96.5 ) . 
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difficult to conduct in the context of toxic waste . Unlike the generators 
and disposers themselves ,  neither the victims nor the courts have any 
special expertise in evaluating the availability and expense of the latest 
technology. Similarly, neither victims nor courts can accurately judge 
the cost of options such as ceasing to manufacture products that 
generate toxic waste or storing the waste at a different location .  
Plaintiffs and attorneys are likely t o  b e  reluctant t o  i ni tiate costly 
litigation in the face of such uncertainty over the sophistication of the 
"reasonableness" analysis that courts and juries will apply. 
The requirement of proving that the risk was "foreseeable" also 
creates substantial problems for the plaintiff. 5 2  Even today, etiology 
is usually ambiguous in toxic waste cases involving latent  inj uries ,  
and a negligence standard would require plaintiffs to  prove defen­
dants' knowledge of the risk of disease many years in  the past. Al­
though some defendants may well have been aware of the risks , proof 
of this knowledge is probably u nattainable through discovery because 
few of the relevant records or  employees are still available .  53 A 
plaintiff also has the opportunity to prove that the defendant should 
have foreseen the risk; this option,  however, would require a time­
consuming survey of the relevant l iterature and would initiate a costly 
and wasteful battle of expert medical testimony. 
2 .  The A dvantages of S trict Liability 
Because negligence is difficult to prove in toxic w aste personal 
inj ury litigation ,  those exposed to hazardous waste currently bear the 
costs associated with its generation and disposal .  Cost internalization 
and loss spreading arguments suggest, however, that, regardless of 
negligence in the particular case ,  disposers and generators rather than 
innocent victims should bear the cost of the injuries caused by toxic 
waste . Courts impose strict liability on the sellers of products for two 
main reasons . First, imposing strict l iability "insure[s] that the costs 
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manu­
facturers that put such products on the market" and prof1t from 
them . 54 Cost internalization is intuitively just, because victims de-
5 2 See  >iote. S trict Liabili ty fo;· G e n e ra tors, TransporteYS, and D ispose rs of Haza rdo11s 
Wastes ,  6c\ Ml"N. L REV. 949· 964 ( 1 98 o ) .  
S J S e e  id .  
04  G reenman \'. \'uba Power Prods  . . 5 9  CaL 2d  5 7 ,  6 3 ,  27  CaL Rptr. 6 g ·; ,  j o r ,  J i' 7  P : d  
8 9 7 .  gor ( 1 96 2  l ( e n  bane) (Traynor, ] .  ) .  The primary argu ment against enforced cost internali­
zation is that cost internalization is too effectin a deterrent of defendants' conduct. Tort l iabi!it,·, 
critics argue.  will driH many activities that pro\·ide \·aluable jobs and services out of business. 
The flrst respons<: is that. i n  fac t ,  few fi rms are likely to be dri\·en out o f  business by tort suits. 
Exc�pt for certain dru:;r and asbestos manufacturers, strict products l iability h as D ·Jt  leci to 
bankrup tcy fer the manufc.cturers of consumer goods. The second response to critics of c::-• s t  
in terr,a!ization is that it  is  .�fjicient  for firms that cannot operate at  a profit while intetT1aliz iPg  
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serve compensation from those who profit from the activity that 
caused them harm. 55 Moreover, because cost internalization deters 
future tortious conduct, it protects personal entitlements to bodily 
safety. 56 Finally, cost internalization promotes efficiency by forcing 
disposers and generators to maximize social benefits when determining 
their level of activity5 7 and investment in safety equipment.  5 8  
Second, courts impose strict liability on the sellers o f  products in 
order to spread the risk of harm . Strict liability guarantees that a 
manufacturer becomes an insurer against the risk of injury arising 
from its products ; through higher commodity prices,  the cost of in­
juries caused by their products is then "distributed among the public 
as a cost of doing business" rather than concentrated on the individual 
fortuitously inj ured .  5 9 Like cost internalization , loss spreading is both 
fair and socially efficient. Loss spreading is fair because everyone in 
society benefits from the products and services that generate the haz­
ard of toxic waste ; therefore , everyone should pay for a portion of the 
harm associated with those products and services.  Loss spreading 
satisfies efficiency concerns in two ways . It more efficiently allocates 
the primary costs of accidents because it is less costly for many people 
to contribute small amounts to offset the loss than for the individual 
victim to bear it all . Also,  compensation of victims reduces the ' 'sec­
ondary" costs of accidents - the costs in human suffering and de­
creased productivity following an accident.  60 
tht: fui l  cost of their conduct  not to operate at all .  See G. C.<\LABRE�l.  THE COSTS OF ACCI­
D E N T S :  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 7 0-7 1 ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  I f  society collectinly determines 
th'-lt an �tcti\·ity desen·es to be subsidized by insulation from the ful l  harm it  causes in order to 
sc:·\·e the long term good ,  then this subsidy should come from th e le _gis laturc : the costs of til < :  
acti'-·it�· '.'; i l l  t h e n  be b o r n e  by society at large rather than by fo rtuitous \·ictims . 
. i5 See  Borgo. Causal  Pardigms i n  Tort Law, 8 ] . L EGAL STUD . . p g ,  ,p g-2 o  ( 1 9 7 9 )  ( s tating 
that "v.:hen one man h arms another the \·ictim has a moral right to demand . c ompens'!tion 
for the h arm'') . 
. i 6  See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases :  . l  "Public Leo.,· ' "  l"isio!! 
of !he Tort System . 9 7  HAR\' . L .  REv.  849,  8 7 7-79 ( l g8.j). 
_; ; Sec G C.;LABRES I ,  s upra note 54 ,  70-7 r .  
_; s Strict l iab il ity forces those with the best information abou t reducing h arrn t the defenciant 
disposer-' and generators) continually to make use of that information in order to lO\\·er their 
expe cted l iabi lity. E\·cn if a court could set the  leHI of due care correcth·. there w�_, t! l cl b:: ! < 1 
:w,;c\less t r::-tnsaction costs involved in forcing plaintiffs affi rm ati vely to clisco\·er an=! p resent in 
c o urt  inforr-:1ation already possessed by the defendants.  and ( c )  a time lag l:Je l'.Veen each ·cd ··::J ncc 
i'1 ;:-,·:ailable safety ieatures and a corresponding r ise  in the  leY>.:! of due care . bcca�.L'C c <.Jc:i"t.s 
Cl:·: '"lot  "ct lm�i l someone b rings suit .  
;.c ,  Es..:ola \".  Coca Cola B ottl ing Co , 2 4 Cal 2d 4 5 .) .  46 2 .  r s o  P 2d 4 .< 6 .  4-� ; ( ;  9-P I '.Tr;r:nor, 
_1 . .  con cur i· lng; .  
"0 5 u G. C.-'..L.-"\BRESI .  s 11 pra note 54.  at 2 7 (stating that "[ t jhe re i.' i V J  clo,iht �hat the "·;::; 
;_·,·.� pro\·ide for accident \·ictims after the accide nt is cruc ial!,- imi)O rtJr.t and ti1ev �h:: r�a! snci.:t�d 
cost3 of :J c -: idents can be reduced as sign ificantly h ere as by takin(( m c �Eurco. to 'l<.·nid J.cci rlems 
in the rir:;t piace") .  ' 'Primary costs" are those that necessarily iol lo\1· from the accident : sui"tering 
a;,d n1edical co�ts. for example) and can only be reduced b:.- deterring th2 ''� cc i clc :i :  i:.seli .  
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The same policies that support strict liability for consumer prod­
ucts also recommend imposing strict liability on toxic w aste generators 
and disposers. 6 1 Because negligence is difficult to p rove , and because 
the doctrine of negligence forces victims to bear the residual risk62 
associated with toxic w aste, disposers · and generators neither inter­
nalize the real costs of their conduct nor act as loss spreaders of the 
resulting harm . So far, only the New Jersey courts have responded 
to cost internalization and loss spreading arguments and imposed strict  
liability on disposers and generators , 63 but more courts should respond 
to such arguments in the future . 64 
3 ·  S tric t  Liabili ty Under Rylands v. Fletcher 
Rylands v .  Fletcher65 provides the third argument for imposing 
strict liability. Unlike the other rationales, the Rylands rule suggests 
strict l iability only for disposers/owners, not for generators .  66 Simply 
stated ,  the Rylands rule makes a defendant liable for any damages 
caused by a "thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to 
the place where it is maintained , in the light of the character of that 
"Secondary costs" are those that follow from a victim's inability to absorb the primary accident 
costs . If ,  for examp le , an accident victi m  cannot afford p roper medical treatment (and is not 
compensated) , her  suffering w i l l  dramatically increase. See id.  at  2 6-2 7 .  
6 I  S e e  D iB e nedetto , supm note 6 , at 6 2 0 ; s e e  also C ERCLA REPORT , supra note 4 ,  at I I I­
I 2 ( observing that in toxic waste and defective products cases, the three rationales for strict 
l iability - difficulties of proof, loss spreading, and cost internalization - are equally appro­
priate) .  
62 Residual risk is the r isk o f  i nj u ry that remains after the defe nd an t conio rms her  conduct  
to the standard of clue care.  
63 See Kenney \·. Scientific ,  Inc . ,  2 04 N . j .  S uper. 2 2 8 ,  2 48 ,  497 ,·\ . 2 cl 1 3 1 0 .  I .) 2 I  ( Super. Ct. 
Law Di\· . 1 985 1 ( concluding that ' 'creators of abnormally dangerous substances are far better 
able than the victims to sustain the costs of  the inj uries resulting from those substances' ' ) ;  City 
of B ridge ton v. B ritish Petroleum Oil .  I nc . . q6 N . ] . Super. r 6 9 .  r 7 7 .  3 6 9  A. 2 d  49. 5 3-54 
(Super. Ct.  Law Di\·. 1 976) .  
64 The  most common argument against the cost internal ization and  loss spreading rationales 
for strict l iabilit\· is that they pnl\·e too much because , i f  we accept them .  w e  m ust aci\·ocate 
strict l iahil it\· in  almost every area of tort law. See  R EPSTE l N ,  C. G RE G O RY & H. K..o.Lv E ;-.; ,  
supra note 48 ,  at 643-44 . The proponents of this  argument are too quick to assume that 
effectio.•e cost i n ternalization and loss spreading could be obtained th roughout all areas of  tort 
law In fact ,  strict l iability would rarely pro\·e effecti\"e if imposed 0:1 parties to relati\·eiy 
random accidents - such as auto or  slip-and-fall accidents, or accidents for which neither partY 
is in a better ex ante position to insure against the loss. If. however, there remain manv areas 
of tort law in 11·hich cost in ternali zation and loss spreading would be effectiYt , this iact p roYes 
only that there arc man,· areas o f  tort law that are ripe for strict l iabi l it\·. 
1'5 3 L R. - E .  & I .  App.  3 3 0  ( f-l  L. r 868 1 .  
<>o This l imitation make:- Rylanrls l e ss  l ikely t o  lead to  plaintiff rccon�ry than the  other 
rationales bccausc plain tiffs ha\·c more difficulty rcco\·ering from disposers than from generators. 
Generators. as a rule. ha\·e the deeper pockets. See l.Vlott & Rivero . G e n e ra t o r  Liability U n d e r  
C u JTozt Federal Theories . in  HAZARDOUS WASTE LlTJG,\TJON 1 983 , a t  q ;  �-�otc . s up;-a note 7 ,  
at s S s .  ;.Jc\·ertheless. some reco\"Cry would generally be a\"ai lable,  and disposers fearing l iability 
might begin to require indemnity contracts from the generators they serve.  
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place and its surroundings .  "6 7  The Rylands doctrine imposes strict 
liability not on dangerous activities per se, but on any activity that is 
dangerous in relation to its surroundings. 6 8  Therefore , allowing re­
covery under the Rylands rule would encourage firms to store toxic 
wastes far from persons who might be injured by leakage or, in the 
alternative ,  would force firms to compensate without regard to fault 
those injured as a result of a site in their neighborhood. Application 
of the Rylands principle , although long misunderstood and disap­
proved in the United States,  has been on the rise lately, 69 particularly 
in the area of environmental hazards , 70 and should be encouraged.  
4·  The R estatement S tandard for S tric t  Liability 
The fourth and final argument in favor of strict liability relies on 
the Restatement concept of "abnormally dangerous activities . "7 1 The 
Restatement advocates imposing strict liability on activity that meets 
"several" of six independent criteria: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person , 
land or chattels  of others; 
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care ; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage ; 
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the p lace where it is carried 
on; and 
(f ) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by 
its dangerous attributes .  7 2  
6 7  PROSSEI· . .  �ND KEETU:-1 , < : ipr . l note I I ,  S 7 8 ,  a t  5 -17-48 .  
6 S  See D i Benede , to ,  s u y ra note 6 ,  at 6 2 0 . 
iJY S ee PROSSER AND KEETON, s upra note 1 1 ,  � 7 8 ,  at 5 48-49 .  Professor Prosser argues that 
disapproval o f  Rylands stemmed largely from a misunderstanding of its holding. American 
courts , focusing on the intermediate decision rather than the final decision in  the House of 
Lords. interpreted Rylands to hold a defendant absolutely l iable when anything in her possession 
escapes and docs damage. B asing their analysis on the misunderstanding of Rylands , legal 
w riters concluded that Rylands imposed a rule of absolute liability, which was unj ustifiable in 
a society dependent upon expanding industrialization and commercialization .  See id. 
After industrialization and the de\·elopmcnt of the country's resources, hesitancy to chill 
enterprise weakened and was replaced by the view that even socially useful enterprises must 
pay their way and make good for damages intlicted. See i d .  Although the conditions and 
activities t o  which the Rylands rule is now applied var\·, the conditions targeted generally have 
fol lowed the " English pattern" articulated in  the House of Lords. See id. at 549 ·  The Rylands 
rule is  cu rrently appro\'ed by name or in  p rinciple in o\"Cr 30 j urisdic tions .  See id.  at 5 49-5 0 
& n n . 64-7 7 .  
70 S e e  Pollan,  s upra note 4 6 ,  at 3 2 3 ;  s e e ,  e . g . , ::.Jew Jersey Dcp't  o f  E nvtl . Protection v. 
Ventron Corp . , 94 N . J .  4 7 3 ,  488 .  468 A . 2 d  1 5 0 ,  1 5 7  ( 1 98 3 ) ,  overruling Marshall \'. \Velwood , 
3S :\' .] .  L. 339 ( Su p .  Ct .  1 8 7 6 )  ( rejecting Rylands) .  
7 1 See RESTATEMENT (SECO:-.ID) OF TORTS � �  5 1 9 ,  5 2 0  ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
i !  ld. � ) 2 0.  
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Like the Rylands rule , the Restatement rule i s  concerned with regu­
lating exceptionally dangerous activities . The regulatory scheme sug­
gested by the Restatement,  however, differs somewhat fro m  that sug­
gested by the Rylands rule .  Whereas the Rylands rule p rimarily 
focuses on the dangerousness of an activity relative to its surroundings 
and embodies a bright-line rule of strict l iability, the Restatement 
considers independently a number of criteria and arguably allows a 
defendant to escape strict liability if the activity at issue serves the 
broad public interest. 7 3  
Because no  single criterion is dispositive under the  Restatement ,  
courts applying the Restatement test must decide whether  to impose 
strict l iability on a case-by-case basis . In most cases , Restatement 
strict l iability should apply to the generation and storage of toxic 
waste . The Restatement specifies that "several" of  the c riteria must 
"ordinarily" be met before the Restatement test is satisfied .  74 Hazard­
ous waste activities normally involve all six . 7 5  
The first three c riteria of  the Restatement are concerned with the 
dangerousness of the activity itself. Toxic waste generation and dis­
posal should be considered abnormally dangerous . First, toxic waste 
creates a high degree of risk of some harm to persons or property. 
Because significant risk of harm results from the seepage of toxic 
chemicals into ground or surface water, the escape of toxic fumes into 
the atmosphere , and the contamination of neighboring soil , all of these 
pathways must be effectively blocked throughout the life of the waste 's 
toxicity before the risk of harm disappears ; yet as much as ninety 
percent of the toxic waste disposed of to date lacks such a guarantee 
of safety. 7 6  Second , the harms that do result are likely to be great. 
Exposure to toxic waste may result in extremely debilitating illness 
':lnd terminal disease .  Environmentally induced cancer and disease 
( admittedly not limited to hazardous waste exposure) is a major  public 
health problem , causing ,  according to some epidemiological studies , 
;_; Factor ( f )  i n  § 5 2 0  embodies a balancing test that ·,veighs the "value to the community" 
agai?"lst the danger of the activity. B ecause the balancing is only one of six c ri ter ia ,  strict l iabil ity 
Hnder  the Restatement could be imposed even if the social value o f  a dangerous activity 
out '.veighed the probability of harm;  factor ( f ) .  howe\·er, reflects the American Law I nstitute's 
p•.:rccption that some dangerous activities are necessary. As comment k suggests , the re are towns 
whc'e "l ivelihood depends upon" dangerous activity. In  such a situatio n ,  the American Law 
:;1 stitute believes i t  is preferable to impose the residual risk of nonneg!igent conduct on  the 
··�sidents rather than on the dangerous acti\·ity. 
;.: See RESTATEMENT (SECON D )  OF TORTS � 5 20 comment f. 
-, The �-Jew Jersey courts han found the generation and disposal of toxic waste to consti tute 
: • • ;  · 'abnormally dangerous activity" within the meaning of the Restatement.  See Kenne\· v .  
-:c,� :<ti ti c ,  Inc . ,  204 N.J .  Super. 2 2 8 ,  2 46�s o ,  4 9 7  .-\ . 2 d I J I O .  1 3 1 9�2 r ( Super .  Ct.  La\\. Div.  
; c;Ss J; �ew Jersey Dep't of Envtl Protec .  \ " .  Ventron Corp . .  ' ?4  N . J .  4 7 3 ,  .c;.g r �g3 . 468 .-\ . 2 d  
: � c .  ! ) g�6o ( 1 98 3 ) .  
''' See  Comment ,  supra note r ,  at 798 .  
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between seventy and ninety percent of all cancers. 7 7  Third, it is 
impossible ,  at reasonable expense , perfectly to contain materials that 
will remain dangerous for thousands of years; therefore , generators 
and disposers cannot eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable 
care . 
The last three criteria relate the dangerousness of the activity to 
its surroundings and measure the social utility deriving from it. Toxic 
waste activity also demands strict liability under these criteria .  The 
fourth c riterion asks whether the activity is a "matter of common 
usage . "  This phrase is defined in the Restatement comments as an 
activity "customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by 
many people in  the community. " 7 8  Although many people may benefit 
indirectly from activities generating toxic waste , the mass of mankind 
clearly does not engage in the creation or disposal of toxic waste . The 
fifth criterion ,  inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it 
is carried on, is  fulfilled whenever toxic waste sites are placed in 
residential areas . 7 9  Finally, although some communities are "largely 
devoted to the dangerous enterprise and [their] prosperity largely de­
pends upon it ,  "80 the sixth criterion would be met in many commu­
nities that presently harbor toxic waste disposal sites . 
C .  Causation 
The third , and largest , barrier to recovery faced by the toxic waste 
victim today is the burden of proving causation . That burden is 
twofold , requiring that the victim identify both the hazardous sub­
stance that caused her inj uries (medical causation) and the defendant 
responsible for discharging that substance (legal causation) .  8 1 To dem­
onstrate medical causation ,  a plaintiff must be able to prove that her 
injury resulted from exposure to a toxic waste substance rather than 
from the "background risk" - the unknown causes of a disease that 
everyone faces.  8 2 Unless the injury is a disease commonly linked with 
a specific agent (for example,  asbestosis and asbestos) , proving medical 
causation is both difficult and expensive . Demonstrating l egal cau­
sation is equally difficult because dozens of generators typically store 
7 7  See id.  at 798 & n . 8 .  
; s RESTATEMD1T (S ECOND) O F  TORTS § 5 2 0  comment i ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
;q Many toxic waste sites are ,  in fact ,  c urrently located in residential areas. S ee Comment,  
supra note 1 ,  at i98 .  No statistics indicate , however, whether as a general matter the residents 
or the waste sites were there first. 
SO RESTATEi\·IENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS � 5 2 0  comment k ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
3 1 See Note . Proving Causation i n  Toxic Torts Li t igat io n ,  1 1  HOFSTR...>. L .  REv . 1 2 99 .  1 .)03-
o-t ( 1 983 ) . 
s2 See Delgado. B eyond Sincle l l .· Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact R u les for lndcte rmiaate Plain­
tiffs , 70  CALIF. L. REv. 88 1 ,  8Ss-8i ( ! 9 8 2 ) .  
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substances at any given waste site , and the site itself may have been 
owned by several successive parties . 
I .  jVf edical Causation 
Medical causation in the context of toxic waste is significantly 
different from causation in more traditional contexts . Although prox­
imate causation has proven an elusive and malleable concept,  there 
is rarely any ambiguity concerning the existence of but-for causation 
following a paradigmatic tort. But exposure to toxic waste creates no  
simultaneous inj ury; it  creates only an immediate risk of injury that 
may manifest itself after a long latency period. Moreover, once man­
ifest, the inj ury is rarely attributable to a single toxic agent .  83 Con­
sequently, it  is typically impossible to establish a traditional cause-in­
fact relationship between the injury and the particular toxic agent .  
Demonstrating a causal nexus between a disease and toxic waste 
is possible , however, through the use of epidemiological studies .  84 An 
epidemiologist examines the relationship in a population between a 
disease and a factor (for example , exposure to a p articular toxic sub­
stance or  residency near a toxic waste site) and compares "the disease 
experiences of people exposed to the factor with those not so ex­
posed. "85 The result of such a study is a statistical measure of a 
factor's relationship to the disease , known as the "attributable risk. "86 
Recognizing that the statistical measure of attributable risk is the best 
proof of causation and is of "critical importance" to a plaintiff 's re­
covery, some courts have been receptive to epidemiological proof87 
and have resolved evidentiary challenges to such studies in plaintiffs' 
favor. 88 Yet major  reforms remain to be implemented before the 
studies can be used in court as powerful evidentiary tools .  
8 3  S e e  Rosenberg , supra note 5 6 ,  a t  8 5 6  ( explain ing  that "[r]arely i s  any particular toxic agen t  
the exclusive source of  a gi\·cn disease" ) .  
34 Epidemiological studies often constitute the  best ,  i f  not the  only, proof  of  medical causation 
in tort cases .  See ,  e . g  . .  In re Agent O range, 6 1 1  F.  Supp 1 2 2 3 ,  1 2 3 1  ( E . D . N . Y  1 985 ) (describing 
epidemiological studies as ' ' the only useful studies having any bearin g  on  causation"  questions 
involving the health effects of exposure to Agent  Orange) .  
ss B lack & Lil ienfeld . Epidemiologic PYoof in Toxic Tort Li t igat i o n ,  5 2  FORDHAM L. REv. 
7 .3 2 ,  750 ( 1 98-\) ( footnote omitted ) .  ' 'Although scien tists do not know what causes cancer in 
humans or how it is caused, they do know that those exposed to certai n  substances appear to 
deHlop cancer more frequently than those not exposed . "  :McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic 
S u bsta11ces: The Problem of Causat ion and the Use of Epidemiology, .3.3 CLEV. ST. L .  REv . 2 9 ,  
.3 5  I 1 98 5 ) .  
� 6  Black & Lilienfe ld .  supra note 85 , a t  7 60 .  
s; See  ! 1 1  re A gen t Onwgc . 6 I I  F.  Supp .  at 1 2 39-4 1 ;  I n  re  Swine Flu  Immunization Prods. 
Liab. Lit ig . , soS F .  Supp 8 9 7 .  907 (D. Colo .  1 98 1 ) . 
'" For example ,  some defendants have objected to the i n troduction of epidemiological proof 
as hearsa\·. See h.ehm \'. Proctor & Gamble Mfg . Co . , 7 2 -\ F.  2d 6 1 .3 ,  6 1 7  (Sth C ir. 1 98.3 ) .  
Courts , however, ha\'t admitted epidemiological studies under Federal Rule of Evidence So3( 8 )( c )  
- the publ ic  records and reports exception - when such studies arc  conducted by government 
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Epidemiological studies are problematic because , by their nature , 
they are purely statistical . They do not purport to demonstrate that 
substance A caused harm to plaintiff B ;  rather, they demonstrate only 
that exposure to A created an attributable risk of X magnitude to 
B .  8 9 At the same time,  courts are traditionally hostile to the use of 
raw statistics .  90 Plaintiffs typically must prove causation by a "pre­
ponderance of the evidence , "  and under the "strong version" of this 
rule ,  courts require some "particularistic" proof from the plaintiff even 
when statistics indicate that the probability of causation exceeds fifty 
percent. 9 1 Because no particularistic evidence exists in most toxic 
waste cases ,  the strong version of the preponderance rule would bar 
most toxic waste suits . Under a "weak version" of the rule ,  courts 
will refrain from directing a verdict against a plaintiff when the 
statistical evidence suggests a greater than fifty percent chance of 
causation .  Even the weak version of the preponderance rule will 
frustrate compensation and deterrence,  however, because actions will 
be dismissed when the excess risk attributed to the defendant is less 
than fifty percent ,  92 as it commonly will be .  
The gap between the probabilistic evidence available to prove 
medical causation and the particularistic proof of causation demanded 
by the common law must be eliminated through reform of the tradi­
tional causation doctrine . 93 The common law's resistance to the use 
of accurate statistical studies reflects a policy choice that insulates 
agencies, as most are . See Ellis v .  International Playtex ,  Inc . ,  745  F. z d  2 9 2 ,  300-04 (4th Cir. 
1 984);  Kelz m ,  7 2 4 F . 2 d  at 6 r 8;  In re Agent Orange, 6 r r  F. Supp. at 1 240-4 1 .  Although 
defendants have contended that epidemiological studies do not fall within rule 8o3(8) (c) because 
they are based on medical opinion and diagnosis rather  than on iactual findings,  courts have 
refused to construe the phrase "factual findings" so narrowly. Rather, courts ha\·e focused on 
"trustworthiness , "  which obtains as long as health departments use "uniform procedures and 
methods . widely accepted by their peers . "  Ellis,  745 F. zd  at 30 1 ;  accord Kehm, 7 2 4  F. 2 d  
a t  6 r 8- r 9 (holding that the "central inquiry" under rule 8o3(8)(c) is trustworthiness and admitting 
studies based on "procedures and methods widely accepted in the field of epidemiology") .  
8 9  See ,  e . g . , Rosenberg,  supYa note 5 6 ,  a t  Ss 6-5 7 (concluding that epidemiological statistics 
can never ' 'pinpoint the actual source of the disease afflicting any specific member of  the exposed 
population" ) ;  Comment ,  supra note 1 ,  at Sog- r o  ( stating that medical scientists are u nable to 
prove that specific em·ironmental pol lutants "directly cause" particular health effects) .  In  ad­
dition ,  epidemiology is ineffective at reaching any conclusions when the toxicity of  a substance 
is low or  exposure is at low doses. In such cases, a huge stucy group is required, making it  
difficult  to control  for a single factor. See McElveen & Eddy, supra note 85 , at 39-40 . 
90 See Tribe,  Trial By ivlathemat ics: Precisio ll and Ri tual in the Lega./ PYocess , 84 H.-\RV. 
L. RE\'. 1 3 2 9 ( ! 9 / l ) . 
9 t See ,  e . g . , Rosenberg, supra note 5 6 ,  at 8 5 7 ;  Hamil \·. Bashl ine ,  2."13 Pa. Super. 2 2 7 , 2 3 3 ,  
3 6 4  A . z cl  1 36 6 ,  1 369 ( 1 9 7 6 ) .  
92 S e e  Rosenberg , s upra note 5 6 .  a t  Ss ;-s S .  
93 Courts should recognize that medical opinions arc  commonly based on probability, not 
ce rtain ty. "lllf epidemiological studies are carefully performed and show material and substantial 
evidence of  causation, such e\·idencc should be accepted by the courts 
Eddy. supra note 85 , at 3 1 .  
" McElveen & 
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industries from liability for harms that they have almost certainly 
caused but that do not lend themselves to traditional forms of parti­
cularistic proof. 94 
Judicial refusal to permit verdicts based on statistical evidence has 
often been j ustified as a device for requiring the plaintiff to search for 
all available particularistic proof. 95 That rationale does not ,  however, 
apply to toxic waste litigation because toxic waste exposure does not 
lend itself to particularistic proof. 96 A second argument against ver­
dicts based on statistical proof is that when the plaintiff adduces only 
statistical evidence ,  "the public is unable to view a verdict against the 
defendant as a statement about what actually happened .  "9 7 Agai n ,  
this argument does n o t  apply as strongly t o  toxic waste litigation .  The 
public is not l ikely to form any opinion at all about the acceptability 
of a verdict except in  highly publicized cases such as Love C anal and 
Woburn . In  these cases ,  dismissal of the plaintiff 's  case because of 
the unavailability of particularistic proof is precisely what the public 
would be unable to accept as a statement about what actually hap­
pened. 98 
The proof problems confronting courts in the context of hazardous 
waste are similar to those encountered in the diethylstilbesterol (DES) 
cases . 9 9  A DES victim could identify the cause of her inj ury but 
usually could not determine which of many potential defendants pro­
duced the drug. 1 oo Confronted with this situation ,  the C alifornia 
Supreme Court held in the landmark case of S indell v .  A bbott 
Laboratories 10 1  that instead of allowing the drug companies to escape 
liability altogether, each could be held liable for the proportion of the 
94 Cf Rosenberg, s upra note 5 6 ,  at 85 7 n . 2 7 ,  858  ( noting that j udicial views of  causation 
reflect the desirability of  particular social policy) .  
95 See., e . g . , Tribe, supra note go ,  at 1 349 .  
96 See Rosenbe rg,  supra note 56 ,  a t  86g .  
9 7  Nesson ,  The Evidence o r  the E·uen t ?  On Judicial  Proof a�;d the A cceptabili ty of Verdicts ,  
98 HARV. L REV . 1 3 5 7 ,  1 3 78  ( 1 985 ) .  
9 8  Cf. C h ristian S c i .  Mon itor, Feb.  1 9 , r g86 ,  a t  3 ,  col .  2 (suggesting  that the publ ic  perceives 
that the companies involved in  the toxic waste leakage at Woburn ,  M assachusetts were , in  fact, 
responsible for causing significant personal injury ) ;  Loth , Woburn,  Sc ience ,  and the Law, Boston 
Globe, Feb.  g ,  r 986 ,  (Magazine) , at r (same) .  
9 9  D iethylstilbesterol (DES) was a drug appro\"Cd by the Food and Drug Administration from 
1 947-1 9 7  r ior presc ription to pregnant women to prevent miscarriage. It was subsequently  
learned that  DES causes cancerous vaginal and cervical growths i n  the daughters of women 
who recei\·ed the drug. See  Sindel l  \ " .  :\bbott Laboratories,  26 C al .  3d 5 8 8 , 5 93-94 ,  607 P z d  
9 2 4 ,  9 2 5 -2 6 ,  1 6 3  Cal .  Rptr. 1 3 2 ,  1 3 3 ,  cerl .  denied, 449 U . S . 9 1 2  ( I gSo) .  
i llO DES was produced from a common and mutually accep ted formula as a fungible drug 
interchangeable with other brands of the product .  S e e  S indell ,  26 Cal .  3d  at 5 9 5 , 607 P. 2 d  at 
9 2 6 ,  1 63 Cal . Rptr. at 1 34 .  Thus,  ll'hi le a plaintiff suffering from adenocarcinoma or adenosis 
( the injuries associated with DES daugh ters) was able to prow that D E S  \\'as the cause of her 
injuries, i t  was usually impossible to prove which of  the dozens of drug companies marketing 
DES produced the actual pills her mother took 20 or more years in the past .  
I O I 26  Cai .  3d  sSS ,  607  P. 2 d  9 2 4 , ! 6,3 Cal Rptr. 1 .) 2 ,  cerl .  denied,  449 U . S . 9 1 2  ( r g8o). 
r g86] DE VELOPMENTS - TOXIC vVASTE LITIGATION r 6z r 
judgment represented by its share of the drug market. 1 02 The diffi­
culty of proving medical causation in hazardous waste cases ,  however, 
lies not in identifying the responsible defendants , but rather in iden­
tifying which sufferers from a given disease are toxic waste victims . 103 
Just as market share statistics generally suggest the causal responsi­
bility of the defendants while failing to pinpoint any specific defendant 
responsible for a particular plaintiff 's injuries ,  epidemiological studies 
suggest the causal responsibility of a hazardous substance while failing 
to separate those plaintiffs harmed by that substance from those 
harmed by the background risk of disease .  All that such a study can 
establish is the proportion of individuals whose disease can be attrib­
uted to the hazardous substance .  
As  the Sindell court recognized ,  a rational j udicial response to 
probabilistic evidence that does not identify any one defendant or  
victim with particularity is to apportion the l iability or recovery. 
Thus , if a study established an attributable risk of fifty percent, the 
court should allow each plaintiff to recover fifty percent of her full 
damages rather than deny her any recovery. 1 04 The theory of pro­
portional recovery is feasible , fair, and efficient .  
The science of epidemiology provides a feasible means for courts 
to apportion recovery in each of two situations that could obtain in 
toxic waste personal injury litigation .  The first situation ,  more com­
mon when the substances present at a site have been identified and 
their migratory pathway tracked , 105 occurs when a plaintiff is able to 
prove that she was exposed to a specific toxic agent from a nearby 
waste site . In this scenario , the appropriate epidemiological study 
begins with the substance to which the plaintiff was exposed , identifies 
a group that has been exposed to that agent, and compares the disease 
outcome of that group with a control group not exposed to the agent 
under study. 106 The study would yield statistics indicating what per-
1 02 See  : 6  Cal .  3d  at 6 1 2 ,  607 P. 2 d  at 9 3 7 ,  1 63 Cal .  Rptr. at 1 45 .  
103 See  Delgado, sup1·a note 8 2 ,  at 882-83 ( describing this situation as the problem o f  the 
" indeterminate plain tiff '') . 
1 04 See Landes & Posner, Causation i n  Tort Lace•: A n  Economic Approach , 1 2  J .  LEGAL 
STUD. rog ,  1 2 3-2� ( r g8J ) .  L ikewise , if the statistics show that only 40% of those with plaintiff 's 
cancer developed the disease from exposure to h azardous waste , she may recover 40% of he r  
damages without any  danger of overde terring the  defendant.  Under  a theory of p roportional 
reco\·ery, the usual requ i rement that a plaintiff pro\·e that the defendant more l ikely than not 
caused her  injury is  unnecessary. That rule was in tended solely to pre\·ent overdeterrence  when 
a plainti ff could recoHr only all or none of  her damages .  
105 Even a t  man�· of the  most publ ic ized sites, howenr, it i s  no t  generallv known what 
hazardous substances are p resent ,  in  what quantities each is present,  o r  the path along which 
the\· may be escaping .  S e e  Comment ,  supra note 1 .  at 8 1 8- r g .  
1 06 This type o f  study i s  known a s  a "prospecti \'C stud\·. " Prospective studies can also be 
conducted by taking an existing group and going back in  time to their exposure to the agent 
under study. This analysis is known as a "noncurrent" or  "historical prospecti,·e" study. See 
McEh·cen & Eddy. supra note Ss . at .)8 .  
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centage of those exposed to a particular substance developed a partic­
ular disease as a result of that exposure . The second situation occurs 
when a plaintiff, because of the passage of time , c annot identify the 
substance to which she was exposed and may not even be able to 
show that she was , in  fact ,  exposed . The appropriate epidemiological 
study in  this case would be a "descriptive" epidemiological study. 1 07 
These studies commonly compare geographical locations  and indicate 
what percentage of those individuals with a particular disease ,  l iving 
within the area of the site , can attribute the harm to their proximity 
to the toxic waste site . 1 os 
Proportional recovery is also fair and efficient .  B ecause toxic was.te 
defendants will pay for approximately the proportion of disease at­
tributable to the substance for which they are each responsible , the 
resulting cost internalization is intuitively just and will lead to the 
correct amount of deterrence . 109 Plaintiffs , in  contrast, arguably will  
not all receive exactly the level of compensation they "deserve . "  B e­
cause epidemiology cannot distinguish those whose cancer was actually 
caused by the exposure to toxic waste from those harmed by the 
background risk,  the former group will recover only a percentage of 
what they "deserve , "  whereas the latter will receive a windfall .  This 
appearance of inequity, however, results from the assumption that the 
actual level of tort compensation can be measured against an ideal , 
"true" level of tort compensation .  1 1 0 I n  fact ,  it i s  impossible to tell 
which victims fall into which group . Under proportional recovery, 
each plaintiff receives precisely the amount of compensation available 
infonnation suggests she should receive . Proportional recovery based 
on the best available information is not unfair ,  and at worst, is 
superior to the current alternative of no recovery at all . 
The advent of proportional recovery would dramatically reduce 
the barrier of proving medical causation , but it would not eliminate 
107 See G. F RIEDMAN , PRIMER OF EPIDEMIOLOGY j 8-S2  ( 2 d  eel. r gSo) .  Although these 
studies fall short of proving causation to a medical certainty, they· do provide indications o f  
etiology. See  id .  a t  3 9 .  The i n dications provided should be sufficie n t  for the p urposes of trial.  
Although error can occur because of fai lure .  for example,  to account for a relevant variable , 
the defe ndants and their experts will have an opportunity d u ring the adversarial process to 
expose flaws in the study or to introduce a study of their o\vn for the j u ry's consideration .  
t o;; The results o f  a descriptive study that  employs "proximity to a waste site" as  a variable 
will not  yield results that arc as precise , or as profitable from the plaintiff 's perspe ctive , as the 
results of a stuclv that is able to foc u s  on those with known exposure to a known substance . 
10° See  Delgad o ,  supra note 8 2 ,  at 893-94 . For further discussion ,  see note 3 7 above and 
accompanying text .  The appropriJ.te amount of deterrence wi l l  resu l t ,  h owever, onh· i f  all  
\· ictims of a given release s u e .  
1 1 0 £\·en in t h e  icl calizcd \\·oriel of "true' '  cleser\'Ccl com pensation , t h e  described result  is less 
unfair than it appears at first glance because e m·ironmental factors are not the sole contribut ing 
factor i n  the de\·clopmcnt o f  latent  disease . .  ·\ person's susceptibil i ty to disease also plays a role . 
See G .  F RIEDill.".N. supra note I O / ,  at .3-5 . 
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this obstacle .  The cost of proving medical causation remains a sub­
stantial barrier to many plaintiffs . 1 1 1  B ecause the issue is complex, 
litigating medical causation may add days to an already lengthy trial . 
Also , the plaintiff will have to pay for extensive discovery, epidemi­
ological and toxicological studies ,  and expert witness testimony. 1 1 2 
These fiscal realities have led several commentators to conclude that 
the costs associated with p roving medical causation wil l  bar many 
toxic waste actions in which the anticipated damage award is not 
extremely high . 1 1 3 Moreover, latent injury toxic waste suits are un­
likely candidates for spreading transaction costs through the proce­
dural mechanism of a class action . 1 1 4 Because even those individuals 
exposed to the same chemical leaking from a single site will have been 
exposed at different times and with varying severity, i t  would be 
difficult to certify such a c lass . 1 1 5 And because their inj uries will 
manifest themselves over a long period of time , it is unlikely that 
large numbers of victims would ever be in a position to b ring suit at 
one time . 1 1 6  The burden o f  paying for and conducting the necessary 
studies , therefore , rests with government agenc1es such as the Envi-
I l l  See Comment,  s upra note r ,  at 8 2 4 .  
1 1 2 See id.  
1 1 3 See ,  e . g . , C E RC LA REPORT, s upra note 4 .  at 70-7 1 ( CC>ncluding that proof of  medical 
causation will inevitably require " large amounts of sophisticated medical and scientific testimony" 
and that the resulting cost is "an almost overwhelming barrier to recovery, particularly in 
smaller cases"); Comment,  supra note 2 .  at 8 5 3  ( suggesting that only the government may have 
the resources to demonstrate causation in cases i n  which latent toxic injury is i nvoh·ed) .  
1 1 4 The advisory committee responsible for promulgating the amended Federal Rule of C ivil 
Procedure 2 3  specifical ly  noted that a '"mass accident' resulting in inj uries to n u merous persons 
is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action . . , FED. R. Crv. P. 2 3  advisory committee note .  
The committee feared that diffe rences in  damages and defenses to liability would always pre­
dominate . See id.  Since the rules were promulgated in r g66 .. howe\·cr, most commentators 
have c ritic ized the advisory committee's interpretation .  See ,  e . g . , 3 H .  :\TEWB E R G ,  NEWBERG 
ON CLASS ACTIO:\TS � �  1 7 . 05 - . 06 ( 2 d  ed .  1 985 ) ;  C .  \VRIGHT & A .  MILLER,  FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROC EDURE: C I VI L � 1 7 83 ( 1 9 7 2  & Supp. 1 985 ) ;  Rosenberg , supra note 56, at 908- 1 6 .  
Moreover. several courts have certified mass accident c lass actions. S e e  I n  re "Agent Orange " 
Prod . Liab. Litig . .  r oo F . R . D .  7 1 8  ( E . D  N \'. 1 98 .) l .  mandanuts denied sub  nom.  In re Diamond 
Shamrock Chern. Co. , 7 2 5  F . 2 d  858 ( 2 d  C ir ) . cevt . denied, 1 04 S. Ct.  I.tf 7 ( 1 984) :  In ve Federal 
Skywalk Cases, 95 F . R . D .  483 ( W. D . Mo. r g8 2 ) ; Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Campania Maritima, 
S . A . ,  70 F .R . D .  40 1 ( E D Pa.  1 9 7 6 ) .  
l i S S e e ,  e . g  . .  Note , A llocating t h e  Costs of Ha:anlous Waste D isposal. 9 4  HARV. L.  REV . 
5 84 ,  5 9 2  ( I g8 r )  (noting that "class ce rtification is usuallY not a\·ailable when injuries to different 
members of the class arise at diflcrent times and are of widely varying seHrity"); Askey \'. 
Occ idental Chern . Corp . , r o 2  A . D . 2 d  I JO .  134 .  4 7 7  N . Y. S . 2 d  2 4 2 .  246 ( 1 984) (denying class 
ce rtification to toxic waste exposure victims with manifest injuries in part because common 
questions o f  law or  fact did not predominate and because the representatives' c laims were not 
typ ical ) . 
1 1 6 See ,  e . g  . .  Askey, 1 0 2  A . D . 2d at I J-! .  4 7 7  N . Y. S . z cl at 2 -16 (denying class certification to 
toxic waste exposure \·ictims with man ifest injuries in part because the class was not so large 
that it made joinder impracticable ) .  
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ronmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Hu­
man Services ,  or  groups of potential plaintiffs living near a site who 
are able to recognize their common interest. 1 1 7 
2 .  Legal Causation 
Once the plaintiff has successfully identified a p articular toxic 
agent as the cause of her inj uries ,  she must also identify a specific 
defendant who can be held responsible for her exposure to that agent .  
Likely targets include the owner or owners of  the  s ite and the gen­
erators of the toxic waste . During the latency period of the disease , 
however, the site may have changed ownership several times ,  1 1 8 and 
any given site may contain wastes from dozens of generators . 1 1 9 B e­
cause of tort rules regulating both the liability of vendors and vendees 
of property and the l iability of generators vis-a-vis their independent 
contractors , not all disposers and generators are suitable targets for 
liability. 1 20 Even when suitable targets exist, the burden remains on 
1 1 7  N o t  only would proportional recovery fail t o  el iminate the expense of epidemiological 
studies ,  it would also not e l iminate the non medical causation barriers to recovery associated 
with latent injury, such as statutes of l imitations and disappearing defendants .  In  an effort to 
circumvent these problems, commentators have suggested an addition al reform in which  the 
present risk of future disease would i tse lf  be recognized as an actionable ,  legally cognizable 
harm. See, e . g. ,  Delgado, s upra note 8 2 , at 896; Comment, supra note r ,  at 848-49; Comment ,  
Increased R isk of D isease from Hazardous Waste:  A Proposal for Judicial R elief, 6o WASH.  L. 
REV . 635 , 643-48 ( 1 98 5 ) .  At present, mere potentiality or threat of  h arm is not sufficient to 
sustain a common law cause of act ion for personal injury. See,  e . g . , Mink v. U niversity of  
Chicago, 460 F .  Supp .  7 1 3 , 7 1 6  n . z  ( N . D .  I l l .  1 9 7 8) ;  PROSSER AND KEETO N ,  supra note  r r , § 
30 ,  at r 6s .  B u t  cf. Schwegel v. Goldberg, 2 09 Pa.  Super. 2 80 ,  2 8 8 ,  2 2 8  A . z d  405 , 409 ( r 96 7 J  
( holding that the risk of  future epi leptic seizures may b e  considered i n  fixing plaintiff 's  damages) .  
S u c h  a reform, however, would n o t  be economically feasible because in  most cases the 
awards would prove too low to merit the extensive costs required to l itigate the claim . Fu l l  
recovery for present r i sk  would  create unfairness and a danger of  overdeterrence.  Courts could 
impose l iabil ity only i n  proportion to the probability of future causation assigned to the excess 
disease risk created by the defendant.  U nless the plaintiff has been exposed extensively to an 
extremely toxic agent ,  the excess disease risk wil l  be low. 
Thus, actions for at-risk injury m ust be brought as a c lass action in order to be economical ly  
\·iable .  A c lass action is more l ikely to  attract the  participation of all potential plaintiffs and 
would therefore make deterrence more effective. See Rosenberg, supra note 5 6 ,  at 908 . More­
over, the costs associated with determin ing compensation for each individual claimant  could be 
diminished b::.· "damage scheduling" - awarding compensation "on the basis of  characteristics 
of a c lass of which the individual was a member. " Id. at 9 1 7 .  The difficulty is  that courts 
ha\·e been exceedingly reluctant to certify classes of tort victims claiming personal injury. See 
supra note 1 1 4 . Moreover, i t  is difficult  to identify an at-risk class more specifically than those 
persons who happen to fall within a geographic area - a degree of specificity that has been 
held ii1suff1cient for c lass certif1catio n .  S e e  Askey v. Occidental Chern.  Corp . ,  roz A . D . 2 d  1 3 0 . 
1 3 5 -3 9 ,  4 7 7 .N. Y. S . 2 d  2 4 2 , 2 46-48 (App .  Div. 1 984) .  
t t s See C ERCLA REPOET,  supra note 4 ,  at ; o .  
1 1 9 See DiBenedetto. supra note 6 ,  at 6 r s ;  C E RCLA REPOET, supra note 4 ,  at  7 0 .  
1 20 Generally, the vendor who was responsible for the  hazardous condition a t  the  site wil l  
remain liable until the vendee discovers the hazard and has a reasonable opportunity to recti!\· 
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the plaintiff to identify one as the source of the substance that caused 
her injury. 1 2 1 The scarcity of records prior to the passage of the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act1 2 2  in  1 97 6  and the generic 
nature of many of the toxic substances make identifying the source of 
a toxic substance an extremely difficult burden to meet. Thus , courts 
must adopt some theory of j oint liability if the tort system is to serve 
its compensatory and deterrence functions . 1 2 3  
(a) A lternative Liabili ty. - Although the inability to pinpoint a 
specific defendant is not unique to toxic waste situations ( the p roblem 
is often confronted by DES1 2 4  and asbestos plaintiffs) , none of the 
liability theories previously adopted by courts is directly applicable to 
toxic waste . 1 2 5  The most widely accepted theory of joint l iability is 
a burden shifting theory known as alternative liability. 1 2 6 The theory 
holds that when the conduct of two or more actors is tortious ,  but it 
is uncertain which defendant caused the particular injury at issue , the 
it .  See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS § 3 73 ( 2 )  ( 1 96 5 ) .  As for generators ( frequently the 
sole surviving "deep pocket"), toxic waste plaintiffs must overcome the commonly stated rule 
that the "employer [the generator] of  an independent contractor [the disposal firm] is  not l iable 
for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or his servants . "  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) O F  TORTS � 409 ( 1 96 5 ) .  
There are se\·eral exceptions to  the  independent contractor rule,  however, and  courts have 
interpreted them liberally. First, an employer is under a general duty to exercise reasonable 
care in  selecting a contractor to do work that will involve risk unless it  is carefully done . See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS � 4 1 r .  Second,  an employer may not contract out  of liability 
if the work to be performed by the contractor is work dangerous in the absence of special 
precautions. See id. § .:p 6 ;  see also Ewell ,. _  Petro Processors of La. , Inc . ,  364 So .  zd 604, 
6o6-o7  (La. Ct. App. 1 9 7 8) (holding that deicndant may not contract out of l iabi l i ty for work 
"intrinsically dangerous unless proper p recautions are taken to avoid i njury"), cert .  denied, 366  
So.  z d  5 7 5 (La I 9 / 9 ) .  Final ly, an  employer rna,· no t  contract out of liability ior work  involving 
an abnormally dangerous activity. See Kenney v.  Scientific, Inc . ,  2 04 N . J .  Super. 2 2 8 ,  4 9 7  
A . 2 d  I 3 I O  ( Super. Ct .  Law Div. I 985 ) ;  RESTATEMENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 2 7A ( I 96 S ) .  In  
sum,  the  very number and  scope of the  exceptions "may be  sufficient to  cast doubt upon the 
validity of the rule . " PROSSER AND KEETON ,  supra note I r ,  § 7 I ,  at 5 IO (footnote omitted ) .  
1 2 1 Cf Gray v. U nited States ,  445 F. Supp . .3.3 7 ,  3 ,-;8 ( S . D .  Tex .  I 9 78)  ( "It  is a fundamen tal 
principle of products l iability law that a plaintiff must prove . 
actually made the particular product which caused inJury. ") . 
1 2 2  4 2  U S. C .  �§ 6go1-6987 ( 1 98 2 ) . 
I 2 3 See Grad, supra note 4, at 1 3 9 .  
1 2 � See supra notes 99- 1 00 .  
that  a defendant manufacturer 
1 2 ' The "concert-of-action" theory, for example ,  requires that defendants act pursuant to a 
common plan or design to commit a tortious act. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS � 
8 7 6  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  E:-.:ccpt in a case of "midnight dumpings , "  which might constitute a trespass, it 
would be difficult  to pro1·e that generators or disposers "planned" to commit a tort. B u t  cf. 
Abel , . . E l i  Lilly & Co. , 94 Mich .  App .  5 9 ,  2 8 9  N . W . 2 d  2 0  ( 1 9 7 9 )  (finding that the p laintiff 
had stated a cause of action in al leging "concert of action" by DES manufacturers for distributing 
the drug without adequate tests or warnings) . modifie d .  4 1 8  Mich. 3 1 1 ,  343 N . W . 2 d  1 64 ,  cert 
denied. 105  S .  Ct .  1 2 3  ( 1 98-1l .  
1 2 0  The theory 11·as first e:-.:pounded in Summers ,. _  T icc ,  3.3  Cal . 2 d  So,  1 9 9 P. z d  I ( 1 94Sl ,  
and was l ater embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECO:"'D)  O F  TORTS � 433B(3 )  ( r g6 5 ) .  
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burden is upon each defendant to exculpate herself. 1 2 7 A version of 
the alternative l iability doctrine was relied upon in S indell ,  in  which 
joint liability was imposed on defendants despite the fact that any of 
over z oo companies might have been responsible for any given plain­
tiff 's injury, provided that plaintiffs joined a substantial percentage 
of the DES market. I 2 8  
Neither the Summers v .  Tice  nor the Sindell version o f  alternative 
liability j ustifies j oint liability in the context of toxic waste . Alterna­
tive liability is inapplicable because its justification for shifting  the 
burden of proof depends upon the fact that all of the defendants were 
negligent1 29  and therefore could have avoided the hardship of having 
liability imposed upon them by exercising due care . 1 30 Not all gen­
erators and disposers are negligent. S indell's market share liability, 
in turn , substituted known causal responsibility1 3 1  for negligence as 
its justification for imposing joint liability. Although a breakthrough , 
market share liability doctrine is not applicable in the context of toxic 
waste because known causal responsibility is absent .  DES presents 
the easiest case for apportioning liability without direct proof of cau­
sation .  B ecause every D E S  defendant in fact caused some injury, 1 3 2  
it would not  be  unj ust to  hold each of them liable without direct proof 
of causation in the particular instance .  In the case of toxic waste 
litigation , however, there is no reason to assume that all the generators 
and owners involved with a site were actually responsible for anyone's 
inj ury. I 33 
In addition ,  it is difficult to transfer the concept of "market" from 
DES to toxic waste . If generators and owners are considered part of 
l l ;  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS � � 3 3 !3(. ) )  ( ! 96 5 ) .  
I ! S  S e c  Sindell \'. Abbott Laboratories ,  2 6  C a l .  jd s S S ,  6 I I - ! J ,  6 o j  P. 2 d  9 2 4 ,  9.) 7 .  1 63 Cal .  
Rptr. 1 3 2 ,  1 44-46,  cert. denied, 449 C.  S .  9 r 2 ( 1 980 ) .  for discussion of  the factual background 
of Sindell, see notes 99- 1 00 abo\·c .  
IZCJ In Summers v. Tice , 33 Cal .  2 cl So, 1 99 P.zd I ( I g-tS) .  the seminal case f o r  alternative 
l iability, see supra note 1 2 6 ,  two hunters shot in the direction of the plaintiff and it was 
impossible for the plaintiff to pro\·e which of the two had actually hi t  h im.  Both hunters, 
however, were negligent in their  conduct towards the mnocent plainti ff and thus it was not 
unfair to hold both I iable. 
uo See Landes & Posner, supya note 1 04 .  at  1 2 4-2 5 .  
U J  See Sindell, 2 6  Cal .  3d at 6 u .  607 P z d  at 93 7 ,  r 6 .) Cal . Rptr. at 1 45 . Because D ES 
was made from a single accepted formula,  and has positi\·e l l· been identified with adenocarci­
noma and adcnosis, courts are able to conclude with ncar certain ty that a defendant who 
marketed 1 0% of the DES was tht: cause of approximately I O'/t: of the resu lting harm. 
U !  See s upm note I.)  1 .  
LU i\s the argument below demonstrates, s e e  i llfra pp .  1 6 2 7-2 9 . the fact that not all defen­
dants actually caused an inj u n· in the narnJ11· medi cal sense does not mean that each cannot 
be held legal ly liable accord ing:  to l egal causation doctrine .  It  does mean . howC\·er, that they 
cannot be held l iable based on a theory of mark�et share liabil ity. The S indell court j ustified 
the fairness of market share l iabil ity by pointing out that " [u jndcr this approach ,  each manu­
facturer's l iabil it\· wou ld approximate its responsibi l ity for the inj u ries caused by i ts own p rod­
ucts . '' 26 Cal .  yl at 6 1 2 , 607 P zd at 9_; 7 ,  1 63 Cal. Rptr at 1 45 ·  
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the same "market , "  it might be impossible to join a "substantial per­
centage" of the market, as S indell market share liability requires . 1 34 
In the DES cases , moreover, all the defendants were engaged in an 
identical activity, creating a qual itatively identical risk. 1 35  Thus, their 
market share could be calculated simply by referring to sales records . 
In contrast,  all who contribute to the danger of a toxic waste site do 
not create a qualitatively identical risk .  Some generators' wastes are 
more dangerous than others .  Some owners are more careful than 
others .  Without identical qualitative risk creation , it is impossible to 
assign any given defendant a market "share . "  Therefore , what re­
mains as the most important aspect of S indell for toxic waste l itigation 
is the court's recognition of the generalized harms caused by products 
and their wastes in our "contemporary complex industrial ized society" 
and the court's willingness to fashion a new remedy to meet the 
changing realities .  1 36  If the common law is to provide compensation 
to victims of toxic waste , some new doctrine must emerge . 
(b) Enterprise  Liability. - The most promising doctrine would 
impose liability on the theory that each toxic waste site is an "enter­
prise" and must be forced to bear all the social costs it creates if it is 
to be socially j ustified . The theory of enterprise liability provides a 
reasonable basis for imposing joint l iability on all disposers and gen­
erators that directly benefited from a toxic waste site from which toxic 
agents have leaked.  
"Enterprise , "  or "industry-wide , "  liability in its  narrow sense was 
adopted by a federal district court in Hall v .  E . I .  Du Pont D e  Nem­
ours & Co . 1 3 7  In Hall, the court was confronted with two of eighteen 
separate accidents scattered across the nation in which children were 
inj ured by blasting caps .  In most instances,  the manufacturer of the 
cap was unknown to the plaintiffs . The court held that each member 
of the blasting cap industry could be held liable on the theory that 
each contributed to the failure of the trade association to set adequate 
industry-wide safeguards and warnmgs . B ecause the blasting cap 
I.J� See Note, supra note 8 r .  at 1 32 3-24 Unl ike a DES plaintiff, who needs to join only 
two or  three manufacturers to obtain a substantial percentage of the market, a toxic waste 
\·ictim might need to join dozens of generators . It must be noted, however, that market share 
liabi lity need not be applied exactly in accordance with S indell .  Commentators have criticized 
the S i n dell court for fail ing to follow the logic of its own reasoning when it  held that a substantial 
percentage of the market must be joined before market share l iability applies. Each defendant 
is held liable only for the proportion of the j udgment represented by its share of the market, 
and defendant's share of the market remains the same whether 1 00% or 1 0 %  of the market has 
been joined.  See Robinson, Multiple Causation i n  Tort Law: Reflections o n  the DES Cases , 68 
V.-\. L REV . 7 1 3 .  7 2 5 ( 1 98 2 ) .  
1 3 5  S e e  Robinso n .  supra note r 3 4 .  at  7 so ;  s e e  also PROSSER A N D  KEETO:-i, supra note r 1 ,  � 
1 0 4 ,  at 7 q ( describing "inj u ry or i l lness occasioned by a fungible product . made by all of 
the deiendants" as a requirement for market share liability) . 
13 6  See S in de/1,  26 Cal . 3d at 6 1 0 ,  607  P. z d  at 9 3 6 ,  r 63 Cal .  Rptr. at 1 44 .  
13 7  345 F. Supp .  3 5 3 .  3 7 0-8 1 ( E  D .N Y .  1 9 7 2 l . 
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industry has few members and a trade association to  which all belong, 
interpretations of Hall's enterprise liability have focused on the pe­
culiar fact situation and have stressed that the doctrine is appropriate 
only for an industry with relatively few participants , all of whom 
apply the same safety standards . 1 38  Thus , enterprise liability, as in­
terpreted by the commentators on Hall ,  would appear to have no 
application in the toxic waste context. 
The policies behind the court's decision in Hall, however, are not 
so limited in application  as Hall's interpreters have argued .  The Hall 
court believed it  was approprate to consider enterprise l iability when­
ever the "sole feasible way of anticipating costs or  damages and de­
vising practical remedies is to consider the activities of  a group .  " 1 39 
In order to establish that a group of defendants should be held jointly 
liable on enterprise liability grounds , the plaintiff 's burden is to dem­
onstrate only the defendants' j oint awareness of the risks at issue and 
their joint capacity to reduce those risks . 1 40 The risk at a toxic waste 
site is that members of the public will be injured by exposure to the 
hazardous substances in the event of a leak. Those involved in the 
industry of generating and disposing of toxic wastes at a particular 
site 1 4 1  are jointly aware of this risk and capable of reducing it .  S ite 
owners can influence the types of waste generated by refusing to 
dispose of the extremely toxic substances of a particular generator ;  
generators can bring pressure to bear on unsafe owners by threatening 
to take their business to a more responsible disposer. 
Not only is enterprise l iability for toxic waste sites supported by 
the Hall court's reasoning,  but it also accords with compensatory 
13 "  See  S i11dell, c6 Cal.  3d at 607-1 0 ,  607 P. 2 d  at 933-3 5 ,  163 C al .  Rptr.  at 1 4 1-4 3 ;  see 
a lso Starling Y .  Seaboard Coastline R. R . . 5 33 F. Supp.  1 83 ,  187 ( S . D .  Ga.  1 98 2 )  ( interpreting 
enterprise liabil ity to proYiclc for joint liability only when an "industrywicle standard of safety" 
is itself the cause of plaintiff 's injur\·) . 
I J<J Hall, 345 F. Supp.  at 3 7 8 .  
1 40 See id.  
1 4 1 The Hall court observed that enterprise l iability was more appropriate to an industry 
with a small number  of  members. See id .  at 3 7 8 .  The entire toxic waste industry, including 
all generators (hundreds of manufacturers of thousands of products) and disposers , certainly 
does not consist of a smal l  number of  firm s .  i\'Iore importantly, however, a p laintiff would haYe 
difficulty demonstrating that the entire industry has joint capacity to reduce risks at any given 
site. Thus, the "enterprise" should be defined as all generators and disposers associated with a 
particular site, that is ,  those collecti\·ely responsible for the hazard the plaintiff faces .  See  
C E RCLA REPORT. Siipra note 4 .  at 4 7  Admittedly, the  number of firms in  the enterprise so 
defined still might not be small .  but  a plaintiff would be able to make a good case that those 
feeding and operating a single s i te have joint awareness of the risks and jo int  capacitv to reduce 
them . At the ,·cry least. i t  is more accurate to conceive of a site as an enterprise for the 
purposes of enterprise liabil ity than to conceive of it as a market for market share l iability 
purposes. The justification for enterprise liability is the defendants' jo int  capacity to reduce the 
risk .  which is applicable in  the context of  toxic waste. The justification for the imposition of 
market share liability is joint p roduction of a qualitati\·ely identical risk, which  does not apply 
in this con text. 
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ideals , basic notions of fairness , and theories of market deterrence . 
Enterprise liability expresses the compensatory ideal that "tort law 
can relieve the suffering of individual victims by spreading those losses 
through the mechanism of the price system or through liability insur­
ance .  " 1 42 Moreover, it i s  fair that the  persons who benefit from a 
good or service generally should pay for the entire cost of receiving 
that benefit. And finally, by compelling those who benefit from the 
sale of a good or service to internalize the entire cost of receiving the 
benefit, socially wasteful enterprises are deterred .  1 4 3  
A remaining issue is  how to apportion liability under enterprise 
liability. The standard common law rule dictates that all persons who 
join in the commission of a tort are j ointly and severally liable for the 
entire harm. 1 44 There is no reason why this rule should not apply to 
enterprise liability for hazardous waste disposers and generators. 1 45 
Because courts generally do not apportion the damages awarded , an 
equitable argument could be made that it is unfair to force the deepest 
pocket to bear the full cost of an inj ury it may not have directly 
caused .  Moreover, it could be argued that the threat of j oint and 
several l iability will over-deter large disposers and generators . 
The fear of crushing liability, however, is probably unwarranted .  
Disposers and generators have the power to mitigate the inequities by 
arranging ex ante to distribute the risk of liability among themselves 
as they deem appropriate . 1 46  They can , and wil l ,  execute indemnity 
contracts 1 4 7 that predetermine the extent of liability for each partici­
pant in the enterprise . Of course , disposers and generators will not 
be able rationally to order their past conduct and liability; however, 
the deep pocket forced to pay the entire j udgment often retains the 
remedy of contribution even in the absence of indemnity contracts . 1 4 8  
1 42 Sugarman , Doing A way with Tort Law , 7 3  CALIF. L REv. 5 5 5 .  5 9 1  ( 1 98 5 )  ( footnote 
omitted) .  For further discussio n ,  see p. 1 6 1 3  above . 
1 43 See Owen,  Deterrence and Desert in Tort: .-1 Commen t ,  7 3  CALIF. L. REv . 665 , 670  
( 1 98 5 ) .  For further discussion , s e e  p .  r 6 r 3  above . It i s  possib le .  of cou rse , that courts could 
force plaintiffs, rather than disposers and generators, to internalize the costs of l iving near a 
toxic waste site.  Such a course might also deter future harm by inducing some plaintiffs to 
move;  however, i t  would be neither as effective nor as efficient in p re,·cnting fut u re harm as 
forci1�g disposers and generators to i n ternalize the  costs of toxic waste. Liabi l ity should always 
be placed on the c heapest cost avoider - the party in the best position to p re1.·c n t  future harm 
at the lowest social cost.  
I H See REST.HEMENT ( S ECOND) OF TORTS � 8 7 5  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
14 5  The alternative would b e  for the court  to apportion damages i n  loose proponion t o  the 
benefit receiHd by each defe ndant from engaging i n  the enterprise.  
1 46 Because strict p roducts liability under Restatement � 40 :0 A  allol\'s reco\·cry i n  full irom 
any of the defendants . the manufactu rers , distributors.  and retaile rs of procluns are also forced 
ex ante to distribute the risks among themsel\'es. 
1 1 '  Sec  RESTATEMDIT ( S ECO:\'D) OF TORTS � 886B ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  
1 40 Indemn ity and contribution arc distinct ,  even exclusive, rights. Thus. \\'hen one lortfeasor 
has a right of indemnity against another, neither has a right of contributio n .  See RESTATEivlE:-JT 
(SECOND) O F  TORTS � 886A( -t )  ( 1 9 7 7 ) . 
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The Restatement provides for a broad right of contribution in favor 
of a tortfeasor who h as paid more than her equitable share . I 49 
A second response to the fear of overdeterrence  is that slight 
overdeterrence of deep pocket disposers and generators will actually 
reinforce the goals served by imposing waste site enterprise liability. 
Because a victim need find only one deep pocket to recover her full 
judgment, compensation will be assured and the risk of insolvent 
tortfeasors will be borne by the enterprise responsible for the inj ury. I S O  
Furthermore , the threat of joint and several liability will be an extra 
incentive upon the deep pockets - likely to be the largest disposers 
and generators - to work affirmatively to reduce health risks at a 
site and to influence the behavior of other parties con tributing to the 
risk . 1 5 1 
D .  Conclusion 
The traditional doctrines of common law torts present insurmount­
able barriers to latent  injury victims of toxic waste exposure who seek 
compensation through the tort system. When victims c annot obtain 
compensation , inequities and inefficiencies result from the concentra­
tion of loss on innocent individuals and a diminished general deter­
rence of socially undesirable activity. At present,  toxic waste gener­
ators and site owners are aware that traditional tort doctrine will bar 
many suits , and consequently they know that it is  extremely unlikely 
that they will be subj ect  to liability. Thus , they fail to internalize the 
social costs resulting from their activity. Although disposing of toxic 
wastes properly for the first time is the cheapest alternative , the large 
number of improperly managed sites indicates that the disposers be­
lieve their out-of-pocket costs for improper disposal plus anticipated 
liability are less than avoidance costs. 1 5 2 
The analysis of this  Part makes clear what changes in  the area of 
toxic waste personal injury litigation will be necessary if the tort 
system is to serve its traditional functions.  Statutes of limitations 
must employ an expanded discovery rule , and legislatures must be 
convinced not to impose statutes of repose in the toxic waste context . 
Strict liability must become the rule for toxic waste . C ourts must 
149 See RESTATEMENT ( S EC O N D )  O F  TORTS � 8S6A ( 1 9 7 7 ) .  The right to contribution applies 
to all joint tortfeasors. I t  is  not necessary that they have acted in concert o r  e\·en that they be 
joined as defendants in the suit .  See id.  comment b.  
1 50 Unlike the plaintiff, the defendants will  actually be able to guard against the risk of  
insoh·ency. A deep pocket owner, for example ,  that  is fearful of a generator's solvency in the 
future can require, as a condition of recei\· ing the waste , a contribution up fron t  to insure again t  
the  possibil ity. 
1 5 1 See supra p. 1 6 2 8 .  
1 5 2 S ee :\Tote, supra note I I .) ,  at s S 6 .  
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become more receptive to statistical proof and allow proportional 
recovery. And, finally, enterprise liability must be adopted.  
The analysis of this Part also makes clear the significance of the 
reforms needea to make the tort system serve its traditional functions 
in toxic waste personal injury litigation . The ability of courts , even 
those so inclined , to implement these reforms will be severely tested .  
I t  is , therefore , appropriate to  consider more seriously the possibility 
for administrative compensation and regulatory deterrence in the con­
text of toxic waste personal injury. Ironically, the fate of legislative 
remedies may depend,  in part ,  on the prospects for recovery at com­
mon law. Only after the barriers guarding employers from liability 
began to break down did a political consensus emerge in support of 
workmen's compensation .  B ecause administrative compensation of 
toxic waste victims would be very costly, a similar political consensus 
might be necessary to make it a reality. 
X. ADMINIST RATIVE COMPENSATION 
A .  IntYoduction 
The common law of toxic torts places formidable obstacles in the 
path of a plaintiff who seeks to recover for personal injuries . 1 These 
obstacles make compensation through litigation a notoriously ineffi­
cient process .  The amount of compensation provided to injured par­
ties is dwarfed by the transaction costs involved . 2 Moreover, those 
resources that do reach victims3 tend to be distributed in a haphazard 
manner. The few plaintiffs who eventually prevail receive generous 
j ury awards , \vhereas a large number of perhaps equally deserving 
victims recr�ive nothing.  4 A federal program of administrative com­
pensation couw . � '- �iry many of these inefficiencies and inequities by 
focusing primarily on the provision of adequate relief to victims and 
1 See ge11 e rally supra Part IX. 
2 S e e  J .  K.A.KALIK.  P. E B E N E R ,  W. F E LSTINE R ,  G. HAGGSTROM & M .  SHANLEY, VARIATION 
I N  .-\S B ESTOS LITIGATIO?\ CoMPE NSATION AND ExPENSES at xi i-xix (Rand Corp. 1 984) (con­
cluding that l i tigation expenses consume roughly 63% of expenditures in  asbestos trials ,  leaving  
only 3 7 %  for ,·ictim aid ) ;  s e e  also In re "Agent Orange'" Prod. Liab . Litig . . 5 9 i  F. Supp .  740,  
S,p ( E . D . N .  \". 1 984 ) ( '' If much of a recovery wil l  go to attorneys and experts rather  than to 
those injured,  then traditional tort remedies may be so ineffccti\·,; as to put in  doubt their u ti lity 
in particular types of c ases . ") .  
3 The uncertain n ature of causation makes use of the term ''victim" problemat ic .  As used 
here.  the term "vict im" means one who h as been exposed to toxic  waste and who later deHlops 
a disease that may be attributable to such exposure, regardless of w hether exposure was the 
cause-in-fact of the disease .  
4 For example, those who were "fortunate" enough to ha\"C been exposed to asbestos - a 
toxin that lean.:s telltale traces i n  its ,·ictims - ha,·e been relati,·eiy successful under the common 
law, albeit only after prolonged court battles. Those exposed to toxins that do not leave such 
traces face a more difficult task when they seck compensation .  
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only secondarily - if at all - on the identification and punishment 
of responsible parties . 
Administrative compensation schemes have emerged in  other areas 
in which tort l itigation  was felt to be an inadequate means of dispute 
resolution .  For example , the failure of the common law to provide a 
swift or  certain remedy for laborers injured on the job  spurred the 
creation of a system of workers' compensation . 5 Workers' compen­
sation had three major  goals :  guaranteeing those inj ured in industrial 
accidents at least a subsistence level of compensation ;  forcing manu­
facturers to internalize  the social cost of workplace inj uries;  and avoid­
ing lengthy, costly, and uncertain litigation . 6 The desire to achieve 
analogous goals in the area of hazardous waste litigation  may make 
administrative compensation a preferable alternative to reforms of the 
common law tort system . 
This Part focuses on  the compensation of individuals who are 
exposed to releases from toxic waste generation and storage facilities .  
The discussion ,  however, has broader implications .  Administrative 
compensation could be extended to individuals who are exposed to 
toxic substances through employment? or through the consumer prod­
uct market. 8 Indeed, some have argued that given the difficulty of 
determining which individuals are the victims of e:r.:posure-related (as 
opposed to natural) disease ,  no principled distinction exists between 
toxic exposure compensation and a broader program of national health 
insurance for all chronic disease victims. 9 Although there is some 
appeal to the proposition that disease victims should be compensated 
based on need rather than on cause of inj ury, the argument for toxic 
exposure victim compensation rests on narrower premises.  Discrete , 
identifiable segments of the population have an artificially high risk 
of developing chronic disease and therefore have suffered a real in-
5 The historical development of  workers' compensation is summarized i n  W .  KEETON , D .  
DOBBS , R.  KEETON & D .  OWEN, PROSSER A :'< D  KEETON ON THE L A W  OF TORTS § So,  at 5 7 2-
80 ( 5 th ed. I 984) [hereinafter c i ted as  PROSSER AND KEETON]. For a description of e lements 
common to many workers' compensation programs, see I A .  LARSON , THE LA\V OF WORKMEN'S 
(O!'v! PEKSATJON § I .  I O  ( I 95 2 ) .  
6 See I A .  LARSO N ,  supra note 5 ,  § 2 . 20 ,  a t  7 (noting that t h e  p hilosophy of workers' 
compensation is to provide, "in the most e fficient ,  most dignified , and most certain form, financial 
and medical benefits which an enlightened community would feel obliged to provide in any case 
[and to] allocat[e] the burden of  these payments to the most appropriate source") .  
; For a discussion of  the difficulties facing victims of occupational disease under the workers' 
compensation system,  see Note, C o mpensating Victims of Occupational  D isease ,  93 HARV. L.  
REV. 9 1 6  ( ! 980) .  
s See, e .g . . Robinson , J'vfultiple Causation in Tort Lace•: R eflections on tlz e  DES Cases, 68 
'. 'A. L. REv.  7 1 3  ( 1 98 2 )  (discussing issues aris ing from consume r exposure to D E S )  
9 See  Kinsley, Fate a n d  Lawsu its: Li t igation Doesn't Work . J-lo'ic' a b o u t  Socialis m ? ,  ="l EW 
REPUBLIC ,  June 1 4 ,  r gSo. at 2 0 ,  2 4  ("The law is indifferent to any sufferer w hose cancer was 
not caused by [exposure to harmful  drugs! ,  thus placing great moral and financ ial weight on a 
d istinction that science cannot make . ") .  
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jury. l O All exposed individuals must live in fear of, and some will 
eventually die from , exposure-related diseases . These victims are in­
voluntary participants in a game of toxic-exposure roulette , and some 
of them are bound to lose . Thus , despite the difficulties of determining 
precisely which exposure victims suffer from exposure-related inj uries, 
the artificial risks imposed on discrete segments of the population are 
a powerful j ustification for compensation .  
The remainder of this Part will examine possible methods o f  struc­
turing an administrative compensation system ,  drawing on both preex­
isting proposals 1 1  and independent analysis .  Under an administrative 
program , exposed individuals would file claims for compensation with 
a government agency, rather than filing complaints against waste 
generators in court. 12 Claimants would bear the burden of establish­
ing their eligibility for the program . 1 3 The agency would then deter­
mme the appropriate amounts to be awarded ,  14  and successful claim­
ants would recover from either the government or the party 
1 0 The risks faced by these individuals thus differ from the risks faced by those who would 
be the beneficiaries of  n ational health insurance .  National health insurance would essentially 
shift the background risk of disease, which threatens everyone ,  from individual victims to 
society in  general . A toxic exposure compensation scheme, on the other hand, would shift only 
artificially imposed and unevenly distributed risk .  Artificially imposed risks that are fairly evenly 
distributed ( for example ,  the health risk posed by air pollution) do not present as strong a case 
for compensation , because a large segment of the population both contributes to the p roblem 
and bears the excess risk. In moral terms, compensation i s  not required because the risk i mposed 
is reciprocal. In economic terms, the transaction costs of  determining who suffers from pollution­
related disease are prohibiti\·e .  Private health insu rance is l ikely to be a more efficient method 
of spreading these risks than is administrative compensation .  
I I Among the  more elaborate proposals are SUPERFUND SECTION J O I ( E )  STUDY G ROUP,  
INJURIES AND DAMAGES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTES - ANALYSIS Al\"D IM PROVEMENT OF LEGAL 
REMEDIES (Comm. Print I 98 2 )  [hereinafter c ited as C ERCLA STUDY] ; KEYSTONE CENTER, 
POTENTIAL APPROACHES FOR TOXIC EXPOSURE COMPENSATION: A REPORT ON THE CONCLU­
SIONS OF A KEYSTONE CENTER POLICY DIALOGUE ( I 985 ) [hereinafter cited as KEYSTONE PRO­
POSA L) ;  Soble , .·1 Proposal for the A dminis trative Compensation of Victims of Toxic S u bs tance 
Pollution: ..J. J\tlodel Ac t ,  I 4 HARV. J .  ON LEGIS.  683 ( I 9 7 7) ;  Trauberman, Statu tm·y R eform of 
"Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic B u rdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 
HAR\'. ENVTL. L. REV. I 7 /  ( I 98J ) .  
I Z Claimants would most  l ikely become eligible for  compensation only after they had devel­
oped diseases that might be attributable to exposure. Alternatively, claimants could receive 
compensation immediately after exposure. See infra pp. I 65 I -S 2 .  
1 3 Criteria for establishing eligibility requirements are discussed below at pp.  r 6 3 7-44 . The 
agency would presumably follow some quasi-judicial procedure in order to determine whether 
c laims were meritorious. One advantage of administrative compensation is that factual disputes 
could be resoh·ed by agency experts, who would be better able to understand compiex scientif,c 
evidence than would a lay jury. Moreover, the agency could resolve such issues in  unified 
proceedings for al l  of  the indi\·iduals exposed at a given site , so that victims would no  longer 
be forced to l itigate these issues individually and at great expense. The ability of the tort syst�m 
to accomplish this result through procedural devices such as class actions is u nclear. See supm 
Part IX pp. r 6 2 3-2-\ ·  
1 4  See infra pp .  I 645-48.  
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responsible for the hazardous waste release . 1 5  The following three 
Sections discuss three interrelated problems: determining eligibility, 
awarding damages , and financing the administrative fund.  
B .  Causation: The Key to S tructuring E ligibili ty 
In order to remain within its proper scope , a compensation system 
for toxic exposure must distinguish eligible exposure victims from the 
sufferers of natural disease . The common law system employs two 
major screening mechanisms to identify eligible parties :  in order to 
succeed ,  plaintiffs must show "legal causation" and "medical causa­
tion .  " 1 6  Together, these two requirements may prevent the vast  ma­
jority of victims from recovering in  tort .  An administrative compen­
sation system could respond to this problem by eliminating the legal 
causation requirement and by relaxing the medical causation require­
ment. 
Proof of legal causation is impossible if a victim cannot identify 
which of many possible defendants is responsible for producing the 
waste to which she was exposed. Absent such identification ,  courts 
traditionally have not assessed tort liability against any waste handler; 
the tort system therefore has provided no compensation to the victim. 
A maj or advantage of an administrative system is that i t  would allow 
the victim to recover directly from a compensation fund ,  regardless 
of whether the responsible waste handler could be identified. Such a 
system would remove the legal causation hurdle from the victim's 
path . 1 7 
The difficulties created by long latency periods and uncertain med­
ical causation will not be eliminated so easily; these problems will 
present novel challenges for any toxic exposure compensation system . 
Identifying individuals  who have exposure-related disease is inherently 
more complicated than identifying the victims of typical industrial 
accidents. Ordinarily, the victim of an industrial accident has little 
trouble showing that her inj ury is "work-related" :  the causal l ink to 
employment is obvious, and the injury manifests i tself immediately. 1 8 
By contrast, the only "injury" that generally occurs at the time of 
toxic exposure is an increased risk of developing a disease that might 
1 5 See i nji·a pp .  1 65 4-5 9 .  
1 6  "Lt:gal causation" refers to the abil ity o f  an exposed individual to identify the waste 
handler responsible for the release to which the individual was exposed . · 'Medical causation" 
refers to a disease victim's abil ity to demonstrate that exposure was the cause-in-fact o f  her 
disease .  This terminology is used in  conformity with Part IX.  See supra Part I X  p p .  r 6 1 7-1 8 .  
1 ; The  problem of  legal causation remains central to  the issue o f  program financing,  which 
will be discussed below at pp .  1 65 4-5 9 ·  
1 " Occupational diseases are a n  exception t o  this general ru le ,  b u t  they arc simply special 
cases of hazardous substance exposure.  S ee supra note 7 .  
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have developed even in the absence of exposure. 1 9 Even when sci­
entists can measure the increase in risk faced by a certain exposed 
group , they cannot distinguish members of the group who suffer the 
disease because of the exposure from those who would have developed 
the disease regardless of  the exposure . The difficulty of establishing 
medical causation indicates that any administrative compensation pro­
gram will face pervasive problems of under- and over-inclusiveness . 
A concrete example may serve as a convenient focus for discussion.  
Consider a situation in which two exposed individuals later develop 
diseases of the kind that could have been caused by their exposure . 
Assume that there is a 6o% probability that the first victim's disease 
was caused by exposure and a 40% probability that the second victim's 
disease was caused by exposure. For the sake of simplicity, assume 
further that each disease causes a $ I oo injury. The expected value of 
aggregate exposure-related injury would then be equal to $ I oo .  20 
The $ I oo represents the appropriate amount of wealth that should 
be transferred from waste handlers to exposure victims .  Some such 
transfer  is justifiable ,  even though the causation question can never 
be answered with scientific certainty in individual cases .  G iven this 
scientific uncertainty, policymakers must determine "whether it  is  so­
cially desirable to conclude that an activity caused an injury. "2 1  The 
remainder of this Section will discuss the implications of applying the 
traditional "more probable than not" causal test in the context of toxic 
exposure , and then will examine the use of presumptions as an alter­
native means of dealing with the problem . 
I .  The Nlore-Probable-Than-Not S tandaYd 
The traditional standard of causation in tort - which asks whether 
it is more probable than not that the defendant caused the plaintiff 's 
injury - awards all-or-nothing compensation to exposure victims,  
depending on their ability to show that exposure was more than s o% 
likely to have caused their disease .  Thus , in the above example ,  the 
6o% ("high-causation") victim recovers the full $ I oo ,  but the 40% 
("low-causation") victim receives nothing. Given the restrictive facts 
of the hypothetical, justice is achieved on an aggregate level because 
waste handlers pay $ I oo to victims .  In reality, this result will be 
reached only if two rather unlikely conditions are met. First the 
high-causation victim must be able to overcome the numerous prac-
1 9 Sec  gencvall_v C ERCLA STUDY , s upm note r 1 ,  at app .  J ( setting forth epidemiological 
data on the health effects of toxic substances) .  
2 0  This  number is obtained by summing the  expected \·alue of the  indi\· idual injuries :  the 
first Yictim has an inj u r y  of . 6o times $ r oo ,  or  :36o; the second \·ictim has an injury of  . .fO times 
7 1 KEYSTO);E PROPOSA L ,  supra note I I ,  at 8 .  
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tical and legal impediments that face all exposure victims . 2 2  For 
example , plaintiffs must have the resources to procure sophisticated 
medical testimony in order to demonstrate that exposure-related risks 
exceed background risks . Without such testimony, even high-causa­
tion victims cannot recover. Second , victims must be spread sym­
metrically along the causal spectrum.  When low-causation victims 
predominate , the traditional standard will lead to under-recovery;23 
when high-causation victims predominate , the standard will lead to 
over-recovery and , if recovery is from the industry, over-deterrence 
of waste-generating  activity. 
Whether the traditional standard is fair for any individual victim 
depends upon whether one adopts a deterministic or a probabilistic 
causal perspective . Under a deterministic view, which treats injuries 
as being caused either completely by exposure or completely by back­
ground factors, the traditional standard may be the best possible guess 
at fair victim compensation .  Under the facts of the above hypothet­
ical ,  however, such a standard yields an incorrect result 40% of the 
time . High-causation victims will always receive full compensation ,  
even though they wi l l  in  fact have been injured in  only 6o% of the 
cases. Conversely, low-causation victims will never receive compen­
sation , even though they will be the "real" victims in 40% of the cases.  
A probabilistic view of causation considers victims to have been 
injured in proportion to the likelihood that their diseases were caused 
by toxic exposure .  24  In the above example ,  exposure would cause a 
$6o injury to the high-causation victim and a $40 i nj ury to the low­
causation victim. From a probabilistic perspective , the more-proba­
ble-than-not standard never achieves justice on an individual level 
because the high-causation victim receives full compensation and the 
low-causation victim receives nothing even though both victims are 
partially injured by exposure .  Although the deterministic view is 
intuitively appealing, the probabilistic view more accurately reflects 
the current state of scientific knowledge in most cases of toxic expo­
sure. An administrative compensation system could adopt a proba­
bilistic perspective and provide some damages to many possible vic­
tims rather than attempt to identify and provide full compensation to 
the "real"  victims . Although the tort system could be transformed to 
2 2 For a discussion of the numerous reasons why at p resent even high-causation victims may 
be unable to recover, see Part IX. Cf I n  re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.  Litig . , 5 9 7  F. Supp.  
7 40.  833-42  ( E . D .  N . Y. r 984) (discussing the problems of identif1cation and  p roof that face toxic 
exposure plaintiffs both indi\'idually and in  groups). 
2 3 To return to the example set forth above at p. 1 63 5 , note that i f  only the low-causation 
Yictim had been exposed, no recove;-y would be possible even though the re lease h ad caused 
:3.�.0 in damages. 
2 4  See Rosenberg. The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision 
of the Tort System, 9i HARV. L. REv. 849 ,  881-87  ( 1 984) .  
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take on a probabilistic perspective , 2 5 an administrative program would 
be preferable to a modified tort system if it reduced l itigation and 
thereby lowered transaction costs . 
2 .  Evidentiary Presumptions 
One method of providing some damages to many possible victims 
would be to employ evidentiary presumptions .  2 6 Presumptions entitle 
claimants who can prove certain "basic facts" to treat other facts as 
being true ,  even though no evidence has been introduced about these 
"presumed facts . "2 7  For example , claimants who could show exposure 
to toxins at a sufficiently high " trigger level" might be allowed the 
presumption that their diseases were in fact caused by exposure. A 
simple set of presumptions therefore would act as a threshold test 
dividing victims into two broad categories28  - those who can make 
the required showing of exposure above the trigger level and those 
who cannot .  No elaborate case-by-case inquiry into the relative levels 
of background and exposure-related risk would be necessary. Such 
presumptions could both lessen the evidentiary difficulties and alter 
the absolute burden of proof facing claimants . This Subsection will 
consider the evidentiary and substantive effects of presumptions .  It 
will then address the issue of who should set the presumptions ,  and 
will conclude by noting that an undesirable redirection of program 
benefits could result if the presumptions are not in harmony with the 
program's stated goals . 
(a) Type of Evidence Required .  - Evidentiary difficulties would 
be reduced if claimants could rely on proof of  objective facts about 
z s  See  supra Part  I X ,  pp .  r 6 2 1-2 2 .  
26 Several p roposed administrati\·e compensation schemes have recommended the use of 
evidentiary presumptions.  See C ERCLA STUDY, supra note I I ,  at I 98-2o4; Soble , supra note 
r r ,  at 7 44-4 7 ;  Trauberman , supra note I I . at 2 2 9-30 .  
z ;  Evidentiary presumptions can  be of  scHral types. I rrebuttable presumptions conclusively 
establish the ''truth " of  the p resumed fact ,  whereas the rebuttable presumptions herein discussed 
shift the burden of p roof to the opposing party. In  the context of medical causation ,  the two 
types of  p resumptions will often have identical effects. When the cause-in-fact  of a disease 
cannot be identified, a defendant can no more dispro\·c causation than a c laimant can prove i t .  
A d ifferent .  weaker form of rebuttable p resumption would merely shift the burden of  
p roduction . For a general discussion of the  intricacies of  evidentiary presumptions and burdens 
of proof. see generally 9 ]. WIGMORE . EVIDENCE IN TRJ..\LS AT COM:V!ON LAW § 2 4 83-2 493 1 g) 
( ] . C hadbourn re\·. ed.  r g8 r ) . 
z s Victims could be cli\·icled into any number of categories by using multiple trigger points 
for cliiferent le\·els of compensation .  For  example .  two trigger points would divide victims into 
three categories: low exposure ( no reco\·ery) ,  moderate exposure (some recovery) , and high 
exposure ( ful l  recover\·) . As more divisions are made , the program wil l  become simi lar to the 
p robabilistic approach and wil l  suffer from the same administrative burdens . See infm p .  1 646 .  
HAR VARD LAW REVIE W [Vol. 99 : 1 45 8 
the duration and severity of their exposure29 rather  than h aving to 
demonstrate in each case that the level of exposure-related risk ex­
ceeded the natural level of risk .  30 The basic facts regarding exposure 
should be easier to e stablish ; thus ,  employing a presumption would 
reduce the cost of making out a prima facie case for compensation . 
When the basic fact of exposure and the presumed fact of causation 
are closely correlated - that is , when claimants who were exposed 
to toxins at or  above the trigger level would generally be able to 
satisfy the traditional test were they to engage in a prolonged com­
parison of natural and exposure-related risk - the p resumption w ill  
merely act as a per se rule obviating the need for inquiry into the 
existence of the more difficult-to-determine presumed fact. 3 1  This 
device will be especially useful when the claimant can show that the 
connection between exposure and disease exists generally but cannot 
demonstrate the connection in the individual cas e .  U nder these cir­
cumstances ,  the p resumption will simply remove an evidentiary hurdle  
from the path of a victim who deserves to recover even under the 
traditional standard . 
(b) Level of Proof R equired .  - In addition to reducing a claimant's 
evidentiary problems , presumptions can directly alter the substantive 
standard of causation .  There is nothing magical about the s o% 
threshold. 3 2  Trigger points could be reduced in order to permit the 
operation of presumptions at significantly lower levels so that the 
problems faced by low-causation victims would be alleviated . 
! 9 For example ,  as a precondition to im·oking a rebuttable presumption of causation under 
one proposal , an individual must first meet three basic requirements :  ( I )  she must have a 
··co\·ercd" disease - that i s ,  a disease with a latency period long enough to justify special 
treatment; ( 2 )  she must show an exposure to hazardous substance ls ) ;  and ( .) )  she  must demonstrate 
a "reasonable l ikel ihood'' that the exposure could cause or be a "substantial factor" in causing  
her  disease. See Trauberman,  sup-ra note I I ,  at  2 2 9-30, 2 63 Any victim with a colorable 
claim of exposure-related injury should be able to meet these basic requirements .  Therefore , 
most of the burden of determining eligibility rests on other requirements relating to the level of  
exposure that  must be shown before the  presumption can be invoked. These  requirements arc 
discussed below at pp .  I 639 ,  I 64o . 
. lo E\•identiary presumptions wi l l  often eliminate the need for expensive medical testimony 
on the subject  of causation .  Also, the presumptions discussed herein make it  unnecessary for a 
\·ictim to "disprove that he smokes or drinks coffee with saccharine ,  or engages in s imilar, 
potentially harmful acti\·ities . "  C ERCLA STUDY. supra note I r ,  at 2 03 ( footnote omitted) . Note 
that in theory the system could be refined to take into account certain self-imposed risks. For 
example ,  smokers could be required to show more serious expo:;ure in o rder to be e ntitled to a 
presumption of causation for lung cancer. 
3 1 .-\s the correlation between the basic fact and the presumed fact becomes weaker, the 
presumption will cause benefits to be distributed to claimants who would not qualify for 
compensation absen t  the presump tion . See illjra pp .  I 64 I -44 . 
'2 Indeed, the more-probable-than-not standard is ,  in one sense , a kind of presumption :  
exposure is  presumed to be the only origin of the diseases of high-causation victims, whereas 
natural diseases arc presumed to be the exclusive source of suffering for low-causation victims. 
See  supra pp .  1 63 5 -3 6 .  
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If the traditional standard were abandoned in order to accommo­
date low-causation victims , it would become very difficult to articulate 
a principled method for setting  the trigger point. For example ,  the 
presumption recommended by the C ERCLA Study33  would operate if 
a victim could show "death or  the kind of injury or disease which is 
known to result from [the] exposure . "34 The "known to result" stan­
dard is clearly more lenient than a more-probable-than-not require­
ment, because victims need only show that the exposure could have 
produced the kind of disease from which they suffer. But the precise 
breadth of such a standard is unclear. 3 5  Whether the trigger point 
will correspond to a 30% probability that a victim's disease was 
exposure-related,  as opposed to a r o %  probability, is basically a policy 
decision concerning how widely program benefits should be spread .  
Naturally, this decision must be made in concert with decisions con­
cerning the amount of compensation to award successful claimants3 6  
and the source of  funding for the program. 3 7 
(c) S e tting the Trigger Level .  - B ecause the substantive choice 
involved in specifying a trigger level is  best left to policymakers ,  the 
issue - if raised at alP8 - is often dealt with in terms of identifying 
who shall make the decision .  For example , the CERCLA Study 
proposes that the authority to establish trigger levels be placed in the 
agency charged with administering the compensation fund.  To sup­
plement the general "known to result" presumption , the agency would 
develop "toxic substance documents , "  which would define the circum­
stances under which the most prevalent hazardous substances were 
J J  See C ERC L:\ STCDY, supra note I I .  
·14 ld .  at I 99 (emphasis added) .  
35 See i d .  at 2 0-1 ( acknowledging that the "known to result" standard could be ''too broad 
and could lead to over libe rality and abuse in [ i ts] application") .  
30 The proper amount of  aggregate victim compensation could be achieved by allowing  both 
h igh-causation and low-causation \'ictims to recover, but l imit ing recoveries to less than ful l  
damages. For  a discussion of the proper level of damage awards, see pp .  I 645-48.  
3 ;  Sec infra pp.  1 65 4-5 9 .  
3 3  U n fortunately, t h e  use of e\·idcn tiar\· presumptions c a n  o ften obscure the pi\·ota! issue o f  
causation .  For  example , Soble's p roposal al lows several rebuttable p resumptions t o  arise i f  an 
i njured party can show that ( I )  pollution has traveled through an " indicated pathway" to the 
inj u red person - that is, that the \·ict im has been exposed , and ( 2 )  the pollution ''resulted i n  
the etiology [medical origin] of the injury or disease . "  Soble, S 'IPra note I I ,  a t  7 -15 (emphasis 
added) .  The second condition would seem to require a strong showing of causation in order to 
be satisfied .  The proposed program, however, goes on to state that anyone who makes the 
necessary showings is entitled, inter al ia ,  to the presumption that "the toxic substance did result 
in  the etiology attributed to [it] by the showing . '' !d.  at 7 4 6 .  Thus ,  the victim is entitled onl\· 
to a p resumption about that ll'hich she has already been required to pnwe . Perhaps Soble 
means to suggest that a modest showing that a toxin te 11ds to .:ause the injury complained of 
will  entitle the \' ictim to the presumption that i t  has , i n  fact, caused the injury. The confusion 
created by using nearly identical language to describe both the basic fact and the fact to be 
presumed makes it unclear what causal showing i s  required . See C E RCL\ STUDY, .wpm note 
I I ,  at 2 1 5 - I S  (not ing the difficulties w ith the Soble p roposal ) .  
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known to .cause injury. 3 9 Victims who had been exposed to  these 
substances at levels in excess of the "triggers" specified by the toxic 
substances documents would be entitled to further presumptions .  The 
CERCLA Study envisions a hybrid approach :  b asic presumptions 
would be available to all toxic exposure victims , whereas more de­
tailed presumptions would be developed about widespread toxins as 
information became available . 
In contrast  with the the C ERCLA Study, which recommends that 
broad discretion be delegated to the agency, the Trauberman 
proposal4o would give the agency no  authority to adj ust trigger levels .  
Instead , presumptions would be available to  victims who could show 
that they were exposed under conditions that violated then-existing or 
current  federal standards .  41  The proposed program would base l ia­
bil ity on the violation of regulations not in order to reintroduce fault ,  
but rather to "reduce[]  the likelihood of open-ended liabil ity by re­
stricting the use of causal presumptions .  "42 
Conditioning eligibility for compensation on a showing that an 
exposure violated federal standards might not achieve this goal . If 
federal environmental standards became more strict ,  more victims 
would become entitled to a rebuttable presumption of causation . State 
regulation  would also affect  eligibility under the Trauberman pro­
posal , because "federal standards" are defined to include state regu­
lations promulgated under federal statutes such as the Resource Con­
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA) . Thus, this method of limiting 
the presumption does not eliminate the pos�ibility of "open-ended 
liability" ;  rather, it makes such l iability contingent upon the will  of 
state and federal regulators.  
The C ERCLA Study's single-agency approach allows for more 
informed decisionmaking .  The responsible agency would likely de­
velop greater expertise in the area than wou ld myriad federal and 
state agencies acting without coordination .  Furthermore , a single 
agency would be more aware of the effect of its actions on program 
-'9 S ee C E RC LA STUDY , supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 99-2 0 2 . Toxic :;ubstance documents would set 
forth: ( I )  the leHl. duration .  and type of  exposure deemed harmfu l ;  ( 2 )  the result ing disease's 
etiology. symptoms, latency period,  prognosis, and related health effects ;  and ( 3 )  known varia-
tions in  susceptibility to exposure (for example ,  by age or sex ) .  S ee id .  
40  See  Trauberman . supm note 1 1 .  
·> � S e e  id.  at 2 2 9-30 ,  2 63 .  The presumption would be allowed to operate i f  the victim could 
show either that federal standards had been violated or that "the exposure w as or  is of sufficient  
duration or quantity to cause the covered disease . "  S e e  id .  at  2 6:; . The c ausal showing required 
under the second branch of the test is not  specified ,  but Traub•:rman apparently contemplates 
a narrow scope for this branch of the test. Indeed,  except in cases in which in formation is 
una\·ai lable.  · 'the claimant must demonstrate that the exposur•: levels exceeded federal stan­
dards . ' ' !d.  at 2 30 .  Thus , the second branch of the requirement i:; eifectively a fallback p rovision 
for victims who can demonstrate exposure ,  but who do not know whether the exposure exceeded 
federal standards. 
42 !d.  at 2 3 0 .  
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eligibility and would become a focal point for public opinion on these 
matters.  43 Program eligibility would not be altered by unpublicized 
decisions to change environmental standards . 
Finally, and most fundamentally, the single-agency approach is 
preferable because there is no a priori reason to expect that current 
toxic substance exposure regulations are maintained at levels appro­
priate for causal presumptions.  44 Regulations may be set at levels 
more stringent than needed to prevent harm to human health , in  order 
to protect other aspects of the environment. 45 Although marginal 
violations of such regulations would present no threat to human 
health , they might still give rise to a presumption of causation for 
exposed individuals who happened to develop illnesses of the kind 
that could have been caused by the toxin had the release been more 
serious. Conversely, some regulations  might allow levels of pollution 
that are admittedly a threat to health because of the overall beneficial 
effect of the regulated activity. 46 Although weighing social costs and 
benefits is desirable when deciding whether to allow a given level of 
activity, the existence of benefits in excess of costs does not necessarily 
mean that inj ured parties should remain uncompensated.  Separating 
the regulation of toxins from the compensation of victims will  make 
it possible to set appropriate standards in both areas . 
(d) Radical Presumptions: The B lack Lung Example . - The ev­
identiary and substantive effects of  presumptions , although closely 
related in practice , are logically distinct .  By simplifying the inquiry 
into causation , presumptions can enable high-causation claimants to 
win compensation awards with greater ease . B ecause these claimants 
would be entitled to compensation even under the traditional stan­
dard , this effect is clearly beneficial . In addition , by changing the 
standard of causation , presumptions can extend administrative bene­
fits to victims who would not otherwise be eligible . This outcome 
4.i The C E RCL.·\ Study would allow for public comment on all p roposed toxic substance 
doc uments . S e e  C ER C LA STUDY. s upra note r r ,  at 2 00 .  F inal decisions of the agency could 
be subj ected to judicial rcYiew. 
44 See l'-E'iSTONE PROPOSAL. supra note I I ,  at 48 (questioning whether "exposure l imits or 
other gO\·e rnmcntal standards" should be admissible "evidence Df the proper standard of  con­
duc t , "  because such standards might be "undul:�· pol itic ized and not necessarily . fair reflec­
tions of  any scientific consensus" ) .  
45 The theory of alternati1·e l iabil ity, discussed in  Part  IX at pp .  r 6 2 5 -2 6 ,  sanctions a shift 
in the burden of proof to the defendant upon a showing that the defendant has breached a duty 
of care - in this context . a federal regulation .  This theory applies,  however, only if the  duty 
is owed io tlze <.> ict illl . See  Trauberman,  supra note I I ,  at 2 3 0  n . 3 2 i . Although the purpose of 
most standards dealing 11·ith toxins is u ndoubtedly to p rotect potential victims from u nsafe levels 
of  exposure . some regulations may seek to p rotect the environment in general o r  certain vul­
nerable species of wildlife .  In these situations,  1·iolation of the regulation is not a breach of a 
duty of care 011·ed to potential 1·ict ims, but rather an assaul t  on the environment in general . 
46 The regulation of air pollution might be an example of this  situation .  
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may or may not be viewed as beneficial , depending o n  one's policy 
outlook. 
Presumptions will have an additional effect .  B ec ause the existence 
of the basic facts of exposure will not correlate perfectly with the 
ability of claimants to satisfy a risk comparison test ,  an elemen t  of 
randomness will be introduced into the program . At the extreme , if 
the connection  between the basic fact and the presumed fact is very 
unreliable , the presumption may transform a program by significantly 
altering the class of eligible people in a manner inconsistent with 
program goals . 4 7 The federal administrative compensation program 
for coal miners with pneumoconiosis (black lung disease)48 illustrates 
these problems . 
In order to expedite the recovery of benefits by disabled miners , 
several presumptions have been established . Miners with more than 
ten years of exposure to coal dust who have pneumoconiosis are 
entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they contracted the disease 
because of employment. 49 The presence of certain pathological ab­
normalities in the lung serves as irrebuttable proof of total disability 
or death due to pneumoconiosis . 50 Additionally, a number of guide-
4 7 This effect is different from the systematic lowering of the substantive c ausal standard 
discussed aboYe at pp. 1 638-39 .  Reliable presumptions can expand e l igibil ity uniformly to a 
class of victims who nearly qualified for compensation under the traditional standard - for 
example,  those victims who could show a probability of between 30% and so% that they 
contracted their diseases through exposure. U nreliable p resumptions might make some individ­
uals eligible despite an extremely low probability that their diseases were exposure-related,  whi le  
at the same time denying the c laims of victims whose injuries were much more l ikely to have 
been exposu re-related. 
4 8 See 30 U . S C §§ 901-962  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
49 S e e  i d .  § 92  I ( C )( r l  ( 1 982 ) .  
Although other causes, such  as  smoking , contribute to  pneumoconiosis and  similar diseases, 
the excessive rate at which miners fall victim to the disease appeared to j ustify this presumption .  
Cf. Usery v .  Turner E lkhorn Mining Co . , 4 2 8  U . S .  I ,  6 & n . 1  ( 1 9 76 )  ( noting that in 1 969  
pneumoconiosis rates were 10% for active coal miners and w% for inactive coal miners ) .  
The  Turner Elkhorn Court  upheld the  presumptions in the  Black Lung Act against a due 
process attack and held that there need be only '"some r ational connection between the fact 
p roved and the ultimate fact p resumed'"  in o rder for the p resumptions to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Id. at 28 ( q uoting IVIobile . ] .  & K.  C .  R .  Co. v .  Turnipseed ,  2 1 9 U . S .  3 5 ,  43 ( 1 9 1 0) ) .  
Although the  Constitution may require on ly  "some rational connection , '' a closer l inkage would 
better serve public policy. 
so S e e  30 U . S C .  § 92 1 (c )(3 ) ( 1 98 2 ) .  
Before 1 98 2 ,  three other rebuttable p resumptions operated b\· statute . Section 9 2 1 (c )( 2 )  
allowed a presumption that death was caused by pneumoconiosis upon a showing of r o  years' 
exposure to coal dust followed by death from any respiratory disease . Under � 9 2  1 ( c ) ( 4 ) ,  
pneumoconiosis was presumed to  be the  cause of any  total respiratory o r  pulmonarv disability 
experienced by miners who had worked for 15 or more years. And S 92 r ( c )( S )  extended survi\·ors' 
benefits to dependents of miners with 25 years' experience who had died prior to 1 9 7 8 ,  unless 
it could be established that the miners were not disabled by p neumoconiosis when they died .  
B ecause i t  is Hry difficult to  establish that a miner's pneumoconiosis d id  not  arise from exposure 
to coal dust .  coal companies were unable to rebut these presumptions,  and therefore a great 
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lines were promulgated under which miners could presumptively es­
tablish that they had been disabled by pneumoconiosis . 5 1 Miners with 
ten years of exposure to coal dust who could not pass certain rather 
stringent tests of cardiovascular fitness were presumed to be dis­
abled . 5 2  
Unfortunately, the guidelines failed to take into account that car­
diovascular performance declines with age . The guidelines therefore 
enabled elderly miners with test results near normal for their age to 
qualify as totally disabled . 5 3 The failure of the guidelines to reflect 
medical realities effected a major  change in the impact of the program . 
Instead of providing only disabled miners with a portion of their lost 
wages ,  all miners with serious - although perhaps not disabling -
cases of pneumoconiosis were entitled to recover, as were many elderly 
miners with no serious inj uries whatsoever. 
This s ituation illustrates a inherent difficulty with presumptions:  
they can serve as a politically expedient method of manipulating the 
scope of a program . Presumptions can be altered in order to restrict 
or expand eligibility, and often such action will not be subjected to a 
great deal of public scrutiny. 5 4 The government may certainly seek 
to provide compensation to all who are inj ured or aged rather than 
many miners and their dependents recovered under the Act .  These presumptions were made 
inapplicable by the passage of  the B lack Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1 98 1 ,  Pub L. No. 9 7 -
r 1 9 ,  � 202 ( b) , 95 Stat. 1 635 . 1 643 , in part because t h e  scope o f  eligibil ity had become too 
expansi\· e .  See C ERCLA STUDY. supm note I r ,  at 2 1 3 (stating that the presumptions "in the 
later view of Congress, had led to an excessive number of  claims and vastly greater expenditures 
than had been anticipated" ) .  
5 ! These �uide!ines were established by the Department of Labor. See Review of Pending 
and Denied C laims Under the B lack Lung Benefits Reform Act of I 9 7 7 ,  20 C . F . R. �§ 7 2 7 . 200-
2 06 ( I 984) .  
5 2  \Vithout a doubt .  these p resumptions served the purpose of admin istrabi l i ty. Making 
decisions on the basis of objec tive data avoids subjective inquir ies i nto the ability of  particular 
victims to work in  spite of their i nj u ries .  Cf. H . R. REP. No. r s r ,  95 th Cong . , 2d Sess. 5 ,  
reprin ted in r 9 7 8  C .  S .  CoDE CONG . & AD. NEws 2 3 7 ,  2 .  p ("In recognition of the historically 
demonstrated and exceedingly high probabil ity of total disabil ity an obj ective test was 
establ ished to simply pro\· ide benefits payments to all c laimants whose claims had been 
denied and who could demonstrate 30 or  more years of underground coal mining experience . " ) .  
5 3 See Solomons,  A Critical A na lysis of the Legislative History S urrounding the Black L u ng 
Interim Presumption a n d  a S u rvey of its Unresolved Issues ,  83 W. VA. L .  REv. 8 6 9 ,  8 7 7-84 
( r 98 I l ( assailing the guidelines for being unjustifiably over-inclusive) .  
5 4  O n e  commentator has noted: 
(T]he flaw in the [administrati\·ej presumption arises from the fact that i t  was conce ived , 
packaged ,  and sold to the Congress and the American publ ic as a legitimate mechanism 
for compensating the real ,·ictims of black lung disease . It  i s  not. Instead, i t  partially 
accomplishes indi rectly what certain congressional advocates could not do directly[ , ]  that 
is .  to turn the black lung program into a de facto federal pension program for some older 
retired miners This is not an exercise which should be repeated without a ful l  
awareness on the  part of Congress and  the American public of the  nature,  scope , and 
consequence of the action proposed. 
I d.  at 9 T 5 ( footnote omitted ) :  see  id .  at 882-83  ( concluding that political pressure to expand 
el igibil ity for the program led to the adoption of unrealistic e\· iden tiary presumptions )  
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restricting benefits only to those who are totally disabled , but such a 
choice should be made openly rather than being disguised by pre­
sumptions .  
The experience of the black lung program suggests that specifying 
the causal eligibility requirements for a toxic exposure compensation 
fund will be a thorny political problem .  This prospect is all the more 
discouraging given that the B lack Lung Act deal t  with a relatively 
simple toxic exposure problem . The program focused on a single 
disease , and it could rely on decades' worth of evidence linking that 
disease to the inhalation of coal dust. By contrast ,  a toxic exposure 
program would most l ikely have to deal with thousands of toxic agents 
whose health effects are not well-established.  5 5  
(e) Conclusion.  - Presumptions clearly can ease the plight of 
victims by reducing the costs of making out a case for compensation 
and by expanding the class of victims potentially able to bring such 
a case . They can also reduce the costs to society of  protracted case­
by-case litigation over similar issues . B ut presumptions j ust as clearly 
can have a negative impact: unless presumptions come reasonably 
close to representing the underlying realities of toxic exposure , the 
administrative program will degenerate into a random compensation 
scheme for certain victims of chronic disease . Setting effective pre­
sumptions requires that a sophisticated understanding of the health 
effects of various toxins be developed and that a consciOus choice be 
made regarding how widely to spread program benefits . 5 6  
C .  Danwges R e coverable 
In addition to establishing a set of presumptions to determine who 
may recover, an administrative compensation scheme must determine 
the amount and timing of recovery. In resolving these issues ,  two 
competing goals should be pursued. First, in order to achieve fairness 
among victims ,  compensation should be proportional to injury. s 7 Sec­
ond,  for internal program efficiency, determinations about compen-
5 '  Congress could address th is  lack of  i n formation by proceeding on  an ad hoc bas is .  As 
more information becomes a\·ailable about the harmful effects of various toxins ,  Congress could 
es tabli:;h compensation funds narrowly targeted at the most pervasive threats to public health .  
This  approach was exernplified i n  the 1 9 70S by the B lack Lung Program and various proposals 
for  the compensation of asbestos workers .  For a description of some legislative proposals dealing 
with asbestos . s e e  Comment.  Relifj for A sbestos Victims: A Legislative A nalys is , 20 HARV. J .  
O N  LEGIS .  r 7 9  ( I 98 J ) .  G i\·en the low degree of public concern � or  even awareness - of the 
problems posed by w:.;ins,  a piecemeal response to toxic exposure was perhaps all that could be 
expected i n  the 1 9 7 0 5 .  A.t present.  however, heightened public awareness makes a comprehensive 
solution 1nor e:  l ikely. 
5 6  This choice should be made in light of the source of p rogram funding and the amount of 
damages that successiul c laimants wil l  rece iH.  
' ;  .-\.gai n .  t h e  '' iairness " of any i ndividual case depends on one's perspective with respect to 
causation .  See  s11pra p. 1 63 6 .  
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sation awards should not create excessive transaction costs . 5 8 If these 
goals are achieved, funds will be effectively channeled to deserving 
victims . This Section discusses the amount of compensation that 
should be awarded ,  the treatment of collateral sources of recovery, 
the role of the tort system once an administrative compensation pro­
gram is in operation , and the timing of compensation .  
I .  Determining the Appropriate A mount of Recovery 
A compensation system's causation requirement will greatly influ­
ence the size of damage awards. For example , the traditional tort 
system required a very strong causal showing .  The defendant could 
be held l iable only upon proof that, more likely than not, he caused 
the plaintiff 's injuries;  therefore , shifting the costs of the injury to the 
defendant was appropriate . 5 9 Tort awards are based on an indivi­
dualized calculation of the inj ury's impact on the plaintiff, because 
they seek to make the plaintiff whole . Recovery is available for 
intangible injuries ,  such as pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of 
life , as well as for more concrete economic injuries .  6 0  
A diluted causation requirement - which allows many disease 
victims to recover even though toxic exposure may not have been the 
primary cause of their inj uries - makes full compensation for all 
successful claimants problematic . If the program is justified as a toxic 
exposure compensation scheme,  rather than as national health insur­
ance ,  aggregate compensation should be roughly equal to aggregate 
exposure-related inj ury. Also ,  if the program is financed through taxes 
on industry, fully compensating all sufferers .of chronic disease will 
result in over-deterrence . Therefore , an administrative compensation 
scheme should offer victims a trade-off: relaxed causation require­
ments will increase the number of victims who receive compensation ,  
s s  In addition to these two goals ,  the compensation mechanism might seek to diminish the 
anxiety of exposure \'ict ims ,  see infm pp. 1 65 3-5 4 ,  or to encourage the generation of useful 
informatio n .  For example,  "discountable" presumptions - w hich impose l iabil ity on waste 
handl e rs but allow a reduction of l i abil ity if there is a significant probabil ity that the i nj ury 
was not caused by exposure - would encourage information disclosure by waste gene rators , 
who may be in the best position to know about the exposure-re lated health effects of toxins. 
See Note, The Inapplicabil i ty of Tradit ional Tort A nalysis to  Environmental R isks: The E xa mple 
of Toxic l·l"aste Pollut io n  Vic t im Compensation ,  35 STAN. L.  REV. 5 7 5 ,  6 1 3-q (! g8 3 ) .  U nror­
tunately, the use of discountable presumptions would e m broil the compensation system in lengthy 
disputes o\·er causation on a case-by-case basis and therefore may not be the cheapest method 
of generating i n formati o n .  
5 9  Cf PROSSER AND KEETO:\ , s upra note 5 ,  § 5 2 ,  a t  345 ("Where no [logical]  basis [for 
apportionment] can be fou n d ,  the courts generally hold the defendant for the entire loss, 
notwithstanding the fac t  tlzat  other causes h ave co ntributed to i t . " )  (emphasis added) .  
60 See RESTATEM ENT ( SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 2 4  ( 1 9 7 9) .  
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but awards will be for less than full damages,  6 1  perhaps compensating 
victims only for that part of their injuries attributable to toxic expo­
sure . Partial compensation will prevent the imposition of an onerous 
burden on taxpayers or a crushing l iability on industry. 
If transaction costs were not a concern , the best method of reduc­
ing damage awards would be to compensate the disease victim only 
in proportion to the exposure-related increase in the probability of 
developing disease .  Individualized damages could be calculated by 
determining the full cost of each victim's inj ury62 and then reducing 
that amount to reflect the probability that her injury was not exposure­
related .  63 Thus , a share of the victim's damages proportional to the 
excess risk would be compensable , whereas the expenses proportional 
to the background level of risk would be borne by the victim . C om­
pensation would not be completely denied simply because exposure 
was not the most probable cause of a victim's injuries .  Such a prob­
abilistic damage system would align victims along the causal spec­
trum , with the size of recovery tied directly to the relative strength 
of each victim's causal showing. 
Unfortunately, a system of probabilistic damages can only be as 
accurate as its ability to identify precisely the relative levels of natural 
and artificially created risk and the actual amount of damages .  Risk 
quantification is a highly complex and imperfect science .  Opposing 
experts rarely agree on the proportion of injuries attributable to ex­
posure . 64 Generating enough information to determine precisely 
where each individual falls along the causal spectrum would be cum­
bersome and costly. 6 5 In-depth inquiries into the p recise extent of 
each individual's full  damages would also be very expensive . 6 6  
6 !  See 1 A .  LARSON ,  supra note s ,  § §  2 .  r o , 2 . 5 0 .  Larson contrasts workers '  compensation 
with tort liabili ty· and notes that the causation requ irements of the former are weake r, see id. 
§ 2. ro , but that the amounts awarded are smaller, see id.  at § 2. so .  
62  The "full" value can be defined descriptively as the amou nt that vict ims could reco,·cr i n  
tort, or  normative ly, a s  t h e  true value o f  t h e  injury. The  former amount wili be greater, t o  the 
extent that j uries overcompensate victims . 
1'3 For example, an exposure that increased the probability of de,·elop ing cancer fror:1 2 out 
of  rooo to 3 out of r ooo wou ld entitle an exposed cancer victim to one third of  full damages. 
See Rosenberg, s upra note 2 4 ,  at 85 9 n . 4 3 .  
04 The . l genl Orange  court  noted that reasonable estimatES of the amount  of artificially 
c reated risk may "range from almost zero to well O\"er r w·· (when expressed as a percentage of 
the backgrou nd risk) In  re "Agent Orange " Prod. Liab . Litig , 597 F. Supp .  740, 836 ( £  D N . Y  
1 984) ;  s ee  also Allen v .  United States ,  5 8 8  F .  Supp.  2 4 7 ,  4 3 8 .  4 .3 9  & n .  l< J /  ( D  Utah 1 984)  
( reponing ,·arying expert estimates of the proportion of leukemia attributable to the atmospheric 
testing of atomic weapons) .  
65 Requ i r ing each claimant to pro,·e the relati,·e level  of exposure-related risk in  order to 
receive damages would u ndercut the usefulness of presumptions, which e l im inate the need for 
such inqui ries in establ ishing e ligibi l ity. See  supra pp .  r 63 7-38 .  
01' Sec Rosenberg, s upra note 2 4 ,  a t  g r 6  ("Possiblv t h e  greatest source of k; -z:'.� ion e:;penses 
[in mass exposure cases ] is the individual assessment and dist.ributior - �  uo:  
follow tr ial  of common l iabil it,· q uestions . ") . 
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The use of presumptions allows a cruder but more administrable 
approach to awarding compensation .  Inquiries into the extent of each 
victim's damages can be avoided if damages are awarded according 
to uniform procedures . Standardized schedules can be used to provide 
uniform damages to all who suffer certain kinds of injury. 6 7 The level 
of such awards should be well below full damages , because relaxed 
causation requirements allow recovery by many victims whose inj uries 
may have arisen through natural causes .  By reducing recoveries uni­
formly for the entire class of victims rather than making case-by-case 
damage determinations , administrative compensation programs are 
able to cut transaction costs and thus to channel a greater proportion 
of expenditures into direct victim aid .  6 8  A standardized schedule of 
awards simple enough to be easily administrable ,  however, might not 
be sensitive enough to reflect the differing severity of possible inj uries . 
Instead of using standardized schedules , recoveries could be re­
duced from full value by allowing compensation for only some of the 
kinds of damages available under the tort system. For example , the 
C ERCLA Study recommended limiting recovery to replacement of 
two-thirds of the first $36 , ooo of lost yearly earnings69 plus reasonable 
medical expenses. 70  No awards would be made for intangible inj uries 
67 See,  e . g . , MASS .  ANN. LAWS ch .  1 5 2 ,  § 36  (Michie/Law. Co-op . 1 976) (providing lump 
sum compensation for certain injuries suffered on the job) .  Tort damage awards vary according 
to the personal characteristics of the victim: an aspir ing young musician receives more for the 
loss of a hand than would a retiring construction worker. The workers' compensation system ,  
b y  contrast ,  treats all injuries as though they had occurred t o  a n  objectively average worker. 
Standardized recovery may be seen as dehumanizing. On the other hand, the tort measure of 
damages may unfairly value the ii\·es and limbs of  the rich and of  the upwardly mobile over 
those of the p;"llJr. 
68 If  the total '" m ouill  s pent on compensating vict ims ( inc luding transaction costs )  is held 
constant, the ':ictim c lass as a whole is  better ofi under the administrative system because the 
average net award is increased.  However, victims who would have received h igher than average 
awards under an individualized system may be worse off under the standardized system.  
Nenrtheless, a l l  victims shou ld  prefer the standardized system i f  i t  i s  not known in  advance 
which victims have claims that would receive higher awards under individualized damages. 
69 See C ERC LA STUDY, s upra note 1 1 ,  at 2 1 9 .  Because these awards will  not be taxable ,  
two-thirds compensation for  lost  earnings wi l l  gi\·e claimants approximately the  same after-tax 
buying power. See id. at 2 2 2  . 
. -\s an alternative to the C ERCLA Study proposal , awards could be l imited to two-thirds of 
the amount by which earned income is reduced below S36 , ooo - that is ,  victims who earned 
more than S36 ,ooo per year despite their injuries would not be eligible for benefits . This 
l imitation introduces a needs-based c riterion ,  whereas the C ERCLA Study focuses more on the 
rights of all  \·ictims ,  rich and poor al ike,  to recover for their i nj uries .  Choosing between needs­
based and rights-based criteria is another subtle way of  affecting the scope of the program . 
70 See  id. The model statute proposed by Trauberman contains similar p rovisions regarding 
compensable damages, see Traubcrman , s upm note I r ,  at 2 65 -68 ,  as does the Keystone Pro­
posal , which will be discussed below at p. 1 65 3 · Trauberman also would allow recovery for 
damages to real property if no financially responsible defendant could be located. S e e  id. at 
2 90-92 . The C E RCLA stucty recommends that property damages should not be recoverable 
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such as pain and suffering or loss of  enjoyment of  l ife . C ompensating 
victims for only certain of their tangible injuries is an effective way 
to reduce recoveries , because damages for intangible i nj uries often 
constitute a large portio n  of tort awards . If reimbursement were 
limited to out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost earnings ,  the pro­
gram's benefits would be directed at those victims who h ave suffered 
the most concrete forms of harm. 
Although restricting compensation to a subset of tangible inj uries 
would reduce each individual award , it would not necessar ily produce 
a situation in which aggregate awards equaled the amount of expo­
sure-related harm. If p rogram benefits exceed exposure-related harms , 
the excess benefits will essentially represent a public assistance pro­
gram for the natural victims of chronic diseases. Although there are 
undoubtedly less deserving beneficiaries of public largesse , a decision 
to provide support to the victims of natural chronic diseases should 
not be disguised as a compensation program for toxic exposure vic­
tims . Thus, to the extent that the administrative fund  is justified as 
a relief program for toxic exposure victims, aggregate compensation 
should not greatly exceed the amount of aggregate exposure-related 
injury. 7 1 
2 .  Collateral S ources of Reco very 
In personal injury lawsuits , damage awards generally are made 
without taking into account the availability to the victim of other 
sources of recovery. 72  This rule can lead to over-compensation but is 
nevertheless supported by two maj or rationales . The "deterrence ra­
tionale" suggests that defendants should pay the full costs of inj uries 
caused by their acts in order to deter activity that is harmful . The 
"entitlement rationale"  suggests that victims who have paid premiums 
for collateral sources are entitled to "the advantage of [their] own 
providence .  "73  The extent  to which the deterrence rationale applies 
from the fund, but should be  sought in plenary state actions under modified state law rules .  
See CERCL:\. STUDY, supra note I I ,  at 2 5 2 .  
; 1 The ful l  extent  o f  the aggregate injury caused by exposure to toxins is not  well  known at 
present ,  see i11ji·a p. I 6 5 9  & n . 1 1 2 ,  but may become clearer in the future as currently latent 
diseases manifest themselves. There are two possible responses to a future determination that 
program benefits greatly exceed the costs of exposure-related injuries .  First ,  the program's 
"subsidization" of natural disease victims could be decreased,  by alter ing presumptions i n  order 
to restrict e l igibil ity and/or by reducing the amount of compensation  provided to successful 
claimants. Second, should society choose to maintain the subsidy, the p rogram's funding mech­
anism could be altered if  such action were necessary to prevent  the burden of the subsidy from 
being placed exclusiHly on waste handlers. 
: 2  See REST.HEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 9 2 0:\(2)  ( 1 9 7 9 ) .  
;s See  C E RCLA STUDY, supm note I I ,  at  2 2 3 . For  a critique o f  both the deterrence anci 
the entitlement rationales, see Note , Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collatrrul S o u r< " < '  
R ule , 77  HARV. L .  REv. 7 4 I , 7 48-5 1 ( 1 964) .  
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to an administrative compensation scheme depends in large measure 
on the method used to finance the program. Unless an administrative 
compensation program is financed by waste handlers, the deterrence 
rationale for the collateral source rule will be inapposite . 74 
The applicability of the entitlement rationale depends upon the 
nature of the collateral source . The entitlement rationale does not 
apply to purely public collateral sources ,  because socially provided 
insurance is not the result of any individual 's  "own providence" or 
investment. Therefore , the level of benefits available under the pro­
gram should depend in part on the availability of compensation from 
other social programs .  7 5 By considering all sources of publicly pro­
vided assistance ,  the administrative agency can make more informed 
choices when determining the amount of awards available under the 
· compensation program .  
The compensation system should treat private disability insurance 
differently from social insurance ,  because the entitlement rationale 
applies to private insurance .  If individuals are willing to pay a pre­
mium in order to carry extra disability insurance,  they should be 
allowed to do so, especially if compensation for lost wages is  l imited 
under the program . 7 6 
7 l  Various methods of fi nancing the administrative compensation scheme wil l  be discussed 
below at pp. r 65 4-5 9 .  
7 5 See C E RCLA STUDY, supra note I I ,  at 2 2 3 .  This  is not to say that dua l  recovery is 
necessarily inappropriate. A victim's ability to qualify for another  program may indicate that 
society h as made a decision through the legislature that she should receive both subsidies.  For 
example, victims who were exposed to toxins at work might be e ligible to receive benefits from 
both the toxic exposure program and workers' compensation . This double recovery might 
represent a conscious l egislative choice to provide more compensation to those who are exposed 
on the job than to other exposure victims. 
76 5 ee supra pp. I 64 7-48 & n .  70  (discussing benefits). Awards given u nder a " needs-based 
test , "  see supra note 69, should be offset by private insurance proceeds , so that benefits will  be 
directed towards those without any col lateral source of  compensation. Under a rights-based 
test, victims are no less entitled to awards simply because they h ad the foresight to i nsure 
themselves. The extra compensation received from private insurance is  justified by the premiums 
paid for insurance coverage . 
Even under a rights-based test ,  a forceful argument could be made against double recovery 
for medical expenses (as opposed to disability payments ) . The distinction between medical 
insurance and disabil ity insurance is based on the kind of injury involved. Being forced to pay 
medical expenses is, in  one sense , a purely economic injury. Ful l  reimbursement  of medical 
expenses represents fu l l  redress of this inj ury, and therefore double recovery should be avoided. 
Disabil ity is  a much more subjective personal injury. Compensation for lost earnings - even 
if unl imited - would not always ful ly redress this injury. I n  reality, lost earnings are merely 
a proxy for the disutility of becoming disabled. Ind ividuals who, for whatever reason ,  place a 
higher disutil ity on becoming disabled should not be prevented from obtaining additional insur­
ance .  
If dua l  reco\·ery were not  allowed for medical expenses, the  burden of  such expenses could 
sti l l  be shifted to the administrative fund by requiring it  to reimburse insurance compani�s See 
C ERCLA STUDY, supra note 1 I ,  at 2 I 9 (noting that a minority of the study group proposed 
such treatment ) .  Al lowing such a transfer, however, probably would serve no great purpose.  
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3 .  R ecovery in Tort 
The inability of victims to recover by means of lawsuits is the 
primary reason for establishing an administrative compensation system 
for toxic exposure . It therefore may seem anomalous to discuss the 
need for preventing double recovery from the tort system .  Nonethe­
less, a few victims are currently able to recover in tort, and more will 
be able to do so in the future if state law is modified in response to 
their plight. 7 i Commentators have therefore expressed concern over 
the prospect of double recovery and have identified three methods of 
combatting  the problem: ( r )  preemption ,  which would completely pre­
clude all future law suits ; 78 ( 2 )  election ,  which would require victims 
to choose in advance between administrative compensation and com­
mon law recovery; 79 and (3)  reimbursement, which would offset any 
tort award by the amount previously received from the administrative 
fund.  80 
Industry naturally would prefer the more restrictive alternatives. 
Indeed , an administrative compensation system that did not preempt 
common law recovery or at least require binding election might be 
viewed by industry representatives as "a national no-fault slush fund 
used to finance tort l itigation .  "8 1 An administrative compensation 
system would be counterproductive if it increased l itigation , because 
avoiding costly litigation is a fundamental reason for administrative 
compensation . Preemption or binding election would certainly reduce 
these costs . These options might also lessen the impact of differences 
in state law on the compensation received by similarly situated victims 
who happen to reside in different states .  
Private i nsurance companies a r e  already effective risk spreaders, a n d  allowing them t o  recover 
from the fund would create added transaction costs. See O'Connel l ,  A Proposal to A bolislz 
Contributory and Comparati·ue Fault ,  with Compensatory Savings by also A bolishing the Col­
lat eral S o u rc e Rule ,  1 9 7 9  U. ILL.  L . F .  5 9 1 ,  6oo ("[Gjiven the c.dded expense of re-sh i ft ing the 
loss to a third-!)arty tortfcasor the insu red victim is the better risk bearer to the extent of h is 
insurance coverage . '' ) .  
; ;  See  gen en lily s upra Part  IX pp .  1 6 3 1-32 ( afh·ocating mod ification of  state laws) .  
;s The workers' com pensation system preempts most suits by employees against their em­
p loyers .  S i't' : 1'1. :\ . LARS O N ,  supra note 5 ,  at * 65 One difficulty wi th preemption would be 
defin ing  precisely the types of suits that would be preempted. A toxic waste release could 
presumably ha\'C such a direct and immediate effect on health that vict ims could maintain 
trad itional law suits.  such as act ions for wrongful death . 
:'i See C E RC L.'\ STuDY, supra note r 1 , at 1 86 (favoring a system of b inding e lection o\·er 
p reemption .  but ultimately reject ing binding election because an impecunious c laimant in need 
of rapid compensation might be forced to forgo a more profitable tort action ) .  
:>u S e e  i d .  a t  I 8 I-8 J .  1 8 7 ( recommending that administrative claimants be able t o  sue 
subsequent!\· in  tort, but also recommending that a successful tort plaintiff re imburse the fund  
for :1m· prior  award) .  
" 1 Garrett, Compensat ing Vict ims of Toxic S u bs tances: Issues Concerning Proposed Fede-ral 
Lcgis/,r t io l l .  r_:; E m·tl . L. Rep .  T O , T / 2 .  r o , r 7 5  ( 1 9S3 ) .  
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The argument for reimbursement relies primarily on equitable con­
siderations .  Preemption may seem unfair to those victims who would 
be able to win more generous tort awards . Similarly, binding election 
will disadvantage victims who discover that they have a strong case 
only after they have received administrative compensation.  8 2  A two­
tiered system, under which victims with exceptionally strong data on 
causation  could recover in tort, would alleviate these inequities .  83 A 
requirement that victims return any prior administrative award would 
prevent  outright double recovery by individuals . 84 
The determination of the proper method of preventing double 
recovery depends on one's assessment of the relative seriousness of 
the inequities caused by foreclosing l itigation and the inefficiencies 
generated by allowing it .  If only a few victims had a chance of 
prevailing in tort , litigation costs would not be great; however, the 
inequities of preempting those few individuals would be extreme . 
Preemption may therefore be unwarranted under the traditional com­
mon law, because the vast majority of victims will be unable to 
recover and will thus be preempted in fact .  B ut if state laws are 
l iberalized and victims have a greater chance of success, limiting 
access to the tort system through election or preemption may be 
necessary to avoid excessive l itigation . 
4 ·  Compensating Risk Venus Compensat;;ng A c tual Injury 
An administrative compensation program could compensate ex­
posure victims85 either prospectively, for the increased probability of 
sz Administrative compensation recipients who later discover more extensive injuries may 
also be treated unfairly, because the original incentive to sue wi:l depend on the expected \·alue 
of  a tort a ward. 
Election may also be inequitable in  that it favors rich victims, who have the resources to 
hold out for a more generous tort award , over poor victims. whose immediate compensation 
needs are greater. S ee supra note 7 9 -
S 3  S e e  C ERCL-\ STUDY, s upra note I I ,  a t  1 85 -8 7 .  
An  administrati\·e compensation system that does not precbdc common lav,; rccoHr�· \\· i l l  
effectinly c reate th ree classes o f  \· ictims: \· ictims exposed at a level below the  administrative 
''trigger point'' wil l  reco\·er nothing; those exposed at higher levels will recover from the admin­
istrative agency; and those who can satisfy the more stringent common law liability standards 
will receive ( presumably more generous) tort awards in court.  
�4 Relying on reimbursement may create aggregate over-recovery if administrative awards 
are set on the assumption that all exposure \' ictims will participate in  the program. but in  fact 
mam· \·ictims recover more generous tort awards.  Those who recover from the administrative 
fund will recci\·e awards that roughly approximate damages proportional to their increased risk. 
See s upra pp. 1 645-48 .  Those who reco\'Cr under present  tort law, however, \Viii recei\·e awards 
which seek fully to compe nsate them for their injuries even though the probability that their 
injuries arc exposure-related is less than 1 oo o/c . Thus ,  aggregate compensation will exceed 
aggregate exposure-related injurY. The barriers that currently fa.:e toxic tort plaintiffs, see supm 
Part IX.  make this concern less weighty, at least for the present .  
8 5  for the purposes of  th is  Subsect ion.  the term "exposure victim" means one \\·ho has been 
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disease suffered at the time of exposure , or retrospectively, for the 
actual manifestation of physical injury. The issue of whether to com­
pensate for risk or for actual harm is primarily one of timing;  it is 
distinct  from the issue of determining the appropriate amount of com­
pensation .  86 Prospectively awarded relief, like relief awarded to dis­
ease victims , can be reduced to reflect the fact that the cause-in-fact 
of the injury is indeterminable . U nder a prospective probabilistic 
damage system,  an exposure victim's award should be discounted 
twice : first , by the probability that the victim will never develop 
disease ;  second, by the probability that any disease , if it does occur, 
will be the result of natural causes .  The victim could then be given 
a lump sum award that ideally would allow her to purchase enough 
insurance to cover the increased risk that she faces .  
In  a world of perfect markets and perfect information regarding 
the effects of  toxins ,  a system of  lump sum awards to  exposure victims 
would be optimal . Victims could choose to spend their awards either 
on insurance or on other goods that they valued more . If the proper 
amount of compensation were given , each victim would find herself 
at least as well off after the exposure as before . 
Once the assumption that markets and information are perfect  is 
relaxed - as it surely must be in order to consider the toxic exposure 
problem realistically - a lump sum system appears less than optimal . 
Exposure victims do not have sufficient informatio n  to make informed 
decisions about their insurance needs . Even if such information were 
available , some individuals might have an excessive preference for 
present consumption or  a lack of concern about developing disease in 
the distant future . These conditions might be especially prevalent 
among the disadvantaged,  because their present  consumption needs 
are more demanding.  8 7  Concern about under-insurance may arise in 
the first instance from the paternalistic fear that victims will not 
purchase "proper" amounts of insurance for themselves . This concern , 
however, is not purely paternalistic :  under-insured exposure victims 
who ultimately do become disabled may well qualify for other forms 
of public assistance and thus become a burden on the public fisc . 8S 
exposed to dangerous levels of toxins,  but who has not yet manifested any signs of serious 
injury 
:;6 See s upra pp.  1 645�48.  
s ;  5ce generally , R. GOODIN,  POLITICAL TH EORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 4 7�5 0 ( 1 98 2 )  (arguing 
that the poor are forced by their "desperate socioeconomic posit ion" to  accept u nfavorable risks 
in  order to keep themselves above the '"disaster' threshold"). 
·'' .-\!lowing under-insured victims to take advantage of other welfare programs would c reate 
an incentive for under-insurance.  Recipients of exposure awards will not need to i nvest al l  of 
their awards in  insurance because of the a\·ailabil ity of public assistance for the disabled . T h is 
problem could be remedied if under-insured victims were partially disqual ified from welfare to  
reflect the  results of the ir  own past  decisions not  to insure; yet  disqualific ation seems unduly 
harsh . and in  any e\·cnt determining the portion of a \·i c tim 's dtstress that was due to her  own 
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These practical difficulties outweigh the theoretical benefits that vic­
tims might realize were they allowed to spend exposure awards on 
items other than insurance . 
An insurance scheme that did not give victims the opportunity to 
opt out would eliminate these problems. The rudiments of one such 
scheme are contained in the Keystone Proposal . 8 9 That proposal en­
visions a two-part response to hazardous waste releases .  First, a team 
of experts would be dispatched to the site to determine the severity 
of the release and to minimize further exposure .  90 If the presence of 
toxins in concentrations greater than certain predetermined trigger 
levels indicated a serious health threat, the agency experts would 
conduct a further inquiry. The agency would identify the population 
placed at risk, conduct periodic medical screening, and provide in­
surance .  9 1  
Unlike a system that provides lump sum benefits to victims upon 
or shortly after exposure , the Keystone Proposal does not compensate 
for risk per se .  The insurance program ultimately provides benefits 
only to those who later develop disease .  Indeed,  the proposed benefits 
are quite similar to those that would be available under the more 
traditional proposals for administrative compensation discussed 
above . 92 The crucial difference between the two approaches is that 
with insurance;  victims know in advance that they will be provided 
for if they are later disabled . They are not required to wait  until a 
disabling disease strikes and then to initiate an uncertain and poten­
tially lengthy claims process . 
The Keystone  Proposal's forward-looking approach would have 
other advantages .  Information about the intensity of exposure would 
be gathered at the time of exposure rather than after long latency 
periods . 93 Immediate response would also allow the government to 
play a more active role in identifying victims . Instead of waiting for 
disease victims to file claims , the expert team would attempt to iden­
tify the class of potential victims in advance upon receiving notice of 
failure to i nsure would be a formidable task. 
For a discussion of the relationship bct•.nen administrative awards and general public welfare 
programs,  see above at p .  I 649 .  
8 9  S e e  KEYSTONE PROPOSAL .  supra note I I ,  a t  1 3-2 5 .  The Keystone Proposal was  formu­
lated by a diverse group from academia.  industry, cm·i ronmental groups, and regulatory bodies .  
See id. at 5 3 -60 (setting forth a membership l ist) .  
90 See id. at 1 3- I 9 .  
9 1  S e e  id. a t  2 2-2 3 .  T h e  insurance 11·ould conr "designated chronic diseases which ha1·e 
been associated with exposure le1·e\:; at or abo1·e certain close levels and exposure durations to 
toxic substancels )  associated 11· ith the wa::te site in question . ' ' !d.  at 2 4 .  
9! S e e  supra pp .  1 64 i-48 & n .  i O .  
9 .l  MoreoHr, if responsible parties were  identified a t  the  t ime  of the release .  they could be  
required to  make immediate prt)l' isions for compensating future 1·ictims. Such  action would 
l imit  the ability of responsible parties to a1·oid liability by fil ing for bankruptcy du ring the 
latency period. For a discussion of  bankruptc1· and related issu·�s. see abo1·e Part VIII . 
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a toxic waste release . F ast action could lead to the identification  of 
victims before they migrated throughout the country. Without such 
immediate governmental involvement, some disease victims might 
never discover that they had been exposed. Furthermore,  an active 
governmental role might reduce the anxiety of those victims who do 
know that they have been exposed by demonstratin g  that the situation  
i s  at least being monitored. Finally, and most importan tly, medical 
screening would "provide early detection and . . . i ncrease the pros­
pects for rapid and complete cure , "94 thus reducing the toll of human 
suffering caused by the release . 
Designing an insurance program that will adequately protect vic­
tims is particularly difficult because of uncertainty about  the effects 
of toxic exposure . Accurate p redictions of risk levels cannot be made , 
especially when chemicals are released for the first time . Thus , some 
adjustment mechanism will be necessary in order to deal with the 
unanticipated health effects of exposure . 95 Furthermore ,  an insurance 
program will be effective only if instituted near the time of exposure; 
it is therefore not a viable alternative for compensating the large class 
of victims who were exposed to toxins in the more distant past. Once 
governmental regulation stabilizes and more information about the 
effects of toxins becomes available ,  an insurance program may provide 
the most effective and equitable means of compensating victims.  For 
the present, however, an insurance program can serve only to supple­
ment other compensation plans that reimburse those who have already 
been inj ured . 
D .  Progmm Funding 
The previous Sections of this Part discussed almost exclusively the 
means of  providing swift ,  certain , and adequate relief to deserving 
disease victims . These aspects of the program will n aturally be of the 
greatest concern to victims. However, choosing a source for program 
funding is also important,  because the source of funding will affect 
perceptions concerning the appropriate scope of the program . If an 
administrative compensation program is used to shift the losses asso­
ciated with toxic exposure away from victims, it will be necessary to 
place this burden elsewhere . This Section will examine the pros and 
cons of three alternative methods for financing the compensation sys­
tem :  imposing liability directly on responsible parties ,  adopting indus­
try-wide taxes ,  or relying on general tax revenues .  
9 4  KEYSTONE PROPOSAL,  s upra note I I ,  a t  2 3 .  
9 5  T h e  Keystone Proposal recognizes this need and recommends t h a t  a n y  i nsurance polic ies 
issued be amendable in  the e\'en t  that unexpected diseases arise in the exposed population S e e  
i d .  a t  2 5 .  
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I .  Direc t  R e covery from Responsible Parties: Subrogation 
An administrative compensation scheme could be designed to shift 
the costs of a victim's disease to the waste handler responsible for the 
release .  Under a system of subrogation ,  the agency charged with 
administering the fund would be entitled to seek reimbursement from 
responsible parties  for all damage awards paid to exposure victims.  96 
Shifting all social costs to the waste handler, who receives the benefits 
of the activity, would deter conduct that does not result in  a net 
benefit to society. Prices that reflected all social costs would encourage 
more optimal waste generation practices .  97 
Unfortunately, the realities of toxic exposure will often make the 
direct imposition of liability on every responsible party either impos­
sible or  prohibitively expensive .  The twin nemeses of toxic exposure 
victims - uncertain causation and long latency periods - once again 
prevent easy application of the theoretically correct solution .  The 
exact number of diseases attributable to a given release will be difficult 
to determine. 98 lVIoreover, the legal causation problem will become 
central : it often will be impossible to identify the ultimate source of 
wastes left in abandoned sites .  The agency can impose liability on 
responsible parties only if they can be identified,  and the identification 
process will conflict with a major goal of the administrative program: 
keeping transaction costs low. Even when identification is possible , 
96 Subrogation would not necessarily slow the process of victim compensation.  Victims could 
recover from the fund irrespectiH of their abil ity to identify responsible parties, and subsequent 
proceedings could then be used to determine the agency's right to subrogation .  The C E RC LA 
Study recommends this p rocedure for victims \Vho are exposed after the administrative compen­
sation system is  adopted .  See C ERCL\ STUDY, supra note I I ,  2 34-3 5 .  
To the extent that responsible parties fear that they may b e  identified, subrogation would 
pose a substantial threat of  l iabil ity for all handlers of  toxic wast<�. I f  insurance for such l iabil ity 
was not available ,  many waste handlers might choose to go out of business rather than face the 
risk. This problem could be alle\·iated by requiring compulsory i nsurance for all waste handlers .  
I f  private insurers were unwil l ing to offer co\·erage, the go\·emment could act as insurer. An 
insurance program, whether public or private, could effectively deter the careless waste disposal 
p ractices of individual firms by raising the rates of waste handlers that had contributed to 
releases .  The insurance fund would bear the threat of liability for any one incident,  but over 
the long run costs would be recovered from the responsible firms in  the form of higher premiums,  
unless they chose to leave the waste handl ing business altogether. (j. KEYSTONE PROPOSAL, 
s upm note 1 I ,  at 20 ( advocating that the proposal i nitially be i mplemented on a small scale in 
order to gi\·e the insurance market time to adj usU.  
g ;  A second j ustification for imposing l iabil ity on responsible firms is that unjust enrichment 
would result i f  an actor \\·ere allowed to prof1t by ignoring the rights of others; any i i i-gotten 
gains should be turned o\·er to the \· ict im in order to correct th is s i tuation .  See supra Part II 
pp .  14 7 7-S.t (discussing correcti\'C j ustice and efficiencY norms). 
9 3 This is a problem of  measurement. not a recurrence of the medical causation problem . If 
increased risk could be prec isely measured,  so that the number of exposure-related inj uries in  a 
gi\·en population were known , an appropriate penalty could be extracted from the defe ndant 
i rrespectiH of the fact that the identity of  the disease \·ictim was unknowable. 
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recovery will be thwarted if the responsible party has  gone out  of 
business during the long latency period between exposure and inj ury. 
2 .  The Case in Favor of More General S ources of Funding 
Instead of relyin g  on subrogation , the compensation p rogram could 
be financed by general tax revenues or by taxes imposed on waste­
generating industries . These options could make sufficient funds 
available for compensating victims , without requiring expensive -
and often futile - investigations into responsibility. In  addition ,  
recouping the loss from a larger segment of society would avoid the 
economic dislocation that results when a crushing burden is placed on 
a single economic actor. Financing through general revenues or taxes 
levied on all waste h andlers would spread the loss more effectively 
than would subrogation .  Any of these alternatives would be far su­
perior to leaving the burden of loss on individual victims .  
In theory, the main drawback with more general financing mech­
anisms is that they would be less effective than subrogation in deter­
ring undesirable toxic releases . 99 Although deterrence is one goal of 
the compensation system,  its importance is diminished by two factors. 
First , many of the toxic exposure inj uries that w il l  occur in the near 
future are the result of  past exposures. These injuries are unprevent­
able ,  because no compensation system can keep latent diseases from 
manifesting themselves . Imposing liability for these inj uries will not 
increase present safety incentives , because firms will treat retroactively 
imposed liability as a fixed cost, and therefore will not factor such 
liability into present decisionmaking .  Compensation in such a situa­
tion is purely a matter of loss shifting . 1 00 
The need to foster deterrence of future waste releases is likewise 
mitigated by the fact that an administrative compensation scheme 
"would not operate in  a regulatory vacuum. " 1 0 1 Today, federal reg-
99 Industry· taxes imposed on a un iform basis (for example, on chemical feed stocks or by 
weight of toxic material produced) would not provide specific incen tives for individual firms to 
avoid waste releases, because such taxes do not differentiate between careful and c areless waste 
handlers. The costs of  releases would be spread over the entire industry by the tax , while 
individual firms that employ improper disposai techniques would enjoy all the benefits of lower 
expenditures on safety. 
100 I n  other words, the lax disposal practices o f  the past will  create net social l osses as 
exposure-related diseases manifest thcmseh·es.  These losses cannot be avoided ,  so they wil l  
necessarily be borne by some segment of society. In  terms of the ever popular pie-making 
metaphor, the question is not how to increase the size of the pie ,  but rather how to decide who 
must eat the poisoned sl ice .  
1 0 1  )/ote .  s upra note s S ,  at s S S .  Prior to the advent of extemivc federal regulation , decisions 
regarding the generation and storage of hazardous materials were based primarily on market 
considerations .  The threat of l iabil ity for improper disposal therefore acted as an important 
restraint on waste generation .  B ecause the deterrence justification for imposing l iability on 
indi\·idual generators presupposes the existence of a functioning market, the need for deterrence 
must be ree:..:arnined in  l ight of recent regulatory developments. 
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ulatory programs have preempted much of the autonomy of firms to 
make independent decisions regarding waste disposal . 1 02 The most 
direct constraint on waste handlers is the "cradle-to-grave" regulation 
of hazardous wastes mandated by the RCRA.  1 03 Hazardous waste 
handlers who fail to comply with RCRA standards are subj ect to fines 
and criminal liability. This direct regulation of waste disposal greatly 
reduces the need to deter waste handlers through the administrative 
compensation system,  provided that RCRA standards are p roperly set 
and rigorously enforced . An administrative compensation scheme 
would provide an added safety incentive when RCRA violations go 
unnoticed or when exposures occur even though RCRA guidelines 
have been followed . 104 The threat of C ERCLA clean-up actions,  
however, may already provide adequate incentives .  The immediate 
threat of liability under RCRA and CERCLA is clearly better suited 
to influencing the behavior of waste handlers th an would be a personal 
injury compensation system that imposed liability only after prolonged 
latency periods. 
3 .  Industry Taxes Venus General R evenues 
On first impression , industry taxes would appear to have many 
advantages over general revenue financing .  Using industry-specific 
taxes 1 05 would force the industry to internalize costs . 106 Prices 
charged for chemical goods would increase ,  and consumption should 
fall to more efficient levels .  107 Conversely, funding the program 
1 02 These programs arc discussed abo\·e i n  Part II at pp. 1 4 70-7 6 .  
103 4 2  U S. C .  § §  6go1-S7  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
I04 O n e  commentator has argued. however. that a n  administrative compensation scheme 
cannot further deterrence goals because ( 1 )  the uncertainties surrounding toxic exposure will  
make effective market deterrence impossible, and ( 2 )  the C E RCLA Post-closure Liabi lity Trust 
Fund destroys any incentive for going beyond RCRA requirerr.ents, because it  absolves firms 
that comply with RCRA from liabil ity for post-closure injuries caused by their activities . See 
Note , s upYa note 5 8 ,  at 5 98-604. 
l OS The "Superfund" for toxic waste c lean-up has been primarily financed in this fashion .  
See C ERCLA �*  2 2 1 ,  2 3 2 ,  4 2  U .S C .  � �  4 6 1 1 ,  466 1 ( West Supp.  r g84) .  The C ERCLA Study 
would rely p rimarily on industry taxes for compensating the victims o f  past exposures. See 
C ERCLA STUDY , s upm note 1 L at 2 3 2-33 .  
1 0 6  A s  noted above, the importance o f  deterrence in  the toxic waste context i s  unclear. 
Nonetheless, where none of the costs of subrogation arc involved, it  is better to pursue a course 
that has the potent ial to deter. Although industry taxes do not specifically deter individual 
firms. sec  supra note gg ,  they at least force industry as a whole to bear the cost of exposure­
related i njury. To some. this may appear only j ust: if the p rices of industrial products should 
bear the cost of the workers '  blood. see PROSS E R  A:--!D KEETON, supra note 5, § So,  at 5 7  3, so 
too should they bear the costs of toxic exposure \·ictims' cancers. 
1 07 Financing the fund through industry tax re\·cnues could lead to a "matching" problem 
Because of lengthy latency period;;, the costs that would be i mposed on the industry by a tax 
represent  the costs of past disposal practices. If  present disposal practices pose less of a threat 
to public health,  there will be some o\·er-deterrcnce of waste-generating activity. 
r 6s 8  HAR VARD LAW REVIEW 
through general taxes would fail to force cost internalization and 
would create a substantial drain on the deficit-ridden federal treasury. 
If the toxic waste situation is considered industry's p roblem,  the use 
of general revenues to fund  the compensation system could be viewed 
as a subsidy to waste generating industries . 
Of course , the chemical industry is not responsible for the entire 
hazardous waste problem . 108 Other industries generate wastes ,  and 
the chemical industry should not be made to pay for all waste-pro­
ducing activity. Partial funding from general revenues may be appro­
priate if it proves difficult to design a tax system that imposes costs 
on all industries that contribute in some way to the toxic waste 
problem . 
General revenue financing also can be justified if the toxic exposure 
problem is considered a problem of society, rather than a problem of 
industry. For example ,  government intervention might be necessary 
if imposing all exposure-related costs on waste generators would de­
stroy their profitability . 1 09 Imposing l iability on American industry 
could damage its competitive position in world m arkets , thus causing 
the loss of American j obs . 1 1 0 Partial financing of the system through 
general revenues may be necessary to preserve chemical industry jobs 
and keep final responsibility for toxic waste disposal within the coun­
try. 
4 .  Conclusion 
The direct imposition of liability on responsible parties ,  which is 
one of the chief goals of the tort system , must be reevaluated in light 
l O S  The C E RCLA Study notes that only  6o% of waste is produced by the petroleum and 
chemical i ndustries. The other -to% comes from a wide variety •)f other sources .  See C E RCLA 
STuDY, supra note 1 1 ,  app .  J ,  at 2 3 9  ( estimating relative volumes of toxins p roduced ) .  
1 09 Soc iety is generally made  better o f f  by the  termination o f  unprofitable acti\·ity, but  this 
is not so when "positive external ities" are p resent .  If  the unprofitable  activity produces benefits 
for many people other than the actor, and i f  the actor for some reason cannot recapture these 
benefits, imposing all social costs on  the actor may be unwise . It could be  maintained that the 
chemical industry produces positi \·e exte rnalities because modern industrial l i fe would be im­
possible without it .  In  the n ineteen th century, courts invoked rhis argument ,  albeit in  a more 
visceral form, as a j ustification for refusing to require industrialists to internal ize all the social 
costs of development: 
We must have factories, machine r\·, dams. canals and railroads. They are demanded by 
the manifold wants of mankind,  and l ay at the basis of all our c i \· i l izatio!1 . If I ha,·e 
any of these upon my lands,  and they are not a nuisance and are not  so managed as to 
become suc h ,  I am not responsible for any damage the\· accidentally and u na\·oidablv do 
my ne ighbor. He receiHs h is compensation for such damage by the general  good .  in 
which he shares ,  and the right which h e  has to place the same things upon his  l2.nds .  
Losee \'. B uchanan , ) I  :\ . Y. -t / 6 .  484-85 ( I 8 7 3 l .  
l l O  The C E RC LA study group noted that this possibi l i ty cou d not be en ti rely dismissed and 
suggested that general tax re\·enues might be used to avoid such a result. Sec C E RC L.-\ Sn;DY,  
supra note 1 I .  at 2 3 3-3-+- .-\n economist might respond that  if  foreign countries arc  more wi l l ing 
to bear the adwrse health effects of toxins than are Americans, i t  is efficient  to s hift toxic  waste 
generation to foreign sources. But  exportin g:  our toxic waste problem to devc lopins: n a t l o n s  
raises serious ethical questions and i s  almost certain ly not ach-isable i n  the long run . 
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of the realities of toxic exposure . Past exposures are undeterrable . 
Future exposures may already be sufficiently deterred by RCRA reg­
ulation and by the threat of C ERCLA liability. Therefore, the use of 
general funding mechanisms such as industry-wide taxes should not 
create serious under-incentives for safety. This is not to say that 
imposing liability on identified waste generators is improper. How­
ever, the marginal deterrent effect of the threat of this liability will 
not justify the costs of the inquiry in many cases.  1 1 1  
E .  Summary of Part X 
The adoption of an administrative compensation system could have 
several beneficial effects . Eligibility requirements and standards for 
determining the size of damage awards could be set uniformly by a 
centralized agency overseen by Congress , rather than being haphaz­
ardly determined through the process of litigation . From society's 
standpoint, administrative compensation would allow a more informed 
choice concerning the amount of compensation provided to toxic tort 
victims . From the standpoint of individual victims , the uncertainties 
and delays of litigation would be replaced with a more certain ,  albeit 
less generous, administrative award.  Funding for the program could 
be secured through general measures ,  such as industry taxes ,  in order 
to avoid prolonged inquiries into the possible culpability of individual 
firms . In short, many of the transaction costs a:ssociated with l itigating 
complicated toxic tort claims could be eliminated ,  thereby channeling 
more money to victims without necessarily increasing the total cost of 
victim compensation . 
The case for administrative compensation is currently a tentative 
one . Much of the information needed to determine an appropriate 
structure for the program is unavailable . 1 1 2 Until better information 
is developed regarding the size of the exposed population , it will be 
difficult to gauge the severity of the problem or the urgency with 
which a response is required . Moreover, a better understanding of 
the health effects of toxins is needed in order to match compensation 
to actual inj ury and to assign liability to a responsible party. As the 
health effects of toxins become better understood, the medical causa­
tion question should become clearer. Similarly, as government regu-
1 1 1 Identification wil l  occasionally be easy. vVhen waste is rdeased from an active site, the 
owner can be held responsibl e .  �o one doubts the  identit\· of the responsible party at B hopal . 
For in?.c li\·e sites , ho\\'C\·er. identification is normally quite difficult .  If the relative responsibility 
o f  waste generators has al read\· been determined in  a CERC LA cleanup action ,  subrogation 
l iability could be b ased on this determination . If no prior determination has been made , 
howewr. apportioning l iabi l i t\· solely for the purposes of recowring \·ictim compensation costs 
wil l  rarelY be worthwhil e .  
1 1 2 Those studies that haH examined the scope o f  the toxi': exposure problem arc mostly 
anecdotal and often reach conflicting results. See C E R C L\ STVDY, supra note I I ,  at 6-7 , r 6 -
I S .  
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lation is tightened , determining the identity of responsible parties 
should become easier. 1 1 3 The possibility that an administrative com­
pensation scheme could be more sophisticated in  the future does not 
justify present inaction . Indeed, the effort to establish evidentiary 
presumptions as part of an administrative compensation program may 
be precisely what is needed to produce the information that will make 
future refinements possible . 
XI . CONCLUSION 
The analysis presented in this Note highlights the mixed success 
of governmental responses to the problems caused by releases of haz­
ardous substances into our groundwater. On the one hand , the en­
actment  of C ERCLA in 1 980 unquestionably provided a badly needed 
legislative framework for cleanup of hazardous waste sites .  On the 
other hand ,  hasty congressional action resulted in expensive and pre­
ventable court battles in which parties contested the meaning of the 
statute . Subsequent j udicial interpretations of C E RC LA's vaguely 
drafted liability provisions now promote industry responsibility by 
forcing potentially liable parties to internalize the costs of toxic waste 
generation,  transportation ,  and storage . Some responsible parties ,  
however, may b e  able t o  avoid paying their fair share o f  the costs of 
cleanup unless the courts impose joint liability in suits for contribu­
tion.  vVhereas the executive agency responsible for administering the 
cleanup program appears to be moving toward a balanced enforce­
ment strategy by deemphasizing costly and time-consuming litigation 
and adminstrative actions and recognizing the role of expedited set­
tlements, the EPA's policies concerning contribution protection and 
liability releases still unnecessarily restrict the possibility of achieving 
fair and cost-effective settlements . Moreover, even the imperfect ef­
forts to encourage cleanup contrast sharply with the complete failure 
of any branch of government to address the special needs of persons 
injured by toxic releases .  
A fair and efficient response to the problems presented by leaking 
hazardous wastes will require coordination among the different 
branches of government and integration of a variety of areas of law. 
C ERCLA will not effectively impose cost internalization upon parties 
responsible for the release of hazardous substances unless insurance 
and bankruptcy law guarantees that defendants in toxic Yvaste litiga-
1 1 3 Although the �1.\·ai labi l ity of information will make it possible for the compensation system 
to make these l inkages. nothing requires that the system do so. The pub l i c  may decide that it 
is socially desirable to ha,·e an assistance p rogram for the Yictims of chronic d isease .  Likewise, 
other hazardous waste regulation may make deterrence through the threat of l iabil ity under the 
compensation scheme unnecessar\· .-\n increase in  a\·ailable information will make m o re in­
formed c hoices possible .  
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tion eventually p ay their full l iabilities .  Congress may therefore wish 
to consider modifications to bankruptcy law when debating the merits 
of extension and amendment of CERCLA. Courts must consider the 
impact of their insurance case holdings for the over- or under-deter­
rence of pollution . Additionally, hazardous waste generators ,  trans­
porters , and disposers will be likely to produce more than the optimal 
level of toxic substances if the tort system permits them to avoid 
responsibility for personal inj uries - injuries they cause in ways less 
obvious but no less real than through the negligence of traditional 
tortfeasors . Courts should recognize that many of the rationales sup­
porting expansive liability in C ERCLA cases apply in the same fashion 
to tort l itigation involving personal injuries caused by leakage of toxic 
waste . Each governmental unit will be more likely to contribute to a 
solution of the hazardous waste problem if it bears in mind the larger 
picture as it considers a particular aspect of the problem immediately 
confronting it .  
This Note has outlined a variety of options open to Congress, 
courts , and regulatory agencies to improve the government's record 
on cleanup and compensation . Congress can significantly enhance the 
efficiency and fairness of CERCLA simply by resolving ambiguities 
in the statute , as some of the clarification proposals currently under 
consideration in the House and Senate recognize . The EPA can draft 
its regulations and guidelines to facilitate cleanups that are cost-effec­
tive and fair to both the public and responsible parties . If budgetary 
constraints presently render administrative c ompensation programs 
politically infeasible ,  courts may alleviate the burdens of inj un:�d per­
sons by adopting common law innovations that comport with the 
peculiar complexities of toxic waste l itigation . By adopting these 
proposals ,  the government may expedite cleanup and assist victims of 
toxic waste even without massive new appropriations of funds . 
